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PREFACE 
In 1969, in an event referred to by Indonesia as the 'Act of Free Choice' (Perpera) , but by some others as an 'act free of choice', 
1 ,022 delegates appointed by the Indonesian administration to repre­
sent the people of Irian Jaya voted to become formally part of the 
Indonesian Republic. Although official and unofficial observers were 
critical of the manner in which the United Nations' Temporary Execu­
tive Authority was brought to an end, few outside Irian Jaya itself seri­
ously contested the outcome of the act. Within Irian Jaya, however, 
some Melanesian nationalists actively resisted the authority of the 
Indonesian government, while others 'voted with their feet' by cros­
sing into Papua New Guinea. 
On the other side of the border, Papua New Guinea progressed to 
independence in 1975 , and though leading Papua New Guinean politi­
cians often expressed sympathy for the position of their Melanesian 
neighbours, successive Papua New Guinea governments maintained 
the broad policies of the i::olonial government, seeking to discourage 
border crossing while dealing sympathetically with 'genuine refugees', 
and giving high priority to the establishment and maintenance of good 
relations with Indonesia. 
Between 1975 and 1984 refugees continued to trickle across the 
border into Papua New Guinea and a number of border incidents pre­
cipitated recurring short cycles of tension and self-conscious cordiality 
between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. Nevertheless a basic bor­
der agreement , negotiated on Papua New Guinea's behalf by the colo­
nial government in 1973 , was successfully renegotiated in 1979 and 
1984, official visits were exchanged, joint border development plans 
were discussed, and machinery was established to deal with the prob­
lems of border administration. Despite the recurring problems along 
the border it appeared that both governments were anxious to prom­
ote good relations between their countries . 
In 1984 the border situation deteriorated markedly. Following an 
attempted local uprising by West Papuan nationalists in early 1984, 
and subsequent repressive action by Indonesian military authorities , a 
flood of refugees began to pour across the border into Papua New 
Guinea and a series of border violations by Indonesian troops and air­
craft created new tensions between the two countries which the 
machinery set up under the border agreement proved inadequate to 
cope with. By mid 1985 there were about 12 ,000 border crossers in 
camps along the border in Papua New Guinea, few of whom showed 
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any inclination to cross back, and repatriation - and broader questions 
of Papua New Guinea's attitudes to the circumstances which had given 
rise to this influx - had become salient in Papua New Guinea's domestic 
politics and a subject of some concern internationally. 
In 1979 a group of interested observers met in Canberra to discuss 
recent developments on the border. The results of this discussion were 
published in that year as Working Paper No. 2 of the Department of 
Political and Social Change , Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University (May 1979b) . In late 1983 an update of 
this volume was commenced, but the exercise was overtaken by 
events . Instead, the present volume has emerged as a substantial 
reexamination of the border situation and Papua New Guinea­
Indonesia relations over the border. Chapters by Prescott, Mackie , 
May and Herlihy present material included in the 1979 volume 
updated to take account of developments since 1979. Verrier presents 
an account of developments to 1969 which was lacking in the earlier 
volume. New contributions by Osborne, Arndt , and Smith and Hewi­
son look respectively at the OPM, transmigration, and border cros­
sers. Hastings , who contributed an introductory chapter in 1979, pro­
vides a concluding overview. 
Those who have followed discussion on this subject over recent 
years will appreciate that this publication brings together contributors 
of quite widely diverse attitudes and opinions. Editorially I have tried 
to ensure that the historical and factual content of the volume is consis­
tent, and to avoid excessive overlap between chapters . But no attempt 
has been made to suppress the diversity of attitudes and sympathies 
among the contributors . It is for readers to arrive at their own judge­
ments. 
In putting the volume together I am heavily indebted to Claire 
Smith and Hilary Bek for their customary excellence as typists , proof­
readers and occasional sub-editors, and to Jo Costin for her assistance 
in the final preparation of the manuscript and index. Photographs were 
kindly made available by The Times of Papua New Guinea, through 
Rowan Callick, South Pacific Post Pty Ltd (Post-Courier) , Sydney 
Morning Herald, through Peter Hastings , Niugini Nius, Mark Baker, 
Hank di Suvero and Robin Osborne. Except for those supplied by Vic­
tor Prescott (1 . 1-1 .3) ,  all maps were drawn by Keith Mitchell, cartog­
rapher with the Australian National University's Department of 
Human Geography. The title of the volume was largely the inspiration 
of Beverley Blaskett . 
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CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
J.R.V. Prescott 
The relations between modern states reach their most critical 
stage in the form of problems relating to territory (Hill 
1976:3). 
There are no problems of boundaries. There are only prob­
lems of Nations (Ancel 1938:196). 
These two quotations emphasize the importance of boundary ques­tions and the fact that they are one part of the totality of states' 
relationships. It would be equally true to say that there is no boundary 
disagreement which could not be readily solved given goodwill on both 
sides, and that there is no boundary which would not furnish a cause of 
dispute if one country wished to force a quarrel on another. 
This essay is divided into three main sections. First, a short intro­
ductory passage identifies the principal types of boundary disputes. 
Secondly, each of these categories is examined in detail, and their 
occurrence in the borderland between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea is considered. Thirdly, the conclusions of the second section 
are listed. 
Throughout this essay the terms boundary and border are used in 
their precise senses. A boundary is a line and a border is a zone in 
which a boundary is located. It would be possible to define the width 
of the border according to a number of different criteria; if a particular 
border was defined by an economist, an anthropologist, a geomor­
phologist and a general , it would be surprising if all the limits selected 
coincided. 
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The principal types of boundary disputes 
The general term boundary dispute includes four distinct kinds of 
disagreements between countries. Territorial boundary disputes occur 
when one country finds part of the territory of an adjoining state attrac­
tive and seeks to acquire it. Somalia's claim to the Haud and Ogaden 
areas of Ethiopia and Guatemala's claim to Belize provide examples of 
such disputes. Positional boundary disputes occur when there is a dis­
agreement over the exact location of the boundary, probably because 
of a controversy over the interpretation of a phrase in a treaty or over 
the correct intention of parts of previous agreements. The disagree­
ment between China and Russia over the course of their boundary in 
the vicinity of the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, and the 
quarrel between Argentina and Chile concerning the location of their 
common boundary in the Beagle Channel provide examples of posi­
tional boundary disputes. In territorial and positional disputes success 
for the claimant state will involve a change in the position of the boun­
dary and therefore the transfer of some territory from one country to 
another. The amount of territory involved would usually be less in the 
case of a positional dispute than in the case of a territorial dispute . 
Governments will normally find it most convenient to apply cer­
tain functions, relating for example to immigration and trade, as close 
to the international boundary as possible . Sometimes the nature of 
these functions or the manner in which they are applied may give a 
neighbouring country cause for grievance . Disagreements of this kind 
can be called functional boundary disputes. Iraq's occasional interfer­
ence with Iranian shipping on the Shatt-el-Arab and Benin's closure of 
boundary crossing points into Togo in October 1975 typify such boun­
dary disputes. Because boundaries are lines they will often intersect 
discrete resources such as rivers or an oil field which the countries on 
both sides of the boundary will wish to use. Conflict over the use of 
such features form a separate category of resource boundary disputes. 
The quarrel between India and Bangladesh over the diversion of 
Ganges waters at the Farraka Barrage is representative of this kind of 
boundary dispute. In resource and functional boundary disputes the 
claimant state can be successful without any alteration in the location 
of the boundary ; in each case what is sought is an agreed set of regula­
tions which will alleviate the administrative problem. 
Territorial boundary disputes 
Territorial boundary disputes can be divided into two main clas-
2 
CHAPTER 1 
ses. First there are legal disputes when the claimant country insists that 
the territory desired is improperly owned by its neighbour. The Philip­
pines' abandoned claim to part of Sa bah and Kampuchea's claim to the 
temple of Preah Vihear in Thailand, which was upheld by the Interna­
tional Court of Justice in 1962, were both territorial claims based on 
legal grounds . Secondly, there are all the other cases when a country 
asserts that it would be more appropriate if part of its neighbour's ter­
ritory passed to its own sovereignty. Lesotho's claim to part of South 
Africa and the Argentine's claim to the Falkland Islands are typical of 
this large group of territorial boundary disputes. There are many 
grounds on which countries will make claims against the territory of 
neighbours ; the arguments will be based in history, in geography, in 
economics , and in ethnology. Usually the claim will be buttressed by as 
many different arguments as possible . For example, Afghanistan's 
persistent territorial claim to parts of western Pakistan, which is thinly 
veiled as support for a separate state of Pushtunistan, has at least four 
strands . First there are the legal and moral arguments that Afghanistan 
was forced to sign the 1893 agreement, which produced the Durand 
Line, under duress. Secondly, historical arguments are deployed to 
demonstrate that Afghanistan once ruled over areas of west Pakistan, 
and it is true that the Durrani Empire controlled some of the claimed 
area for seventy-six years prior to 1823 , when Peshawar was lost. The 
third set of arguments is based in the witness of ethnologists that 
Pathans in Afghanistan and Pakistan form a single cultural group. 
Finally , it is asserted on geographical grounds that the proper bound­
ary of the Afghanistan uplands lies closer to the Indus River, along the 
Sulaiman Range. 
Although in most cases when territorial disputes originate the 
claimant state genuinely hopes and expects to acquire additional territ­
ory, there are cases when territorial claims are made to serve some 
domestic or international policy. Presidents Nkrumah and Amin, at 
different times, have made claims against Togo and Tanzania respec­
tively , when it was obviously useful to distract attention from pressing 
domestic problems of an economic and political nature. When the 
Philippines claimed parts of northern Sabah it was suggested by some 
observers that the chief design was to delay the formation of Malaysia. 
When the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is 
considered there does not appear to be any likely territorial claim from 
either side. The agreement between Australia and Indonesia on 12 
February 1973 fixed the boundary in a clear manner which does not 
3 
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allow any territorial claims. However, it should not be assumed that a 
claim could not be manufactured by either side if changed political cir­
cumstances warranted it. Once it was fashionable to classify bound­
aries into two major classes called artificial boundaries and natural 
boundaries . Artificial boundaries included those which did not corres­
pond with any of the major divisions of the physical or cultural land­
scape, while natural boundaries were distinguished by their coinci­
dence with rivers or watersheds or lines of tribal separation. The fash­
ion was abandoned because it was recognized that it was still necessary 
to select a specific line within the river or the watershed or the frontier 
between two tribes. This realization underlines the point that in the 
vicinity of a boundary there will be other limits which will be more or 
less obvious. Some will concern the physical landscape of plants, 
geological structure and hydrology, while others will relate to human 
occupance and include differences in language, systems of land tenure, 
and patterns of trade. Because the present boundary formed by the 
two meridians and the Fly River does not correspond consistently with 
possible physical and human divisions in the border it would be possi­
ble for either country, by emphasizing one of these dividing zones , to 
call for a rectification of the boundary. 
There is a number of changed political circumstances which might 
persuade a country to challenge the location of a settled boundary. For 
example , there might be a desire to provide an external focus for 
national sentiment at times of difficult economic conditions ; or the 
temptation to take advantage of a weakened neighbour might prove 
irresistible ; or it might be decided to raise the boundary issue to show 
displeasure with some policies or attitudes being adopted by the 
adjoining state. 
It must also be recognized that population distributions some­
times change , and if alien settlement occurs on a significant scale across 
a boundary it can later provide the ground for a demand to redraw the 
boundary. It was the major immigration of Chilean workers to the 
guano and nitrate fields of southern Bolivia which strengthened Chile's 
determination to acquire that area. 
Fortunately, in the case of the border between Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea there is no evidence that either country has the 
slightest wish to raise territorial claims against the other. It must also 
be a matter of satisfaction to both governments that their maritime 
boundaries have been settled. Maritime claims have been a fruitful 
source of discord in a number of regions , but that risk has been avoided 
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by Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The boundary in the Arafura 
Sea was settled by Australia and Indonesia in 1971 and 1973 on terms 
which proved entirely acceptable to the independent government of 
Papua New Guinea. On 9 September 1983 Indonesia and Papua New 
Guin ea extended the short boundary which Australia and Indonesia 
had agreed in 1971 into the Pacific Ocean. That boundary has now 
been fixed to separate the seabed and exclusive economic zones 
claimed by the two countries , to a distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the nearest land. It was based on equidistant principles . 
Positional boundary disputes 
While the basic cause of territorial boundary disputes is superim­
position of the boundary on the cultural or physical landscape, which 
allows one or both sides to canvass the greater merit of alternative 
lines , positional boundary disputes arise because the evolution of the 
boundary is incomplete. It is a defect in the definition of the boundary, 
in a text, on a map or in the landscape , which is critical in the case of 
positional disputes. They will often arise during the process of demar­
cation when joint survey teams are striving to match the boundary 
defined in a treaty text with the features of the landscape. For example , 
the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1896 stipulated that the boundary between 
the areas now known as Iran and Pakistan would follow the Tahlab 
River to its junction with the Mirjawa River. Eight years later it was 
discovered that Tahlab and Mirjawa are two names for the same river 
and there is no point where usage changes from one to the other. Often 
the problems arise because the boundary was defined by diplomats in 
imperial capitals , working with inaccurate maps. Sometimes the errors 
arise because of the errors on the map, on other occasions confusion is 
created because the diplomats tried to make assurance doubly sure and 
defined a single point in two ways which were found later to be quite 
different . For example , the first boundary between Bolivia and Peru 
was defined as passing through the confluence of the Lanza and Tam­
bopata Rivers which lay north of parallel 14 degrees south. The sur­
veyors had no trouble finding the confluence , but unfortunately it was 
south of 14 degrees south. 
Positional disputes can also arise in situations where a boundary 
has been demarcated through an unpopulated border which sub­
sequently becomes more intensively used. The movement of new 
settlers into a border and the use of virgin land close to the boundary 
5 
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provide an acid test for the completeness and accuracy of the boundary 
definiton and demarcation. 
Sometimes positional boundary disputes arise because the line is 
made to coincide with some unstable feature in the landscape . Some 
rivers make very poor boundaries because rivers tend to change their 
course in two ways . First, rivers can change their course gradually, and 
generally imperceptibly, by accretion and erosi on. The downstream 
migration of meanders falls into this category. Secondly, river courses 
can be changed suddenly by cutting through the neck of a meander. 
The first case does not usually call for any special arrangements 
because over the long term both sides will lose and gain approximately 
equal areas. However, in the second case the area of land enclosed by 
the meander is suddenly switched from one side of the river to the 
other. It is then a nice point to decide whether the boundary follows 
the new course of the river or continues to follow the abandoned 
course. The question of river islands can also be difficult because the 
deposition of silt will sometimes join islands to one of the banks. This 
latter problem has been particularly serious on the River Mekong 
where it forms the boundary between Thailand and Laos. The Franco­
Thai treaty of 1893 gave France title to all the islands in the river and 
problems of jurisdiction arose when some of the islands become 
attached to the Thai bank through the deposition of alluvium. A com­
mission was established in 1926 to rule on all future problems of this 
nature but the decolonization of lndo-China and the determination of 
Laos to own all the islands, as France did before it, has caused a fresh 
round of problems. 
Many boundary architects have been deceived by apparently 
exact representation of rivers on maps and have decided that such pre­
cise features would make excellent boundaries. Unfortunately the 
actual rivers possess a width which makes it necessary to select some 
particular line within the river.  Lines which can and have been used in 
rivers include the bank, the line of equidistance or median line, and the 
thalweg. If a bank is used then the entire river belongs to a single coun­
try, but an added advantage is that water levels change and so does the 
position of the bank. Further, the banks of some rivers in very flat 
country might merge into swamps before reaching firm ground. The 
median line can be easily constructed if the banks are clearly defined, 
but of course the line will change in location as the banks are eroded or 
extended by alluvial disposition. Further, the median line might inter­
sect the navigable channel of the river and create problems for corn-
6 
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mercial use. The thalweg is the line of the deepest continuous channel 
in the river. While this line will also change it does mean that countries 
on both sides will be able to claim navigation rights for their citizens. 
Turning now to the boundary between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea it seems that the only scope for a positional boundary dispute 
concerns the section of the Fly River used for the international bound­
ary. The meridians north and south of the Fly River have been marked 
by ten and four monuments respectively. The maximum distance bet­
ween any two markers is the 56 nautical miles between monuments 
MMll and MM12 (see figure 1 . 1 ) .  Such a distance would mean that it 
would be difficult for a person to know exactly where the boundary lay 
in the intervening area, but it is understood that all major tracks have 
been signposted and the exact location of each adjacent village has 
been computed. Modern survey techniques would make it a compara­
tively easy matter to fix more monuments on the line if that was 
deemed essential . The 1973 agreement defines the boundary along the 
Fly River as the waterway, which is shown in parentheses to be the thal­
weg. The distance between monuments MMlO and MMll ,  which 
mark the termini of the section of the Fly River which forms the boun­
dary, is 34 nautical miles, but the course of the river will be much 
longer because it meanders widely over the flat, marshy plain (see 
figure 1 .2). Maps of the region show very clearly the abandoned mean­
ders along the river's course, and in some cases the boundary has 
moved as much as 3 .5 kilometres when the neck of a meander was 
breached (see the meander marked B on figure 1 .  3) . The map evidence 
suggests that the Fly River has an unstable course which makes it 
unsuitable for use as an international boundary. If the border in the 
vicinity of the river ever became intensively used it would prove to be 
a very difficult line to monitor. 
An early feasibility study of the Ok Tedi mining project in the Star 
Mountains of Papua New Guinea recommended that meanders should 
be breached in an effort to improve the opportunity for barge naviga­
tion on the river. Unfortunately it will prove a very difficult and expen­
sive engineering operation to contain the Fly River between fixed 
banks. The river's catchment in high mountains with heavy rainfalls 
generates a large sediment load, which cannot be carried when the low 
gradients are reached south of parallel 6 degrees south. 
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Functional boundary disputes 
A functional boundary dispute is created when one country's 
authorities decide that national interests have been adversely and 
unfairly affected by the activities of a neighbouring country along the 
boundary. These activities will obviously be concerned with move­
ment across the boundary of people , or stock, or goods, or ideas, and 
the complaint can take two major forms. In the first case the plaintiff 
state might consider that its neighbour is unreasonably interfering with 
trans-boundary movements. For example, Pakistan , in retaliation 
against Afghanistan's support for the Pathan secessionist movement , 
required Powinda herders to produce certificates of health for their 
animals before admitting them on their annual transhumance move­
ment to the Indus plains at the beginning of winter. It proved impossi­
ble to satisfy this new regulation and the Powindas and their herds had 
to winter in Afghanistan. More recently Tanzania has prevented 
Kenyan lorries from operating between Kenya and Zambia along the 
roads through the west of Tanzania. Tanzania claims that this heavy 
traffic is damaging its unsealed roads ; Kenya believes that Tanzania is 
unwilling to see Zambia's dependence on Dar es Salaam reduced. The 
imposition of tariffs is another device by which one country can hinder 
trans-boundary trade ; while the withholding of work-permits is one 
method of obstructing immigration into a country. 
In the second case the plaintiff country might be dissatisfied 
because its neighbour is not preventing illegal trans-boundary move­
ments. For example, in the last year the export earnings of both 
Uganda and the Central African Empire were seriously reduced 
because diamonds, cotton, cocoa and coffee were smuggled out and 
sold in neighbouring countries. Countries might also complain if a 
neighbour fails to enforce health standards which result in animal or 
human diseases being introduced across the boundary, or fails to pre­
vent a flood of refugees into the plaintiff's part of the border. Some of 
the most serious functional boundary disputes arise when one country 
fails to prevent its border being used as a base for dissidents attacking 
the authority across the boundary. Such attacks may be launched as 
military campaigns in the style of the POLISARIO raids into 
Mauritania from Algeria, or they may simply be propaganda attacks 
by radio transmitters. 
Functional boundary disputes have not attracted the interest of 
scholars to the same extent as territorial or positional disputes. This 
1 1  
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situation may be due either to the prompt settlement of most func­
tional disputes or to the fact that serious and persistent functional dis­
putes occur only between hostile countries which display their 
antagonism in more obvious and often more threatening ways . It 
seems likely that the chance of functional disputes developing will be 
greatest when the traffic across the boundary is mainly in one direc­
tion, whether it is legal or illegal . This is because in such situations 
there will be little or no opportunity for retaliation by the plaintiff 
state. If there is a flourishing traffic in both directions across the boun­
dary any country which considers itself to be adversely affected by its 
neighbour's actions in the border can adopt similar measures. The 
introduction of new regulations or the more stringent application of 
existing rules which precipitate functional disputes, will often be made 
for sound strategic or economic reasons . However, it is also possible 
that they may be introduced or intensified in order to show displeasure 
with the policies or attitudes of a neighbouring country. 
While it is possible that functional boundary disputes will arise 
between the two countries, the chances have been significantly 
reduced by the agreement on border arrangements which the two gov­
ernments concluded in October 1984. An agreement on administrative 
border arrangements had been reached by Australia and Indonesia on 
26 November 1974 and Article 13 of that agreement required it to be 
reviewed in 1979. The review was undertaken during that year and an 
agreement of twenty articles was signed in December 1979. This agree­
ment was in turn reviewed (as required by Article 19) in 1984 and a new 
agreement, of twenty-two articles , was signed in October 1984. 
This agreement has no effect on the location of the boundary ; it is 
concerned with the functions of governments in the border, and it is 
designed to avoid problems and to provide mechanisms for solving any 
problems which do occur. 
The border area, within which residents on both sides have certain 
rights and responsibilities , is defined as the Kecamatan-kecamatan Per­
batasan in Indonesia and the census divisions of Papua New Guinea 
which extend to the boundary . It has been agreed that both sides will 
produce maps of their section of the border area and that the area can 
be changed after consultation. 
Articles 4 ,  5 and 9 deal with the indigenous population of the bor­
der area. Those residents are entitled to cross the boundary for tradi­
tional activities associated with social contacts and ceremonies such as 
marriages or funerals. They are also permitted to cross the boundary 
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to carry out farming, hunting and fishing under the terms of traditional 
rights held in areas of land or water in the neighbouring state. The arti­
cles conferring these rights stipulate that such crossings will only be of 
a temporary nature and must not involve permanent resettlement . In 
order to reduce the chance of future problems both countries have 
agreed to discourage the construction of new villages within 5 km of 
the boundary. This is not an absolute prohibition but special approval 
is required from the government concerned before such settlements 
can be established. 
Cross-boundary customary trade will be facilitated by the two 
governments, although it is restricted to residents of the border area to 
satisfy their needs and it may not include items prohibited by either 
government. 
Crossing of the boundary by people who do not reside in the bor" 
der area , and by those residents not engaged in traditional activities , is 
regulated by Article 6. This article provides for the designation of cros­
sing points and the exchange of information about migration laws and 
policies between the two governments. 
Other articles describe actions which governments must take. For 
example , Article 7 requires both governments to prevent any part of 
their territories, in or near the border area, from being used for hostile 
or illegal actions against the other. The authorities have agreed to 
cooperate if any disaster or major accident occurs in the border area 
and to promote the maintenance and extension of air, road and radio 
communication across the boundary. Finally, Article 12 deals with the 
continuance and development of cooperation to prevent dangerous 
plant , animal and human diseases from crossing the boundary. 
Articles 2 and 3 deal with the mechanism which will keep the 
agreement running smoothly. A joint Border Committee of senior 
officials will meet at least once a year to produce guidelines for the 
effective implementation of the agreement and to review the success of 
cooperation. Arrangements are also made for liaison between officials 
at various levels of national and local administration. 
This mechanism was tested in April 1983 when surveyors of Papua 
New Guinea discovered that the trans-Irian Jaya highway appeared to 
cross into Papua New Guinea in two places. The highway, which is 
being built by Japanese contractors , appeared to cross the boundary 
twice, a few miles south of parallel 8 degrees south. One section of 
road was reported to be 3 .5 km long and to have penetrated 0.5 km into 
Papua New Guinea ; the other section was 4.5 km in length and penet-
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rated 1 . 5  km. The country in this region is low and swampy and Papua 
New Guinea's member for North Fly, Mr Warren Dutton, told news­
men that he believed the roadbuilders had been following the top of a 
ridge which led them into Papua New Guinea. There were no bound­
ary markers in this area. 
A meeting of officials was organized in Merauke within a week. It 
lasted three days and arrangements were made for satellite fixings of 
the road near the border to be made on 1 1 and 12 May 1983. A more 
detailed survey was arranged for August 1983 and it was agreed that 
the entire boundary line would be resurveyed in three sections by 1985 . 
Despite the attempts of some politicians in Papua New Guinea to 
make political capital out of these events , the matter was handled 
calmly and swiftly by both governments. The offending sections of the 
road were formally closed in August 1984. It was a joint performance 
which augurs well for the future . 
Resource boundary disputes 
Not all trans-boundary resources will provide possible causes of 
resource boundary disputes. For example, it is unlikely that a valuable , 
pure stand of hardwoods which straddled the boundary would cause 
any difficulties , providing the exact position of the boundary was 
known. The mining of ore bodies in the border will only call for coop­
eration and discussion when the construction of shafts and galleries 
might produce drainage or flooding problems for a mine on the other 
side of the boundary. The most common source of resource boundary 
disputes are water bodies, such as lakes or rivers, which mark or cross 
the boundary. Two main cases can be distinguished. First, there are 
those situations where the boundary is drawn through the lake or along 
the river. In that case each state has equal access to the same stretch of 
the river or lake for navigation , fishing, water supplies and irrigation. 
It is usual for treaties producing such boundaries to stipulate that each 
side has equal rights to use the river or lake, but that such use must not 
be to the detriment of the other user. Plainly any country which allows 
a breakwater to be constructed into a river without consultation with 
its neighbour runs the risk of fomenting a dispute if the altered flow of 
the water begins to erode the neighbour's bank. Equally it would be 
against the terms of the general clause described above if one country 
allowed developments along a tributary of a boundary river to pollute 
that boundary river and perhaps spoil the fishing for people on both 
banks. 
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The second situation arises when the river basin is divided by the 
boundary and the states have successive use of the waters . In such a 
situation the downstream state can adversely affect the upstream coun­
try by building a dam which floods back into the neighbour's territory. 
Such flooding will reduce the neighbour's capacity to use that land. 
The construction of the Aswan High Dam resulted in flooding in the 
Sudanese border and the Egyptian government agreed to share the 
cost of resettling those villagers whose lands were inundated. The 
downstream country can be adversely affected if the upstream state 
builds a dam which alters the regime of the river or diverts large vol­
umes for irrigation , which reduces the flow in the lower sections. When 
Kariba Dam was built it was necessary for what are now Zambia and 
Zimbabwe to guarantee a minimum flow along the Zambezi into 
Mozambique. Many international agreements have been reached to 
deal with the successive ownership of rivers ; the Indus Waters Agree­
ment shows that even countries which exhibit a high level of mutual 
suspicion, such as India and Pakistan, can reach a satisfactory solution 
to this kind of problem. 
The other obvious resource which could create problems is a hyd­
rocarbon deposit of natural gas or crude petroleum. Such a deposit , 
given the right structural conditions could be trapped from either side 
of the boundary. For this reason most current seabed boundary agree­
ments require consultation between the parties if any hydrocarbon 
deposit is found to straddle the boundary. In some cases this consulta­
tion is required for any deposit found within a set distance of the boun­
dary. 
The Indonesian and Papua New Guinea governments were evi­
dently aware of the risks of functional disputes along a boundary which 
cuts in an arbitrary fashion across the landscape when they negotiated 
the 1979 and 1984 agreements. Four articles deal with such issues . 
First, in Article 13 provision is made for free navigation for 
nationals of both countries along the Fly River where it forms the 
boundary. This section is referred to as the Fly River Bulge. Further, 
provision is made for each government to have the right of navigation 
along a shared river , for the purposes of a national development pro­
ject. This provision will be of most use to Indonesia, in respect of the 
Fly River, but Indonesia seems to have settled for less than it was enti­
tled to under the terms of the fifth article of the 1895 Convention bet­
ween Britain and the Netherlands . That article guaranteed both par­
ties free navigation on the Fly River except for the carriage of warlike 
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stores. The latest agreement restricts Indonesian rights to transit navi­
gation for the purposes of a national development project. It is not 
clear why Indonesia made this concession. The fact that this article 
would also apply to the Sepik River does not seem adequate compen­
sation, because only quite small craft would be able to reach the border 
along this river at times of highest flow. It is possible that Indonesia 
made the concession because the matter was deemed to be one which 
was too difficult for the government of Papua New Guinea to sell to its 
electorate. 
Article 15 deals with the major development of natural resources. 
It specifies that governments will keep each other informed when such 
developments are planned ,  and the governments have also agreed that 
they will cooperate with each other to facilitate major developments 
within either of the countries . The Ok Tedi mining project is nomi­
nated as a major development. There is also provision for the exploita­
tion of single accumulations of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas or 
any other minerals which straddle the boundary and which can be tap­
ped from only one side. The governments have agreed to consult on 
the exploitation of the resource and the distribution of profits in an 
equitable manner. 
Article 16 provides that when mining, industrial , forestry, agricul­
tural or other projects are carried out in the border area care will be 
taken to ensure that pollution of trans-boundary areas does not occur. 
There is a similar reference in Article 17, which is concerned with the 
use and conservation of water, forests and wildlife . Such projects will 
be designed to avoid adverse effects on trans-boundary regions. 
Conclusions 
This review of the four kinds of boundary disputes suggests a 
number of conclusions regarding the boundary between Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea. 
First , the land and sea boundaries have been defined and are free 
from ambiguity. Further survey is required along the land boundary , 
and it is encouraging that more detailed work will be completed by 
1987 . It appears inconceivable ,  in the present climate of friendly rela­
tions between the two countries , that a territorial dispute could 
develop. 
Secondly, the Fly River Bulge appears to be the only sector where 
positional disputes could occur because of the capacity of that river to 
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meander across its flood plain. The problems would become more 
acute if there were major developments in this area, including closer 
settlement and perhaps the discovery of fields of hydrocarbons. 
Thirdly, the recent agreement on border arrangements provides 
an excellent framework for building enduring good relations in the 
border. The speed with which the problem of the errant road-builders 
was solved gives the promise that there will be no serious boundary 
problems between the two countries in the foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ORIGINS OF THE BORDER PROBLEM 
AND THE BORDER STORY TO 1969 
June Verrier 
An Indonesian nationalist movement developed in the early years of the twentieth century but had gained few concessions from the 
Dutch by the time of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. 
Japan's occupation of the Netherlands East Indies was thus at first wel­
comed by the nationalists. However Japan was to prove little more 
receptive to the nationalists' cause , at least until their increasing milit­
ary defeats from the end of 1944. On the eve of their surrender on 15 
August 1945 , Japan appeared willing to grant independence: two days 
later the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed. 
The Dutch refused to recognize Indonesia's independence and set 
out to reassert their authority by force. A bitter struggle followed 
which lasted for four years . At a Round Table Conference in The 
Hague in 1949 the Dutch eventually agreed to the transfer of 
sovereignty from the former Netherlands East Indies to the Republic 
of Indonesia, with the exception of the territory of West New Guinea 
whose future was to be decided in negotiations between Holland and 
Indonesia within the following year. The talks broke down, and by 
1952 the Dutch appeared determined to retain this last outpost of their 
former empire in the East Indies. In the subsequent decade the Dutch 
went on , deliberately and contrarily, to develop a sense of separate 
West Papuan nationalism which was destined to come into head-on 
collision with the assertive nationalism of an Indonesia , under Presi­
dent Sukarno , determined to return West New Guinea to the 'father­
land' from which the Dutch had, in its view, illegally excluded it. 
Through the 1950s , therefore, President Sukarno escalated the cam­
paign against the Dutch for the return of West New Guinea, and by the 
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end of 1960 was sending 'volunteers' to the territory to procure that 
end. 
Australia, which had supported the Indonesian nationalists in 
their struggle against the Dutch , thereby laying down firm foundations 
for good relations with the new Indonesia, was nonetheless made 
increasingly nervous by the emerging nature of Sukarno's regime . 
Although it had entertained a sporadic concern for the security of the 
region to its north for more than a hundred years , it had had little to do 
with it in practice, at least until the Second World War. It was there­
fore the force of traditional fears and phobias , rather than the exigen­
cies of contemporary realities which required Australia to live and 
work with Indonesia as a good neighbour, that led Australia to support 
and encourage Dutch retention of West New Guinea until forced to a 
turnabout in 1961. 
Developments in Indonesia in these years appeared to make the 
judgement a correct one. A deteriorating domestic economic and 
political situation in Indonesia , which included a struggle for power 
between the communists and the army, encouraged President Sukarno 
to a foreign policy adventurism which included the acquisition of West 
New Guinea, by force if necessary, and then the confrontation of 
Malaysia. Australia's worst fears appeared to be founded; its nearest 
neighbour looked increasingly unstable as a battle for political domi­
nance was fought at home between the Communist Party and the 
army. 
In the circumstances Indonesia's even closer presence to 
Australia in West New Guinea - already opposed by Australia's 
agricultural interests as a threat (from disease) to Australia's major 
exporting industries - was out of the question. One solution was to 
engage in an administrative cooperative relationship with the Dutch 
for the joint development of their territories in New Guinea. A united 
New Guinea proceeding to independence together was one option 
held open . 
Such plans as there were , however, were overtaken by events . 
Different views were held by the governments of Holland and 
Australia of the pace of progress towards joint development, and 
external developments exerted pressures. As Sukarno escalated his 
campaign for the return of West New Guinea, and seemed to fall 
increasingly under the influence of the communists at home, the 
United States came to determine that West New Guinea was a small 
price to pay to keep Sukarno out of the communist camp abroad. In 
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1961 the United States therefore exerted pressure on the Netherlands 
and Australia to change their policies with the result that in August 
1962, with the New York Agreement , the administration of West New 
Guinea was transferred to a United Nations Temporary Executive 
Authority. Seven months later Indonesia succeeded to administrative 
authority in the territory pending an Act of Free Choice which was to 
take place at some time before 1969. 
Australia's extreme apprehension about the implications of an 
Indonesian presence in West New Guinea, at a time when Indonesia 
had gone on from the West New Guinea campaign to confront 
Malaysia, was illustrated by its closure of the border in New Guinea, 
the pursuit of a defence and development programme designed to turn 
the orientation of the people determinedly eastwards , and a defence 
build-up in Australia itself. The West New Guinea crisis had been an 
undoubted shock bringing home to Australia both the realities of its 
alliance relationship and some realities of the region in which Australia 
lived. The process of adjustment consequently called for by Australia's 
foreign minister, Garfield Barwick, was slow to be made. In 
Indonesia's case it was not until President Suharto replaced President 
Sukarno following the coup in 1965, and the subsequent western effort 
to stabilize Indonesia in 1967, that Australia set about mending fences 
with Indonesia. This included better management of the border mend­
ing fences with Indonesia. This included better management of the 
border in New Guinea. 
All international borders contain within them the potential for 
trouble between neighbours. Whether they do so or not depends on a 
host of factors - historical , geographic, ethnic, economic - but most 
obviously on the state of relations between the countries concerned. In 
the case of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, the existence of a border 
problem is the product not of relations between Papua New Guinea 
and Indonesia per se, for both have declared the best of intentions 
towards each other. Rather it is a problem which , in its essence, they 
inherited from their colonial predecessors, the Dutch and the Austra­
lians, and from the kinds of policies they pursued both separately and 
together in their respective halves of the island of New Guinea. The 
border problem in New Guinea thus arose not simply out of the geog­
raphy and ethnography of a remote and ill-defined border, nor even 
out of the economics of uneven development which gave rise to the 
argument in some quarters that refugee movement across the border 
from West New Guinea was in fact primarily economic in origin . 
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Rather it arose out of the policies of the administrative powers which 
developed a sense of separate West Papuan nationalism and held open 
the prospect of a united New Guinea. 
The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border is a classically arbitrary 
product of colonial history . The problems that have arisen on account 
of the border since are equally a classic result of the assertiveness and 
sensitivity of newly independent nations and, once Papua New Guinea 
became the sovereign power, an illustration of the limits of small 
states' diplomacy. This chapter sets out to show that the character of 
the border problem in New Guinea is also the product of a particular 
history. 
Australian-Dutch administrative cooperation in New Guinea 
In 1545 Inigo Ortiz de Retes took possession of the island of New 
Guinea in the name of the king of Spain and in 1606 the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands first laid its claim to the western half of the island. Dutch 
interest in West New Guinea was as a buffer, to prevent another Euro­
pean presence which could challenge its monopoly of the lucrative 
spice trade of the Indies . Hence the Dutch government did not estab­
lish its first settlement in West New Guinea until 1828, and then in 
response to anticipated British interest and intrusion. With the excep­
tion of the highland areas , major exploration of West New Guinea had 
been undertaken by the start of the Second World War, but the extent 
of contact was slight until the Dutch decided to develop the territory in 
the early 1950s. 
Following West New Guinea's exclusion from the transfer of 
sovereignty from the Netherlands East Indies to the Republic of 
Indonesia, Australia's diplomacy was directed to encourage the Dutch 
to retain the territory when the Dutch had not yet determined to do so 
(Haupt 1970 ; Feith 1962). Speculation about joint cooperation or con­
dominium accompanied Australia's effort, which resulted in a Dutch 
decision, by mid 1953 , to hold on to the territory and develop it 
towards self-government and independence , and a corresponding 
decision to enter into a cooperative relationship with Australia . 
With Australia's own postwar extended development programme 
for Papua New Guinea, Australian officers on the spot saw advantages 
in some level of cooperation with their Dutch counterparts across the 
border. Colonel J .K. Murray , administrator of the then Territory of 
Papua New Guinea, was proposing as much to the secretary of the 
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Department of Territories as early as March 19491 (he had particu­
larly in mind plant and animal quarantine to protect Australia's major 
exporting industries) . Although Murray was cautioned for his over­
enthusiasm for joint cooperation and restrained from initiating it, it 
was Australia , initially, which proposed the formalization of coopera­
tion with the Dutch in New Guinea. Following talks which took place 
in July 1953 , Australia's foreign minister, R.G. Casey stated : 
In view of the similarity between the peoples of the Austra­
lian and Netherlands territories in New Guinea, and of the 
problems faced by the two administrations, discussions 
were held on practical measures of cooperation at adminis­
trative level between the TPNG and NNG (Current Notes 
on International Affairs [CNIA] 24 (7) July 1953 :396-397) . 
Although there had been little contact between Australia and the 
Netherlands in New Guinea until the Second World War, before the 
July 1953 arrangements were made there had already been considera­
ble practical cooperation between the two administrations. This had 
taken place on such questions as the movement of peoples across the 
undefined international border, at a time when the loss of scarce 
potential labour had become a serious issue to the Dutch now set upon 
the development of the territory. Under the 1953 arrangements, Port 
Moresby and Hollandia were given a mandate to discuss land laws , 
labour, and border control with a view to the development of conson­
ant policies in the spheres of the economic, social and political 
advancement of the people , and to discuss district services with par­
ticular reference to the exchange of information between patrol 
officers in border regions. In addition, there was to be a similar 
exchange of information and consultation, as well as of research 
experience, in and between the departments of Agriculture, Stock and 
Fisheries, Health , and Education, and also in geological data and land 
use surveys . 
There is some evidence to suggest that there was pressure from 
agricultural and defence interests in Canberra for the extension of the 
administrative cooperation relationship . The former saw New Guinea 
as an extension of the Australian production unit and believed that 
Australia's agricultural industries required the quarantine guarantees 
1 J . K. Murray to J . R  Halligan, Secretary, Department of Territories, 26 March 1949. 
PNG Archives, File : CA38-6-8, Hollandia : Telecommunications. 
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a cooperative relationship was expected to bring ; for the latter, 
defence considerations required the Dutch to remain in West New 
Guinea rather than be superseded by what was seen to be an inevitably 
unstable Indonesia. In August 1955 ,  therefore, cabinet instructed the 
ministers for Territories and External Affairs to reexamine adminis­
trative cooperation in New Guinea in order to develop proposals for its 
extension, paying particular attention to the question of a common 
language. At a subsequent meeting between Brigadier Cleland, then 
administrator of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, and the offi­
cials of the departments of Territories and External Affairs, the impor­
tance of a common language was declared to be that the adoption of 
English 'would further the Eastward and Pacific orientation of the 
Dutch territory. 2 
The language question was to continue to be considered at the 
administrative cooperation conferences which followed the Australia­
Dutch Joint Statement on Administration Cooperation of November 
1957. The purpose of the pursuit of a common language was made 
clear in the conclusion of the secretary for Territories following his visit 
to West New Guinea in 1959. In his view it appeared only logical that 
east and west New Guinea should be in a position where they could, if 
they wished, eliminate the artificial border between them; one of the 
greatest aids towards this would be the existence of a common lan­
guage. 3 The Dutch agreed. Meanwhile Australia made some conces­
sions to Dutch language with its inclusion in the syllabus of the first two 
senior high schools which were to open in Port Moresby and Rabaul in 
1960 (South Pacific Post 29 January 1960) . 
The language question is important for what it suggests about 
intentions at this stage . Earlier, the politics of administrative coopera­
tion had been more important than their substance , the arrangements 
signalling support for Dutch retention of West New Guinea as much as 
anything else for in practice they essentially duplicated the role played 
by the South Pacific Commission for the exchange of information and 
advice in such areas as public health, social welfare and education. The 
2 Cabinet Decision No. 482 noted in the record of the meeting at the Department of 
External Affairs on 3 August 1955 between Cleland and officials of the Departments of 
External Affairs and Territories, forwarded with Hasluck's letter to Casey, 4 August 
1955, PNG Archives File : AD 92-3-13: His Honour's Visit to Hollandia. 
3 Report: Visit of the Secretary of the Department of Territories to NNG, May-June 
1959. PNG Archives File : AD 78-2-37. 
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arrangements therefore represented a commitment , and a firm and 
valuable one according to Alfred Stirling, Australia's ambassador at 
The Hague. In this way administrative cooperation between the east­
ern and the western halves of the island of New Guinea contributed to 
the then growing Dutch interest in their territory as well as reflected it, 
as did the subsequent Australian-Dutch Joint Statement on Adminis­
trative Cooperation in New Guinea of 1957. Motivated by a deteriorat­
ing situation in Indonesia , Australia proposed furthering administra­
tive cooperation in New Guinea with the joint statement, which was to 
produce a qualitative and quantitative change in the administrative 
cooperation relationship. Its institutional innovations were described 
by the minister for External Affairs in the House of Representatives in 
February 1958 (CNIA 29(2) February 1958 : 109-110) . They were the 
appointment of liaison officers, the assigning of an attache to the 
Netherlands embassy in Canberra to deal exclusively with New Guinea 
affairs , and the introduction of the more-or-less annual conference on 
administrative cooperation, the first of which was to take place in Can­
berra in October 1958. 
The agenda of the Canberra conference ranged from legislative 
structures and administrative organizations, through agricultural 
issues to conditions of labour employment , native local government, 
public health and administration, and the exchange of planting mate­
rials of economic importance. The extent of cooperation to date was 
recorded , including the coordination of patrols along the border and 
the cooperation concerned with surveying the border : the area was 
being photographed preparatory to mapping, Australia working in the 
southern half and the Netherlands in the north. 
At the close of the conference , a statement was issued which drew 
attention to the fact that the mandate of the conference was limited to 
discussion and the submission of recommendations on these subjects 
( CNIA 29 (10) October 1958:654-655) . The records themselves reveal 
that recommendations were made for the furtherance of cooperation 
in administrative organization , in problems met in increasing indigen­
ous participation in the public service , in the administration of native 
peoples, in land laws, and in technical training matters. A resolution 
on indigenous participation in measures of cooperation was also 
adopted and it was proposed that there should be a joint committee to 
collect and analyse information activities in the two territories. 
As far as education was concerned, the prospect of sending stu­
dents from West New Guinea to secondary schools and training 
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institutions in Australia was to be examined. In the field of specialized 
training , joint training centres for indigenes for common technical, 
vocational and professional training were proposed, as was the reser­
vation of places for West New Guinea officials at ASOPA (the Austra­
lian School of Pacific Administration in Sydney) , at which Dutch lec­
turers would also be invited to participate in instruction. It was 
suggested ,  too , that Australian New Guinea make use of the Nautical 
Training School established in Hollandia three years previously. 
These recommendations were accepted by the conference, along 
with those for an annual meeting and the pooling of technical skills. 
There was a persistent theme running through Australia's presen­
tations and its working papers for the conference, that the object of the 
exercise was to strive for 'consonant' developments . There was to be , 
for example, the 'development of consonant educational policies for 
both administration and mission schools' ,  'consonant forestry policies' 
and 'consonant policies in relation to land laws'. Some sections of the 
Australian press , at least, deduced from this that as a result of the con­
ference there was an agreement on a programme of 'parallel develo­
ment' which was to be recommended to the governments both of the 
Netherlands and of Australia .  
Whether , or to what degree, the Australian government pursued 
a policy of administrative cooperation with the Dutch in order to lay 
the foundations for the emergence of a Melanesian Federation 
remains debatable. Suffice it to recall that the 1957 joint statement 
declared that it was designed to leave the way open, if the inhabitants 
of the island one day so chose, for a united New Guinea. More impor­
tant for this discussion is that the nature of both Dutch and Australian 
policies had the effect, if not always the intention, of creating both a 
nationalist identity in West New Guinea and a feeling for a united New 
Guinea, both of which were to be at the base of the border problem 
which developed with Indonesia's administration of the Territory from 
1962 and which , in one form or another, continues to this day. It is to 
this extent that in their different ways the governments of both the 
Netherlands and Australia were responsible, not for creating the prob­
lem - since all borders present the potential for problems - but for shar­
ing the kind of problem which was to characterize this border from 
1962 on. 
Meanwhile , by the time of the second conference on administra­
tive cooperation, which took place in Hollandia in March 1960, 
Australia had downgraded the significance of administrative coopera-
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tion. One reason for this change of Australian policy was Paul Has­
luck's attachment to the policy of gradualism for the development of 
Australia's own New Guinea territories .  Otherwise a hawk on 
Indonesia who could be expected to support policies designed to deny 
her West New Guinea, and so to support the joint statement and the 
prospect of a Melanesian Federation, this minister for Territories was 
a persistent opponent of the kind of cooperation with the Dutch that 
interfered with his own view of an appropriate programme for the 
advancement of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. 
Australia and the Netherlands had quite different views of colo­
nial development even from the early 1950s, for the Dutch encouraged 
the emergence of a local elite with the sponsorship of trade union activ­
ity, political participation and localization at all possible levels. Has­
luck, by contrast, was opposed to the creation of elites and pursued a 
policy of 'uniform development' which had at its foundation the view 
that it would take years before consideration could be given to the 
political shape and size of Papua New Guinea. The 1957 joint state­
ment, and the subsequent Dutch programme for the rapid acceleration 
of the political development of the people in their half of the island, 
threatened this gradualist view of Papua New Guinea's development. 
With the Dutch announcement in 1960 of a ten year plan for the 
development of West New Guinea to self-government (which was in 
fact a decision to leave West New Guinea gracefully without conceding 
the Indonesian claim to the territory) , therefore, Hasluck visited the 
Netherlands and expressed the view that, as far as the political 
development of New Guinea was concerned, the slower the better 
(The Age 27 May 1960) . It was Hasluck's object to see Australia dis­
sociated from the Dutch resolve to move the territory rapidly towards 
self-government in association with Australia and related Pacific ter­
ritories . From this time the Dutch replaced the Australians as prime 
movers in the promotion of the kind of administrative cooperation 
which was designed to promote the ultimate goal of a united and inde­
pendent island of New Guinea. 
More important than Hasluck's influence on the thrust of adminis­
trative cooperation between the first and second conferences in 1958 
and 1959, however, were accelerating international developments. 
International developments in the West New Guinea dispute, particu­
larly the decision of the United States to improve relations with 
Indonesia, and Australia's decision to follow suit by inviting Dr Suban­
drio to visit Australia, were the key determinants of the changed status 
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of administrative cooperation in New Guinea. 
The Casey-Subandrio joint statement of 15 February 1959 which 
resulted from the visit of Indonesia's foreign minister to Australia 
stated that : 
It followed from their position of respect for agreements on 
the rights of sovereignty that if any agreement were 
reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia as parties 
principal, arrived at by peaceful means and in accordance 
with internationally accepted principles , Australia would 
not oppose such an agreement. 
Publicly this was received as a change of policy, though the govern­
ment denied that it was so. The fact is that it was Spender's position in 
1950 that West New Guinea was vital to the security of Australia and 
that Australia should be consulted on any change in its status, while 
Casey put on the record in 1959 Australia's willingness to recognize an 
agreement reached by peaceful processes between the parties . But 
whatever shift this represented, Australia in 1959 still recognized 
Dutch sovereignty, supported the principle of self-determination for 
the Papuans, and refused to encourage those negotiations which could 
only have one result. It took the worsening crisis of the next two years , 
and the emergence of a real prospect of the use of force by Indonesia 
to secure its claims, to push Australia , like America , to overcome 
resistance and reluctance at home and change policy still further to 
promote negotiations between the disputants. Meanwhile the prospect 
of an independent West New Guinea was kept alive, and with it the 
belief in the possibility of a Melanesian Federation. 
Indonesian policies: compounding the problem 
To speak of Papuan political opinion in Netherlands New Guinea 
is to speak of the opinion of a tiny proportion of the community which 
in West New Guinea at the relevant time numbered 700,000 - 800,000. 
Given the limited time for their execution, Dutch development prog­
rammes were to take only the few fast to the front of modernity. The 
elite was thus little more than a handful , mostly urban dwellers in the 
few enclaves which dotted the coast. They either left for Holland, 
returned to the village, or threw in their lot with Indonesia following 
the signing in August 1962 of the New York Agreement, which trans­
ferred West New Guinea to a temporary UN administration and there-
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after to Indonesia pending the Act of Free Choice . 
In the struggle for independence against the Dutch, West New 
Guinea had revolted alongside the rest of Indonesia. There were out­
breaks in Hollandia in December 1945 , in Merauke and Sarong in 
1946, and in Biak in 1948. Thereafter there remained some pro­
Indonesian sentiment among some of the elite, and in at least one 
political party in the territory. A proportion of the Papuan elite was 
prepared to work with Indonesia in the interim before the act of self­
determination promised them in the New York Agreement. Yet so 
successful was the germination of the Dutch seed of self-determina­
tion, that even this support was conditional upon an act of ascertain­
ment taking place, and it was to be lost in the light of Indonesian rule 
after 1963. It is for this reason that it can be argued that the West New 
Guinea problem could have been contained by Indonesia had it pur­
sued different policies in the territory from 1962. 
Indonesia began enthusiastically enough in West New Guinea, 
lauding the return of the territory to its rightful place in the Republic. 
The enthusiasm carried through the 1 May 1963 takeover from the 
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) but lasted 
little longer than a year. It was followed by the curtailment of political 
liberties in the territory, its closure to the outside world, and the 
increasing involvement of what had now become West Irian in the 
rhetoric of the Malaysian Confrontation campaign. 
In spite of Indonesian reports of great progress in the education 
and welfare of the territory, Justus M. van der Kroef, writing the his­
tory of the development of resistance in Irian, concluded that the situ­
ation had already deteriorated to such an extent by late 1964 that 
minor clashes between Papuans and Indonesian civil and military per­
sonnel were becoming almost daily occurances, and that by early 1965 
there were reports of major disturbances (van der Kroef 1968) . A 
catalyst was Indonesia's exodus from the United Nations at the turn of 
the year, and President Sukarno's subsequent announcement that a 
plebiscite in West Irian would not now take place after all. Allegations 
of Indonesian atrocities and accounts of Irianese uprisings now charac­
terized both the reports coming out of West New Guinea and the com­
plaints of the Free Papua Movement abroad. 
Some admission of maladministration in West New Guinea came 
with the coup which toppled Sukarno in September 1965 , Adam 
Malik's subsequent visit to the territory , and FUNDWI's report on the 
development prospects and needs of the Territory thereafter 
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(FUNDWI 1968). The new regime announced that Irian would have 
its Act of Free Choice after all. But FUNDWI's recommendations 
could not be implemented immediately, nor Adam Malik's pragmatic 
reformism have its effect in a situation in which Indonesia was now 
caught up with the first necessity of implementing an effective Act of 
Free Choice . 
Sarwo Edie, Indonesia's administrator in West Irian, himself sub­
sequently conceded that the security situation deteriorated in 1965 , 
but stated that it was largely for economic reasons. He also conceded 
that there were troubles in a number of parts of the province , in 
Merauke , Kokonau and Fak Fak as well as Manokwari , one result of 
which was increasing movement across the international border into 
Papua New Guinea. He added that operations against troublemakers 
had been 'hindered somewhat by the existence of the border' . The 
troubles in Irian accelerated prior to the Act of Free Choice, causing 
Indonesia to bring in four extra battalions , raising the estimated total 
of troops in the territory to 9 ,000 (South Pacific Post 24 July 1968) . By 
this time, however, the Australian government was less alarmed by 
this state of affairs than it might have been ; this was because of the 
metamorphosis in its own policy towards West New Guinea from one 
of border build-up against Indonesia in 1962 to one of border coopera­
tion with her by the time the Act of Free Choice eventually took place 
in 1969. 
Australia's reaction to Indonesia's accession to the administration 
of the Territory of West New Guinea.: 
border development and demarcation 
With the Casey-Subandrio joint statement of 1959 Australia step­
ped out of the front line of the West New Guinea dispute and away 
from any claim to be a party-principal. Thereafter Australia's concerns 
concentrated increasingly on the threat of the use of force. Against the 
backdrop of regional instability with Indonesia's confrontation of 
Malaysia, there was a very real fear for Australia's own security and 
that of her New Guinea territory as the West New Guinea dispute 
deteriorated in circumstances of continuing Dutch arms buildup, 
Indonesian arms acquisition, and the beginning of infiltration into the 
territory of West New Guinea. One result was that the defences of 
Australia were built up rapidly from 1962, as were those of Papua New 
Guinea in spite of the chiefs of staff's reassessment of its strategic sig-
29 
BE1WEEN TWO NATIONS 
nificance for Australia in December 1961 . 
At some stage in this period the Australian government appeared 
to realize that the outside help which it had believed would be forth­
coming in the event of Indonesian hostilities in West New Guinea 
would not in fact materialize . In a statement in explanation of the New 
York Agreement in the House of Representatives, Australia's minis­
ter for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick , had emphasized that 
Australia could not have acted alone in the West New Guinea dispute 
and that no other country was prepared to make a military commit­
ment to maintain the sovereignty of the Netherlands : 
If any should have contemplated a military adventure, 
none of the countries of the west, and particularly of those 
. with whom Australia has the closest association, were at 
any relevant time willing to maintain Netherlands 
administration by military means (Commonwealth Par­
liamentary Papers III 1962-63 :781-785) .  
In explanation of Australia's vote on the New York Agreement in the 
General Assembly that September, he added that the agreement was 
'a part of history with which we must live' , and that it created for the 
first time : 
A common land frontier . . .  with a people of Asia. But 
although new arrangements may need to be made, it would 
be wrong . . .  to begin this closer association with Indonesia 
in any sense of foreboding or recrimination (Common­
wealth Parliamentary Papers VII 1962-63 :759-764) . 
The reality, however, was to be different. The United States had 
by this time requested an Australian contribution to the defence first of 
South Vietnam and then of Thailand. The New York Agreement was 
also 'a major actor in the decision of Australia, announced towards the 
end of 1962, to embark upon a $1 .5 billion defence expansion prog­
ramme' (Stebbins 1958-62 :209) which included the formation of a sec­
ond battalion of Papua New Guinea's Pacific Island Regiment . In May 
1963, when he announced Australia's further defence increases, Sir 
Robert Menzies pledged Australia's determination to defend Papua 
and New Guinea 'as if they were part of our mainland' : Australia 
would not be stampeded out of Papua New Guinea (Commonwealth of 
Australia Parliamentary Debates (CPD) H.  of R. 38 :1668-1672, 22 
May 1963) . His guarantee received wide publicity (see Neale 
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1963 : 145) , as did the addition to it of American support. In June that 
year, Averell Harriman said that the USA would regard an attack on 
Papua New Guinea as an attack on Australia itself. Menzies repeated 
Australia's guarantees on the occasion of his visit to Papua New 
Guinea in September 1963 (South Pacific Post 10 September 1963) , 
following a year in which a number of notables, including the minister 
for Territories, the minister for the Army and the secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs did likewise . 
Moreover, some military experts did not accept the strategic 
downgrading of Papua New Guinea and urged the improvement of its 
defences. They saw Papua New Guinea as more liable than Australia 
to minor infiltration and to major assault (paper presented to a seminar 
held by the Council on New Guinea Affairs, Sydney, December 1964, 
by Dr T.B. Millar) . The government responded accordingly. From 
1962 , as part of the flurry of activity which took place in defence and 
development in Papua New Guinea : 
The Papua New Guinea Training Depot was opened at 
Goldie River, near Port Moresby, in 1964 to train recruits 
for the PIR and to give advanced specialised training which 
is not provided by the PIR itself. In September 1963, the 
Australian Government announced a general expansion of 
Army strength in the territory, involving the construction 
of new barracks, the raising of additional administrative 
and service staff units, and the addition of another battal­
ion to the PIR. The Second Battalion was raised at Wewak 
from two of the companies of the First Battalion on 3 
March 1965 . The Second Battalion took over the Vanimo 
outstation and the First Battalion now has an outstation at 
Lae. A multiracial cadet battalion has also been raised 
(O'Neill 1971 :3) .  
In addition , there was a reactivation of the Manus naval base and the 
beginning of a Papua New Guinea navy, the improvement of air 
facilities at Boram near Wewak (to take Fl-lls) ,  and at Daru, Mount 
Hagen and Nadzab. A host of border airstrips was established or 
upgraded and there was widespread acquisition of land in 'strategic 
areas' for future purposes. Although options on much of this land were 
not in fact taken up, although, too, some of the plans and projects for 
the increase of Papua New Guinea's defence did not materialize , and 
although there are no separate estimates for Papua New Guinea 
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defence expenditure, nevertheless, according to one commentator, by 
the end of September 1965 Australian defence spending in the border 
areas of Papua New Guinea amounted to 40 million pounds and there 
was more to come . 
What happened on the border itself as a result? For Papua New 
Guinea the changed status of West New Guinea meant that the policy 
of administrative cooperation between east and west New Guinea, 
which to all intents and political purposes had ended by 1960, was now 
ended in a practical sense as well . 'Unless it could be established' , said 
Hasluck, ' that ENG and WNG were moving towards a single objec­
tive, there was no case for administrative cooperation as we had known 
it up to date but only a case for trying to maintain friendly relations as 
best we can with the people next door' (Hasluck 1976 :371) .  There was 
therefore a border freeze designed to prevent movement across it, 
quarantine concerns reappearing as the primary reason, and develop­
ment of the remotest regions of Papua New Guinea adjacent to the 
international border was upgraded in importance . Development, in 
this way, became the other side of the defence coin, which also meant 
an effort to delimit the border itself. One important result was that the 
alarm these developments reflected on Australia's part created a cor­
responding alarm among Papua New Guinea's upcoming elite who 
thereby emerged into a world in which the enemy, very clearly, was 
Indonesia. 
Border demarcation and development 
In his description of the origins of Papua New Guinea's bound­
aries Paul van der Veur describes the remarkable lack of activity or 
urgency to demarcate the western boundary on the ground. He notes 
that apart from the occasional exceptional incident , such as that of the 
Tugeri incursions into British New Guinea in the 1890s, followed Sir 
William McGregor's vigorous objections which contributed to the 
1895 convention redefining the southern sector of the boundary, little 
was done even up to 1960 (van der Veur 1966) . But there was some 
concern about Papua New Guinea's border with West New Guinea 
from the time when the status of the latter was called into question in 
1949. This contributed to the first of a series of spurts of interest in the 
border region on the part of the Australian government and the TPNG 
administration over the next two decades. Efforts to control the border 
areas and then to develop them and secure their political allegiance 
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reflected developments in the western half of the island. In 1950 the 
urgency was only moderate and was conditional upon resources being 
available. Later, as Sir Paul Hasluck has recorded in his account of his 
years as minister for Territories : 
When change of administration in WNG had seemed cer­
tain, I had directed that a chain of new patrol posts be 
established in the border region, so that. . .  we could be in 
touch with all the people on the Australian side of the bor­
der region and, either by direct observation or by reports 
from the village people , be sure of knowing what was hap­
pening at any time and have landing strips and administra­
tive centres from which we could work in any emergency, 
such as a cholera epidemic sic, unusual movements of 
population or the unwelcome activities of strangers (Has­
luck 1976 :370) . 
Border development therefore began in earnest in the Western 
and Sepik districts adjacent to the international border as a result of 
the settlement of the dispute in Indonesia's favour. An unprecedented 
supplement to the Western District Annual Report in August 1962, for 
example , reported that progress had been made on the establishment 
of new patrol posts at Nomad and Maka, and that work had begun on 
a post in the Star Mountains . In addition , a programme of extensive 
patrolling was initiated in the Western District to bring all its inhabit­
ants into close contact with the Australian administration , and efforts 
were made to improve its economic prospects. However by 1964-65, in 
part because of the World Bank Report (which advised concentration 
of effort where the potential was best) and the Five Year Development 
Plan which followed it, it was realized what little economic reward 
there was from efforts to bring development to the Western District. 
Except as a source of labour, the potential of the Sepik District 
was to prove to be little better. The area was more sensitive, however, 
because of the proximity of the West New Guinea capital and its grea­
ter political awareness on account of its exposure to the outside world. 
The Japanese had occupied parts of the Sepik from the end of 1942 to 
May 1945, whereas the Western District had escaped the impact of 
war. Before that, there had been German rule, as afterwards there was 
Australian, and then greater contact with the Dutch and with West 
Papuans in circumstances in which it was mostly from the Sepik that 
exchanges of schoolchildren and of sports teams had been made under 
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the administrative cooperation programme . Perhaps as a result, even 
before the New York Agreement was signed there was increased pat­
rolling of the border areas, an extension of educational opportunities , 
and the encouragement of the development of local government coun­
cils. And it was to be in the Sepik, at Vanimo , that the second battalion 
of the PIR would be based. 
For the Sepik, therefore , the result of the border development 
programme in 1963 was, according to the district commissioner, that 
an 'astounding' amount had been achieved : 
All stations on the border have been manned during the 
year and a big development programme is underway. Per­
manent housing is now going in, schools , hospitals and aid 
posts . . . .  agricultural extension has increased . . .  Timber cut­
ting equipment is installed at Pagei, Imonda and Amanab . 
During the year Vanimo and Pagei LGCs have gone ahead. 
By the end of the year it is hoped to have low level councils 
established at Green River, Imonda and Amanab. All in 
all, the Border Development Plan is going ahead according 
to schedule . 
Further : 
As to the future , we should have something for our 
neighbours to think about. However . . .  the development of 
border stations is causing dissent in other parts of the Dis­
trict . . .  the border people are looked upon as 'new natives' 
who have not worked for or with the Administration as 
have those with years of contact . . .  the border has been 
given everything (North Sepik District Annual Report 1963-
64 :36-37) . 
'Traditional' movement, border trouble spots and 
border demarcation efforts 
On account of its larger population and their relative sophistica­
tion, its less deterring topography, and the proximity of a greater prop­
ortion of the district to the largest West New Guinea metropolis, the 
Sepik was to be the source of greater rebel and refugee movement , and 
consequent Australian attention, through the 1960s. The most signifi­
cant border movement took place over the years on the Hollandia/ 
Kotabaru/Sukarnapura/Jayapura-Vanimo north coast axis, although 
there was another notable trouble spot in the Sepik District around 
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Skotiau, Waris and Jafi. In the Western District the major border 
movement came from the hinterland of Merauke to that of Daru in the 
Bensbach Census Division around Weam and Morehead near the 
south coast , although there was an additional particular problem at the 
bulge of the Fly around Ningerum, Opka and Ingembit. Both this and 
the second Sepik trouble spot were areas of relatively heavy popula­
tion concentration and, more importantly, were areas where the 
Dutch, in less tense times and for agreed expedient reasons, had exer­
cised administrative control on and across the international border. 
At first the problem was largely one of accelerated traditional 
movement across an unmarked border. Movement of the traditional 
kind, to which Australia had in the past taken a necessarily lenient 
view, increased in the different and disturbed circumstances on both 
sides of the border as Indonesia's administration in the west created 
new problems on the border itself. Officially, as we have seen, the 
greatest fear was for quarantine ; in fact , just as great was the fear of 
incidents with Indonesians , whose patrols pursued peoples from the 
much more populous side of the international border into Australian 
territory. By the time of Indonesia's formal assumption of administra­
tive authority in West New Guinea, therefore, the situation was such 
that Australian patrols into the Trans-Fly Census Division inland of 
the border, for example, were without the services of interpreters and 
agricultural fieldworkers 'on account of the situation on the border'4 a 
situation in which all those reinforcements of personnel which could be 
spared from less pressing posts had been sent in. 
I have described details of the border incidents which took place 
in the Sepik District and the Western District from 1962 elsewhere 
(Verrier 1976) ; these highlighted the need for border demarcation. 
Concerned about the loss of labour, the Dutch administration had 
initiated an agreement at Ingembit in 1954 which discouraged labour 
recruitment across the border but, more importantly, established 
which villages in the border region fell under what administration . 
Some twelve villages were listed as falling under Australian control 
and another seven straddling the border as remaining Dutch. One 
result was that in the course of a patrol to carry out astro fixes in five 
border villages at the end of 1962 , Opka, administered by the Dutch, 
4 Western District Patrol Report, No. 6 62-63, W.G. Speldewinde to Morehead - Trans­
Fly CD, from 20 May to 20 July 1963. 
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was found to be a quarter of a mile inside Australian territory and 
Ingembit,  where the Dutch flag was flying, to be on the border. 
The Ingembit agreement and subsequent meetings smoothed a 
few ruffled feathers in Hollandia but failed to remedy the essential 
problem, that of an ill-defined border where there was still very little 
control. In 1956 there were meetings in Hollandia and in Merauke on 
respective border differences. However, little progress was made and 
the problem was shelved pending the establishment of a border demar­
cation commission. 5 Hasluck records that a Technical Border Com­
mission was established consequently in November 1958, convening 
after inordinate delay at Delft in November 1961 when it recom­
mended the creation of a Dutch-Australian Border Commission (Has­
luck 1976 :369) . 
In July 1962, after a number of border incidents , Hasluck 
obtained cabinet approval and funds to start aerial mapping of the 
international border in New Guinea and to establish a priority for this 
work. However, progress was unsatisfactory and there remained 
doubt as to where the border was at the time of the Indonesian 
takeover (ibid.) .  Some of the difficulties were revealed in a patrol 
report of November 1962, where it was reported that weather condi­
tions had limited their operations from five border villages to two.6 
The prospects of armed Indonesian bands wandering across the border 
simply because there was no means of ascertaining its position, and of 
resulting incidents , were raised (The Age (editorial) 1 October 1962). 
In a question directed to the minister for Territories on 4 October 
1962, one member of the House of Representatives asked whether the 
boundary between West New Guinea, East New Guinea and Papua 
had been surveyed and accurately defined and, if not, when the gov­
ernment intended to undertake this task. In reply, the minister out­
lined the history of demarcation . He recalled that there were two inter­
national agreements, the first made in 1895 between the Netherlands 
and Great Britain and the second in 1936 between Australia and the 
Netherlands. In 1958 agreement had been reached between the 
5 Van der Veur (1965-66 :92) reports that the meeting in Hollandia produced a 'gentle­
man's agreement' to maintain the status qua 'temporarily' and for 'practical purposes' 
(the quotation marks are his). 
6 E. Flower, D.O.,  to the Director, ODS and NA, 15 November 1962: Western District 
Patrol Report: Border Survey Patrol. 
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Netherlands and Australia on the divison of responsibility for photo­
graphing and mapping the border ; consequently most of the border 
had been photographed and the remainder would be completed when 
weather permitted ( CNIA 33( 10) October 1962 :86). In addition, Has­
luck explained that the Australian government had approached the 
Indonesian government about border demarcation in December 1962, 
but Indonesia preferred to leave its consideration until its assumption 
of administration the following May. 7 Van der Veur has described the 
result : 
By early 1962, Dutch authority was still exercised in some 
23 villages in the W aris enclave and some 17 villages in the 
Jaffi enclave. 
Moreover : 
The flags of the Netherlands and West Papua were the rec­
ognised symbols of authority ; Malay was the lingua franca ; 
and six subsidised and seven un-subsidised schools were 
maintained by the Catholic mission (van der Veur 1965-
66 :90) . 
It was this situation which led to the western orientation of some bor­
der villages , their resentment of Australian intrusion (which included 
prevention of their flourishing trade with the urban areas of West New 
Guinea, and their subsequent sympathy and support for Irianese 
refugees. 
Out of this border confusion , and the conflicting loyalties and 
resentments to which it gave rise , another problem of a more serious 
nature arose . Its character was indicated in reports on the cir­
cumstances of the establishment of Pagei patrol post. This post was 
established for border surveillance on account of activities at Skotiau, 
a village within the borders of Papua New Guinea but which had been 
administered by authorities in the west and at the end of 1962 was 
reported to be completely West New Guinean in attitude.8 A West 
New Guinea 'camp' was found here , which was dismantled following 
7 The subject was raised in a television interview with Indonesia's ambassador, Mr 
Suadi, which was reported in the Canberra Times 7 May 1963 ; see also Indonesia's 
response in the Canberra Times 8 May 1963. 
8 Sepik District Patrol Report Vanimo No. 5, 62/63, N .H. Walters to Sekotchiau through 
Kilmeri and Pagei CD, from 1 December to 18  December 1962. 
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the establishment of an administrative presence in Skotiau. 9 
By December 1963 there were reports of armed Indonesian pat­
rols pacing the border and sometimes being found many miles inside 
Papua New Guinea. Agreement had been reached in Jakarta in Sep­
tember to 'the placement by Australia of temporary markers on 
Australian territory on tracks and pathways crossing the border indi­
cating the approximate position of the border and this was to be done 
in advance of the completion of the survey and permanent marking of 
the border' . 10 
However , in November an Indonesian patrol had torn out survey 
markers and driven back an Australian survey team at gunpoint. 
Barnes, as minister for Territories , stated that border marking 
activities had been suspended, as a result of this incident, while the 
situation was being clarified 'at the diplomatic level' in Jakarta (The 
Age 21 December 1963 ; South Pacific Post 24 December 1963) . In 
January 1964, Dr Subandrio agreed that the work of marking the bor­
der should continue (New York Times 1 January 1964) and Australia's 
ambassador to Indonesia explained that the marker incident had been 
a mistake . 1 1  
The incident was nevertheless serious enough to galvanize 
Australian and Indonesian authorities to action . Discussions followed 
between the Australian and Indonesian governments and, in August 
1964, the Australian Department of External Affairs released a state­
ment issued by the Indonesian foreign minister and the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta at the conclusion of border talks. It agreed that a 
joint Australia-Indonesian reconnaissance team should visit the bor­
der as soon as practical to prepare the way for the subsequent concur­
rent astronomical surveys by both countries ; correlation of the results 
of these surveys would clear the way for the permanent marking of the 
9 Ibid. No. 2 63/64, R.L. O'Connell to Pagei CD, from 4 June to 1 August 1963. 
10 Senator Gorton, the minister representing the minister for External Affairs in the 
Senate, answering a question on the subsequent border marker incident on 19 March 
1964 (CNIA 35(3) March 1964:48). 
1 1  Mr Shann stated on his return to Canberra to discuss this matter that Dr Subandrio and 
Sir Garfield Barwick had agreed to the placing of markers and that authorities in West 
New Guinea had simply not been informed that this was the case. His comments were 
reported in The Age 7 March 1964, as they had been in the Indonesian Observer 25 Feb­
ruary 1964, which also agreed with his interpretation of the situation. 
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border (CNIA 35(8) August 1964 :28) . Shortly thereafter, Australia's 
minister for External Affairs , Paul Hasluck, answering a question in 
parliament about demarcation progress , said that it had been good and 
that the work, planned to proceed over a period of two or three years , 
would be set in train in due course ( CNIA 35(9) September 1964 :38) . 
He also assured his questioner that there was no dispute with regard to 
the border and that the only matter requiring attention was its marking 
on the ground. Mr Hasluck could add little more in answer to a similar 
question a year later ( CNIA 36(9) September 1965 :598) . There had 
been no progress in a situation in which Australian-Indonesian rela­
tions had reached their lowest ebb and in which, at the same time and 
for the same reason, the need for border demarcation in New Guinea 
was greatest . 
A report from Port Moresby carried in the Canberra Times on 20 
April 1965 stated that refugees were now crossing into Papua New 
Guinea weekly and that their flight had occasioned shootings. It con­
tinued that although Australian officials had only admitted two inci­
dents - the first of the border marker and the second of the crossing in 
1964 at Vanimo of John Djakedawa and his family (who were sub­
sequently granted permissive residence) - at least twenty-seven 
refugees had crossed . The report concluded that neither Pacific Island 
Regiment fortnightly patrols along the length of the border, nor Has­
luck's assurance that Indonesian behaviour so far had been 'quite cor­
rect' 12, nor even Subandrio's statement that there was no border prob­
lem and that there would be demarcation as soon as the wet season was 
over13 , resolved the problem . Effective border cooperation had to 
await the eventual overall improvement of Australian-Indonesian 
relations which followed the coup which toppled Sukarno. 
The new regime dispatched Colonel Pranoto Asmoro, 
Indonesia's director of topography, to Canberra with an entourage of 
four to discuss details of the plans for border demarcation (Canberra 
Times 21 May 1966) . The first stage of the project , involving the place-
12 This comment was volunteered in answer to a question in the House of Representa­
tives on 28 September 1965. It asked whether Indonesia had the same right to use the Fly 
River as the Netherlands had had as a result of an agreement with Britain in 1895 (CPD 
H.of R. 48 : 1298, 28 September 1965 . )  
1 3  Subandrio had made this statement after talks with Shann in December 1965, and went 
on to state that there was no border problem between Indonesia and Australia (Indone­
sian Herald 2 December 1965). 
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ment of six meridian markers in the northern sector of the interna­
tional border, was successfully completed shortly thereafter in 1966. 
The remaining eight markers for the southern sector of the border 
were planned in talks which took place the following year. The second 
stage was announced completed on 29 September 1967 ( CNIA 38(9) 
September 1967 : 393-394) . It was hailed as a diplomatic success and 
also as , 'probably', the first joint project successfully undertaken by 
Australians and Indonesians in cooperation (Pacific Islands Monthly 
December 1968 :64) . The degree of cooperation that had been 
achieved was again underlined on the occasion of the signature of the 
survey of meridians report prepared and submitted by the Indonesian 
director of topography and the Australian director of national map­
ping in February 1970 (CNIA 41 (2) February 1970 :68-69) . 
1965-1969: A 'political' border problem and a change of 
Australian policy 
The border problem in the island of New Guinea began as an irrit­
ant between mostly friendly adjacent administrative powers. The 
problem lay in the border's remoteness, its arbitrariness and the fact 
that it was not clearly demarcated. 'Traditional' movement across it 
was common and resented by the Dutch only when it was seen as a 
potential loss of scarce labour after it was decided to develop the territ­
ory in earnest . With the departure of the Dutch from West New 
Guinea in 1962 and the effective accession of Indonesia, the problem 
was at first essentially the same, although the response to it differed. 
Australia closed the border and engaged in a defence and development 
programme designed to resist incursion from the west and to orient the 
border peoples clearly eastwards. 
A third stage developed around 1965 when the border problem 
became far more 'political' than to date it had been. There were at least 
two reasons. First , there was an acceleration of political movement 
across the border ; movement neither of a traditional kind nor of an 
economically motivated kind , but rather a flight of rebels and refugees 
resisting Indonesian rule, some to camps operating from the Papua 
New Guinea side of the border. One consequence was an increase in 
border incidents , some of which involved Australian administrative 
personnel. Secondly, the border problem became political on account 
of the policies Australia adopted in response. Australia was 
thoroughly alarmed by these border developments, though the gov­
ernment denied the problem or downplayed it in order to avoid em bar-
40 
Lx1lcd OPM leaders Seth Rumkorem (left) and Jacob Prat Mgning the 'Port Vila Declarauon' of 
1 1 July 1985. 
Former OPM district commander. Yance Hcmbring, standmg in front of the West Papua 
nag. Photo-Hank di Suvtro 
An OPM camp in the border area. Pbot�Times of Papua New Guinea 
CHAPTER 2 
rassing Indonesia and eventually went on to cooperate with Indonesia 
in a border management programme. As border movement increased 
in the months immediately before and after the Act of Free Choice , 
Australia took a tougher line on border crossing even of the traditional 
kind which had been tolerated in the past. Contrary to official public 
statements, the majority of Irianese who crossed the border in 1968 
and 1969 undoubtedly did so for political reasons, just as most of them 
were undoubtedly sent back also for political reasons. 
In 1965 , at the same time as disturbances were occuring in West 
New Guinea, the Papua New Guinea press carried reports of the flight 
of refugees across the border in both the Sepik and Western districts , 
along with denials that a clash of PIR and Indonesian troops had been 
involved (South Pacific Post 25 June 1965) . In 1964 Skotiau became the 
subject of special attention by the administration (as it had been earlier 
and was again later) , when a patrol set out to investigate the appear­
ance in the village of several villagers dressed in Indonesian uniforms. 
In the light of such incidents Minister Barnes made a statement of pol­
icy in the House of Representatives in September 1965 : 
Instructions to all officers of border stations through the 
District Commissioners for the Sepik and Western Districts 
are substantially as follows :- Every person crossing the bor­
der into the Territory of Papua-New Guinea (other than 
cases of people living astride the border who may continue 
their normal local movement) is to be interviewed and if he 
can give no reasonable grounds on which he could claim 
special consideration for the granting of permissive resi­
dence in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, he is to 
be fed ,  well looked after and returned across the border as 
expeditiously as practicable . Any with an apparent case for 
consideration as political refugees are to be closely ques­
tioned and reported on, and held for the time being at a 
nearby border station pending decision. (Senator Gorton, 
the Minister representing the Minister for Territories in the 
Senate , in reply to a question upon notice from Senator 
McManus, CPD S .  29 :654, 28 September 1965) .  
In 1966, on the occasion of a visit to Papua New Guinea, Barnes added 
that 'factors of common humanity' would influence Australia's deci­
sion on refugees (South Pacific Post 17 January 1966) , but he stated 
that their numbers were so far few : 128 had crossed in 1964/65 and con-
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siderably fewer since then. Of these 90-95 per cent were of native 
groups straddling the international border ; there had been only eleven 
applications for political asylum, of which one had up till then been 
granted (South Pacific Post 19 January 1966) . 
By this time, however, patrol reports were recording 'bursts of 
migration' ,  sometimes of whole villages, across the border and , more 
seriously , the establishment of resistance camps on the Papua New 
Guinea side of the border. Patrol reports reveal that in the first case 
newcomers were sent back across the border. 14 The solution was not as 
easy in the second. Large-scale and frequent patrolling had resumed in 
1968 with the specific objective of border assessment, including, by this 
time, ascertainment of the location of refugee camps and of the pre­
sence of unauthorized Irianese. 
The problem this represented is illustrated by the case of the bush 
camp centre at Skotiau. For long uncooperative with the administra­
tion on such matters as the establishment of a local government council 
in the area, its headman, Yundun, was also suspected of harbouring 
OPM sympathizers and supporting raiding parties into West Irian . 
Originally more pro-Indonesian, Yundun eventually came to welcome 
Irianese in his village and to speak frankly of Indonesian atrocities in 
the west. A patrol contacted a group of twenty in bush camps at Simi 
near Skotiau at the end of 1968 , all of whom claimed that they were 
wanted men whose safety would be endangered by their return. 
Nevertheless, the patrol claims to have succeeded in convincing them 
that the administration would not tolerate their establishment of 
centres of opposition to Indonesia on the Australian side of the border. 
A patrol officer therefore reported : 'We destroyed the campsite . . .  to 
prevent the people returning to it as soon as we left them . . . .  and then 
accompanied them for about half an hour on the Skofro track' . 15 Any 
14 Instructions as given to M. Eggleton and M.A. Richards, 16 July 1969, Western District 
Patrol Report Ningerum No. l ,  69170 to North Ok Tedi CD and part of South Ok Tedi 
CD, from 18 July to 28 July 1969. 
15 Sepik District Patro.l Report Pagei No. 7, 68/69, R.R. Fairhall, Special Purpose Border 
Security to Sekotchiau-Niau-Wutung Border Area from 3 December to 19  December 
1968 accompanied by fifteen members of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 
(RPNGC). Instruction for the patrol from ADC T.R. Bergin to Fairhall, 25 November 
1968, was to return any refugees found camped on the eastern side of the border or villa­
gers living there. This was to be done without force ; 'nor is there to be any destroying 
of houses and barracks (sic) or camps in which refugees may be found'. 
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doubt about the camp's nature was dispelled when the district commis­
sioner proposed a further patrol to the area in the first week of 
December and noted that 'reports indicate that it will be about this 
time that an attack will be made on Sukarnapura, and if the attack fails, 
as it must, we could have considerable numbers of West Irianese trying 
to cross back into this territory . . .  ' . 16 
By this time the public attention that the border situation 
attracted had changed official statements from low-key announce­
ments of the type still common in August (for example, that a handful 
of Irianese had crossed the border at Wutung and Pagei and were 
returned, South Pacific Post 21 August 1968) to the full statement of 
both the legal and practical situation that was made by the secretary for 
law in Papua New Guinea's House of Assembly in September (HAD 
11(2) :359-360, 4 September 1968) and again in November (HAD 
11(3) :589-590 , 20 November 1968) . Answering questions , Mr Watkins 
stated that 217 refugees had crossed to date, 27 had returned voluntar­
ily and one had been returned (HAD 11(2) :478-479, 1 1  September 
1968) . Shortly thereafter the administrator, David Hay, elaborated 
further in the light of the 'small but steady trickle of illegal squatters in 
the past few months with the numbers building up in recent weeks' 
(TPNG Press Release No. 168A, 31 October 1968). He repeated that 
border crossers unable to give adequate reasons to support an applica­
tion for permissive residence were told to return and were warned of 
the consequences of illegal entry. However, he added that the 
administration was aware that cases may occur where internationally 
recognized principles of humanity required a grant of permissive resi­
dence . The conditions of permissive residence included acceptance of 
settlement away from the border areas and abstention from political 
activity. 
Hay's statement was followed by a number of reports from the 
border on refugee camps and conditions. There was, according to Jack 
McCarthy of the South Pacific Post, a string of camps along the Papua 
New Guinea side of the border at such places as Wutung, Waris, 
Skotiau and Korfor, some of them two years old. Their inmates were 
all qualified people - academics, missionaries, politicians, policemen 
16 My emphasis. Wakefield to the director of the Department of Native Affairs (DNA) 
25 November 1968 recommending a follow-up patrol to that of Sepik District Patrol 
Report, Pagei No. 6 ,  68/69, ADC Bergin to the Sekotchiau-Niau Border area from 29 
September to 6 October 1968. 
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or mechanics - none of whom was allowed to use his skill in Papua New 
Guinea. They asked the minister for Territories for land to grow food 
and were told that they must integrate or return ; Australia could not 
allow minorities to develop (South Pacific Post 6 November 1968) . 
That the camps attracted Indonesia's attention was made clear by 
the incidents at Wutung and Kwari . Of the first, Barnes stated in parli­
ament that on 26 April 1969 a small group of armed uniformed Indone­
sians had entered Papua New Guinea at Wutung in search of Irianese 
who had crossed the border from their bush camp, and in the process 
shots were fired at the Australian officer-in-charge, Tony Try, two 
native constables and an interpreter, none of whom was armed. After 
a prolonged discussion with Try, during which a man held by the 
Indonesians was released, the intruders left. The situation had since 
returned to normal . A second incident took place three weeks later at 
K wari in the Western District when fifteen Indonesian soldiers raided 
a camp nineteen kilometers inside Papua New Guinea on 18 May. A 
patrol set out to investigate and on 29 May district officer Arthur 
Marks was shot by a group of Indonesians when being paddled along 
the Baro River by six Irianese who dived into the water. Only three of 
these subsequently turned up at Kwari and two bodies were found. 
The official statement announcing these events went on to add that in 
the sixteen very difficult square miles of country south of K wari patrols 
had found 254 Irianese (29 men, 48 women and 177 children) who lived 
in six camps scattered throughout the area (TPNG Press Release No. 
532A, 5 June 1969) . 
One result was that Adam Malik subsequently protested that 
offensive action was being directed against Indonesia from Papua New 
Guinea 17 and indeed Australia's own account acknowledges that this 
17 In a report from Jakarta, the Sydney Morning Herald 28 May 1969 recorded Malik's 
statement to the press that Indonesia would be grateful if Australia would prevent the 
existence in Papua New Guinea of 'refugee camps that might be used as training camps' 
as 'a necessary part of a good neighbour policy'. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, Indonesia's 
deputy foreign minister in charge of Pepera, had made the accusation in May. (Although 
Hastings concluded in the Australian 9 May 1969 that Sudjarwo had a 'mild obsession' 
about the master-minding of operations from Papua New Guinea, he also concluded 
there was no doubt that OPM activities were conducted from there, although their main 
function was to send on mail, brochures and propaganda to and from the OPM in West 
New Guinea, Holland and New York. It is interesting to note that Indonesia sub­
sequently saw the liaison arrangements as cooperation to prevent the establishment of 
'training camps' for Irianese rebels in Papua New Guinea according to ANT ARA, 
reported in Canberra Times 2 June 1969.) 
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was so (Goode 1970 :27). The action, however, was not at this stage 
from camps set up by the Australian administration to contain refugees 
as was perhaps implied, for the systematic organization of these was to 
come only as a consequence of the border incidents just described ; and 
the same was true of border liaison arrangements. The numbers which 
crossed the international border in New Guinea in the months 
immediately preceding the Act of Free Choice, and the incidents 
which arose as a result, led Australia to seek to abolish border squatter 
camps, replace them with refugee holding camps for those with both 
reason and desire to stay, and to formalize border liaison arrange­
ments with Indonesia. Before the month in which the Wutung and 
Kwari incidents occurred was out, border liaison arrangements had 
therefore been made between the governments of Australia and 
Indonesia. Even before these were announced in Papua New Guinea's 
House of Assembly on 17 June 1969, a third border episode was added 
to provide reason for them. Two former members of the West New 
Guinea Legislative Council , Wilhelm Zonggonau and Clemens 
Runaweri , entered Papua New Guinea as chairman and vice chairman 
of the West Irianese nationalist body seeking to establish the Austra­
lian attitude to the Act of Free Choice and hoping to take their case to 
the UN General Assembly in New York . They were offered permis­
sive residence, the first such for several months . 
Although only in a limited way, Australia had at last responded to 
the overtures made by Indonesia for cooperation in New Guinea. 
Indonesia had expressed an interest in Australian assistance for the 
development of West New Guinea before the closure of the territory 
to the outside world, and before the development of those foreign 
policies which precluded it. It was to do so again when relations bet­
ween Australia and Indonesia began to improve in 1968. In spite of 
appreciation of the destabilizing effect of an ever-widening gap bet­
ween east and west New Guinea - Papua New Guinea's annual grant at 
this stage was more than $100 million while West New Guinea's was 
only $10 million - border liaison was to be the way Australia's change 
of course was to be charted by the new foreign minister, Gordon 
Freeth. 
Freeth's approach was indicated by his response to the Wutung 
incident, which occurred while he was in Jakarta. On his return to Can­
berra Freeth stated that no formal protest was made about it and none 
would be made (in contrast, Barnes simultaneously spoke of the 
'strong representations' made on the matter) . 'There was a friendly 
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discussion of the incident' ,  Freeth said ((Department of External 
Affairs Press Release No. 51 ,  30 April 1969) , and there had already 
been talks on the border problem in which it was agreed that it was a 
matter for local administrations to handle (Department of External 
Affairs Press Release No. 49, 28 April 1969) . The Sydney Morning 
Herald (28 April 1969) commented that the minister for External 
Affairs's statement at his press conference in Jakarta in April was the 
most direct support of Indonesia's position to date. But Freeth had 
made his attitude quite clear from the outset, both towards Indonesia 
and towards the forthcoming Act of Free Choice . 
In his first speech in his new position, Freeth recognized the right 
of Indonesia to carry out the act of self-determination for West New 
Guinea by the process of musjawarah rather than by one man one 
vote18 , a decision which had been the subject of considerable critical 
debate. He explained that it was essential to live in harmony with 
Indonesia and that whatever happened in West New Guinea was 
bound to affect Papua New Guinea. Ian Hicks, writing in the Sydney 
Morning Herald on 19 February 1969, interpreted the government's 
attitude to be that while one-man-one-vote was desirable it was not 
worth jeopardizing the good relations between Australia and 
Indonesia built up since Sukarno's fall, and there was little to be gained 
from having an independent but economically unsound West New 
Guinea subject to bitter emnity from Indonesia. Freeth went on, in 
parliament and outside it , to resist the suggestion that there was any 
undue coercion in pursuit of the Act, to point out that Indonesia was 
doing the best job it could in the circumstances, and that it was not, 
anyway, Australia's business to judge. 
Perhaps in response to criticism of his cavalier position , in the 
middle of May Freeth addressed the National Press Club in Canberra 
on the subject of regional stability. He explained that the object of reg­
ional stability, and therefore that of Australian diplomacy, was to pre­
vent , where this could be done, incidents or potential sources of con­
flict becoming worked up to crisis proportions. It was this that guided 
Australian policy towards Indonesia, particularly through its confron-
18 He was speaking to the first national convention of Young Liberals and was reported 
in The Age 19 February 1969. The report concluded that many observers interpreted his 
comments as an apology for the Indonesian position which flouts the one man one vote 
principle which 'Australia has defended vigorously elsewhere - and particularly in 
Rhodesia in recent years' . 
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tation of Malaysia, and this continued to be Australia's approach, just 
as it was now Indonesia's :  
Recent border intrusions in New Guinea fit this pattern , 
not as being in any sense comparable to the issues we faced 
during confrontation, but in the sense of carrying the seed 
of dissension. If we are too heavy handed, these seeds 
could quite easily grow to critical size (Department of 
External Affairs Press Release No. 60, 17 May 1969) . 
In an adjournment debate at the end of May Freeth sought to bring 
certain members 'back to a sense of reality' on the West New Guinea 
question (CPD H.of R. 63 :2554-5 , 30 May 1969) and in the process 
himself flew furthest in the face of the facts. He stated unequivocally 
his belief that Indonesia was genuinely trying to carry out its obliga­
tions under the New York Agreement and that criticism was unwar­
ranted until the results of those efforts could be seen. He stated that 
there was no evidence of the repression in West New Guinea to which 
some members drew attention and asked, 'Is Indonesia being charged 
with the administration of that area under this agreement not to main­
tain law and order?' He added that there was 'not a shred of evidence' 
to support the suggestion that Indonesia would hinder the develop­
ment of West New Guinea, since it had already spent considerable 
sums there. Just what did the members expect the government to do in 
any case? 'I suggest that in the interests of maintaining good relations 
with a large neighbour, we should at least give the Indonesians the 
benefit of the doubt and await events as they turn out' .  Freeth's posi­
tion was unpalatable to a large cross-section of Australia's public, 
politicians on both sides of the House 19 , churches , and the local 
Commission of Jurists, and brought a hornet's nest about his ears. 
Common to much of the criticism - and its importance here - was recog­
nition of the overriding need to cultivate good relations with the new 
Indonesia, but not at any price. For who knows what expectations 
were thereby laid down in Indonesia of Australia's reaction to the bor­
der incidents that were to continue in New Guinea over the years , or 
to comparable uncomfortable problems elsewhere? 
In full and indignant flight as the Australian press was prior to 
19 Standish (1969) concluded that only the 'Indonesian lobby' and a few prestigious 
academics and influential columnists supported Freeth and the leader of the opposition's 
earlier echo on West New Guinea. 
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Pepera, West Irian's Act of Free Choice , interest quickly fell off even 
as the Act was underway. Other issues began to dominate the head­
lines. In Papua New Guinea and in the Post-Courier, these were 
Bougainville and the Gazelle, copper and confrontation. The extra 
police contingents which confronted the Mataungan Association in 
Rabaul were those which had earlier been sent to Wutung and Yako. 
In Australia, also, these issues took over from Pepera, along with the 
five power talks on defence and the forthcoming federal election. In 
the course of the campaign for the latter, at the end of the year the Syd­
ney Morning Herald was to declare that the new government would 
have no choice but to strengthen Australia's defence, strengthen its 
regional military involvement and improve relations with its 
neighbours in circumstances in which, it believed, Australia would 
stand alone as never before , as Britain and America were leaving Asia, 
China was emerging as a Southeast Asian power in its own right , and 
the Russians were coming (into the Indian Ocean) 'athwart our trade 
routes' .  Thus even this most trenchant critic of Freeth was aware of the 
pressures which operated on his Indonesia and New Guinea policies. 
These pressures ,  which were changing the face of Southeast Asia, 
centred on the decisions of the UK to withdraw its forces from east of 
Suez, and of the US, under the Nixon Doctrine, to play in future only 
an offshore role in the region's defence . There was thus every interna­
tional encouragement for the stabilization of Indonesia in order that 
she might play her rightful role in the new indigenous balance, and 
every incentive for Australia to improve its relations with Indonesia in 
these new circumstances. The results would be reflected on the border 
in New Guinea. 
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OPM AND THE QUEST FOR WEST PAPUAN UNITY 
Robin Osborne 
For at least 20,000 years , for the indigenous Melanesians of New Guinea, 'foreigners' were people of other language groups, even 
close neighbours. While there was some economic contact between 
different clans , and the formation of alliances, mainly through inter­
marriage , there were also frequent abuses of traditional rights. These 
included the theft of property and natural resources, encroachments 
on land , and the infringement of taboos . Villagers dealt with perceived 
abuses in accordance with customary methods, notably compensation ; 
failing agreement they engaged in retributive 'payback' .  These 
responses can still be seen in the eastern half of the island, Papua New 
Guinea, where some customary law has been incorporated in a mod­
ern legal system and inter-clan warfare remains a regular occurrence, 
especially in the highlands provinces. However in the western half of 
New Guinea, now the province of Irian Jaya , officials have exerted 
much pressure to secure obedience to the laws of the Indonesian state. 
From about the 7th century the local concept of foreigners was 
expanded by the arrival , on an increasing scale, of Asian traders , 
mostly Chinese and Indonesian. The coastal Melanesians were, of 
course , the first to sight and deal with the newcomers ; it was 700 years 
before the interior of the island was also contacted by outsiders. The 
Asians sought natural products such as the scented masoi bark, used 
for traditional medicine, and bird of paradise plumes. While they were 
often prepared to trade for these , rather than simply plunder them, 
dealings were usually disadvantageous for the Papuans. But what 
angered the indigenes most was being taken as slaves , a 'natural 
resource' for which no payment was offered. Predictably, there was 
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strong local resistance to the foreigners. 
From the 16th century European navigators came to the island ; 
they found the Papuans generally unapproachable. In 1605 Captain 
William Janz commanded the first Dutch ship to reach the mainland ; 
while fetching water, nine of his crew were killed by tribespeople and 
reportedly eaten. Eighteen years later the Dutch navigator Jan 
Carstensz wrote that the blacks of the western extremity of New 
Guinea were even more 'cunning, bold and evil-natured' than those 
around Australia's Gulf of Carpentaria (cited in Willey 1979 : 18) . 
Another European visitor of this time noted that Muslims from the 
Indonesian archipelago were in the habit of attacking the Papuans with 
what was then modern weaponry as well as trying to win converts to 
Islam. 
The Dutch eventually gained supremacy over their European 
competitors in the race to gain permanent footholds on the New 
Guinea coast. The aim was to establish bases which would assist in the 
dominance of the spice trade , centred in the nearby Moluccan islands. 
Due to local opposition, Holland maintained minimal contact with the 
Papuans, even after the territory was proclaimed a Dutch possession in 
1848 . 1  However the Dutch, unlike the clan enemies of old, attempted 
to exert lasting control over the peoples' land (and waters). This was 
much resented. So too was the Papuans' lack of participation in the 
slim bureaucracy developed by Holland prior to the second world war. 
Those civil service positions not occupied by the Dutch were offered to 
trusted Asians from nearby islands of the Netherlands Indies. 
As a result there was initial enthusiasm upon the arrival of Japan's 
imperial forces which promised , as they had elsewhere in the Asia­
Pacific region, a liberation from white colonial rule. In fact, the 
Japanese showed that they were more concerned with consolidating an 
empire of their own. There were outbreaks of resistance in various 
parts of West New Guinea, including resurgences of the millenarian, 
cargo and messianic cults which portrayed rebellion in religious terms. 
Japanese reprisals were often savage, whole villages sometimes being 
eliminated (Wilson 1975 ; Worsley 1957). 
The most obviously nationalistic opposition to Japan was the 
1 Holland had earlier 'administered' the New Guinea islands through the sultan of 
Tidore , an Asian involvement that was later used by Indonesia to support its claim of his­
torical links with the area. But it is clear that the sultanate did not enjoy unfettered con­
trol. See letter from First Secretary of Tidore in Whittaker et al. (1975 :208). 
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revolt of the Geelvink islands people , which culminated in 1942 in a 
proclamation of independence and the raising of a national flag. The 
standard's design featured the 'Morning Star' which was personified in 
local mythology. 
In 1944 the Allies ousted Japan and handed West New Guinea 
back to Holland. After the war, when the Dutch realized they would 
lose their Indies to the Indonesian nationalists led by Sukarno, they 
decided to 'hold the line' at New Guinea . The transfer of this wes­
ternmost territory was excluded from the agreement of 1949 which 
gave the rest of Indonesia its independence . The Dutch felt that New 
Guinea could be a suitable base for a re-entry to Indonesia in the event 
of a collapse of the republican government. They were also interested 
in the territory's resources potential, especially oil. 
Holland was realistic enough to accept that the colonial days were 
ending. Thus it decided to prepare the territory for independence in 
the hope that a Papuan leadership fostered by Holland would be 
generous to Dutch business interests . The proposed deadline for inde­
pendence was 1970. 
Holland launched a programme aimed at rapidly educating a 
Papuan elite. Administrators, technicians , police and army received 
training and encouragement from the Dutch (Savage 1978a) . The local 
elite was also urged to think politically. Not all members, however, 
endorsed the Dutch-sponsored independence plan. Some denounced 
it as a 'neo-colonial ploy' and felt that Papuans' best hopes lay with 
Indonesia, which had become a vocal leader of the world anti-colonial 
movement . This group, in the words of one Papuan writer, 'saw 
Indonesia as a potential partner to get the Dutch out of West New 
Guinea' ('West Papuan nationalism : an inside view' in May 
1979b : 134) . Most of its supporters were from Biak Island and many 
joined two pro-Indonesia political parties that had been formed by 
Indonesians who settled in New Guinea earlier in the Dutch occupa­
tion. 
This split in the independence movement, along both tactical and 
geographical lines , was to hamper the Papuan cause for the next 
twenty years. Only since late 1983 have there been signs that the divi­
sions are healed. 
The anti-Indonesia forces were led by the New Guinea Unity 
Movement , which managed to gain some defections from the opposite 
camp. Another movement, the Christian Workers Union of New 
Guinea, came to represent the rights of Papuans employed mainly 
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within the government. This organization was responsible for the 
founding of Parna (Partai Nasional - National Party) in 1960. As Sav­
age has noted, Parna's demands - localization , education ,  access to 
credit facilities - were indicative of its petty bourgeois orientation 
(op.cit. :983) . There was little concern for, or liaison with, the rural vil­
lagers who comprised the majority of the population. 
In early 1961 national elections were held for the newly-formed 
New Guinea Council and twenty-two out of twenty-eight seats were 
gained by Melanesians . In the next year, ten Regional Councils were 
established. Holland's aim was to dampen pro-Indonesian sentiments 
among the educated elite. 
Soon, five of the Papuan members of the Council had formed the 
National Committee (Komite Nasional) and convened a meeting at 
which some seventy people chose a flag, an anthem and a name - Papua 
Barat (West Papua) - for their country. Again there were no real links 
with the common people. However the Committee's work received 
widespread publicity through the distribution of leaflets, and Dutch 
cooperation. On 1 December 1961 the Morning Star flag was raised 
beside the Dutch tricolour. It was to have 'the briefest life of any 
emblem in the history of colonial heraldry in Asia' (Lockwood 
1982 :263-264) . 
During this period of Dutch activity the Indonesian government 
was similarly active . President Sukarno made it clear through fiery 
speeches that Indonesia's determination to incorporate 'West Irian' 
was irreversible. As a clear sign that his international lobbying might 
soon be backed by military force, he approached the US and then the 
USSR for weapons . From the latter he received a $US450 million 'soft 
loan' for a variety of arms, including tanks, rockets, fighter planes and 
bombers. A 'liberation force' was assembled under the command of 
Major-General Suharto, specially promoted from colonel to head the 
'Mandala' force . He was later to become Indonesia's president. 
There were naval engagements with Holland and in 1962 Indone­
sian paratroops began dropping onto New Guinea. This latest wave of 
newcomers received a hostile reception, not only from the Dutch but 
from the Papuans, including villagers in remote areas. Of the 1 ,419 
troops dropped on New Guinea, 216 were killed or never found and 
296 were captured (McDonald 1980) . After much pressure from 
abroad, notably the US and Australia, the Dutch conceded that West 
Irian was a lost cause . On 15 August 1962 it was announced that 
Indonesia would take over the territory after an eight-month interim 
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period supervised by a United Nations Temporary Executive Author­
ity (UNTEA) . A national congress of ninety Papuan leaders accepted 
the decision , agreed to cooperate with both UN and Indonesian 
administrations, and asked for a plebiscite as soon as possible after the 
UNTEA's mandate ended. From this time, sentiments among West­
ern-educated Papuans began to shift to a pro-Papuan, rather than a 
pro-Indonesian or pro-Dutch viewpoint (van der Veur 1964) . To 
further this aim they placed their faith in the UN peacekeepers ; but 
they were to be disappointed , an outcome which came as no surprise 
to the pro-Dutch Papuans who had joined in the colonials' exodus back 
to Holland . 
Soon the Indonesian military outnumbered the UNTEA officials 
and began to strike savagely at expressions of resistance . This policy 
accelerated after the UNTEA's departure and continued in the follow­
ing years. The Papuan elite's last hope rested with the referendum 
which, as part of the peace accord, Indonesia had promised would be 
held before the end of 1969. Again the UN came in to supervise , but it 
clearly lacked both the will and the resources to ensure a genuine poll. 
Although the report of the UN's representative , Fernando Ortiz­
Sans, expressed reservations about the so-called Act of Free Choice , it 
supported the outcome which was a 'unanimous' vote by the 'represen­
tatives' of the Papuan people to continue as a part of Indonesia. The 
Ortiz-Sans report was accepted by the UN General Assembly, thus 
giving Indonesia international approval to remain in control. This 
marked the end of the resistance's domination by the Papuan elite : 
The history of the national liberation struggle in West Irian 
is to a large extent the story of the misfortunes of the edu­
cated petty-bourgeoisie : their successive attempts to make 
linkages with a variety of foreign elements : the Dutch col­
onialists, the Indonesian 'middle strata' colonisers and 
political exiles in Dutch New Guinea, the United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (U.N.T.E.A.) and the 
Indonesian pre-1969 administration. It is the story of the 
successive failures of this category, and of the divisions that 
emerged within it. Finally, left with nowhere else to turn, 
elements of the educated petty-bourgeoisie have turned 
inwards and have sought to make linkages with the peasant 
and proto-peasant masses and have chosen the road of 
organised armed struggle (Savage 1978b: 143) .  
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That this struggle was being called by the name 'OPM' (Or­
ganisasi: Papua Merdeka) at the time of the Act of Free Choice was 
noted by journalists who covered the polling. The title apparently had 
been coined by supporters of the self-styled 'president-in-exile' ,  Mar­
kus Kaisiepo , amongst the Arfak people of the Manokwari area. One 
witness of the Act has recalled being told that the 'organization' was 
more in the manner of a general movement. 'We are all OPM' , a 
Papuan pastor was quoted as saying (B . May 1978 :182) .  However 
there were several well-coordinated underground groups which lent 
their weight to the OPM. A prominent one was the Lovers of the 
Motherland (Pecinta Tanah Air) which had a youth wing (Pentana 
Muda) and produced journals such as Melanesian Triumph and The 
Voice of Liberty. These groups arranged demonstrations against the 
Act, including one on 1 1  April 1969 in front of the Office of the UN 
representative , Ortiz-Sans. Indonesia reacted strongly to this opposi­
tion. One demonstrator, Celsius Wapai , now living in Papua New 
Guinea, has said that during interrogation he was beaten, given elec­
tric shocks and burnt with lighted cigarettes. 
The OPM 
Indonesia regarded the UN's endorsement of the Act of Free 
Choice as a green light to crack down on rebelliousness. Military and 
intelligence officials were given greater powers to harrass alleged dissi­
dents and many detainees were subjected to harsh interrogation and 
imprisonment. Instances of anti-Indonesian activity were countered 
with strong reprisals. These, combined with the rising number of 
immigrants from other parts of Indonesia, further alienated the local 
population. But they encouraged an alliance between different strata 
of Melanesian society and also fostered cooperation between the two 
main factions, though past animosity often overrode the importance of 
uniting against the common enemy. Proper coordination was further 
frustrated by claims to control of the movement by some of the leading 
Papuans who had gone overseas. Among the better-known emigres 
were Nicolaas Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo, who lobbied on behalf of 
the West Papua cause from Holland and Herman Womsiwor and, 
later, Ben Tanggahma,  based in the African state of Senegal. 
The epitome of factional opportunism, and a good illustration of 
the difficulty of proper liaison with supporters abroad, was the decision 
of the OPM's Biak group to declare West Papuan independence on 1 
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July 1971 .  Not the least of its goals was to beat the other main group, 
also centred in the Jayapura-Papua New Guinea border area, in the 
propaganda stakes and so to legitimize its claim to the leadership of the 
whole movement . It failed on both counts. The news that indepen­
dence had been proclaimed did not travel from the New Guinea jungle 
to the waiting supporters in London at the appointed time. Nor did the 
entire movement fall into line behind the new president, 'Brigadier 
General' Seth Rumkorem, whose proclamation was broadcast over a 
short-wave radio captured in the Indonesian outpost of Waris . The 
proclamation read: 
To all the Papuan people , from Numbay Jayapura to 
Merauke , from Sarong to Baliem Star Mountains and from 
Biak to the isle of Adi : With God's blessing, we take this 
opportunity today to announce to you all that. . . .  the land 
and the people of Papua have been declared to be free and 
independent (de facto and de jure) . May God be with us , 
and let it be known to the world that the sincere wish of the 
Papuan people to be free and independent in their own 
country is hereby fulfilled. 
But whatever other Papuans might have felt about the former 
Indonesian army officer turned guerilla, and the bloc he represented, 
they decided to endorse his proclamation and have done so ever since . 
In addition there has been consensus over the use of the Morning Star 
flag, the national symbol of the crested goura pigeon, the anthem 'O, 
My Land of Papua' , and the 129 articles of the Provisional Constitution 
of the Republic of West Papua which have been printed in a handsome 
blue booklet. The motto of the resistance is 'One People ,  One Soul' 
although over the years there have been numerous occasions when this 
expression of unity has been ignored in favour of pursuing factional 
vendettas. Mostly the in-fighting has been done with words but some­
times the two main arms of the OPM have come to blows. 
The years from 1971 to 1976 were marked by improved links bet­
ween the OPM's founding elite and village supporters. Instead of 
destroying the OPM, Indonesian reprisals served to increase the 
strength of the resistance , especially in rural areas. Many villagers 
joined the regular guerilla groups in the jungle, meeting there the 
urban elite for whom town life had become impossible . The most suit­
able area for such activity was the jungle along the Papua New Guinea 
border. From there, relatively safe sanctuary could be found in the 
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neighbouring country. But the mid 1970s also saw the development of 
an anti-Indonesian consciousness among Papuans throughout the 
land. Attacks on government outposts and patrols increased. Modern 
light arms, mostly of US origin, were seized from Indonesian soldiers 
and added to the existing supply of rather ancient arms and traditional 
weapons. 
In 1976 the subject of arms supply - or lack thereof - sparked off a 
dispute between two of OPM's military commanders, Rumkorem and 
Jacob Prai . The former said that the movement should break with past 
practice and seek weapons abroad, if necessary from socialist coun­
tries. Prai, however, insisted that self-sufficiency be adhered to. An 
angry confrontation followed , during which the pair also argued over 
who was entitled to keep a batch of written records relating to the West 
Papua Liberation Front (Front Komando Pembebasan Papua Barat) 
formed in 1969. The showdown resulted in Prai's leaving the camp and 
heading for his home area of Ubrub in the border area. A few months 
later one of Prai's guerillas led an attack on the Rumkorem group at a 
sago-gathering camp called Suhampa, on the Papua New Guinea side 
of the border. Some hostages were taken and the news reported back 
to Rumkorem who , with many of his Biak Island supporters, had 
established a permanent camp near Bonay beach, on the north coast. 
Attempts to heal the rift failed and the two groups began to oper­
ate independently of each other. The pro-Prai faction called itself 
'Pemka' (an acronym from Pemulihan Keadilan) , Command for the 
Restoration of Justice. Its political organization was the de facto Gov­
ernment of West Papua and its military wing the Liberation Army (Te­
penal, or Papenal) . The originally-Biak group was known as the Provi­
sional Revolutionary Government and its army the TPN, or Libera­
tion Forces. The latter's main overseas supporter was the Senegal­
based Ben Tanggahma. The sympathies of the Papuan emigres in 
Europe lay mostly with the Pemka force although these Holland-based 
leaders had become somewhat out of touch with the realities of the dis­
tant 'field of struggle' .  
The role of the overseas supporters was mainly propagandist , 
ranging from lobbying members of the UN through to the running of 
a 'South Pacific News Service' which disseminated regular releases to 
the foreign press. There was no channelling of arms , although printed 
material , letterheads, seals and even some badges of rank were smug­
gled into the guerilla areas , often through Papua New Guinea where 
there were groups of sympathetic Papuan emigres . 
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While OPM's internecine rivalry continued, the movement did 
not lose sight of its real enemy. Clashes between fulltime guerillas and 
pro-OPM villagers on the one hand, and the Indonesian forces on the 
other, intensified as Indonesia's national election, set for May 1977, 
approached. Government troops, backed by aerial support , struck 
back against Papuan communities in several areas, including some 
located far from the border area. One focus of intense fighting was the 
central highlands, particularly the Baliem valley and the site of the 
Freeport copper mine at Tembagapura. 
The bloody events of 1977-78 have been well documented (Sharp 
1977 ; May 1980 ; TAPOL 1984) . It was clear that, despite Indonesia's 
claims to the contrary, the fighting was not a protracted outbreak of tri­
bal fighting but an acceleration of the nationalist resistance . The feroc­
ity of Indonesian reprisals became so intense that the OPM had no 
time to concern itself with rival factions , 'enemies under the same mos­
quito net ' .  As a result of the conflict, perhaps as many as 3 ,OOO Papuan 
villagers crossed the border into Papua New Guinea seeking tempor­
ary asylum. 
Among the refugees were Jacob Prai and his deputy, Otto 
Ondowame. Although only 34 years old , Prai had been fighting for a 
decade and was in poor health. The pair were arrested by Papua New 
Guinea authorities and after complicated legal and diplomatic moves 
deported to permanent exile in Sweden. By sending Prai far from the 
battle front both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea hoped to cripple 
the resistance . What they failed to recognize was that a nationalist 
movement is unlikely to be destroyed by the loss of one military com­
mander. Still in the jungle was the Tapenal force which Prai had 
developed . In addition, Rumkorem remained active . 
After Prai's departure the OPM-Pemka group reorganized its 
command structure. The new leader was Marthin Tabu. Before falling 
into Indonesian hands, Tabu would become best known for his follow­
ers' destruction of an Army helicopter, killing of its crew and the 
abduction of its passengers , who included the speaker of the local 
assembly. It was not long after Prai's departure that a Papua New 
Guinea-based journalist could write that the 'initial euphoria (felt by 
Indonesia and PNG) was . . .  evaporating rapidly' (Age 31 January 
1979) . 
After the demise of Tabu came 'General' Elky Berney but he too 
disappeared in 1981.  The military leadership of OPM-Pemka passed to 
James Nyaro who continued to command Tapenal in 1984 . Nyaro is a 
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highly educated Melanesian who studied agriculture in the Nether­
lands . He was formerly married to a German, who is reportedly still 
living in Jayapura , but now has a local wife . He went into the jungle 
only in about 1982, leaving behind his life as a senior public servant. 
When the widespread uprisings of the late 1970s subsided, and 
Indonesian reprisals were scaled down, the OPM again turned its 
attention inwards . In July 1981 Papua New Guinea officials announced 
that there had been a major clash between rival factions near Wutung, 
on the border. Several deaths were reported after members of the 
Berney-led Pemka group attacked a camp of Rumkorem's guerillas, 
using automatic weapons. Eleven hostages were taken and imprisoned 
in harsh circumstances . A Papua New Guinea newspaper said that 
seven of them had died after being housed in metre-wide cages 
resembling pig-pens.  Several were apparently murdered (Niugini Nius 
9 July 1981 , 24 February 1982) . 
The factional struggle was reflected in splits in the emigre com­
munity in Papua New Guinea, particularly in Port Moresby. Each 
group made public statements denouncing the other. Their attention 
was diverted temporarily by news of a bold attack by the Genyem sec­
tion of OPM which attacked a timber camp near the capital. Eighteen 
Indonesian hostages and a Malaysian-Chinese were led off into the 
jungle. A ransom demand was made for $US2 million and an air-drop 
of 100 machine guns. Eight months later the hostages were freed as a 
result of intervention by a Papua New Guinea official who crossed 
alone into Indonesia and made contact with the guerillas . Because of 
their ordeal the hostages were in poor health ; some had died (although 
one had married a guerilla, another example of the so-called 'Stoc­
kholm syndrome') .  The affair was a public relations disaster for the 
OPM which was seen by many outsiders as having maltreated innocent 
civilians. It was also an embarrassment for Indonesia which, unable to 
locate the guerillas, had insisted that they were sheltering in Papua 
New Guinea. The hostage debacle, and the continuing factional prob­
lems, caused alarm among West Papuan nationalists . In February 1982 
the underground West Papuan Students League sent a memo to other 
pro-OPM groups expressing concern about the frequent public differ­
ences between the two main blocs. It said the fighting was 'not benefi­
cial to our revolution' .  Three months later, in Oegsteest , Holland, a 
summit of all the main West Papuan leaders took place . A resident of 
Papua New Guinea, who supported the Pemka group, returned from 
the meeting saying that there were strong pressures for unity but a 
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genuine reconciliation had not yet occurred . 
In September 1982 the leader of the Victoria group, Seth Rum­
korem, was arrested by Papua New Guinea authorities off Rabaul, 
having left Irian Jaya with several followers in a motorized outrigger. 
The party was bound for Vanuatu where they believed the Lini govern­
ment would grant them sanctuary. (Later, while visiting Papua New 
Guinea, Fr Lini said that his country could not accept any more West 
Papuans than the few who had previously been granted residency.) 
The Papua New Guinea representative of the UN High Commis­
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found Rumkorem a difficult person to 
resettle abroad. All the countries in the region turned him down, as did 
several European countries . It was felt that he could not be sent to 
Sweden because of the risk of his clashing with Prai. After more than 
a year in Papua New Guinea Rumkorem was accepted for temporary 
asylum in Greece . Before he boarded his flight at Port Moresby airport 
he was greeted cordially by local representatives of the Pemka faction. 
Cynics might suggest that Pemka was being friendly to Rumkorem 
because it was glad to see the end of him. However feelings of solidar­
ity were expressed and the next day a prominent (if somewhat indi­
vidualistic) West Papuan , Henk Joku, told the Papua New Guinea 
press that previously warring factions were now united under a single 
field commander, Pemka's James Nyaro (Times of PNG 2 December 
1983) . 
Given the OPM's history of factionalism , this announcement was 
treated with scepticism by the press, the government (in private) and 
foreign observers. However the events of February-May 1984 seemed 
to give support to OPM's claim of emerging unity. 
In early 1984 Indonesian intelligence received information that 
OPM members in the Jayapura area were planning a large-scale upris­
ing. According to Papua New Guinea's Justice minister , Tony Bais , 
the tip-off had been given to Indonesia by Papua New Guinea intelli­
gence. The resistance has since said that the uprising was provoked by 
ongoing Indonesian policies , particularly the transmigration prog­
ramme which has been most intensive in the border area. The OPM 
explained that it was also angered by the detention, in the previous 
November, of about thirty Papuans suspected of OPM sympathy. The 
most prominent of the detainees was Arnold Ap, curator of the ethnol­
ogy museum at Cendrawasih University and director of the Mambesak 
cultural troupe. Ap, along with two or three friends, was shot dead by 
the Indonesian military in late April 1984, allegedly after escaping. (It 
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is likely that he was killed by a military death squad from the Kopas­
sandha (Red Beret) unit which was involved in the street executions in 
Java and had earlier been holding him (National Times 1 1-17 May 
1984) . )  
Pre-emptive action by Indonesian security averted the uprising 
but did not stop a series of minor attacks in Biak, Sarong, Manokwari 
and Jayapura. The best publicized incident was an OPM flag-raising 
attempt outside the provincial government building in the capital . 
The attacks in and around Jayapura involved both main OPM fac­
tions. They were led by 0. Joweni (Victoria group) , Y .  Hembring 
(Pemka) and a J.  Awom who was formerly second-in-command of a 
Mobile Brigade unit of the Indonesian army . 
In response to the uprising attempt Indonesia launched a security 
crackdown on suspected OPM supporters in both urban and rural 
areas . The focus was the border area and in time over 1 1 ,000 Papuans 
had crossed into Papua New Guinea as refugees. This was the largest 
flow of border crossers since the Indonesian arrival in 1962-63. Of par­
ticular relevance is the fact that both of the OPM's main factions were 
in action, sometimes together, against the Indonesian military. 
The refugee crisis , and the concurrent visit of Pope John Paul II, 
attracted much media attention to Papua New Guinea. Journalists 
who visited the refugee camps reported meeting numerous people who 
felt that their involvement with the OPM would endanger their lives if 
they returned to Irian ; the UN representative estimated that 10 per 
cent were in this category. Included in their number were supporters of 
both Pemka and Victoria factions. Some were members of the urban 
elite from Jayapura-Sentani , others were villagers . 
Descriptions of camp life seemed to indicate that the proximity of 
the different factions had not led to serious clashes, verbal or physical . 
(This was not the case in the late 1970s when refugees at the Wabo and 
Y ako camps created separate living areas and often engaged in faction 
fights .)  According to reports by both the UNHCR representative and 
The Age (30 April 1984) , in 1984 the refugees in Vanimo had segre­
gated in accordance with a 'social pecking order' rather than factional 
or even clan allegiances. At one end of the camp, near the water, the 
middle class was grouped together ; Papuan deserters from the Indone­
sian military lived in another spot while villagers and fishing families 
were living in the most inhospitable part of the camp. 
Of the journalists who visited the border zone during this period , 
two - an Australian (Damien Murphy) and a Papua New Guinean 
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(Neville Togarewa) - managed to walk into Irian Jaya and interview 
OPM-Pemka leaders. Both found the OPM's leadership greatly lack­
ing in resources. The Australian wrote that the movement was 'on an 
ultimately quixotic quest' .  When asked the size of the guerilla force 
along the border, the leadership was said to have spent some time cal­
culating figures before estimating it at 5000. Papua New Guinea intel­
ligence believed that at that time there were about 1000 full- and part­
time guerillas in the kabupaten of Jayapura (Sydney Morning Herald 2 
May 1984) . Rumkorem has since said that his Victoria group has 500 
guerillas , and the Pemka group about 1 ,600. Around the Freeport 
mine site and Enarotali , Paniai Lakes, another 2 ,000 were in place. In 
all, he claimed a total force of 30,000-50,000, admitting they greatly 
lacked modern arms (TAPOL Bulletin 62, March 1984). 
The Papua New Guinean journalist Togarewa interviewed the 
leadership of the West Papua Senate , a twenty-minister underground 
cabinet which has taken over the function of the former de facto gov­
ernment . The Senate's chairman, Fisor Yarisetouw, explained the 
movement's goal : 
Our dream is to have one parliament, one government for 
all Melanesians from Sarong in the west of Irian to Samarai 
in the east of mainland Papua New Guinea where you don't 
need a passport or identification card to travel from one 
end of the island to the other. You have a house with two 
rooms , one represents West PNG, the other East PNG. If 
the house is burning, it is foolish for the occupant of one 
room not to help the other to put out the fire and save the 
house and both rooms (Times of PNG 15 March 1984) . 
Yarisetouw, unlike so many resistance leaders before him, is not 
an intellectual but a coastal villager who went into the bush in 1973 
after completing high school .  He told Togarewa that OPM stood for 
democracy and Christianity, an orientation that is emphasized in the 
preamble to the West Papua Constitution. He insisted that help would 
not be sought from communist nations , a policy that may however be 
ignored by Rumkorem who said on leaving Papua New Guinea for 
exile that arms would be accepted from any donor regardless of its poli­
tics. Oddly, Yarisetouw told his interviewer that Indonesia itself was 
communist ; the Indonesian Communist Party was a strong advocate of 
the Irian takeover and active in the military operations when 
Yarisetouw was only a young teenager in 1962 and doubtless he heard 
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his christian relatives speaking of the communists' involvement. 
Another OPM leader interviewed recently by journalists was the pres­
ident and military commander, James Nyaro. In an interview with 
ABC-TV's 'Four Corners' programme, which caused some con­
troversy before it went to air in late May 1984, Nyaro admitted that his 
followers were short of modern arms and said that though , as a christ­
ian , he regretted the killing of his Indonesian enemies, 
. . .  in the revolution time we must kill them - against another 
nation that makes us harm : . . .  my heart feels so . I'm not 
afraid of them. I will fight so long as I live. When I get my 
independence I can stop it. Until they're out of my country, 
then I will stop it. 
During the recent refugee crisis two Indonesian military jets were 
reported to have crossed the border and caused a panic when they flew 
low over Papua New Guinea's Green River settlement. On receiving 
Papua New Guinea's official protests, Jakarta officials remarked that 
their neighbour was being overly sensitive ; after all, they suggested, 
Papua New Guinea had done little to inhibit the OPM's cross-border 
movements. While essentially true, this statement implies that 
sanctuary in Papua New Guinea is the OPM's lifeline. In fact the 
majority of OPM supporters , active or covert , never enter Papua New 
Guinea : even in the unlikely event that Papua New Guinea could mus­
ter the political will - in the face of public sentiment - and the logistic 
support to effectively seal the border, the OPM would continue to 
operate . This was shown in May 1985 when 200 Papua New Guinea 
soldiers and riot police were despatched to the border station of 
Bewani in response to the detention of a Posts and Telegraphs Depart­
ment helicopter which had mistakenly landed near an OPM camp. The 
troops did not manage to trace any guerillas and succeeded only in 
destroying some deserted huts. As has happened so often in the past, 
on both sides of the border, the OPM had melted back into the bush. 
Despite the harshness of jungle life , the OPM remains effective 
there and in early 1985 was showing signs of uniting its long-feuding 
factions. In the Netherlands , too , West Papuan emigres had begun to 
develop a new solidarity, largely due, they said, to their exclusion of 
the old-timers such as Nicolaas Jouwe, who they felt could not 
appreciate the current state of play. The West Papuan People's Front, 
formed in 1984 , comprised the sons (and, less actively, the daughters) 
of the leaders who had moved to Holland in 1962-63. Among the mem-
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bers of the front were Victor Kaisiepo, whose father, Markus, was well 
known in earlier years, Eliezer Bonay, the former governor of Irian 
Jaya who had fled to Papua New Guinea, and four younger Melane­
sians who had gained sanctuary in the Dutch embassy in Jakarta, and 
asylum in Holland in 1984. Like the guerillas in the bush , these OPM 
were strongly critical of the factionally-inclined emigre community in 
Port Moresby, feeling it was hampering the cause . 
The first major initiative of the Front was the raising of funds 
amongst emigres in Holland to buy air tickets so that OPM faction 
leaders Seth Rumkorem and Jacob Prai could travel to Vanuatu to 
attend the ruling Vanuaaku Pati's annual congress , scheduled to be 
held in mid July 1985 on the island of Tanna. However, when Rum­
korem tried to collect his Qantas ticket from an Athens travel agent he 
was told that the Australian government had refused him a visa to 
transit at Sydney airport for three hours prior to conecting with his 
flight to Port Vila. Undeterred, he rerouted through USA and Fij i and 
in due course reached Vanuatu where he met his former comrade for 
the first time since 1976. After lengthy negotiations the pair vowed to 
bury past differences , co-authoring a pact dubbed the 'Declaration of 
Port Vila' . They remained in Vanuatu for a month, hosted by the gov­
ernment and liaising closely with local OPM representative Rex 
Rumakiek . Rumkorem appears to have been more flexible regarding 
his exclusive claim to the title of OPM 'president' , an insistence that 
had prevented him gaining permission to migrate to Vanuatu in 1983 
when he was living in temporary asylum in Rabaul, Papua New 
Guinea. 
Conclusion 
From earliest times the Melanesians of West New Guinea have 
shown their willingness to fight outsiders when they felt their rights 
were threatened. Indonesian policies in modern Irian Jaya present a 
greater threat than any yet encountered and this awareness has spread 
throughout the indigenous population. Even observers sympathetic to 
Indonesia's presence in Irian have estimated that 80 per cent of 
Papuans would vote against integration if given a genuine plebiscite. 
An attempt at a military takeover by the OPM could not succeed. 
As in past years, however, it is likely to have some victories against 
Indonesia, both on the battlefield and in the propaganda war being 
waged in the foreign media. 
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The tenacity of the movement has so far won no concessions from 
Jakarta officialdom. However in mid 1984 there was a sign that the 
government was considering the 'softening' of its stance in Irian Jaya. 
Advocates for more humane development policies included non-gov­
ernmental organisations in Jakarta and some officials (Feith 1984). 
Peter Hastings has written that even Irian's military commander, Gen. 
Sembiring Meliala, has strong doubts about Transmigration to the pro­
vince. Given the population's propensity for exacting 'payback' it 
seems likely that past actions would be forgotten if Indonesian policy 
were to moderate at this stage . 
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DOES INDONESIA HA VE EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS 
ON PAPUA NEW GUINEA? 
J .A.C. Mackie 
This paper had its origins in a talk I gave at the University of Papua New Guinea shortly after the September 1978 Waigani seminar, 
in which I attempted to answer various comments made there to the 
effect that Indonesia's foreign policies were inherently expansionist. It 
was a time of strained relations between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea because of several border incidents earlier in 1978, which were 
regarded by many people in Papua New Guinea as indications that 
Indonesia aspired to dominate and perhaps ultimately to annex the 
eastern half of the island. 
Comments of this kind were usually based on three types of argu­
ment. According to one of these, the fact that the Indonesian govern­
ment was putting pressure on Papua New Guinea to cooperate militar­
ily with her in trying to seal the border against the Irianese dissidents 
seeking refuge in the east was to be seen as merely the first in a series 
of demands which , unless resisted from the outset, would culminate 
eventually in the complete subjugation of Papua New Guinea. We 
could call this the 'the thin end of the wedge' interpretation. My own 
belief was that Indonesia's objectives on that occasion were - and still 
are - merely limited ones to do with her way of handling the border­
crossing problem ; there was no reason to believe she had broader and 
more sinister designs for the ultimate annexation of Papua New. 
Guinea as a whole. It is not surprising that many people in Papua New 
Guinea did not see it that way. It was understandable that many people 
in Papua New Guinea took a more sceptical and suspicious view of 
what was happening across the border and of Indonesia's intentions. 
They were uneasy about the whole record of Indonesian policy in Irian 
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Jaya and often not well informed of the motives behind her policies 
and actions . They felt strongly that the Melanesian inhabitants of Irian 
Jaya were their blood brothers , hence they were hostile even towards 
Indonesia's limited goal of closing the border against OPM members 
taking advantage of the opportunities for easy sanctuary it provided. 
But that in itself was (and is) not an adequate reason for making the 
further inference that Indonesia has unlimited expansionist ambitions. 
The second type of argument advanced by critics of Indonesia's 
policies hinged on the proposition that her expansionist appetites had 
already been amply demonstrated by the seizure of East Tim or, by her 
'confrontation' of Malaysia in 1963-66 (referred to hereafter simply as 
konfrontasi) and by her earlier campaign to gain control of Irian J aya 
over the years 1950-62. It is this second argument - about the conclu­
sions to be drawn from the historical record regarding the supposedly 
'expansionist' character of Indonesia's foreign policies - which consti­
tutes the central theme of this paper. If one looks only at this sequence 
of events, the three episodes involving the use of force around 
Indonesia's borders, apparently directed towards the acquisition of 
territory, it is very easy to jump to the conclusion that they constitute 
evidence of territorial expansionism. Yet when we examine the moti­
vations and political dynamics behind each of these episodes we find 
that however we define territorial expansionism, it has not been a sig­
nificant causal factor. At this point, we should first define what 'expan­
sionism' means as precisely as possible . I am interpreting it here to 
mean a desire to annex additional territory either 
(i) for the sake of more lebensraum (living space) or resources (oil, 
copper, timber, etc . ) ,  that is for essentially economic reasons ; 
(ii) for the sake of demonstrating the national power so as to intimi­
date neighbours ; 
(iii) because of an ideology of national greatness, power and vigour, 
as in the case of Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany ; 
(iv) for irredentist reasons (to recover parts of the national territory 
which have been lost in the past) , or 
(v) because of a belief that the nation has a historic mission to rees­
tablish its ancient or mythical boundaries, as in the case of Rus­
sian pan-Slavic movements in the late 19th Century . 
None of these motivations has played any significant part in shaping 
Indonesia's foreign policies since independence , with the possible 
exception of the last two (and I would even query those) . I will later 
give some attention briefly to this last possibility, however, for several 
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articles have been written, with titles like 'The Potential for Indone­
sian Expansionism' (Gordon 1963-64) to explain her foreign policy 
objectives in the 1963-66 konfrontasi episode, and these have gained 
wider circulation than they deserve . They were based primarily on the 
Indonesia Raya , or 'Greater Indonesia' , theory - that is that the coun­
try's leaders have constantly nurtured irredentist aspirations to redraw 
their national boundaries in accordance with the historic boundaries of 
ancient empires like Majapahit. In my study of the causes of konfron­
tasi, however, I found this theory utterly erroneous and irrelevant. 1 
It is equally irrelevant as an explanation of the invasion of Timor, 
although the Timor affair did indeed revive many of the old fears that 
Indonesia has an ominous appetite for additional territory because it 
was not easy to understand her motivations according to any clearly 
discernible explanation. It is even less relevant, I think, to Indonesian 
thinking about Papua New Guinea, for reasons I will outline later in 
the paper. 
I will say something more about the lebensraum argument at the 
end of this paper, because people in Australia and Papua New Guinea 
frequently misinterpret the significance of lndonesia's ' transmigration' 
programme as if it represented part of an expansionist drive to shift 
people from overcrowded Java to other parts of the archipelago, or 
beyond. It is easy to draw the further inference that population pres­
sure will in due course require her to look beyond her national bound­
aries for more land ; yet such an inference would be quite erroneous . 
Anyone who is at all familiar with the history and workings of the 
transmigration programme is likely to find this an extremely far­
fetched proposition, for reasons I will set out below. In saying that I do 
not deny that the social and demographic consequences of large-scale 
immigration of Javanese into Irian J aya are likely to create serious ten­
sions there between the newcomers and the indigenous population. 
Understandably, people in Papua New Guinea with Pan-Melanesian 
sympathies will also be disturbed by the consequences of those ten­
sions. But to assert that the transmigration programme represents an 
expansionist drive to gobble up more territory as a means of solving 
Java's population pressures is to exaggerate beyond the bounds of 
probability . 
A third type of argument, which one most frequently encounters 
' For a fuller discussion of the Indonesia Raya theory and the Malaysian propaganda use 
of it, see Mackie (1974 : 2 1 -4,  326-7 and the references cited therein).  
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among radical critics of the Indonesian government, is one I will call 
the 'analogy with fascism' argument - that is, the proposition that 
expansionism tends to be an inherent structural characteristic of milit­
ary or authoritarian or avowedly fascist regimes. Hence, since 
Indonesia undeniably has a highly authoritarian, army-based govern­
ment, there is a prima facie presumption that her foreign policies are 
expansionist and aggressive in much the same way as were Mussolini's 
or Hitler's or those of pre-war Japan, either because of a militaristic 
and imperialist ideology or because of more complex socio-political 
power drives . This kind of analogy is absurdly far-fetched, however. 
The Suharto regime may be authoritarian and in some respects indeed 
repressive , but to call it 'fascist' is a sheer misuse of that term. Yet this 
kind of hypothesis has some affinities with what might be categorized 
as 'diversionist' or 'instability' theories about the dynamics behind 
Indonesian foreign policies , which also achieved quite wide currency 
at the time of the konfrontasi episode and cannot be dismissed entirely 
out of hand. 
Closely akin to this approach is one of the more plausible (but mis­
leading) explanations of the Suharto government's foreign policies, 
put forward in 1976 by Rex Mortimer (Mortimer 1976) which could 
almost be called a 'neurosis theory' of Indonesian national self-asser­
tiveness . I will return to this below, but it is worth noting that Mortimer 
himself had abandoned it by 1979. 
Before we go any further, however, we need to look more closely 
at the particular episodes which are commonly held to be evidence of 
Indonesia's 'expansionist' appetites . From these it will become clear 
that the motivations behind Indonesia's policies on those occasions 
were by no means the same as those implied by the word 'expan­
sionism' as specified on page 66 .  And it is of particular significance that 
all three episodes relate to the last stages of the ending of colonial rule . 
The withdrawal of the metropolitan powers , Netherlands, Britain and 
Portugal , and the process of decolonization was in all three cases a 
messy one , often indefensible on a strict reading of national or interna­
tional law (as also was the founding of the colonial empires) . But the 
process of decolonization is now complete in this part of the world. 
Indonesia has no basis for claims to Papua New Guinea - and no desire 
for it or sense of need for it - as she had in two of those three cases. 
The lrian Jaya claim 
The basis of the original Indonesian claim to Irian J aya is so well 
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known that it is hardly necessary to go into it at any length .2 
Indonesia maintained that as the successor state to the former Nether­
lands East Indies her national territory should embrace the whole of 
what had formerly been the Netherlands East Indies , including Irian 
Jaya which had previously been considered an integral part of the 
former colony (albeit one of the most neglected and little-developed 
parts). The Dutch insistence on retaining possession of what they cal­
led 'Dutch New Guinea' at the time of the 1949 Round Table Confer­
ence negotiations leading to Indonesian independence , for reasons of 
Dutch domestic politics and wounded amour propre, created a dead­
lock which was broken only by the unsatisfactory compromise decision 
to postpone further negotiations on the issue until 1950. In the course 
of those negotiations neither side would budge - and as the status quo 
favoured the Dutch, they clung on grimly to their colony until mount­
ing Indonesian pressures, military as well as diplomatic and economic, 
coupled with declining international support for the Dutch, finally 
compelled them to surrender their hold on the colony in 1962. 
The rationale behind Indonesia's case was perfectly straightfor­
ward : her claim to Irian Jaya derived from the central principles of 
nationalism and anticolonialism upon which her revolution against the 
Dutch had been fought. To abandon the claim would have been to 
deny those principles at a time when the very unity of the fragile new 
state depended on maintaining the principle of nationalism as 
paramount in the face of potentially secessionist regional dissident 
movements. Indonesians believed that in pursuing their claim to Irian 
Jaya they were merely trying to gain control over territory that should 
have been recognized as rightfully theirs from the outset. The Dutch 
were thought to be holding on to West New Guinea for no better 
reason than to use it as a base from which they could subvert and frag­
ment the new Republic of Indonesia especially by stirring up trouble in 
the Moluccas and other eastern islands of the archipelago. The Dutch 
tried to deny Indonesia's claim by stressing the racial differences bet­
ween Indonesians of Java or Sumatra and the Melanesian inhabitants 
of West New Guinea, but Indonesians regarded this as irrelevant, 
since they themselves were ethnically a heterogeneous bunch and they 
did not regard racial affinities as the determining criteria of their 
nationhood. 
2 The best account of the early stages of the Irian Jaya campaign is Bone (1958) ; for the 
final stages, see Mackie (1974:98-103). 
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Indonesians of all political persuasions were united in support of 
the claim to Irian Jaya. (The strongest initial proponents of the claim 
were, in fact, the most pro-Dutch and conservative group of leaders at 
the Round Table Conference negotitions, the Federalists, not the 
Republicans . )  No one ever publicly denied the rightness of this claim, 
as far as I know, although there were major differences between the 
parties about the most effective tactics for pursuing the claim. As time 
passed the more radical parties became increasingly militant in the 
prominence they gave to this issue and the lengths they were willing to 
go to press it, whereas the more anti-communist, pro-Western parties 
and opinion leaders clung to the belief that moderation and persuasion 
would induce the Dutch to make concessions. This did not happen, 
however, and the latter group were outmanoeuvered by the radicals in 
1957 when, after several efforts to win support in the UN had failed, 
the radicals seized the initiative , at President Sukarno's instigation, 
and 'took over' all Dutch plantations, business enterprises and banks 
in Indonesia and nationalized them soon after. But the Dutch merely 
dug their toes in harder and it took the threat of military invasion of 
Irian J aya in 1961-62 to force them (largely at the instigation of the US 
government) to abandon the struggle and negotiate a compromise set­
tlement. 
It is misleading and ignorant to assert that 'expansionism' was a 
factor in the Indonesian campaign for West Irian, either in respect of 
the arguments used or of the basic political dynamics which impelled 
Indonesia. Even though Sukarno resorted in 1962 to an undeniably 
aggressive , confrontative political strategy for putting pressure on the 
Dutch , we need to distinguish his methods from his motivations and 
objectives. The style of the campaign in its final stages was certainly 
highly emotional, the political atmosphere almost feverish ; the issue 
lent itself to a form of mobilization politics which President Sukarno 
and the Indonesian Communist Party exploited very effectively for 
their own domestic advantage and in which the army leaders found 
themselves badly outmanoeuvered. The lesson was not lost on the 
army leaders , however, and when the conflict with Malaysia loomed 
up a year or so later they took good care not to lose the political initia­
tive on an issue with strong nationalist appeal and so they played an 
important part in getting the campaign of konfrontasi against Malaysia 
started. But that turned out to be a very different story. 
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Konfrontasi 
Indonesia's 'confrontation' of Malaysia in the years 1963-66 pro­
vides the strongest ammunition for advocates of the expansionist 
theory, but an explanation given in these terms alone is seriously mis­
leading, for the basic dynamics of the campaign have to be sought 
elsewhere . 3 Indonesia never asserted �ny claim to the territory of the 
northern Borneo states whose incorporation into the Malaysian feder­
ation she was protesting ; her argument was that the project was a 
neocolonialist strategem, master-minded by the British to enable them 
to maintain their interests there, and that the people of Borneo and 
Singapore were being steamrollered against their will into the wider 
Malaysian federation . There was a good deal of evidence in favour of 
that proposition , although I believe that overall the pro-Malaysia case 
was much stronger on nearly all accounts. The whole episode was a 
curious, half-hearted affair, a mixture of threats , propaganda, low­
level border raids and reconnaissance incursions into Sarawak and 
Malaya, attempts to ferment domestic opposition to the Malaysian 
government, coupled with diplomatic and economic pressures which 
seemed to have a variety of objectives and motivations, few of them at 
all clear to outside observers . 
Konfrontasi was very much a personal campaign of President 
Sukarno's, although both the Armed Forces leaders and the PKI sup­
ported it enthusiastically in the early stages (though much less 
wholeheartedly later on, when the costs and risks were greater) . And 
it undoubtedly served a variety of purposes which Sukarno found con­
venient - for example, maintaining an atmosphere of crisis and exter­
nal threat , so that calls for national unity and solidarity with the leader­
ship were more easily justified ; simplifying the job of balancing left 
and right wing forces in the government and in the country ; enabling 
him at times to divert attention from pressing domestic issues by stres­
sing the primacy of the conflict with neocolonialist enemies at home 
and abroad ; providing apparent justification for his ideological doc­
trines of inevitable conflict between the 'New Emerging Forces' and 
the old established forces of neocolonialism and imperialism. There is 
something to be said for explanations of the campaign in terms of its 
'diversionary' value, at a time when the national economy was in 
3 l have summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the various interpretations of this 
�pisode in Mackie (1974 : 1 - 1 1 ,326-33 et passim). 
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decline and political tensions mounting, but they too tend to be grossly 
oversimplified, although in a more refined form there is something in 
them. 4 
Konfrontasi was, in a very real sense , an extension into the foreign 
affairs sphere of the basic instability of Indonesian domestic politics at 
that time. Yet on several occasions when he had to make difficult 
choices in domestic politics , Sukarno did make them and on several 
occasions he scaled down the intensity of confrontation when cir­
cumstances made it prudent for him to do so. So the diversionary 
theory cannot be carried too far. A more fundamental element in the 
explanation of the whole affair is the relevance of the ideological fac­
tor. The struggle against Malaysia served, in effect, to validate the doc­
trine of the New Emerging Forces, while at the same time that doctrine 
created the imperative to engage in the struggle, for otherwise the 
ideology would have been hollow and meaningless. All Sukarno's 
speeches on the issue stressed the ideological factor, never the 
Indonesia Raya theme or the appeal to historic greatness. 
In short , the whole episode was very much an outgrowth of the 
rather singular combination of political and ideological circumstances 
prevailing in Indonesia in the early 1960s. The only sense in which it 
could be categorized as 'expansionist' was in terms of the style and 
methods adopted, not the objectives or motivations - for example the 
generally assertive , sometimes truculent claims made by Sukarno for 
the universality of his doctrine of the New Emerging Forces as apply­
ing to all Third World countries. But would one categorize German or 
Italian foreign policy today as inherently expansionist just because 
Hitler and Mussolini pursued assertive , truculent claims and methods 
(and, indeed , specified external objectives) in the decade before 1945? 
It must, indeed, be admitted that if Indonesia had succeeded at that 
point in the decolonization process in overthrowing the Malaysian fed­
eration, she would undoubtedly have been cock of the roost in South­
east Asia. Sukarno certainly aspired to a leadership role , not only in 
that region but in the Third World generally (though without much 
success, in the final analysis) . But the explanation for this impulse is 
better seen in terms of what Kahin (1964 :260-261) has called 'the pow­
erful , self-righteous thrust of Indonesian nationalism' , derived from 
the sense of pride in their revolutionary struggle for independence and 
from their opposition to colonialism and neocolonialism, than in terms 
4 The best exposition of the 'diversion' theory is given by Donald Hindley (1964). 
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of ' Greater Indonesia' doctrines or an ideology of territorial expansion 
reminiscent of Mussolini's or Hitler's demands for lebensraum. 
East Timar 
Even less, in my opinion, can the campaign to incorporate East 
Timar be categorized or explained as simply a manifestation of expan­
sionist appetites. Indonesian motivations in that unhappy affair are 
murky and complex, not at all as easy to identify with precision - or to 
defend on legal and moral grounds - as in the previous cases examined. 
But it is not difficult to discern the major factors impelling the Suharto 
government to become involved in the way it did and one of the most 
striking features to be noted was Suharto's reluctance to use troops 
there. Certainly there could be no claim here, as there was in the case 
of lrian Jaya , on the ground that this territory had been part of the 
former Netherlands East Indies. Nor was it possible after April 1974, 
as it might have been prior to the overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano 
regime in Portugal , to make a case on the grounds of liberating East 
Tim or from colonial rule of a singularly miserable , debilitating charac­
ter which had left the colony poverty-stricken and neglected. 
The fundamental consideration was probably one which could not 
easily or delicately be put into words. This was that the Portuguese col­
ony was an historical anachronism , just as Goa in the midst of India 
had been before 1961 . Sooner or later it would have to be liberated -
though neither in Portugal nor Australia were voices being raised on 
behalf of independence or self-determination for the Timorese before 
1974 - and most Indonesians who ever gave any thought to the matter 
probably assumed that sooner or later it would become part of 
Indonesia by a process of natural attraction to independence. The 
people were, after all , ethnically akin to those in the rest of Timor and 
they had been separated from them politically only by the Dutch-Por­
tuguese rivalries of the 17th to 19th centuries, not by their own voli­
tion. No one in Indonesia ever gave much thought to the question of 
when and how East Timar should be decolonized, and the general 
assumption seems to have been that the people of East Timor would of 
course want to join their Indonesian brothers in enjoying the fruits of 
independence. Few Indonesians knew that they could not even speak 
the same language or that Portuguese propaganda had implanted 
widespread fears of an Indonesian takeover long before 1974. It is 
probably not far-fetched to imagine, however, that if the Suharto gov-
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ernment had mounted a campaign to assist in the liberation of East 
Timar from Portuguese rule prior to 1974, justifying this on the ground 
that it was also helping to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule and help 
the freedom fighters of Angola and Mozambique it would almost cer­
tainly have won widespread international support and left the Fretilin 
leaders no option but to side with Indonesia. Suharto must have sub­
sequently regretted that he had been too cautious and restrained to 
embark on such a course, for once the revolution of April 1974 in Por­
tugal had occurred the ball was at Fretilin's feet, not Jakarta's . To 
claim that Indonesia's attitude towards Timar was grasping or covet­
ous or expansionist seems, in the light of these circumstances, simply 
to ignore the historical background. 
The Indonesian case has , in general , been argued mainly on the 
ground that the people of East Timar wanted incorporation into 
Indonesia, that the Timorese party favouring incorporation, Apodeti , 
had substantial popular support but was severely handicapped by the 
strong anti-Indonesian propaganda campaign earlier maintained by 
the Portuguese colonial authorities and later by Fretilin . It is highly 
doubtful that Apodeti really did have very widespread popular support 
initially, but that is not very surprising in view of the sustained anti­
Indonesian propaganda to which the population had been subjected 
for years previously by the Portuguese. During early 1975 the Indone­
sian government tried to cooperate with the Portuguese in devising a 
political formula based upon consultations (musjawarah) between the 
Portuguese authorities and the three major Timorese parties, which 
would have resulted , they hoped - with the aid of a little 'gentle pres­
sure' - in a decision to seek incorporation in Indonesia. But the out­
break of fighting between the UDT and Fretilin factions in July 
wrecked any hopes of this and soon resulted in the military victory of 
the Fretilin forces, which were by that time the faction most strongly 
committed to an independent East Timar and the most uncompromis­
ingly anti-Indonesian. (UDT had by that time swung over towards a 
pro-Indonesian stance .) This created a situation in which the Indone­
sian government had to choose whether to acquiesce in a Fretilin vic­
tory and the establishment of an independent, strongly anti-Indone­
sian regime in East Timar, or to intervene militarily in the civil war 
there. The Suharto government opted for the latter choice, sending in 
Indonesian troops covertly in October-November and then invading 
overtly in December.5 
The legal and moral rights and wrongs of these actions are a mat-
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ter of controversy which would take too long to assess thoroughly here. 
But the question of Indonesia's underlying motivation is a quite dis­
tinct question. Why did the Indonesians feel it mattered so much to 
them to prevent East Timar becoming independent? Their military 
intervention did no good to Indonesia's international reputation and 
appears to have been costly to her armed forces in both lives and 
resources. Why, then, could they not have acquiesced in a Fretilin vic­
tory? 
I suspect that the basic answer boils down to the proposition that 
as time passed Indonesia's key policy makers simply found themselves 
more and more committed by their own rhetoric and their initial 
policies to the ultimate incorporation of East Timor ; hence they either 
had to press on towards that goal at any cost or accept a humiliating 
defeat which might have been seriously damaging to their own domes­
tic political prestige and influence. 
Another factor was certainly their fear that East Timar might 
become a nest of communist influence , 'another Cuba' on her 
doorstep. The charges that Fretilin leaders were communists or pro­
Chinese may have been wildly exaggerated , but some Fretilin leaders 
were speaking in a way which certainly justified that suspicion. Even if 
the charges were false , it was obvious that an independent East Timar 
would have had to look overseas for economic assistance and perhaps 
also political support from some quarter, since the economy was 
hardly viable and the political structure rudimentary - and China or 
Vietnam or Russia seemed to be the most likely candidates for such a 
role. Moreover, the possibilities that even a non-communist indepen­
dent East Timor might provide a haven for Indonesian communist 
exiles outside Indonesian control was alarming enough to the Jakarta 
authorities , for it would be hard to prevent their infiltration from there 
into other parts of the archipelago. 
A second consideration frequently mentioned was the fear of sec­
essionist sentiment in other parts of eastern Indonesia if East Timor 
were to succeed in maintaining an independent existence . The effect 
on the Indonesian side of the island would have been disturbing, to say 
the least, and perhaps elsewhere too. Ever since the 1950s when 
regionalist movements threatened the territorial integrity of the young 
5 I know of no good account of the Indonesian side of the Timor affair. A useful survey 
of events in Timor, stressing the role of the Portuguese, is Nicol (1978). A strongly anti­
Indonesian, pro-Fretilin version is given by Joliffe (1978). 
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nation, Indonesia's leaders have been sensitive to the dangers of seces­
sionist sentiments in the outlying regions of the archipelago. I doubt if 
there is currently as much risk of secessionism or territorial disintegra­
tion as is often suggested, for the centralizing tendencies of the last two 
decades have been very powerful . But it is probably true to say that 
Indonesia's national unity is still a rather brittle creation, which might 
not stand up to any serious blow to the authority of the central govern­
ment . If any part of the archipelago were able to defy J akarta's author­
ity on a major issue and get away with it , the chain reaction elsewhere 
could be quite disastrous . That kind of consideration probably exerted 
great weight on the minds of the Indonesan government's policy mak­
ers throughout the Timor affair. 
Another background consideration that was also important was 
the inclination to believe that Apodeti really did represent the true 
voice of the Timorese people .  Indonesians referred to Fretilin , not 
entirely without j ustification, as the 'Eurasians' party' ,  as a coterie of 
part-Portuguese , urban, educated leaders with no substantial follow­
ing among or rapport with the bulk of the village population. They 
inevitably compared them with a similar group of first generation lead­
ers of the anti-colonial movements in Indonesia, most of whom later 
drifted away from the mainstream of Indonesian nationalism ; in fact , 
Indonesia's Eurasians had tended to be either pro-Dutch or highly 
ambivalent towards the nationalist cause during the struggle for inde­
pendence, so their nationalist credentials were suspect. In the cir­
cumstances Indonesians were highly sceptical that the Fretilin leaders 
could really represent the true voice of East Timorese nationalism. 
Their suspicions of Fretilin were later exacerbated by the collusion of 
two left-wing Portuguese officers, Majors Mota and Jonatas, in 
advancing the Fretilin cause during 1975, which was reminiscent of 
Dutch patronage of the 'puppet' Federalists in 1948-49. UDT, on the 
other hand, had initially spoken out in favour of maintaining Por­
tuguese rule and against immediate independence, so it was clearly a 
'reactionary' rather than a 'progressive' force like Apodeti. So the his­
toricist caste of mind with which Indonesians approached these mat­
ters would have inclined them towards Apodeti even though it could 
show little positive evidence of substantial popular support . This is not 
to say that they were right in that assessment ; it is , however , to point 
out the basis of Indonesian perceptions of the matter, which is what we 
must be concerned with in a matter like this. 
Finally , we should notice certain aspects of the Indonesian domes-
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tic politics of the Timar episode which indicate , I believe, that what­
ever Indonesian motivations may have been - and they were certainly 
tangled - they were by no means expansionist in a crude sense. The ini­
tial reaction of the foreign minister, Adam Malik, in mid 1974 was, 
indeed , distinctly 'dove-ish' . He went so far as to assure Jose Ramos 
Horta, a Fretilin leader, that Indonesia made no claim to East Timar 
and would seek close relations with it 'after independence' . This early 
view was soon modified as anti-communist leaders of the intelligence 
forces in Jakarta began to express concern at what they saw as a drift 
towards the left in Timar, paralleling the course of the revolution in 
Portugal in its first year. But Suharto regarded the Portuguese govern­
ment as the key factor determining the course of events in Timar and 
did not allow this group of officers to determine Indonesian policy, so 
long as he could hope that a political-diplomatic strategy would work 
towards Indonesia's ends. But after the outbreak of the civil war in 
Timar in July-August it became increasingly difficult for him to deny 
the arguments for military intervention or cling to any hope that a 
political solution would work. Thus the determination of policy finally 
fell into the hands of the military leaders , for by this time Indonesia 
was too deeply committed to the goals it had set to back away. 
It is worth remembering that if Suharto failed to prevent the 
emergence of an independent East Timar once the Indonesian govern­
ment had started to work for its incorporation, he would have been 
highly vulnerable to the charge that this kind of thing would never have 
happened in Sukarno's days. Paradoxically , it was precisely because 
Suharto's foreign policies were so different from Sukarno's unasser­
tive, low-keyed, committed to good-neighbourly relations with the 
ASEAN countries, and quite sensitive to world opinion, that he found 
himself subject to criticism from the former radical-nationalist fringe 
of the political public in Indonesia that he was not sufficient of a red­
blooded nationalist, that he was subordinating the country's interests 
too much to the goal of presenting an image of moderation and respon­
sibility to the Western creditor nations. Political comment within 
Indonesia was distinctly muted in 1974-75 , for the crackdown on dis­
sentient opinion following the 'Malari' riots during Prime Minister 
Tanaka's visit in January 1974 was very severe. But precisely because 
the regime had been shaken by the mild expressions of criticism that 
occurred in late 1973 , there was a good deal of nervousness about 
arousing fresh criticism over new issues. It is hardly surprising, in those 
circumstances, that there was almost no overt opposition to the gov-
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ernment's policies on Timor, even though there seems to have been 
nothing like the widespread popular support for the campaign that 
there was over Irian Jaya. In 1975 , moreover, the development of the 
Pertamina crisis was creating new difficulties for the government and 
making it even less willing to run risks of leaving its flanks exposed to 
critics of any hue , whether radical or nationalist. The fact, too , that the 
Timar crisis occurred soon after the communist victories in Indochina, 
when the generals in Jakarta were most sensitive to what they per­
ceived as communist threats to the region , must have helped to 
strengthen the hands of the hardliners and undermine the advocates of 
moderation. But it was anti-communism that was the decisive motivat­
ing force , not a diffuse espousal of expansionist objectives .  
Conclusion 
Are we justified, then, in concluding that 'expansionist' elements 
have played no part at all - or very little - in the shaping of Indonesia's 
policies towards her neighbours? I am inclined to answer: 'Yes ; the 
primary motivating forces behind her foreign policies could not be 
described as expansionist in any substantial respect' .  One could even 
go further and list a series of opportunities Indonesia has not taken 
since 1945 which, if she really had been determinedly bent upon expan­
sion or aggrandizement of her influence over her neighbours, she could 
easily have exploited to her advantage - for example the situation 
created by the race riots of May 1969 in Malaysia, the Muslim 
insurgency in the southern Philippines , to mention only the most obvi­
ous. 
It is possible that there may be more elaborate definitons of 'ex­
pansionism' that could be applied to the Indonesian case, but I have 
not yet encountered any that was at all convincing. The nearest thing 
to such a theory is Rex Mortimer's 1976 article (Mortimer 1976) in 
which he put great emphasis on the country's potential instability and 
the inherent weaknesses or incapacity of its government, seeing vari­
ous factors in that situation which were 'nudging Indonesia towards a 
more assertive regional role' .  Mortimer explicitly recognized that 
Indonesia was 'not an actively expansionist power' , but he portrayed 
her leaders as bordering on the neurotic (the article is studded with 
words like 'hysterical' ,  'obsessive', 'tense' ,  'hypersensitive' and 'frus­
trated') in their preoccupation with their country's regional influence, 
particularly in the aftermath of the communist victories in Indochina in 
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the previous year. Hence he regarded them as intensely concerned 
with the stability of Papua New Guinea also . 
Mortimer's theory is vulnerable on three main grounds. First, 
Indonesia's 'regional role' since 1965 has not been at all 'assertive' or 
'obsessive' , as it was under Sukarno. Quite the opposite . Secondly, the 
emphasis on the 'hysterical' ,  'neurotic' character of Indonesian politics 
is grossly exaggerated. Thirdly, in the years that have passed since that 
article was written , the course of events has simply not borne out the 
predictions Mortimer then made. Instability has not significantly 
increased in Indonesia, her government has responded rather sensibly 
and coolly to the emergence of a powerful Vietnam as a potential rival 
for political influence in Southeast Asia, not hysterically at all, while its 
handling of relations with Papua New Guinea has not conformed with 
the pattern adumbrated in that article. One might justifiably ask 
whether the underlying theory was wrong, or whether the data was 
erroneous - or both? 
Mortimer's account of Indonesia's lust for regional dominance 
does not rely directly on the analogy-with-fascism argument, although 
both rest upon the assumption that authoritarian regimes are poten­
tially unstable (because by definition unrepresentative - although it is 
questionable whether more representative political systems are signifi­
cantly more stable) , so there is likely to be some sort of link between 
the politics of domestic instability and the politics of external assertive­
ness , particularly if frustrations over the failure of domestic policies 
really are generating neurotic attitudes and irrationality. But that has 
not been the case of Indonesia in the 1970s. Her leaders have felt they 
have been achieving results , despite all the criticisms that have been 
directed at their policies. Their actions seem to me to betoken a good 
deal of confidence (within the authoritarian framework of the political 
system, admittedly) rather than a sense of insecurity and hysteria. 
Before concluding ,  I want to comment briefly on the 'Indonesia 
Raya' theory of Indonesian expansionism and offer some guesses 
about the likelihood of a recurrence of that stream of foreign policy 
thinking. I had to examine the influence of these doctrines closely in 
1964-65 when I was trying to analyse the causes of konfrontasi and I 
have discussed the matter more fully in my book on that subject (Mac­
kie 1974) . Advocates of the 'Indonesia Raya' theory of expansionism, 
like Bernard Gordon, relied mainly on two sources of evidence . One 
was writing and speeches of the Indonesian politician-poet-historian , 
Mohammed Yamin, who was a great advocate of 'Indonesia Raya' and 
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inclined to wax eloquent on the theme of Indonesia's historic greatness 
in the days of Srivijaya and Majapahit, when Indonesian language , 
trade and cultural influence allegedly extended as far afield as 
Madagascar to the west and Cambodia to the north . . Yamin was a maverick , non-party minister in several of Sukarno's cabinets and had 
a certain affinity of temperament and style with Sukarno, insofar as 
both were romantics and rhetoricians with a strong sense of 
Indonesia's historic destiny. He played an active part early in the cam­
paign to recover Irian Jaya. But neither he nor his ideas played any 
great part in the konfrontasi campaign, for Yamin died shortly before 
it began to develop and Sukarno never made use of the historic appeal 
to 'Indonesia Raya' themes in his speeches on the subject of Malaysia. 
Nor did any other Indonesian public figure try to step into Yamin's 
shoes in order to exploit the theme for its political mileage, a rather sig­
nificant piece of evidence which advocates of the 'Indonesia Raya' 
theory overlooked. Presumably there was not much mileage in it. 
Yamin was very much sui generis and his political influence depended 
more on his proximity to Sukarno than the intrinsic appeal of his doc­
trines (Mackie 1974 :21-23). 
The other piece of evidence used in support of the 'Indonesia 
Raya' theory was the debate that took place in June 1945 in the Pre­
paratory Committee for Indonesian Independence on what the future 
boundaries of independent Indonesia should be . Yamin played a 
prominent part in this debate, arguing that 'the areas which should be 
included in Indonesian territory are those which have given birth to 
Indonesian people ; the motherland of a people will be transformed 
into the territory of a State' .  Thus Indonesia should consist not only of 
the former Netherlands Indies, including West New Guinea, but also 
the whole of Timor and North Borneo and Malaya, including the four 
northern states of Malaya which the Japanese had transferred to Thai­
land. Sukarno supported Yamin's formulation (although on rather dif­
ferent grounds) against the more cautious arguments of realists like 
Mohammed Hatta and Haji Agus Salim ; and the Yamin-Sukarno view 
carried the day when it came to a vote. But the debate had no practical 
consequences, for when the Indonesian leaders proclaimed the inde­
pendence of their country in August 1945 they were so hard-pressed by 
events that they neglected even a commitment they had earlier given 
a group of Malayan revolutionaries to include Malaya in the anti-colo­
nial struggle . Twenty years later the Malaysians quoted the 1945 
debates extensively for propaganda purposes as evidence of Indone-
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sian territorial ambitions (Department of Information, Malaysia 1964) 
but that assertion does not really stand up to serious critical scrutiny. 
It is not inconceivable , of course , that at some point in the future 
another Yamin or Sukarno will emerge in Indonesia and try to exploit 
nationalist sentiments on the basis of an appeal to historic greatness. 
The teaching of Indonesian history and Indonesian patriotism in the 
schools , military academies and indoctrination courses almost cer­
tainly continues to incorporate some elements of Yaminesque fantasy 
about the past which could in appropriate circumstances be nurtured 
as the basis for a kind of revivalist movement.6 But one could say 
that of most countries in the world. Patriotism, they say, is the last 
refuge of scoundrels. Logically, however, the weakness of theories 
about expansionist tendencies which are based on predictions about 
how a country might one day react is that they can neither be confirmed 
nor refuted by testable evidence. That being the case, they are virtually 
useless. 
My own guess is that Indonesia, like China and Vietnam, will con­
tinue to be concerned to ensure that developments she considers 
adverse to her interests will not occur around her immediate 
peripheries. She will also , no doubt , seek to play a prominent part in 
the politics of the ASEAN region. But these are perfectly legitimate 
objectives , provided they are pursued by legitimate means. They are 
not in themselves evidence of a desire for aggrandizement of either 
power or territory. There may indeed be aspects of Indonesian 
nationalism and of the style of Indonesian politics which outsiders find 
repugnant or frightening, but to infer that this is evidence of aggressive 
intent is to oversimplify absurdly. One could easily imagine a state of 
political instability developing, in which Sukarnoesque policies of 
militantly radical nationalism and assertive foreign policies could con­
ceivably recur, the implications of which could be alarming for 
Australia and Papua New Guinea. But the dynamics of that kind of 
politics entail something very different from the dynamics of crude 'ex­
pansionism' .  
I t  has been put to me that even if  my rejection of the appropriate­
ness of the term 'expansionism' is accepted, we can hardly be surprised 
that many people in Papua New Guinea feel apprehensive about their 
country's future when they contemplate Indonesia's foreign policy 
6 An intriguing recent manifestation of this sort of subterranean survival of 'Indonesia 
Raya' sentiment is Rahasia (1975) . 
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record. For she has on several occasions had no compunction about 
resorting to force and pursuing policies which could be described as 
both interventionist and aggressive. Moreover, her governments have 
been inclined to claim that what happens in neighbouring countries is 
a matter of direct concern to them. And they might do so yet again if 
there were to be a collapse of governmental authority in Papua New 
Guinea in circumstances which Indonesia regards as entailing some 
potential threat to her control over her eastern islands. Particularly if 
Indonesia herself were to subside back into an era of political and 
social instability reminiscent of the late Sukarno era, the possibility of 
a reversion to more assertive , interventionist foreign policies could not 
be ruled out of consideration. 
These points can hardly be denied , yet there are several strong 
reasons for believing that Papua New Guinea is most unlikely to 
become a target for Indonesian aggression in such circumstances. All 
the other episodes we have been considering here had to do with the 
process of decolonization and the redrawing of the frontiers created by 
colonialism. The claims made to Irian Jaya and East Timor were to 
that extent sui generis . (Konfrontasi was also in part a response to the 
decolonization process, but in that case no claim was made to Sarawak 
or Sa bah.)  Neither in Irian J aya nor in East Tim or had the decoloniza­
tion process been completed and international recognition through the 
UN achieved for a new and independent state ; nor was there in either 
case much effective international support for such an outcome , for the 
principle of self-determination cannot always be sustained in the 
course of the decolonization process , as Bougainville and Papua 
Besena have discovered. But once the independence of a former col­
ony has been achieved and recognized internationally , challenges to its 
sovereignty are quite another matter . Moreover, as time passes, the 
new map of the post-colonial world tends to achieve firmer acceptance. 
To that extent , the situation of Papua New Guinea is radically different 
from that of Irian Jaya and East Timor. 
For ten years Papua New Guinea has enjoyed recognition, by 
Indonesia and the rest of the world, as an independent and sovereign 
state. So it would be extremely difficult and embarrassing for any 
Indonesian government to challenge its right to independence and full 
national sovereignty. President Suharto has visited Papua New 
Guinea, as have Indonesian foreign ministers and numerous other offi­
cials . The Indonesian government has clearly accepted the status qua 
there. Indonesians are not casting covetous eyes on Papua New 
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Guinea. They would be concerned if Papua New Guinea crumbled 
into anarchy or suffered any serious secessionist challenges, but it is 
probably true to say, as Mortimer argued, that they would prefer to see 
Australia intervene in that case to maintain the status quo, rather than 
intervene themselves. That is hardly a sign of expansionist ambitions. 
As anyone who has ever canvassed the matter in Jakarta will attest, 
Indonesian officials give very little attention to Papua New Guinea and 
basically just do not want to be burdened with additional problems, 
worry and expense in that quarter. Irian Jaya and Timor have already 
caused them more than enough already. They have required special 
financial allocations , which have been a cause of resentment in other 
provinces. Unless there is a reversion to quite serious instability and 
irrationality in Indonesian politics, as in the late Sukarno era (which 
seems an unlikely contingency, as of 1985), I see no reason for Papua 
New Guinea to feel vulnerable to annexationist designs in Jakarta. 
Finally, something more needs to be said about the subject of the 
transmigration in Irian Jaya and the lebensraum argument - that is, its 
relationship to the problem of overpopulation in Java. It must be stres­
sed that the solutions to Java's population problem do not depend on 
transmigration programmes to the Outer Islands and the opening up of 
more land for Javanese farmers to settle on. The long-term solutions 
lie in the direction of effective family planning and the creation of off­
farm job opportunities in Java itself. Since the birth rate in Java is now 
declining rapidly and non-farm employment is steadily increasing (al­
though still not as rapidly as we might wish) , there is a reasonable 
chance that these solutions will prove adequate over the next genera­
tion or so. Transmigration has been much discussed as an outlet for 
Java's excess population since around 1900 - precisely because neither 
of those alternative solutions appeared feasible ; only in the 1970s did 
they begin to do so . Yet Indonesia's transmigration schemes never suc­
ceeded in shifting really large numbers out of Java until the last five or 
six years because of the sheer costs of opening up new land and resettl­
ing people. Part of the problem (until very recently) was also that it was 
difficult to persuade even landless and poor villagers in Java to move 
to the other islands, even j ust across the Sunda Straits to South 
Sumatra. Between 1950 and 1983 , the total number of transmigrants, 
mostly to nearby South Sumatra, was only two million, that is , on aver­
age , 65 ,000 per annum. Considering that the annual increase of Java's 
population has been nearly two million over the past five years, it can 
be seen that transmigration is likely to provide only marginal relief to 
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the basic problem of population increase there. Other processes and 
mechanisms are providing the more important solutions within Java. 
Even the quite substantial expansion of the programme over the last 
five years (with World Bank funding) has not radically changed this 
state of affairs . The rationale behind the programme these days seems 
to be as much to promote the opening up of unutifized areas in 
Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya as to relieve population 
pressure in Java, although in some districts it may do that to a small 
extent. I wish the Indonesian authorities could be persuaded that 
transmigration schemes involving Irian J aya result in little real relief to 
the population problem and high costs in terms of the socio-cultural 
frictions entailed . But there is still an almost doctrinaire commitment 
to transmigration on basically Malthusian grounds . (See Arndt's 
analysis below. )  
Another serious demographic problem arising in Irian Jaya has 
derived, in fact , not from the government sponsored transmigration 
programme but from the spontaneous migration of Buginese and 
Moluccans in response to the opportunities they have perceived to 
earn a better living there. This is a response, in short, to pull-factors 
rather than push-factors. Relatively few of them are farmers making 
demands upon the land of the indigenes , as far as I am aware. There 
are reasons for concern over the political and socio-economic consequ­
ences of this flow of non-Melanesian immigrants into Irain Jaya, as 
Peter Hastings has frequently emphasized . It almost certainly means 
that in the course of the next few decades the Melanesian inhabitants 
of Irian Jaya will be outnumbered by 'other Indonesian' ethnic types. 
The tensions likely to be generated by this process will undoubtedly be 
a cause for concern in Papua New Guinea. But it hardly amounts to a 
process of crude territorial expansionism. There is no reason, in princi­
ple , why it cannot be stopped at the border (as it is , with minor excep­
tions , on Indonesia's borders with East Malaysia and the Philippines) , 
although that might become administratively more difficult if the 
population densities change dramatically. It is a process which will 
need to be carefully watched, analyzed and understood by the Papua 
New Guinea government - but it is not, in itself, evidence of sinister or 
immutable expansionist intent. 
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EAST OF THE BORDER: IRIAN JA YA AND THE 
BORDER IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S DOMESTIC AND 
FOREIGN POLITICS* 
R.J. May 
0 ver the years the Papua New Guinea government has made abun­
dantly clear its unqualified acceptance of Indonesia's sovereignty 
in Irian Jaya and of the corollary that Indonesia's action against dissi­
dent elements in the province is a matter of internal policy. At the 
same time, there has been widespread recognition of an underlying 
conflict between Papua New Guinea's official policy, dictated by the 
political reality of the situation , and the fundamental sympathies of 
many Papua New Guineans for their Melanesian neighbours, sym­
pathies which have been made explicit on occasion even by those who 
have occupied the highest levels of government. In an earlier paper 
(May 1979a) I referred to this as a tension between public attitudes and 
private feelings. Such tension has been exacerbated over the past 
decade by the generally high-handed and often arrogant position 
Indonesia has adopted in its dealings with Papua New Guinea. In 
recent years the two countries have developed administrative arrange­
ments and diplomatic relationships designed to cope with the problems 
generated by the border but these have not significantly improved the 
situation and in 1984 a massive movement of Irianese across the border 
into Papua New Guinea raised the prominance of the issue to a new 
level in Papua New Guinea's domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, 
an apparent increase in activity by the OPM, 1 which many observers 
were prepared effectively to write off in 1978-79, and the extent of 
planned transmigration to lrian Jaya, suggest that the new salience of 
* This paper updates my earlier paper, 'Living with a lion' (May 1979a) and for the 
period up to 1979 draws heavily on it. 
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the border may be irreversible. 
The object of this paper is to describe Papua New Guinea's hand­
ling of the border issue, in a historical context, and to examine some of 
the domestic political forces which affect official policy. 
The colonial legacy 2 
Until well into the 1960s , within Papua New Guinea the concern 
over the West New Guinea issue was largely that of Australian colonial 
officials and an already slightly paranoid expatriate business and 
planter community. 
The concern of Australian officials was for the most part a reflec­
tion of the Australian government's attitude toward West New 
Guinea. Up till the end of the 1950s this attitude was dominated by 
Australia's perception of the importance of the island to Australia's 
security. The Australian government supported Holland in its denial 
of Indonesia's territorial claims to West New Guinea, it established a 
number of new patrol posts in the border areas , and it entered into 
agreements for administrative cooperation between Dutch and 
Australian officials in the two territories , particularly in matters of 
joint concern such as health and quarantine. 
The announcement in 1959 that Australia would recognize any 
peaceful agreement between Holland and Indonesia on the West New 
Guinea issue gave the first indication of a change in policy in favour of 
Indonesia, anticipating Australia's acceptance of the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1962. Notwithstanding this, relations between Australia 
and Indonesia continued to deteriorate during the first half of the 1960s 
and Australian fears of a possible Indonesian invasion of Papua New 
Guinea resulted in a dramatic increase in defence spending in Papua 
New Guinea and a substantial outlay on airstrips, wharves and other 
infrastructure in the border areas. 
The immediate impact of the transfer of sovereignty was an inflow 
1 OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka , or Operasi Papua Merdeka - Free Papua Move­
ment) is used here as a shorthand term to describe the various organizational and fac­
tional components of the West Papua nationalist movement - what Indonesian official 
sources generally refer to as gerakan pengacau liar (GPL), 'wild terrorist gangs'. For a 
more detailed discussion see Osborne's contribution to this volume. 
2 A more detailed account of the period up to 1969 is to be found in Verrier (1976: chap­
ter 1 1 ) ,  from which this section has drawn. Also see Hasluck (1976: chapter 30) for an 
'inside' view of the period. 
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of West Papuan nationalists into Papua New Guinea. As far as possible 
the Australian administration dealt with these crossings as though they 
were traditional movements and encouraged the border crossers to 
return, but a small number was granted permissive residency. With the 
growing resistance to Indonesian rule in West New Guinea from 1965, 
movement into Papua New Guinea increased sharply. There was, 
moreover, a number of border incidents as Indonesian patrols pursued 
Irianese across the border. The Australian response has been well 
summarized by Verrier (1976 :366-367) : 
Along with the troubles in WNG as a whole, the Australian 
Government played this down and , from 1967, to avoid 
embarrassing Indonesia, took a tougher line on border 
crossing even of the traditional kind which had been toler­
ated in the past. 
She adds 
Contrary to official public statements the majority of 
Irianese who crossed the border in 1968 and 1969 undoub­
tedly did so for political reasons, just as most of them were 
undoubtedly sent back for political reasons. In addition 
there is no doubt that Irianese dissident activity directed 
against Indonesia had a base in the bush camps on the 
Australian side of the international border . One result was 
a number of border incidents of potentially serious propor­
tion, and yet another was the creation of liaison arrange­
ments between Australia and Indonesia to resolve them. 
The anxieties of the expatriate population during the 1950s and 
early 1960s are recorded in the pages of the South Pacific Post (which 
maintained a regular coverage of events in West Irian throughout the 
1960s) and the debates of the Legislative Council. They urged support 
for the Dutch position until it became obvious that this was a lost cause 
and they used the spectre of an Indonesian invasion to gain support for 
a Melanesian Federation and for proposals that Papua New Guinea 
become a seventh state of Australia. These anxieties were pungently 
expressed in 1962 by the president of the Highlands Farmers' and 
Settlers' Association, Ian Downs : 
. . .  . it is not our intention to deliver the Highlands people so 
recently won to civilisation into the hands of the decadent, 
degenerate Indonesian bandits (quoted in Bettison, 
Hughes and van der Veur 1965 :33) . 
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Paradoxically ,  considering the relative levels of social and 
economic development in the two territories , in 1962 there was not in 
Papua New Guinea, as there was in West New Guinea, a conspicuous 
nationalist elite. Hence the reaction from within Papua New Guinea to 
the transfer of sovereignty in that year was almost entirely an expat­
riate reaction. However in January 1962 delegates to a local govern­
ment council conference in Port Moresby passed a resolution against 
an Indonesian takeover of West New Guinea ; in June 1962 John Guise 
told Papua New Guinea's Legislative Council that his electorate had 
asked him to express concern over the fate of West New Guinea and 
that he supported an immediate referendum in West New Guinea, and 
in August (following a meeting of the South Pacific Commission) 
Guise was one of three Papua New Guinean signatories to a letter sent 
to the secretary-general of the United Nations criticizing the UN's 
handling of the question. 
During the second half of the 1960s the situation changed quite 
profoundly ; indeed Verrier ( 1976 :369) has suggested that the West 
New Guinea dispute was a catalyst in the emergence of Papua New 
Guinean nationalism in the 1960s and has commented further 
(ibid. :200) that 
In the unprecedented flurry of activity which took place in 
PNG [in the 1960s] largely because of Australia's own fears 
of Indonesia, those fears were firmly implanted in the 
minds of PNG's first elite where they were to remain when 
for Australia they had gone. 
In a review of Australian administration in Papua New Guinea from 
1951 to 1963 former Territories minister Hasluck has written 
(1976 :372) , 'My impression was that most of the indigenous people in 
our Territory who were at all aware of the events were anti-Indonesian 
in sentiment' .  In 1965 , with Irianese refugees flowing into the Sepik 
and Western provinces in large numbers , and Australian officials put­
ting pressure on them to return, national members of the first House of 
Assembly appealed for sympathetic consideration of Irianese pleas for 
asylum and demanded a clear policy on the refugee issue (House of 
Assembly Debates [HAD] I(6) :924-925, 31  August 1965).  One of the 
most prominent spokesmen for the Irianese was the member for 
Upper Sepik Open , Wegra Kenu. Kenu, from Yako village (where the 
Administration had recently purchased land for the resettlement of 
refugees) , had been to school in Hollandia and had relatives on both 
sides of the border . Others included Paul Langro (member for West 
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Sepik Open, who later became deputy leader of the opposition and 
opposition spokesman on foreign affairs) and Guise , who had become 
leader of the elected members of the House. In the same year, Guise 
and United Party leader Mathias Toliman, attending a UN meeting in 
New York, spoke with the UN secretary-general and demanded that 
the 'Act of Free Choice' be a true referendum (Verrier 1976 :385) . 
As the 'Act of Free Choice' approached, activity along the border 
intensified. By the end of 1968 about 1200 refugees were reported to 
have crossed and over 200 were granted pemissive residency. In 
November 1968 , in response to repeated questioning of Administra­
tion policy on the border (principally by former missionary, Percy 
Chatterton) ,  the secretary for law told the House that in view of the 
rapid build-up of Irianese camps on the Papua New Guinea side of the 
border over the past few weeks , 'together with indications that the 
camps were focal points for political activity' , the Administration had 
informed the refugees that they must return to the Irian J aya side of the 
border ; near Skotiau a shelter had been destroyed 'owing to its insanit­
ary condition' (HAD 11(3) : 589-590, 20 November 1968) . Five days 
later the member for East Sepik Regional, Michael Somare, moved 
'That this House expresses its sympathy with the plight of the West 
Irianese refugees in the Territory and urges the Administration to treat 
them with every consideration' .  Som are was supported by Chatterton 
but official members attacked the motion as implying criticism of the 
Administration's already liberal policy and it was defeated (HAD 
11(3) :671-674, 25 November 1968). 
In June there was a further debate on the Irian Jaya situation, 
occasioned by an official statement following border violations by 
Indonesian troops at Wutung and Kwari .3 Chatterton successfully 
moved an amendment to the statement, expressing dismay that the 
UN was 'not prepared to insist on the holding of a genuine act of free 
choice' and requesting the Australian government to transmit the 
motion to the UN. During the debate a number of members expressed 
sympathy with their Melanesian brothers but , interestingly, their ire 
was directed not so much at Indonesia (several specifically said they 
had no dispute with Indonesia) as at the UN; members were quick to 
point out that though the UN had thought fit to criticize the conduct of 
the elections in Papua New Guinea in 1968 it was conspicuously silent 
3 See HAD II(5) : 1 131-1 133, 1342- 1346, 1436-1444 ; 17, 26, 27June 1969. Also see Goode 
(1970). 
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on the denial of free choice to the Irianese . 
In May 1969 about five hundred students, church leaders and 
others staged a march through the streets of Port Moresby, following 
a forum at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) , and a peti­
tion was presented to the Administrator protesting against the Austra­
lian government's tacit support of Indonesia. 
After the 'Act of Free Choice' there were numerous complaints, 
expressed in the House of Assembly and through letters to the Post­
Courier, that the Australian administration was putting pressure on 
refugees to return to Irian Jaya . 
The reaction of Papua New Guineans to the West New Guinea 
question in this period was a complex of at least three elements. In the 
first place there was a genuine sympathy for the position of these fellow 
Melanesian people ; as no lesser person than Michael Somare said in 
1969, 'We are the same people . . .  ' (HAD 11(5) : 1346 , 25 June 1969) . 
This sympathy increased as the evidence of Indonesian repression in 
Irian Jaya mounted and as a growing number of Irianese took up resi­
dence in Papua New Guinea and brought stories of repression and per­
secution. Secondly, the way in which not only the Dutch but also the 
United States, Australia and in turn the United Nations capitulated to 
Indonesia's display of truculence caused concern among the more 
thoughtful members of Papua New Guinea's elite. This was forcefully 
expressed by Chatterton at the UPNG forum in 1969 (as recorded in 
Nilaidat 2(2)) : 'If the United Nations rats in West Irian now, it may 
well be that in a few years time it will rat in East Irian' .  It was also a 
recurrent theme in comments in the House of Assembly and clearly lay 
behind some early Papua New Guinean support for seventh statehood. 
Finally, expressions of support for self-determination in West New 
Guinea were evidence of the emerging nationalism in Papua New 
Guinea during the 1960s. By expressing sympathy for the Irianese -
particularly when official policy was actively to discourage such expres­
sion4 - and by criticizing Australia for its lack of moral fortitude , 
Papua New Guineans were serving notice on the Australian colonial 
regime of their own demands for self-determination. 
Even at this stage, however, Papua New Guinean sympathy for 
4 This was particularly evident during the June 1969 House of Assembly debate. Shortly 
before, Papua New Guinean MHAs visiting Australia had spoken about the coming 'Act 
of Free Choice' in Irian Jaya and had been publicly rebuked by External Territories 
minister Barnes (South Pacific Post 23 May 1969) . 
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the plight of the Irianese was not without reservation. In 1965 Kenu 
(1965-66 : 10-12) had expressed some fears about the inflow of people 
from West lrian ; in 1968 Somare, while expressing sympathy for them, 
said, 'We must put them in different areas so that they cannot plan 
unrest' (HAD II(3) :671 ,  25 November 1968) , and in 1970 the member 
for Maprik Open , Pita Lus , told the House, 'We do not want these 
refugees to come here and make trouble' (HAD II(12) :3709, 19 
November 1970) . More significantly , at the UPNG forum in 1969 
Albert Maori Kiki disappointed students by refusing to commit the 
Pangu Pati on the West Irian question, stressing the need, on security 
grounds, to see Indonesia as a friend, and in the House of Assembly 
Pangu member Tony Voutas spoke of the need to maintain a stable 
government in Indonesia even at the expense of 'the human rights of 
the minority in West Irian' (HAD II(5) : 1439, 27 June 1969) . 
The Irian Jaya question in Papua New Guinea 1972-1977 
Although formal responsibility for Papua New Guinea's foreign 
policy remained with the Australian government until Papua New 
Guinea's independence in September 1975 , in practice the Somare 
government began to have a substantial say in policy formulation from 
its accession to office in 1972. 
On the question of Irian Jaya, as foreshadowed in the comments 
of Kiki and Voutas , the coalition government did not seek to change 
the broad policy of the Australian government - indeed there were 
strong suggestions in 1972, 1973 and 1974 that the Somare government 
was taking a much tougher line on Irianese refugees than had the colo­
nial administration before it (see, for example , Age21 August 1972, 23 
July 1973 ; cable from Australian High Commissioner 6 March 1974, 
reproduced in Kabar Seberang 819, 1981 : 155-157). Responding to 
questions about his government's decision in July 1972 to deport eight 
lrianese border crossers , Somare was quoted as saying that acceptance 
of Irianese refugees with OPM sympathies could affect relations with 
Indonesia (Age 21 August 1972 ; also see Post-Courier 17, 18 and 25 
August 1972 and Sydney Morning Herald 18 August 1972) ; Australian 
External Territories minister Peacock, whose approval of the deporta­
tion was required, was reported to have commented 'It is their country 
and they are entitled to determine who resides there ' (Australian 
Financial Review 18 August 1972). 
In February 1973 Somare, on behalf of the Australian govern-
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ment, signed an agreement with Indonesia which defined the location 
of the border. There was little debate on the subsequent authorizing 
legislation, the sole dissenting voice being that of Langro who was 
pointedly reminded by Somare 'that we have a population of only 2.5 
million people while Indonesia has about 100 million people. When we 
see such a big population in the country bordering ours we must not 
create any disputes with Indonesia' (see HAD II1(15) : 1831-1833, 
1840-1844, 18 ,  19 June 1973) . A further agreement, on administrative 
border arrangements, was signed in late 1973 . This covered such mat­
ters as traditional land rights , traditional movement , health , quaran­
tine and pollution, and liaison arrangements, which had been the sub­
jects of early agreements , and an important new provision , the obliga­
tion of both parties to prevent the use of their respective territories for 
hostile activities against the other. 
During the early 1970s border crossings continued, though on a 
much reduced scale , and the number of Irianese granted permissive 
residency increased. However, within Papua New Guinea popular 
interest in the Irian Jaya situation seems to have diminished as people 
became more preoccupied with maintaining internal harmony and 
with the general business of preparing for independence. In official 
statements,  which provided the first outlines of the country's 'univer­
salist' foreign policy, particular reference was made to the friendship 
and understanding which existed between Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia and it was acknowledged that 'Indonesia has shown under­
standing in our role of granting permissive residence to Irian J aya 
refugees'5 
But while in official statements the Papua New Guinea govern­
ment was unreserved in its expressions of friendship towards Indonesia 
and its acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over Irian J aya, in state­
ments outside diplomatic circles the constant reference to the relative 
size of populations and armed forces and to 'sleeping giants' and 'lions' 
and the occasional acknowledgement of Melanesian brotherhood, left 
little doubt that Papua New Guinea's position was dictated by expedi­
ence rather than sympathy . The situation was not improved by 
Indonesia's invasion of East Timar in 1975 .6 
It was perhaps this conflict between expedience and sympathy 
5 Address by the then chief minister (Michael Somare) to the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, Melbourne, June 1974 (quoted in Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 1976 : 17) . 
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that prompted Kiki , as minister for Defence , Foreign Relations and 
Trade, in 1973 to initiate 'secret diplomacy' designed 'to mediate bet­
ween the rebels and the Indonesian Government and bring about con­
ditions where the two could have come together for constructive con­
sideration of the means of peaceful reintegration of the rebel groups 
into the Irianese community' (Post-Courier 23 February 1976. This 
was the first public statement on the negotiations) . Over a period of 
years , with the blessing of the Indonesian government, Papua New 
Guinean ministers and senior officials talked with rebel leaders from 
overseas and from the bush but they were unable to bring the Indone­
sians and the lrianese to the conference table , largely, according to 
Kiki, because of divisions within the rebel movement . 
In 1976 the position of Irianese refugees again came into promi­
nence. In February the Dutch-based Revolutionary Provisional Gov­
ernment of West Papua (RPG) issued a release claiming that 5 ,000 
(later the figure became 15 ,OOO) Indonesian troops were involved in an 
offensive near the border in which napalm had been used and 1 ,605 vil­
lagers killed, and that Australian officers of the Pacific Islands Regi­
ment had cooperated in sealing the border (Post-Courier 18 February 
1976). The report was promptly denied by both Kiki and Somare and 
by the Defence Department but Somare was clearly angered by the 
publicity it had received and told a press conference that the govern­
ment would prosecute Papua New Guineans caught actively support­
ing Irian Jaya freedom fighters and deport Irianese permissive resi­
dents supporting them. 'We do not recognize rebels' ,  he said, 'We rec­
ognize Indonesia's sovereignty' (Post-Courier 20 February 1976) . In 
response to this, a spokesman for the Irianese community in Port 
Moresby issued a statement saying that 'The threats of Government 
action against dissidents must not go unchallenged',  that the Irianese 
may be forced to seek Communist aid, and that they would make rep­
resentations to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. However, 
after Kiki had accused the group of breaching the conditions of their 
6 Papua New Guinea's official concern over Indonesian intervention in East Timor was 
elegantly stated by Kiki in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1976 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1976:47-48). After Somare's visit to 
Indonesia in January 1977, however, the government adopted a more conciliatory line, 
describing the Timor situation 'entirely as a domestic matter of Indonesia' (Australian 
Foreign Affairs Record January 1977:47) and in December 1978 it opposed a UN resol­
ution supporting self-determination for East Timar. For an account of popular reaction, 
see Samana (1976). 
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residency and threatened deportation the community's spokesman 
retracted and the subject was dropped (Post-Courier 26 February 
1976). 
Later in the same year the refugee issue again became a point of 
contention, this time as the result of an Indonesian press report. In 
December, shortly before a planned visit to Indonesia by Somare , 
Papua New Guinea's National Broadcasting Commission relayed a 
report from the official Indonesian newsagency ANTARA (appa­
rently emanating from the Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby) that 
talks had begun between the Papua New Guinea and Indonesian gov­
ernments over the extradition of five hundred Irianese residents in 
Papua New Guinea. Although the report was denied by Somare , the 
subject was raised as a matter of public importance in the National Par­
liament where several speakers criticized Indonesia and the UN, recal­
led the invasion of East Tim or, and demanded independence for Irian 
Jaya. The member for Maprik Open, Pita Lus, told the House 
. . . .  the United Nations is not doing its job to recognize the 
West Irian cause. I think it is made up of lazy buggers ! If 
only this country could send me to the United Nations . . .  I 
would tell the United Nations to give West Irian its freedom 
and the member for Manus, Michael Pondros, said 'Ifwe cannot reach 
any agreement, we should go to war' . Nor were Indonesians likely to 
have taken much comfort from the assurances of Kiki that 'The West 
Irianese are our neighbours and friends . . . .  The Government has no 
intention of selling our brothers' (National Parliamentary Debates 
(NPD] I(18) : 2400-2410, 9 December 1976) . 
Relations between the Papua New Guinea government and the 
Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby were still a little uneasy when in 
January 1977 the head of the RPG, Brigadier-General Seth Rum­
korem, crossed into Papua New Guinea and was flown to Port 
Moresby for talks with the government ; the Indonesian embassy 'ex­
pressed concern about the Government making available facilities to 
the rebels' (Post-Courier 6, 10 January 1977) . And relations between 
the Papua New Guinea government and Irianese dissidents were not 
improved following reports that the liberation movement would use 
terrorism in the Pacific to gain recognition for its cause (Post-Courier 
29 April 1977 . The report was subsequently denied, see Post-Courier 
3 May 1977) . 
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The events of 1977-78 and 'normalization', 1979 
Papua New Guinea-Indonesia relations continued to deteriorate 
from around May 1977 when hundreds of Irianese began crossing into 
the Western and Sandaun (West Sepik) provinces. The movement of 
Irianese across the border was known to be associated with an intensifi­
cation of conflict between OPM sympathizers and Indonesian military 
forces in the period leading up to Indonesia's national elections (see, 
for example , Canberra Times 31 May 1977) . But when Kiki expressed 
concern at the border situation Indonesian foreign minister Malik told 
him, curtly, that the recent 'tribal fighting in Irian Jaya was a domestic 
affair and that Indonesia would not tolerate those who attempted to 
exploit the tribal clashes for political purposes' (Post-Courier 8, 13 ,  15 
June 1977) . 
At the end of May 1977 there were reported to be over two 
hundred refugees at Suki in the Western Province and several hundred 
more at other points along the border. There were also reports (sub­
sequently denied by intelligence sources) that a Papua New Guinean 
villager had been shot by an Indonesian patrol on the Papua New 
Guinea side of the border (Post-Courier 30 May 1977). 
The government thus found itself in the uncomfortable position of 
having to reassure Indonesia that it was not providing a harbour for 
opponents of the Indonesian regime, while at the same time attempt­
ing to meet the considerable local pressures (including pressure from 
the representative of the UN High Commission for Refugees) to deal 
sympathetically with the border crossers and not to let itself be pushed 
around by Indonesia - and this at a time which the Post-Courier (3 June 
1977) delicately referred to as 'the sensitive pre-election phase' .  
In June the secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Tony Siaguru, told reporters that the refugees had returned to 
Irian Jaya after being told of Papua New Guinea's policy on border 
crossings (Post-Courier 2 June 1977) . Irianese sympathizers , however, 
suspected that undue pressure had been put on the refugees and Lan­
gro , as deputy leader of the opposition , issued a statement accusing the 
Somare government of appeasement (Sydney Morning Herald 1 June 
1977).  During the ensuing elections the Somare government was fre­
quently attacked for its handling of the Irian J aya issue ; among those 
who took up the issue were Langro, Pondros, Noel Levi (former 
Defence secretary who was a successful candidate in New Ireland, sub­
sequently became minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade) and John 
Jaminan (former head of the security intelligence branch-who was a 
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successful candidate in the East Sepik electorate of Yangoru-Saussia 
and became, for a while, opposition spokesman on foreign affairs) . 
Nor did Somare find, on his return to office in August, that the 
issue had gone away . During the second half of 1977 and early 1978 it 
became abundantly clear that what Malik had dismissed as 'tribal 
clashes' was in fact a series of widespread confrontations between 
Indonesian troops and Irianese dissidents. It was in this context that in 
November 1977 the minister for Defence, Louis Mona, informed Par­
liament that 
Recently government policy has been to take a tougher line 
with all border crossers . People who enter Papua New 
Guinea illegally can now expect to be arrested and may be 
put in gaol or handed over to Indonesian authorities (NPD 
I1(4) :381 , 10 November 1977) . 
During 1978 this situation became more complex and the govern­
ment found itself squeezed on three sides : by the Indonesians , who 
sought a firm commitment against Irianese rebels ; by an increasingly 
vocal group within the country which demanded sympathy towards 
Irianese freedom fighters ; and by OPM leaders, who threatened milit­
ant action against Papua New Guinea if it attempted to close the bor­
der. 
In April the government was embarrassed by the publication of an 
OPM press release naming the members of the newly appointed minis­
try of the de facto government of West Papua. Of the eighteen names 
on the list six were Papua New Guinea citizens, two were permissive 
residents , and two were serving gaol sentences for illegal entry but had 
given notice of their intentions to apply for political asylum. In a state­
ment pending a full enquiry, the minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Ebia Olewale , said that he viewed the matter with the 'utmost 
gravity' and threatened to cancel the entry permits of those named ; 
'we will oppose any minority which seeks to involve Papua New 
Guinea in the domestic affairs of Indonesia', he said (Post-Courier 19 
April 1978) . However this did not prevent the Indonesian embassy 
from making strong representations to the government and calling on 
the named rebels to declare their loyalties ; moreover Indonesian first 
secretary Siregar was reported as accusing Papua New Guinea of hav­
ing double standards and saying 'If we wanted to invade Papua New 
Guinea we would do it now when Papua New Guinea is weak' (Post­
Courier 19, 26, 28 April 1978). The Indonesians also requested tighter 
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controls over journalists. Olewale reacted sharply to these pressures 
and was reported to have asked the Indonesian ambassador to con­
sider reposting Siregar (Sydney Morning Herald 2 May 1978) . 
In the week following publication of the OPM cabinet list it was 
announced that Olewale, Mona and Defence Force Commander Diro 
had held talks in Port Moresby with OPM leaders Jacob Prai and Seth 
Rumkorem. Prai and Rumkorem were told to remove camps within 
the Sandaun Province or have them burnt (Post-Courier 28 April 1978, 
1 May 1978 ; Age 29 April 1978). According to the Post-Courier (28 
April 1978) , 'They were told PNG did not want to act against 'other 
Melanesians' , but , at the same time, the Government could not afford 
a fall out with Indonesia'. Journalist Mark Baker described the 
ultimatum as 'the strongest stand PNG has yet taken against the guer­
rillas' but reported that it had been firmly rejected (Age 29 April 1978) . 
In May Olewale made an official visit to Indonesia. Indonesian 
officials succeeded in communicating their doubts about the strength 
of Papua New Guinea's commitment to its obligations under the 1973 
border arrangements and at the conclusion of his visit Olewale told 
reporters that Papua New Guinea was now mounting 'constant patrols' 
along the border (Post-Courier 26 May 1978 ; Sydney Morning Herald 
18 May 1978) . 
Activity along the border further intensified in late May 1978 fol­
lowing the kidnapping of Indonesian officials by a rebel group south of 
Jayapura. At the end of the month the Post-Courier (31 May 1978) 
reported that a large-scale Indonesian military operation was in prog­
ress. Shortly after,  Somare annnounced his government's decision to 
deploy additional troops and police along the northern sector of the 
boundary in order to prevent rebels from crossing ; according to 
Olewale , any rebels encountered by Papua New Guinea border patrols 
would be dealt with in a 'Melanesian Way' : they would be told to go 
back and if they refused they would be arrested (Post-Courier 13 June 
1978) .  However, although there was liaison between the two govern­
ments , Papua New Guinea firmly resisted repeated Indonesian 
requests for joint patrols (see Post-Courier 12 ,  13,  21  June 1978). 
In the following weeks there was at least one major border incur­
sion by an Indonesian patrol which was reported to have raided a 
Papua New Guinea village and destroyed gardens, bringing an official 
protest from the Papua New Guinea government (Post-Courier 22, 23 
June 1978 ; Age 22, 25 July 1978). Early in July Indonesian operations 
escalated ; villages were strafed and plastic bombs dropped in the bor-
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der area. In Papua New Guinea the government expressed to the 
Indonesian ambassador its fears for the safety of Papua New Guinea 
citizens near the border but requests to Indonesia to confine bombing 
raids to an area not less than 8 km from the border were refused. Con­
scious of the possibility of an accidental clash between Indonesian and 
Papua New Guinea patrols , the Papua New Guinea government began 
withdrawing its troops from the area. Once again hundreds of Irianese 
villagers moved across the order into Papua New Guinea. At a meeting 
of the UPNG Law Faculty Papua New Guinea was described, some­
what dramatically, as 'slowly entering a state of war with Indonesia' 
(Post-Courier 7 July 1978) . In September, however, the Indonesian 
hostages were released and Indonesia began to scale down its military 
operations . 
On top of this , the arrest of Prai and Otto Ondowame in the San­
daun Province in late September pleased Indonesia but provided an 
additional headache for the Papua New Guinea government - espe­
cially when the persistent Siregar annnounced (incorrectly, as it turned 
out) that Indonesia would seek their extradition to stand trial for 
treason.7 The two were charged as illegal immigrants and, having 
been denied permissive residency in Papua New Guinea and 
threatened with repatriation to Indonesia (Post-Courier 29 January 
1979) , they were eventually granted asylum in Sweden in March 1979, 
along with three other OPM leaders. 
A few weeks later , a statement by Indonesia's Defence minister, 
General Jusuf gave notice of a shift in Indonesia's policy towards 
Irianese dissidents ; under a new 'smiling policy' it would not be neces­
sary for the army to pursue rebels (Far Eastern Economic Review 24 
November 1978 ; Sydney Morning Herald 12 December 1978) . In 
December the new policy was outlined to Papua New Guinean minis­
ters during an official visit to Papua New Guinea by Indonesia's foreign 
minister , Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who praised the Papua New 
Guinea government for its 'restraint and good leadership' in cooperat­
ing with Indonesia (Post-Courier 12 December 1978 ; Sydney Morning 
7 Circumstances surrounding the capture of Prai and Ondowame remain somewhat mys­
terious. Prai claims to have entered Papua New Guinea in the belief that the government 
wanted to talk to him. (On five previous occasions he had visited Papua New Guinea 
without a visa and with the government's knowledge.)  Prai believes there may have been 
a plot to remove him from leadership (see Age 1 December 1978) . Levi claims they were 
'captured by Australian and Indonesian intelligence operatives' (Our News 21(  4) 28 
February 1979). 
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Herald 1 1 ,  15 December 1978) . 
With the scaling down of military operations and a certain amount 
of goodwill generated by Mochtar's visit, at the end of 1978 relations 
between the two countries seemed to be taking a definite turn for the 
better . Shortly after Mochtar's visit the two governments began a 
series of discussions preliminary to the renewal of the 1973 border 
agreement and in March 1979 the first round of these discussions was 
concluded without significant disagreement. The atmosphere of 
renewed cordiality even survived the publication , in February, of a 
document purporting to be a plan for an Indonesian takeover of Papua 
New Guinea (Nation Review 1 February 1979 ; Post-Courier 8 ,  12 Feb­
ruary 1979) . Papua New Guinea security experts dismissed the docu­
ment as a fake and there was virtually no public discussion of it. 
In June 1979, amidst what was described (Post-Courier 5 June 
1979) as the tightest security operation Papua New Guinea had ever 
provided for a visitor (it included the use of a bullet-proof limousine 
lent by the Australian government) , Papua New Guinea received a 
brief visit from President Suharto. The Indonesian president told his 
hosts that he appreciated the present Papua New Guinea stand, and his 
minister co-ordinator for political and security affairs gave Papua New 
Guinea a further assurance that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions 
(Post-Courier 7 June 1979) . A technical cooperation treaty was signed 
during the visit and it was reported that the new border agreement 
would be finalized soon and 'would ensure improved quality of life of 
people living along the common border and encourage development 
programmes in the area' (ibid. ) .  Opposition leader Iambakey Okuk, 
who had become a vocal critic of the government's handling of the bor­
der issue in 1978, presented the Indonesian president with a submis­
sion in which (as reported in Post-Courier 6 June 1979) he urged 
Indonesia to consider large scale investment in Papua New Guinea and 
offered the interesting suggestion that massive Indonesian aid would 
help Papua New Guinea overcome some of its domestic problems. 
Renegotiation of the border agreement continued during 1979 ; 
drafting was completed in late July and the agreement signed in 
Jakarta in December. Amongst the topics covered in the new agree­
ment were preservation of customary rights across the border, cooper­
ation in the development of the border areas , upgrading of quarantine 
and health controls, and improved liaison procedures for border 
administration ; it was also agreed to establish a joint border commit­
tee. Other developments in late 1979 included an announcement that 
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the police communications network along the border was to be 
upgraded as part of the border administration programme, and the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding between the two countries 
which formalized arrangements to improve communications across the 
border. Details of Papua New Guinea's border development prog­
ramme, foreshadowed in earlier talks, were released as part of the 
1980-83 National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP) in December ; pro­
vision was made for expenditure of K4.45 million over the four years 
to 1983 , commencing with K0.8 million for projects in West Sepik and 
K0.6 for projects in Western Province in 1980. There was, however, 
some implicit irony in the NPEP's provison for development projects 
on the Papua New Guinea side of the border, in order, in part, 'to 
minimise the risk of major influxes of refugees and dissident activity' 
(National Planning Office 1979 :III, italics added) . 
Towards the end of 1979, also, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DF AT) reported that the number of border crossers had 
increased in 1979 and that 'although the actual number of people cros­
sing . . .  was not high, they were becoming a burden to the PNG Gov­
ernment' (Post-Courier 29 November 1979) . The deportation of sev­
eral Irianese , including six involved in a fight at Wabo camp in 
December, was widely interpreted as an indication that the govern­
ment was taking a tougher stand on border crossers (for example see 
Post-Courier 14 December 1979) , and this appeared to be confirmed in 
a statement by Foreign Affairs minister Olewale on his return from 
Indonesia in December 1979 : the government 'would continue to 
respect the interests of Irian Jayans with a genuine basis for seeking 
political asylum' but would not accept people who acted against the 
security of either Indonesia or Papua New Guinea or who only sought 
employment or schooling (Post-Courier 21 December 1979) . The fol­
lowing month the Black Brothers, an Irianese rock group, were 
ordered to leave after overstaying their visa, despite considerable 
popular support for them. (The group subsequently sought asylum in 
Holland and after five years there took up residence in Vanuatu. )  
Change of government: 1 980-82 
Late in 1978 there had been a falling out within Papua New 
Guinea's coalition government, which took Julius Chan and his 
People's Progress Party (PPP) across to the opposition. Fourteen 
months later two other prominent members of the coalition left the 
government, forming a new party, the Melanesian Alliance, and in 
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March 1980 with their support a no-confidence motion was carried 
against the Somare government. Chan became prime minister as the 
head of a National Alliance coalition, with Okuk as his deputy. 
Despite earlier criticism of the Somare government's handling of 
the border issue by Okuk , the change of government did not bring any 
significant change in government policy or attitudes (see, for example , 
the report of a statement in parliament ,  Post-Courier 25 June 1980). If 
anything, there was evidence that the Chan government intended to 
take a harder line on border crossers. In December 1980 prime minis­
ter Chan and Foreign Affairs minister Noel Levi paid an official visit to 
Indonesia, where inter alia they signed a maritime boundaries agree­
ment and, as appears to be mandatory upon visiting Papua New 
Guinea dignitaries, visited a small arms factory in Bandung. Chan was 
reported to have told the Indonesians that he was 'not in the least con­
cerned or suspicious that Indonesia might try to expand its territory 
into PNG' and that 'tensions which had been significant . . .  in the past 
were no longer significant, and should decrease [with development] in 
future' .  For his part, Mr Suharto 'was reported to have praised PNG's 
action in support of the Government of Vanuatu in putting down the 
rebellion [in Santo] (Post-Courier 15 December 1980) . 
However, if things appeared to go smoothly for Chan in Indonesia 
they did not go so well at home. In a statement made prior to his depar­
ture, Chan was quoted as saying that his government did not recognize 
the OPM and that 'if there was a step up in guerilla activities in the bor­
der region . . .  PNG would feel bound to consider military action after 
consultation with Indonesian authorities' (Post-Courier 10 December 
1980 ; the Post-Courier paraphrased this as 'PNG troops would be sent 
to crush OPM's guerilla activities' . Similarly see Canberra Times 6 
December 1980) . This statement drew a sharp reaction in Papua New 
Guinea : the national executive of Chan's coalition partner, the 
Melanesian Alliance , strongly criticized the prime minister and 'de­
clared its support for the Irian J aya freedom movement' (Post-Courier 
12 December 1980) (though, significantly , the party's parliamentary 
leaders Fr John Momis and John Kaputin, were away at the time) ; and 
opposition leader Somare called on Chan and Levi, on their return , to 
explain their government's attitude to the OPM (Post-Courier 15 
December 1980). Responding, Chan denied that he had threatened 
force against Irianese , and told reporters that though he only had 
Indonesia's word that it was not going to pursue an expansionist policy 
in the Pacific, 'he thought he sensed a new [sic] non-aggressive stance' 
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(Post-Courier 16 December 1980) ; he also sought an early meeting 
with Melanesian Alliance leaders. 
Late 1980-early 1981 also saw an apparent further hardening in 
the government's attitude to border crossers . In December 1980 a 
group of over one hundred crossers was repatriated after being given 
food and medical treatment and the new Foreign Affairs and Trade 
secretary Paulius Matane took the opportunity to observe that Papua 
New Guinea and Indonesia were working towards the establishment of 
a joint border committee to coordinate development on the border in 
order to prevent such mass migrations (Post-Courier 22 December 
1980) . The following month, in giving notice of the government's 
intention to close refugee camps at Yako and Wabo, Matane reiter­
ated the view that as development got under way 'we can reasonably 
expect this problem [border crossing] to disappear' ; those presently in 
the camps would be given permissive residency or sent back to Irian 
Jaya, the secretary said, but future border crossers would be 
immediately sent back to Irian Jaya (Post-Courier 21 January 1981) .  
The Post-Courier reported (20 January 1981 ) :  'It is understood the 
Government believes the flow of 'genuine refugees' across the border 
has significantly declined' . 
Against this background, in February 1981 the first meeting of the 
Joint Border Committee , created under the 1979 border agreement, 
was held in Jakarta. The meeting, which was judged a success , discus­
sed infrastructure development, communications, trade and cultural 
exchange (Post-Courier 5 February 1981) .  
In retrospect , relations between Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia probably reached a highpoint around this time. The tense 
atmosphere which prevailed during most of 1977-78 appeared to have 
abated ; the two governments had exchanged cordial official visits ; a 
new border agreement had been successfully negotiated and adminis­
trative arrangements were in hand for more effective control of the 
border ; Papua New Guinea's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty in 
Irian Jaya and its unwillingness to allow the OPM to operate on Papua 
New Guinean soil had been reconfirmed following a change of govern­
ment ; Indonesia had given a further reassurance that it had no expan­
sionist ambitions ,  and there were hopes that a joint border develop­
ment programme would gradually remove the incentive to border 
crossing. 
This is not to say that there were not problems. For one, although 
the border never became a partisan issue in Papua New Guinea's 
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domestic politics, it remained a subject about which successive govern­
ments were made to feel a need periodically to defend their record. For 
another, there was at least one further border incursion, in July 1980 
when a party of Indonesian police crossed into Western Province in 
pursuit of 'an escaped family' (Post-Courier 7, 8 July 1980). Thirdly, 
there was a protracted disagreement following a decision by Air 
Niugini , for economic reasons, to cut out a Jakarta stop-over on its 
flight to Singapore and to close its Jakarta office. In retaliation, 
Indonesia refused Air Niugini flyover rights , causing Transport minis­
ter Okuk , in turn , to cancel plans (part of a recently signed technical 
cooperation agreement) to have Papua New Guineans train at 
Indonesia's Air Training College . Fourthly, there was a continued 
steady trickle of Irianese across the border into Papua New Guinea. 
But generally it was felt that the problems posed by the border were 
likely to diminish . 
Towards the middle of 1981 the border issue appeared again to 
become more salient, and relations between Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia to move into a new downward phase. 
In April 1981 UPNG students, led by Student Representative 
Council (SRC) president Gabriel Ramoi (a West Sepik , who in 1982 
was elected to the National Parliament) , staged a solidarity march 'to 
assess the public's support for the West Papua freedom movement' , 
and approved a gift of K2000 to support the OPM (Post-Courier 2 
April 1981) .  The following month a Melanesian Solidarity Week was 
organized at UPNG. As part of this a South Pacific Human Rights Tri­
bunal was convened to consider charges that Indonesia had violated 
international laws on human rights. Members of the self-appointed tri­
bunal included acting national court judge Bernard Narokobi , East 
Sepik politician and sometime opposition foreign-affairs spokesman 
Tony Bais , National Cultural Council chairman Moi Avei , church 
leader Dick Avi, and the UPNG's dean of Law, Sao Gabi. Over sev­
eral days the tribunal heard from Irianese witnesses accounts of execu­
tions , torture, political indoctrination and denial of free speech (see 
Post-Courier reports 28, 29 May and 1 ,  5-6 June 1981) .  The Indonesian 
embassy declined an invitation to attend the tribunal and appears to 
have put pressure on the Papua New Guinea government to stop the 
hearings . The incident clearly did cause some embarrassment to the 
government, and foreign minister Levi said the tribunal could jeopar­
dize the government's acceptance of Irianese refugees ; however prime 
minister Chan was reported as saying, 'It is allowed by PNG 
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authorities because it is an expression of our people's rights to express 
themselves' (Post-Courier 29 May 1981) .  
In June it became known that three Irianese refugees who had 
been involved in the Human Rights Tribunal - including former Irian 
Jaya governor Eliezer Bonay, who had crossed to Papua New Guinea 
seeking asylum in 1979 - were to be deported. Two of them, Bonay and 
Dean Kafiar, left for Sweden early in July but the third, John Hamadi , 
who had been in Papua New Guinea since 1978 and whose mother was 
Papua New Guinean, was taken in by UPNG students who managed to 
conceal him from police and D FAT officials for several weeks. (As a 
result of this incident Ramoi was subsequently charged and convicted 
of harbouring an illegal immigrant . )  The government's deportation 
order came under strong criticism, amongst others from Bais. Not­
withstanding this criticism, in late July another three Irianese, long­
time residents in Papua New Guinea, were deported, this time back to 
Indonesia. A statement by Levi accused the three (Bob Kubia, Fred 
Pieger and Willie J ebleb) of being senior members of the Melanesian 
Socialist Party , in whose name approaches had been made to the 
USSR and Cuba for assistance to the OPM, and of 'orchestrating . . .  
recent armed clashes between OPM rebel factions' ; he warned that 
'similar stern action' would be taken against other permissive residents 
who breached the terms of their entry (Post-Courier 28, 30, 31  July 
1981) .  Again the Chan government came under heavy criticism. Bais 
accused it of sending the three to their deaths, and the general secret­
ary of the Melanesian Alliance, Michael Malenki, issued a statement 
saying that while his party respected the need to safeguard national 
security , 'we call on the Foreign Affairs Department to stop being dic­
tated to by Indonesia and come to grips with the need to be sensitive 
to the plight of Irian Jayans' (Post-Courier 31 July 1981) .  But the pro­
tests were of no avail , and public interest in the fate of the refugees 
appears to have quickly faded. 
In the latter part of 1981 reportage of border activities was taken 
up largely with accounts of clashes between rival OPM factions along 
the border. In late June supporters of a faction led by Elky Berney 
were reported to have crossed into Sandaun Province and raided 
Papua New Guinea villages reputed to be sympathetic to the rival 
Rumkorem faction. Another raid occurred in the same area in August, 
in which several villagers were abducted, and there were reports that 
several OPM supporters had been killed in faction-fighting. More gen­
erally , there appears to have been an upsurge of OPM activity within 
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Irian Jaya during 1981 (see, for example , Canberra Times 20 October 
1981 ; Courier-Mail (Brisbane) 27 October 1981 ; Bulletin 15  December 
1981) ,  and with this came an increase in military activity in the pro­
vince and a new escalation of border crossings. In September the Post­
Courier carried an AAP report , quoting ANTARA newsagency, that 
the provincial military commander in Irian Jaya, Brigadier-General 
Santosa had declared that OPM rebels had not responded to the 'smil­
ing policy' and that 'All troublemakers at home and their supporters 
abroad should be eliminated' (Post-Courier 8 ,  24 September 1981 ; 
Niugini Nius 8 September 1981) .  
In November foreign minister Levi tabled the government's 
White Paper on Foreign Policy , the product of a foreign policy review 
initiated by the Somare government in 1979. In it the government 
observed that relations between the two countries had been marked by 
an increasing commitment to cooperation by both governments , while 
noting that such commitment had 'not always been matched by public 
understanding' .  The document also reaffirmed that , in recognition of 
public opinion in Papua New Guinea, it would not become involved in 
joint patrols , would not allow foreign forces to enter in 'hot pursuit ' ,  
and would not insist that 'genuine refugees' return to the other side 
(PNG Foreign Affairs Record 1(4) 1982 :41-43) .  
Apparently moved by developments in 1981 , deputy prime minis­
ter Okuk responded to the White Paper with a statement in which he 
said that 99 per cent of educated Papua New Guineans supported the 
OPM, that 'Indonesia must realize the people of Irian Jaya were 
Melanesians - not Indonesians' ,  and that Indonesia 'should be 
ashamed that its own people were crossing the border to live in Papua 
New Guinea' (Age 11  November 1981) .  The statement prompted a 
sharp response from Indonesia's foreign minister Mochtar who 
warned Papua New Guinea not to take advantage of the 'economic 
imbalance' between Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea (Post-Courier 
26 November 1981).  Not to be discouraged, in March 1982 the outspo­
ken Okuk returned to the subject of the border: Papua New Guinea, 
he said, faced a growing threat from Irian Jaya. The threat came from 
a build-up of non-Melanesians in the province, and Indonesian border 
developments unmatched by Papua New Guinea (Post-Courier 23 
March 1982) . Levi dismissed Okuk's statement as 'sheer nonsense' and 
'election bluff' ; 'We have excellent relations with Indonesia' , Levi 
said, 'and they will continue' (Post-Courier 24 March 1982) . (This was, 
in fact , a slight exaggeration : in January the Papua New Guinea gov-
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ernment had refused to renew the visas of two members of the non-dip­
lomatic staff of the Indonesian embassy, who had arrived in the coun­
try on tourist visas and who , according to the Times of PNG 15 January 
1982 , had been engaged in espionage ; in retaliation the Indonesian 
embassy in Port Moresby had closed down its visa section.) But Okuk 
persisted : under the headline 'Okuk : I won't shut up ! '  he was reported 
as telling the UPNG branch of the National Party : 
I believe you are fed up . . .  with a foreign policy which sells 
out our fellow Melanesians . . . .  We complain about events 
in New Caledonia - yet we maintain a deafening silence 
about events in Irian Jaya (Post-Courier 2 April 1982) . 
The DFAT quickly dissociated the government from the views expres­
sed by the deputy prime minister , but others thought his warning 
timely (see Post-Courier 5 ,  7 ,  12 April 1982). The discussion took a 
new direction, however, following the publication of an Indonesian 
embassy newsletter (Indonesian Newsletter No. 3/111/82) . Under a 
heading 'A matter of understanding' the embassy presented a defence 
of transmigration to Irian Jaya, which concluded with a short homily 
whose object was not difficult to guess : 
One has to understand the nature of international politics if 
one would become a leader of a certain nation , otherwise 
such a person will create disaster instead of developing 
peace and harmony between neighbouring countries .  
The Post-Courier (29 April 1982) reported the newsletter on its front 
page , under the headline , 'Indonesia's warning : shut up on Irian Jaya' 
and the next day Okuk responded. In his usual forthright manner 
Okuk told the Indonesian embassy to stay out of the Papua New 
Guinea election : 
The people of this nation do not respond kindly to thinly 
veiled warnings from foreign governments, or their embas­
sies (Post-Courier 30 April 1982). 
He went on to say that some years ago the Indonesian embassy had 
attempted to 'win [his] favor' and that other leading Papua New Gui­
neans had 'been 'greased' by highly-trained Indonesian officials' ; the 
Indonesian embassy, he said , was 'grossly over-staffed' - 'One must 
wonder what they all do' - and a National Party government would 
make it very clear that embassies are 'for diplomatic purposes only' . 
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Okuk was supported by a Post-Courier editorial (3 May 1982) which 
spoke of 'a crude attempt by Indonesia to curb not only Mr Okuk's 
freedom of speech, but everyone else's, on matters Jakarta finds 
embarrassing' and described as 'ominous' , given the history of 
Indonesia's relations with its neighbours, the reference to 'creating dis­
aster' . More significantly both Matane and Levi came in behind Okuk. 
Matane was reported to have told the Indonesian ambassador that the 
newsletter had created damage the two governments now would have 
to repair (Post-Courier 3 May 1982). Levi described the newsletter as 
undiplomatic and was reported as saying that the government would 
now move to 'tighten up' the border agreement at the next meeting of 
the joint border committee ; specifically 
He said PNG would press for amendments to the 1979 bor­
der agreement to outlaw settlement of non-Irianese in 
'clearly defined traditional zones' (Post-Courier 5 May 
1982) . 
Close on the heels of this (and on the eve of voting for the national 
elections) came reports that armed Indonesian troops had crossed the 
border into Papua New Guinea. In October 1981 an OPM group had 
made a raid on a sawmill at Holtekang south of Jayapura, taking fifty­
eight hostages. Indonesian military operations had apparently resulted 
in the release of some of these hostages but seven months later about 
half were still being held, according to Indonesian intelligence on the 
Papua New Guinea side of the border . Without prior consultation , 
Indonesian patrols crossed into Papua New Guinea on three separate 
occasions between 14 and 22 May and in one instance Papua New Gui­
nean villagers in Sandaun Province were questioned at gunpoint. 
Although Papua New Guinea's leaders were by this time in the midst 
of campaigning for the national election, a meeting of the National 
Security Advisory Council was called and on 27 May an official protest 
was lodged with the Indonesian embassy. The same day a fourth incur­
sion occurred. Levi expressed himself 'deeply disturbed' that Papua 
New Guinea's sovereignty had been 'so blatantly breached' and said 
the incidents had the potential to severely damage relations ; Defence 
minister Pepena said further incursions would be 'dealt with accord­
ingly' , and though Momis criticized 'prominent leaders' for 'baiting 
our enemies' (Times of PNC 28 May 1982) , the Melanesian Alliance 
called on the government to take a tougher stand on border violations 
(subsequently the party's deputy chairman, Narokobi, urged the 
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immediate cutting of diplomatic relations as a mark of protest) . (See 
Post-Courier 24, 27 May 1982, 1 June 1982 ; Canberra Times 22 May 
1982 ; Far Eastern Economic Review 4 June 1982. )  A second protest 
note was sent and the Papua New Guinea ambassador was brought 
across from Jakarta and instructed to pursue diplomatic initiatives to 
bring foward the annual joint border committee conference scheduled 
for August. In the midst of this a helicopter containing the provinicial 
military commander and thirteen troops and civilians bound for 
Wamena landed at a mission station on the Papua New Guinea side, 
allegedly having been forced down by bad weather. When, eventually, 
Indonesia responded to the Papua New Guinea demand for an expla­
nation of the border violations it claimed that Indonesian troops had 
not been involved and that all the hostages had been recovered from 
Papua New Guinea by people from the Irian Jaya village of Selmus ; 
the statement went on to accuse Papua New Guinea of failing to hon­
our its obligations under the 1979 Border Agreement . An editorial of 
the Times of Papua New Guinea ( 11 June 1982) described the Indone­
sian response as 'singularly arrogant' and said : 'The Indonesians . . .  
have , in the toughest terms diplomats use , told PNG where it can stick 
its protest note. We believe they have told lies' . The credibility of the 
Indonesian response was, in fact , severely dented when , a few days 
after its receipt, a group of eighteen hostages was handed over to 
Irianese villagers who escorted them across the border into Papua New 
Guinea where they were intercepted by a border patrol and taken to 
Vanimo hospital. It appears that the release of the hostages was 
negotiated by DFAT officials and a Catholic brother, who had crossed 
into Irian Jaya with the agreement of the Indonesian government ; 
moreover, although the Indonesians had been asked to suspend milit­
ary operations in the area while negotiations were being carried out, 
Indonesian troops were actively patrolling and the negotiating group 
was 'several times close to discovery' (Times of PNG 16 July 1982. See 
also Post-Courier 1 1 ,  15 June 1982 ; Sydney Morning Herald 1 1  June 
1982 ; Far Eastern Economic Review 18,  26 June , 2 ,  9 July 1982 ; Nan­
goi 1982) . The hostages were subsequently repatriated (though 
Indonesia refused to meet the costs of repatriation). Informed public 
feeling in Papua New Guinea was well represented by the Post­
Courier's defence reporter (16 June 1982) : 
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(1) That a group of villagers from Irian Jaya popped over 
the border last month to free hostages held by the Free 
West Papua guerillas . 
(2) That all the hostages taken in the October raid on a saw­
mill near J ayapura had been freed, and 
(3) That a helicopter flying the Jayapura military comman­
der, Brig-Gen Santos [sic] , from his headquarters to 
Wamena in the Highlands 240 km south-west of the Irian 
Jaya capital was forced by bad weather to land in PNG 
some 10 km south-east of his departure point. 
The answers are (1) : Rubbish. (2) : Not true. And (3) : 
When the Indonesians next get the chance to discuss their 
defence co-operation agreement with Australia ,  they 
should request navigation training for their helicopter 
pilots. 
On a more serious note a DFAT spokesman was reported as saying 
that the entire incident could have been avoided if Indonesian officials 
had kept Papua New Guinea informed,  in the spirit of the 1979 border 
agreement , and Papua New Guinea reaffirmed that it would not 
become involved in joint patrols (Post-Courier 15, 16 June 1982). 
In the first week of July 1982 another three military incursions 
occurred. In the first incident nineteen people who had crossed in 
1977, and were said not to be OPM sympathizers , were taken back 
across the border by an armed Indonesian patrol . Matane made strong 
verbal representations on this occasion and L.evi forwarded a formal 
protest , saying that Papua New Guinea 'would not tolerate continued 
violations of its territory by armed Indonesian soldiers' and question­
ing Indonesia's sincerity in complying with the 1979 border agreement. 
Chan stated that border patrols (which had been increased in June) 
must act to disarm Indonesian troops or OPM guerillas inside Papua 
New Guinea. Okuk called for the closure of the Indonesian embassy, 
and was supported in this by Bais (Post-Courier 8 July 1982 ; Far East­
ern Economic Review 9 July 1982) . 
Nevertheless, during the next few weeks, as voting was finalized in 
Papua New Guinea's elections and a new Somare government came to 
office, things quietened down along the border and tensions eased. 
The Indonesian government , which had reportedly favoured a So mare 
victory , must have been well satisfied with the outcome , especially as 
Okuk failed to gain reelection and the foreign affairs portfolio was 
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allocated not to the former opposition foreign affairs spokesman, Bais , 
but to Rabbie Namaliu. In August, the third meeting of the joint bor­
der committee went ahead as scheduled. Memoranda of understand­
ing were signed covering the formal establishment of the joint border 
committee , arrangements for border demarcation, survey and map­
ping, installation and operation of a high frequency radio linkage, and 
traditional and customary border crossings. Officials of the two coun­
tries also met to discuss border surveying and mapping. The following 
month Namaliu visited Jakarta to ratify a seabed agreement. By mid 
September, in what seemed to be a quick about-face , the Post-Courier 
(14 September 1982) felt able to comment , 'Our relations with 
Indonesia are probably better right now than they have been for at 
least two years' .  
Then, on 17 September, providing a sequence of developments 
which recalled the events of 1977-78, OPM leader Seth Rumkorem 
and nine of his deputies were taken into custody in Rabaul, allegedly 
en route to Vanuatu and Senegal, and subsequently charged as illegal 
immigrants . 8 
1 982-83: mounting tensions 
But just as the optimism of late 1978 proved shortlived, so did the 
newfound accord of 1982. 
Late in 1982 there was a minor flurry when the staff driver of the 
Indonesian defence attache (Colonel Ismail) was murdered by an 
Irianese permissive resident , Simon Alam. During the course of the 
trial it was claimed that the driver, Meinard Poluan , had been involved 
in coordinating the surveillance of Irianese residents in Papua New 
Guinea and that Alam had been a reluctant informer (Far Eastern 
Economic Review 6 January 1983 ; Canberra Times 28 January 1983). 
Then in February 1983 some concern was caused by reports that bet­
ween 1 ,000 and 1 ,500 Irianese - refugees, apparently, from clashes bet­
ween Indonesian troops and the OPM - were about to cross the border 
into Papua New Guinea (Times of PNG 11  February 1983 ; Sydney 
Morning Herald 16 February 1983).  
8 The charge was dismissed, on the grounds that Rumkorem's group had been 'invited' 
to disembark by Rabaul police and customs officers. After about fourteen months of 
unsuccessful negotiations to find a third country which would accept the refugees, Rum­
korem and two of his deputies were granted temporary residence in Greece. The rest 
were granted permissive residency. 
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In April 1983 the border again captured the headlines when it was 
reported that Indonesia's trans-Irian Jaya highway, then in an early 
stage of construction, crossed into Papua New Guinea at two points 
near the headwaters of the Bensbach River in Western Province. 
(Later survey established that it crossed at a third point .) That the 
highway crossed into Papua New Guinea had been established by a 
National Mapping Bureau survey in late March-early April9 though 
later information suggested that photographs taken during a National 
Intelligence Organization-Defence-DFAT survey had revealed the 
crossings in October 1982, and that the National Security Advisory 
Committee had been informed of this (though N amaliu claimed not to 
have been advised) . A peculiarity of the situation was that the highway 
in this section lay in largely uninhabited country between the border 
and the Merauke River, bypassing planned transmigration settlements 
to the west of the Merauke River - a fact which led an anonymous 
DFAT 'analyst' (as reported in Post-Courier 9 June 1983) to conjec­
ture that the location of the road 'indicated it would serve a 'strategic 
military' purpose' and 'had potential for aggression rather than 
defence' .  Foreign minister Namaliu expressed himself 'very con­
cerned' at the incursion (Post-Courier 14 April 1983) and a formal pro­
test was lodged calling for the closure of the offending sections of the 
road. Opposition leader (and former Defence Force chief) Diro refer­
red to it as 'the first act of deliberate territorial violation' (Post-Courier 
18 April 1983 ; later he took a more moderate stand, calling for a con­
tinuation of 'the present good relations with Indonesia', Post-Courier 
19 May 1983).  From Rabaul, where he was still awaiting acceptance by 
a third country, Rumkorem commented that he was aware of the road 
'and several other major projects . . .  aimed at reducing rebel activity on 
the border' (Post-Courier 19 April 1983) .  
The alleged border violations were referred to a joint border tech­
nical sub-committee meeting scheduled for later in the month. Foreign 
Affairs secretary Matane requested that the meeting be at departmen­
tal head level , and led the Papua New Guinea delegation ; the Indone­
sian delegation was headed by the director of the National Co-ordina-
9 This survey had been carried out after two unsuccessful attempts to arrange a joint 
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea survey - the first in September 1982 when a survey had 
commenced but was called off twenty-odd kilometres south of the incursions due to bad 
weather; the second in January 1983 when a proposed survey was cancelled at 
Indonesia's request. 
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tion Agency for Surveys and Mapping. Following this meeting the area 
was subjected to a satellite scan which confirmed that the road had 
crossed the border in three places. In mid June it was reported that in 
Jakarta Mochtar had expressed his government's official regret over 
the crossings , but it was not until the end of July that Namaliu received 
confirmation of this. Towards the end of the year a joint Indonesia­
Papua New Guinea survey party began detailed survey, mapping and 
demarcation of the border, after which the offending road sections 
were to be closed. The exercise took place under the protective watch 
of Indonesian and Papua New Guinean troops ; the Papua New Guinea 
government acknowledged (Post-Courier? July 1983) that 'This can be 
regarded, therefore , as a joint operation with Indonesia' - something 
of a departure from its earlier firm denial of joint military operations 
and one which drew criticism from opposition spokesman Levi (Post­
Courier 20 July 1983) - but according to Namaliu (Post-Courier 13 July 
1983) neither nation's troops would cross the border at any time. (Re­
ports in the Times of PNG 8 July 1983, 6 January 1984, on the other 
hand, claimed that the agreement gave rights of 'hot pursuit' twenty 
kilometres inside the border.) However in December it was 
announced that survey work had been halted due to heavy rain and 
'financial problems [which] forced the Indonesian group to withdraw' 
(Post-Courier 27 December 1983). The offending sections of the road 
were eventually closed off at a formal ceremony in late August 1984 ; 
'We hope the road intrusion was an honest mistake' ,  Matane told the 
assembled group, 'We hope it is the only mistake the Indonesian gov­
ernment will make' (Niugini Nius 3 September 1984). In a later com­
ment on the subject (Post-Courier 28 September 1984) Matane said, 
'The 'mistakes' they made had cost us thousands of kina that should 
have been spent in developing Papua New Guinea and its people' .  
In summary, generally cordial relations at the government-to­
government level together with improved machinery for joint border 
administration made it possible to sort out what was in all probability 
a harmless, if puzzling, error by the road construction contractors 
employed by Indonesia , without any significant deterioration in rela­
tions between the two countries. The incident did, however , suggest 
also that the joint border machinery, and indeed diplomatic channels, 
were not functioning very effectively. Nor, it might be added, were 
border development programmes conspicuously successful, despite 
the early rhetoric, on either side of the border. In Papua New Guinea's 
two border provinces there were frequent complaints of lack of 
1 1 2  
CHAPTER 5 
development, even before 1983 when border development prog­
ramme expenditure was cut severely. 
In the border road incident and in other developments in 1983 the 
Somare government worked hard at maintaining good relations with 
Indonesia. It again reiterated its acceptance that what happened in 
Irian Jaya was Indonesia's internal affair, notwithstanding a steady 
build-up in the number of border crossers (see, for example, Draft 
Hansard 5 May 1983) ; it maintained a firm line against border crossing 
and against support for the OPM within Papua New Guinea ; and it 
announced increased allocations for border patrols and plans to station 
an infantry company at Kiunga. In September Defence minister Epel 
Tito was relieved of his portfolio after expressing the view, to an 
Australian audience , that an Indonesian invasion of Papua New 
Guinea was a future likelihood. And in December Somare made 
another state visit to Indonesia and was reported (Pacific Islands 
Monthly February 1984) as being impressed with Indonesian assur­
ances of determined efforts to develop and improve the lives and con­
ditions of Melanesians in Irian Jaya. 
Once again, however, the good intentions of government were 
overtaken by events. 
The events of 1984 - a substantive shift? 
It appears that during 1983 there was an upsurge of OPM activity 
in Irian Jaya, in part the consequence of a new solidarity within the 
movement. It seems, further, that there were ambitious plans for a 
general uprising in early 1984, to draw international attention to the 
demands for West Papuan independence (see, for example, the report 
of an interview with James Nyaro, Niugini Nius 27 February 1984) . 
In late January intelligence sources in both Papua New Guinea 
and Australia were forewarned of a likely influx of border crossers into 
Papua New Guinea. Around mid February the influx began, initially 
mostly women and children, then men, including a number who had 
deserted from the army or abandoned public service or university 
posts. By the third week of February there were said to be about 130 
border crossers . Requests by the Papua New Guinea government for 
information concerning the movement of people and the situation in 
Irian Jaya failed to elicit a credible response . Indonesian officials, ini­
tially not available for comment, told the Papua New Guinea govern­
ment that they knew nothing of reported events in Jayapura, yet 
denied that there had been a confrontation between the OPM and the 
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military (Post-Courier 16 February 1984 ; Niugini Nius 16 February 
1984) ; the situation in Jayapura was said to be 'normal' (Niugini Nius 
22 February 1984). Irianese refugees told a different story. In January , 
according to one , some thirty OPM supporters in Jayapura had been 
arrested and detained. Another told of a fight in the Hamadi (Jayap­
ura) market, in which three Melanesians had been killed. But the crit­
ical incident was an abortive attempt by West Papuan independence 
supporters on 13 February to raise the West Papuan flag on the provin­
cial assembly building in Jayapura, an incident in which two West 
Papuans were killed. As a sequel to this, Indonesian authorities were 
said to have conducted a house-to-house search for OPM sympathisers 
and, according to refugees, 'hundreds' of Melanesian civil servants and 
army deserters were under military detention. Others had fled. Resi­
dents on the Papua New Guinea side of the border confirmed that 
J ayapura was in darkness and its government radio station silent. OPM 
supporters spoke of an imminent attack on Jayapura and other centres 
(Post-Courier 20 February 1984). 
On 21 February it was reported that foreign minister N amaliu had 
cabled his Indonesian counterpart Mochtar, urgently requesting infor­
mation, since contacts at senior official levels had proved unsuccessful. 
Namaliu expressed his disappointment at the lack of communication 
from Indonesia and made the pointed observation that under the bor­
der agreement the two countries had an obligation to inform each 
other of matters relevant to their security (Post-Courier 2 1 ,  22 Feb­
ruary 1984) . (It might be noted that when the crisis arose , there had not 
been a border liaison meeting since December 1983 - allegedly because 
of lack of funds - and the Vanimo-Jayapura 'hot-line' had been out of 
service for 'several months') . Three days later Namaliu and prime 
minister Somare told a press conference that they had still not received 
an answer from Indonesia and had sent a second telex asking for a 
reply within forty-eight hours. A Post-Courier editorial (24 February 
1984) described the Indonesian non-response as 'an insult' .  When a 
reply came, on 25 February, it confirmed that there had been clashes ,  
but said little. Namaliu told _reporters he thought the response was 
'sufficient enough' (Post-Courier 27 February 1984). 
Meanwhile two police riot squads were dispatched to Vanimo to 
join the 360 Defence Force personnel already patrolling the border 
and northwest coastline . 
By the end of February there were about 250 border crossers, 
mostly accommodated in camps on the outskirts of Vanimo, and 
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although a number said they intended to return to continue the fight 
for West Papuan independence, the number of refugees rose daily. In 
the hope, it seems, of discouraging such movement the government 
pressed charges of illegal entry against all the adult males (then num­
bering eighty) , and acting foreign minister Bais announced that the 
government would decide on the future of the crossers after further 
consultation with Indonesia. This action came under strong criticism , 
among others from Okuk (who had been returned to parliament in a 
by-election and emerged again as opposition leader) , UPNG students 
and law faculty, the bishop of Vanimo, and officials within DFAT, Jus­
tice and the Public Solicitor's Office . The court handed down its deci­
sion in Vanimo on 21 March , by which time the number charged had 
increased to 1 1 1 :  84 crossers were found guilty by one magristrate -
who, however, expressed sympathy with their reasons for crossing -
while a second magistrate dismissed the case against the other 27. 73 of 
those found guilty were sentenced to six weeks gaol , but were sub­
sequently released on their own recognizance pending appeal . Their 
conviction was later quashed by the National Court (Post-Courier 22 
June 1984) . 
As the flow of Irianese across the border continued during Feb­
ruary and March, the government found itself under pressure from a 
number of sources to grant asylum to the refugees and also to support 
West Papuan independence demands at the UN. In early March, fol­
lowing a parliamentary debate on the border problem, prime minister 
Somare told a press conference that his government was prepared 'to 
act as honest brokers' ; Papua New Guinea would support the Irianese , 
he said, but not to a situation where it would jeopardize Papua New 
Guinea's own position (Post-Courier 2 March 1984) . 
Confronted with a growing volume of border crossers , the Papua 
New Guinea government requested an urgent meeting with Indone­
sian officials to discuss the border situation, and particularly the ques­
tion of the refugees. It appears that Papua New Guinea requested a 
meeting of the joint border committee (though there is some confusion 
on this - see for example Niugini Nius 15 March 1984 and Far Eastern 
Economic Review 12 April 1984) but when its delegation, led by 
Matane, arrived for the meeting in Jayapura in mid March it found 
itself sitting down to a meeting of the lesser border liaison committee 
with an Indonesian delegation led by a local bupati (district commis­
sioner) who was apparently uninformed on the subject of border cros­
smgs and did not have authority to make decisions. Papua New 
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Guinea's frustration on this account was aggravated by an Indonesian 
news report which claimed that Papua New Guinea had agreed to 
repatriate the 300 or so refugees who had crossed since February. 
Namaliu denied the report , at the same time revealing that Indonesia 
had requested a list of names and particulars of the border crossers. 
(See Post-Courier 19, 20, 21 March 1984) . 
While DFAT officials were still interviewing these border cros­
sers, another group of about one hundred crossed into Sandaun Pro­
vince, seeking temporary refuge from fighting along the border. 
Matane told the Indonesian ambassador that the government was 
'very, very concerned about the situation' (Post-Courier 27 March 
1984) ; nothing if not consistent, 'Mr Soepomo said he was unaware of 
the latest crossings . . .  ' (ibid.) .  
In the midst of all this (and within hours of restoring the telephone 
link between Port Moresby and the border stations in Sandaun Pro­
vince - which had been disconnected because accounts allegedly had 
not been paid) , the Papua New Guinea public learned that two 'un­
identified jet fighter planes' had flown low over Green River station, 
buzzing the station and, according to some reports, dropping what was 
thought to be a bomb or rocket (witnesses reported hearing a loud 
'explosion' and some said they saw smoke as an object was dropped) 
(Niugini Nius 28 March 1984 ; Post-Courier 28, 29 March 1984). A 
complaint to the Indonesian ambassador brought an immediate denial 
that the planes were Indonesia's, though the ANTARA news agency 
had already reported an exercise by the Indonesian air force, including 
mock battles and paratrooper drops, around Jayapura. Indonesia's 
foreign minister Mochtar declined to comment. The ambassador's 
curious response caused Matane to comment, 'We are very disap­
pointed and annoyed as to the way we have been treated by Indonesia 
so far' (Post-Courier 29 March 1984) , while Namaliu was said to be 
'Bloody angry' (Far Eastern Economic Review 12 April 1984) . The 
prime minister instructed Namaliu to seek an immediate meeting with 
Moch tar, and suggested a meeting of defence ministers and armed 
forces chiefs after that ; an immediate meeting of foreign ministers, 
however, was ruled out by Mochtar's previous overseas commitments. 
The disappointment and annoyance expressed by Namaliu and 
Matane was manifested in a threat to expel Indonesia's defence 
attache, Colonel Ismail ; speaking to the press after delivering 'a 
strongly worded protest note' ,  Matane observed that Papua New 
Guinea had not been advised of the air force exercises and said, 'We 
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believe the defence attache is not doing his job' (Post-Courier 30 
March 1984) . (It might be added that within Papua New Guinea it was 
generally believed that Ismail was in charge of Indonesia's espionage 
activities in the country - see , for example, Times of PNG 12 April 
1984.) 
A formal response to Papua New Guinea's request for informa­
tion on this latest incident was received on 3 April. By this time the pre­
sence of Indonesian aircraft in the general vicinity at the time of the 
incursion was an established fact and the possibility of an unintentional 
incursion had been privately admitted (Niugini Nius 30 March 1984 ; 
Far Eastern Economic Review 12 April 1984) ; however the Indonesian 
reply, which emanated from military sources, continued to insist that 
no incursion had occurred and suggested that the reports of a bomb or 
rocket firing might be explained by the fact that the aircraft had, at the 
provincial governor's request, produced a sonic boom, 'to raise a spirit 
of love for the skies in the people of the region' [ 'untuk membangkit­
kan semangat cinta udara masyarakat daerah'] (Tempo 14 April 1984 ; 
see also Far Eastern Economic Review 12 April 1984 and Post-Courier 
4 April 1984). Namaliu, describing the reply as 'highly unsatisfactory' ,  
delivered a second diplomatic note, asking for clarification of the 
Indonesian response within forty-eight hours and again raised the 
threat of expulsion of the military attache. (After some abstruse dip­
lomatic shuffling - including denial of landing rights to an Indonesian 
military aircraft sent to collect Ismail - the military attache left Port 
Moresby on 12 April . )  
The Indonesian ambassador was not the only one to receive a dip­
lomatic note on 3 April . At the end of March the Australian National 
Times had published the contents of a 'leaked' cabinet document out­
lining the strategic bases of Australian foreign policy (National Times 
30 March-5 April, 6-12 April 1984 ; Sydney Morning Herald 30 March 
1984) . Contained in this document was the statement that 'Australian 
policy should encourage PNG to take action wherever possible to sup­
press anti-Indonesian activity by Irian Jaya dissidents and progres­
sively to develop the PNG official presence in the border region' .  The 
Australian high commissioner in Port Moresby was called in and asked 
to provide information on the status of the leaked document ; at the 
same time Namaliu took the opportunity to tell the Australians that 
Papua New Guinea would 'not accept suggestions from any foreign 
government or organisation which seeks to involve the country and its 
people in an internal dispute of another sovereign base' (Niugini Nius 
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4 April 1984 ; Far Eastern Economic Review 12 April 1984). 
In the midst of these diplomatic 'exchanges' , it was reported that 
OPM guerillas had kidnapped a Swiss mission pilot, Werner Wyder, 
and an lrianese school superintendent and that the Swiss embassy in 
Jakarta had asked the Papua New Guinea government to help locate 
the pilot and negotiate his release. The pilot and his passengers had 
been ambushed when his plane landed at Yurup, a mission station 
across the border from Kamberatoro ; two other passengers , Indone­
sians, had been murdered. (It was while searching for this aircraft, it 
transpired, that the Indonesian jets had flown over Green River.) The 
Swiss authorities subsequently received, through Henk Joku, a ran­
som demand for Kl .5  million, to be delivered to OPM leader Nyaro 
via Papua New Guinea officials and the Catholic mission at Kamberat­
oro. Somare reacted promptly and sternly to this demand : 'The gov­
ernment will not allow PNG soil to be used as a base for terrorism,  
extortion or murder by the OPM',  Somare said, and any resident of 
Papua New Guinea, citizen or non-citizen, 'shown to be involved in 
such criminal acts' would face criminal charges (Post-Courier 5 April 
1984) . He did, however, offer to mediate in the release , without condi­
tions, of the hostages. Statements from members of the Irianese com­
munity in Papua New Guinea called on the OPM to release Wyder, 
offered to assist in negotiation of his release , and cast doubts both on 
Joku's credentials as OPM spokesman and on the source of the ransom 
demand. The latter was subsequently quietly dropped but the OPM 
did insist that as conditions for the release of Wyder, Switzerland act 
as intermediary in arranging talks between the OPM and the Indone­
sian government, and that it present the West Papua issue to interna­
tional forums (the UN General Assembly and its Committee on Decol­
onization, and the Non-Aligned Nations' Conference were men­
tioned) . On 7 April Nyaro's men were finally persuaded to free Wyder, 
without conditions, and a party comprising the bishop of Vanimo , the 
Swiss ambassador to Australia, the Swiss honorary consul in Papua 
New Guinea and Henk Joku escorted the pilot from the border to 
Kamberatoro mission and thence to Vanimo and Port Moresby. (The 
Irianese captive had been released in Irian 1 aya earlier.) 
In the meantime , the Papua New Guinea government received a 
reply to its second diplomatic note. Although this second response 'did 
not deal directly or in full with all matters raised in the two protest 
notes' , it was accepted by Namaliu who said,  'We believe that the vio­
lation of our territorial sovereignty . . .  has been acknowledged' (Post-
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Courier 6 April 1984). The Indonesian note also confirmed arrange­
ments for a meeting between Namaliu and the Indonesian ministers for 
Foreign Affairs , Defence and Home Affairs in mid April . 
It also became clear early in April that, associated with the Wyder 
incident (and despite a statement by Mochtar, reported in Post­
Courier 23 April 1984, that 'very little or no fighting has taken place 
between troops and rebels') ,  there had been increased military activity 
on the Indonesian side of the border from around late March , particu­
larly around Yurup-Amgotoro , and a further massive flow of people 
across the border was taking place. According to a Post-Courier report 
(9 April 1984) DFAT officials, concerned at this latest development, 
had instructed border officials to refuse these people food and send 
them back across the border. On 9 April it was reported (Post-Courier) 
that the number of border crossers had risen to 1 ,000, most of them in 
Sandaun Province. Three days later another report said that 3,000 
Irianese were heading for the border, in Western Province ; by the end 
of the month the number in refugee camps along the border was put at 
more than 4,500 (Post-Courier 1 May 1984) . As further clashes occur­
red between the OPM and Indonesian troops, and OPM activities in 
the southern part of the border area intensified, the number of border 
crossers increased steadily : to 5 ,600 by 1 1  May, 7 ,400 by end May, 
over 9,000 by end June and around 1 1 ,000 in October. Understanda­
bly, the question of border crossers/refugees10 became a dominant 
concern of the Papua New Guinea government in 1984, both domesti­
cally and in its relations with Indonesia, and it remains such. Since this 
is the subject of a separate chapter (Smith and Hewison, below ; see 
also Brunton 1984 ; ICJ 1984), however, it will not be considered in 
detail here, except insofar as it is an essential element of Papua New 
Guinea's domestic political situation and foreign relations .  
The scheduled ministerial talks between Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea were held in Jakarta in mid April . A few days before they 
10  The use of the terms 'border crosser' and 'refugee' has been a contentious issue. The 
Papua New Guinea government rightly argues that many of those who have crossed the 
border are 'traditional crossers' or people who intend to go back as soon as things 
quieten down ; only a small proportion of those who have crossed the border are 
'genuine refugees', that is people who might have a reasonable claim to political asylum. 
Accepting the logic of this I have generally used the term 'border crossers' in this discus­
sion. But this is not meant to deny that, in the common usage of the term, virtually all 
border crossers are 'refugees' , people seeking permanent or temporary refuge from con­
ditions they perceive as threatening their wellbeing. 
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commenced the Papua New Guinea press carried reports of a state­
ment by Indonesia's military commander in Irian J aya, Brigadier-Gen­
eral Sembiring Meliala, which accused Papua New Guinea of 'habour­
ing, giving sanctuary, to the OPM'. As reported (Niugini Nius 1 1  April 
1984 ; see also Post-Courier 16 April 1984) Sembiring expressed the 
view, inaccurate as well as optimistic, that 
If only the PNG government was consistent with promises 
made during our joint border committee talks that it would 
not allow OPM living there to carry arms . . .  the problem 
would be solved. 
He also repeated the denials of the air incursions, denied that there 
had been an uprising in Jayapura, and said that Indonesia had no obli­
gation to warn Papua New Guinea of military exercises. The Papua 
New Guinea government appears to have made no response to this 
statement, though Okuk called for another formal protest note. It 
may, however, have influenced the stand which Namaliu took. In a 
statement issued to the press soon after his arrival, the Papua New 
Guinea foreign minister said that the immediate cause of his visit was 
to lodge 'a very strong formal protest' . Apart from the specific issue of 
violations of Papua New Guinea's territorial sovereignty by Indone­
sian military aircraft , Namaliu referred to the problems that had led to 
so many Irianese crossing the border since February, and complained 
that his government had been forced in recent months 'to deal with the 
effects of problems not of our own making'. 
The people and government of my country have a very real 
interest in ensuring that Irian J aya is administered in an 
orderly and peaceful way and that development takes place 
in the interests of the people who live there 
the minister said (Niugini Nius 16 April 1984) . The impact of the state­
ment was not softened, in Indonesian eyes, by Namaliu's offer of finan­
cial and technical development assistance , and assistance to other 
Indonesians 'to understand the cultures and values of the Melanesian 
inhabitants in Irian Jaya' (ibid.) .  In an interview with AAP correspon­
dent Leigh Mackay, Mochtar referred to Namaliu's statement as 'of­
fensive' and 'provocative' and said Indonesia had 'reacted in a very 
restrained manner' (Post-Courier 23 April 1984) . 
The same day, in Port Moresby a statement by the acting Foreign 
Affairs minister, Tony Siaguru, reflected Papua New Guinea's 
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stronger stand on the border situation : 
There has never been any question that PNG regards Irian 
Jaya as an integral part of Indonesia. 
Since the first Somare Government, we have been careful 
not to interfere in the internal affairs of Indonesia. 
But the time has come to make it clear to the Indonesian 
Government that many of its policies and actions in Irian 
Jaya affect PNG quite directly (Post-Courier 16 April 
1984). 
The Jakarta talks did little to reconcile the two governments : on 
the subject of the Green River incursions the Indonesian government 
continued to deny that its aircraft had crossed the border ; with regard 
to Defence attache Ismail, the Indonesian government insisted that 
the attache had been expelled , while Papua New Guinea claimed that 
Indonesia had been persuaded to withdraw him. On these issues, 'We 
have agreed to disagree' ,  Namaliu reported, and he described himself 
as 'satisfied . . .  under the circumstances' (Post-Courier 18 April 1984) . 
Partial agreement was reached on the repatriation of border crossers , 
and Namaliu was given an assurance of the safety of those who 
returned to Irian Jaya, but Papua New Guinea's request for UNHCR 
supervision of the welfare of returnees was not accepted by Indonesia. 
General reaction in Papua New Guinea to the Jakarta talks seems 
to have been that, though they failed to resolve some major differ­
ences, they had been fruitful and that Namaliu had succeeded in taking 
a commendably firmer line in presenting Papua New Guinea's position 
(see, for example, Times of PNG 26 April 1984) . Some, however, felt 
that the foreign minister had not been firm enough : former Foreign 
Affairs minister Noel Levi described his successor's offer of assistance 
to Indonesia as 'nothing more than buying friendship from a burglar' 
and said that 'any help to Indonesia would mean assistance in the kil­
ling of the Melanesian race in Irian Jaya' (Post-Courier 18 April 1984) ; 
UP leader Torato urged that diplomatic relations with Indonesia be cut 
and that Papua New Guinea support West Papuan demands at the 
UN ; MA spokesman Narokobi expressed the view that Papua New 
Guinea would be 'justified in treating Indonesia as a hostile and 
unfriendly nation' (Niugini Nius 21 April 1984) ; the Sandaun premier, 
Andrew Komboni , said that sending the border crossers back was 'as 
good as killing them' (Times of PNG 3 May 1984) and suggested that 
Mochtar visit the refugee camps ; and in the National Parliament the 
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member for Wosera-Gaui proposed a bill to resurrect the Papua New 
Guinea Volunteer Rifles and to create reserve police and school cadets 
in order to prepare Papua New Guinea for an attack by Indonesia 
(such legislation was in fact passed in November 1984) . 
The question of border crossers and what to do with them preoc­
cupied the Papua New Guinea government in its dealings with 
Indonesia throughout 1984. Namaliu and Matane , it seems, had hoped 
to commence repatriation soon after the April talks (though it is not 
clear how they intended to do this, since there is no evidence that the 
border crossers were willing to go back of their own accord) . At the 
end of April Mochtar announced that 1 , 140 border crossers would be 
returned within days (Post-Courier 30 April 1984) but in mid May it 
was reported that Papua New Guinea was waiting for Indonesia to set 
a date for repatriation (Post-Courier 14 May 1984) . The government 
perhaps had good reason for wishing the border crossers away, since 
by this time the situation in camps in the Western Province was being 
described as 'quite desperate' (Post-Courier 15 May 1984) . On 28 May 
Niugini Nius quoted an ANT ARA report that repatriation was to com­
mence 'in the near future' ; the following day, however, the same paper 
reported that repatriation plans had been 'shelved indefinitely' follow­
ing the withdrawal of Indonesian officials from a meeting arranged in 
Vanimo to finalize a programme for the repatriation of about 5 ,OOO 
border crossers. (According to a report in Niugini Nius 29 May 1984 
the Irian Jaya governor, Isaac Hindom, who was to have led the dele­
gation, was 'over-committed' ; but Post-Courier 30 May 1984 reported 
that Hindom had fears for his security in Papua New Guinea.) 
This was symptomatic of a state of affairs which continued 
throughout the year. There were , it seems, three major obstacles to 
agreement on repatriation arrangements. One was Papua New 
Guinea's insistence on a guarantee of the safety of returnees. Such an 
assurance had been given verbally on more than one occasion but 
when Papua New Guinea sought, first, a written undertaking and, sub­
sequently, a formal commmitment from both the foreign minister and 
the military as part of a joint repatriation agreement, it met resistance . 
In August Namaliu sent for the Indonesian ambassador and expressed 
Papua New Guinea's concern that despite commitments made by 
senior Indonesian ministers in April , assurances still had not been for­
malized ; ' . . .  arrangements will not - I repeat not - be put into effect 
until the guarantees we seek have been finalized' , said the minister 
(Post-Courier 21 August 1984 ; see also Post-Courier 7 September 
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1984) . Some two weeks later Mochtar was reported (Niugini Nius 8 
September 1984) as saying that his repeated verbal assurances should 
have been sufficient but that he would provide an assurance in writing, 
as part of a formal repatriation agreement recently negotiated at a bor­
der liaison meeting. In fact, Mochtar objected to the terms of the 
assurance which Papua New Guinea sought in the agreement (see 
Post-Courier, Niugini Nius 25 September 1984) and it was not until late 
October, and after the offending section had been removed, that the 
agreement was signed. In the event, the assurance of the safety of 
returnees was given in a separate (unpublished) letter. A second point 
of contention was Papua New Guinea's request that the UNHCR be 
involved in overseeing the repatriation exercise . Indonesia denied this 
request, though it agreed to have Papua New Guinea officials monitor 
the repatriation and visit returnees in Irian Jaya. Towards the end of 
the year the Papua New Guinea government appears to have given up 
on this point (see, for example, a statement by Siaguru reported in 
Post-Courier 16 October 1984) , though in an unexpected reversal of 
policy in December Indonesia was reported to have agreed to let the 
UNHCR supervise repatriation (Post-Courier 13 December 1984) . 
The third obstacle to agreement on repatriation was Indonesia's insis­
tence that Papua New Guinea provide it with a list of names of border 
crossers . In early June Mochtar was quoted as saying that repatriation 
had been stalled by Papua New Guinea's failure to provide such a list ; 
'It would be an enormous task' ,  was Namaliu's reported response , 
'There are 8000 here now and they are still coming' (Post-Courier 4 
June 1984). However a week later Mochtar told a press conference in 
Jakarta that the names of some sixty dissidents (including army deser­
ters and hard-core OPM sympathizers) would suffice, and that repatri­
ation could begin once this list was received (Post-Courier 12 June 
1984) . Niugini Nius (12 June 1984) expressed widespread reaction 
within Papua New Guinea to this demand in its headline : 'Don't do it, 
Mr Namaliu' . The same issue carried a detailed report on the killing of 
Irianese museum curator Arnold Ap. 1 1 The Papua New Guinea gov-
1 1  Ap, along with several other Irianese nationalists, had been detained and held, appa­
rently without formal charges, since November 1983. For accounts of his death see 
Niugini Nius 7 May, 1 1 ,  12, 30 June, 28 August 1984; Times of PNG 10  May, 7 June 
1984; Sydney Morning Herald 14 May, 27 August 1984; Far Eastern Economic Review 
7 June 1984. Ap's wife was among refugees who crossed into Sandaun Province in Feb­
ruary 1984. 
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ernment appears to have refused this request but to have offered to 
supply lists of names for each group repatriated as they were sent back 
(Post-Courier 27 June 1984) . 
Within Papua New Guinea opposition to repatriation was strong 
and vocal , not only from within the camps and from the political 
opposition (notably Okuk, Momis, Narokobi and the member for 
North Fly, Warren Dutton) but also from the Sandaun and Western 
provincial premiers, from students , from various church sources, from 
some government officials, and in newspaper editorials and numerous 
letters to the press. Public sentiment on the refugee issue was further 
aroused in August by a statement by Matane, on his return from a joint 
border committee meeting, that 9,000 border crossers would be 
escorted across the border by Defence Force personnel 'within the 
next few weeks' (Post-Courier 1 August 1984) , and it was intensified 
following newspaper reports that about one hundred people in refugee 
camps had died from starvation or malnutrition-related causes (Post­
Courier 13,  14, 16 August 1984 ; Times of PNG 16,  30 August 1984). 
Although many of those who died were old or very young and in poor 
condition when they crossed into Papua New Guinea, there was 
nevertheless a strong feeling that tragedy could have been avoided, 
and questions were raised about the extent of the government's resolve 
with regard to refugees and about why offers of assistance from the 
UNHCR and from churches had not been taken up. (See Smith and 
Hewison, below. )  Government backbencher and member for Aitape­
Lumi, and former student leader, Gabriel Ramoi accused the govern­
ment of employing a policy of deliberate starvation to encourage 
people to go back across the border (Niugini Nius 20 August 1984). In 
the National Parliament the government came under strong criticism 
and there were calls for the resignation of the ministers for Provincial 
Affairs (John Nilkare , who accepted responsibility for the govern­
ment's failure to cope with the situation) and Health (Niugini Nius 17,  
23 August 1984). If any demonstration were needed of the fact that 
conditions within Irian Jaya were of direct concern to Papua New 
Guinea, this surely provided it. 
In a press release issued on 19 August Namaliu said that while 
Papua New Guinea regretted the deaths and suffering, 'We should not 
forget that ultimately conditions in the camps on the border were 
brought about as a result of circumstances in Irian Jaya which have 
caused more than 9,000 people to flee their homes to Papua New 
Guinea'. He went on to say that Papua New Guinea,  believing that the 
1 25 
BETWEEN TWO NATIONS 
border crossers , as Indonesian citizens, were primarily an Indonesian 
responsibility, had repeatedly asked the Indonesian government to 
help feed them, but apart from an amount of K22,800 received in April 
it had received no assistance - 'In fact, most of our requests have gone 
unanswered' (Post-Courier 20 August 1984). (A further K18 ,000 was 
received from Indonesia subsequently. )  Nilkare , on the other hand, 
laid part of the blame on the OPM, who, he said', had told the refugees 
not to return until Irian J aya had independence from Indonesia ; 'They 
are killing their own women and children for the sake of politics' ,  he 
said (Niugini Nius 17 August 1984) . 
In late August, following a border liaison meeting in Port 
Moresby, it appeared that repatriation was about to commence ; 
Indonesian sources even mentioned a date, 17 September, though this 
apparently came as a surprise to Namaliu (Post-Courier 29 August 
1984) . 'Public awareness' patrols were carried out in the border areas 
in the hopes of persuading border crossers to return and arrangements 
were in hand for an Indonesian 'verification team' to visit the camps to 
speak with prospective returnees. But in October repatriation still had 
not commenced. OPM sources ,  meanwhile, had let it be known that 
they intended to disrupt the repatriation exercise and would take 
retaliatory action if it proceeded ; specific threats were made against 
the Ok Tedi mining project and against individual Papua New Gui­
nean politicians and bureaucrats (see, for example , Post-Courier 12 
September 1984 ; Niugini Nius 19 September 1984) . 
In October letters concerning repatriation arrangements were 
exchanged and at the end of the month Mochtar visited Papua New 
Guinea to sign a new basic border agreement (see below) . During 
Mochtar's visit it was announced that repatriation would commence 
the following week. However, when in early November the Indone­
sian verification team visited the Blackwater camp outside Vanimo 
(against the advice of Papua New Guinea officials, who had warned of 
likely violence) it was confronted by stone-throwing Irianese refugees 
and had to withdraw. Five of the seven Indonesian team members had 
to be treated in Vanimo hospital and amid heated complaints of 
inadequate security on Papua New Guinea's part (including a 
demonstration outside the Papua New Guinea embassy in Jakarta) the 
verification team returned to Jayapura. 
Shortly after this, Namaliu presented a statement to the National 
Parliament in which he announced that 'A flexible program for the 
return of border-crossers to Indonesia has been devised . . .  The repat-
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riation program will . . .  take place in stages , over an extended period of 
time' (Post-Courier 21 November 1984) . Apparently as the first act 
under this 'flexible program' ,  on 23 December a group of 102 refugees 
from Blackwater camp was taken by Indonesian government boat to 
Jayapura , where they were given a welcome feast before being 
returned to their home district of Arso . The group was accompanied 
by a Papua New Guinean observer but there was no UNHCR involve­
ment. By this time Namaliu had left the Foreign Affairs ministry (shift­
ing to Primary Industry , ostensibly to be able to spend more time with 
his family) ,  and had been replaced by John Giheno. In announcing the 
repatriation Giheno said that of the 1 1 ,000 who had crossed by 
October 1984 about 2,000 had returned in small groups and many more 
were expected to follow (Post-Courier 27 December 1984) . An even 
more optimistic outlook was attributed to a Foreign Affairs official : 
A Foreign Affairs official said yesterday it was hoped the 
1 1 ,000 crossers in camps in Western and West Sepik Pro­
vinces would return voluntarily . . . . making an official 
repatriation unnecessary. 'We wanted to allow the situa­
tion to solve itself . . .  ,' he said (Post-Courier 4 January 
1985). 
The estimate of 2,000 has been largely discounted by informed 
sources, and the expectations of Giheno and his department have so 
far proved wildly optimistic. In mid May 1985 , on the eve of a border 
liaison committee meeting, a second group was repatriated from 
Blackwater camp, on this occasion with the involvement of the 
UNHCR as well as the Papua New Guinea government and refugee 
camp representatives. Initially 79 people agreed to go back but in the 
event 28 had second thoughts, leaving 51  to be repatriated (Post­
Courier 15 May 1985 ; Far Eastern Economic Review 30 May 1985) .  
Two months later it was reported that in Sandaun Province there were 
300 to 400 recently arrived border crossers at Old Skotiau, another 100 
at Yabsiei, and over 200 at Wasengla (Post-Courier 12, 16 July 1985 ; 
Wantok 20 July 1985) .  The same month an event long anticipated by 
some Australian observers of the border situation occurred when five 
refugees arrived, via Papua New Guinea, on Australia's Boigu Island, 
and sought asylum. Australian authorities who hoped to shift this 
problem back to Papua New Guinea were quickly disabused : "If the 
reports are right , then it is a matter between Australia and Indonesia' , 
an official [of DFAT] said' (Post-Courier 8 July 1985). 
1 2 7  
BETWEEN TWO NATIONS 
While repatriation of border crossers became the major issue in 
both domestic politics and foreign relations concerning the border dur­
ing 1984, it was not the only problem. 'Incidents' continued to occur 
and border administration posed continuing problems. Together with 
what Papua New Guinea saw as a somewhat intransigent attitude to 
repatriation on Indonesia's part, these contributed to a toughening of 
the position taken by Papua New Guinea which culminated in a com­
plaint about the border situation at a UN General Assembly meeting 
in October. 
In late April 1984 , shortly after the Jakarta talks and with refugees 
pouring across the border, it was reported (Niugini Nius 27 April 1984) 
that about 150 Indonesian soldiers had crossed the border near 
Imonda while pursuing Nyaro , and in Western Province four Indone­
sians, who confessed to being in pursuit of border crossers near Weam, 
were taken into custody before being sent back across the border. 
About three weeks later Papua New Guinea officials learnt from an 
Indonesian press report that a three-day military exercise was under 
way to the south of Jayapura. Despite undertakings given in April, the 
Papua New Guinea government had not been advised of this and the 
Indonesian charge d'affaires claimed he was unaware of it. On 21 May 
it was reported (Niugini Nius) that two Indonesian helicopters had 
strayed 3 km into Papua New Guinea territory near the Bewani patrol 
post. The same day, Namaliu delivered a major statement on the bor­
der situation to the National Parliament ; the statement summarized 
developments since February and elaborated the government's 
approach to the question of repatriation, but the foreign minister also 
took the opportunity to express the government's deep concern that it 
had not been informed of Indonesia's military activities near the bor­
der and that Indonesia had not been responsive to its requests for bor­
der liaison meetings . Namaliu also reiterated the view that while 
Papua New Guinea did not want to interfere in Indonesia's internal 
affairs, ' . . .  the border crossings are not simply internal affairs of 
Indonesia. They have had - and continue to have - direct effects on 
Papua New Guinea' (Times of PNG 24 May 1984). 
About the same time as N amaliu's statement to parliament , it was 
announced that, in an effort to reduce border crossings and to prepare 
for the repatriation of crossers, police and military patrolling of the 
border was being stepped up and permanent bases were to be estab­
lished at Vanimo and Amanab (Niugini Nius 17 May 1984) . The fol­
lowing month several Irianese, described as 'leading members of the 
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OPM', were arrested in a police mobile squad raid on a camp inside the 
Papua New Guinea border, near Kamberatoro ; six were subsequently 
charged under the Criminal Code with operating an illegal paramilit­
ary force . 
Within days of this, however, relations between Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea headed towards a new nadir after it was estab­
lished that fifty-three Indonesian soldiers had crossed into Papua New 
Guinea and had destroyed crops and garden huts in Suwampa village 
near Wutung. Yet again the Indonesian ambassador was called to 
DFAT and given a 'strongly-worded note' ; the Papua New Guinea 
government claimed compensation for the damage and told the 
ambassador that unless a satisfactory explanation was provided soon, 
'the Papua New Guinea Government will feel compelled to begin con­
sidering raising the violations at forthcoming regional and interna­
tional meetings' (Post-Courier 29 June 1984). Yet again,  however, 
Indonesian authorities refused to admit that an incursion had occurred 
(indeed, shortly before this the secretary to the governor of Irian Jaya 
repeated the claim that 'There have never been any clashes between 
the Indonesian defence forces and the OPM rebels. There have been 
no clashes, never' , Times of PNG 31 May 1984) . Notwithstanding the 
fact that witnesses had reported that all but three of the party were 
non-Melanesians, Mochtar suggested that perhaps the offenders were 
OPM guerillas in Indonesian army uniforms ; but he was said to be tak­
ing the Papua New Guinea claim seriously and seeking advice from 
military sources in Irian Jaya. Although the Indonesian ambassador 
accompanied secretary Matane on an inspection visit to Suwampa -
where empty Indonesian army ration packs had been left behind and 
names carved on trees - Indonesian armed forces commander General 
Murdani formally denied the incursion, attributing it to a 'third party' 
and adding that Indonesian army uniforms could be 'easily purchased 
anywhere' (Niugini Nius 26, 29 , 30 June, 3 ,  5 ,  7 July 1984 ; Post­
Courier 29 June , 2 , 5 July , 3 August 1984 ; Times of PNG 5 July 1984) . 
Indonesia's formal response was received by Namaliu on the eve 
of his departure for Jakarta to attend a ministerial meeting of ASEAN 
(within which Papua New Guinea has special observer status) , and in 
a speech to that meeting Namaliu took the opportunity to inform 
ASEAN ministers of his government's 'deep concern at recent events 
on the border' (Post-Courier 1 1 July 1984 ; Niugini Nius 25 July 1984). 
While in Jakarta Namaliu also had talks with senior Indonesian minis­
ters and with Murdani who gave him an assurance (not, however, the 
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first such assurance) that in future Papua New Guinea would be 
informed in advance of any Indonesian military exercises in the border 
area (Post-Courier 13 July 1984) . Papua New Guinea , it was reported, 
again rejected the idea of joint border patrols. 
On the last day of June the border incursion was jostled out of the 
headlines by the news that in Sandaun Province the headmaster of a 
community school near Amanab had been kidnapped by OPM gueril­
las . Reports suggested that kidnappers were demanding a halt to the 
proposed repatriation of refugees and the withdrawal of special police 
patrols along the border. Following an emergency meeting of the 
National Security Council, acting foreign minister Bais issued a state­
ment calling for the release of the teacher and saying there would be no 
negotiations and no bargaining (Niugini Nius 30 June, 2 ,  3 July 1984 ; 
Post-Courier 3, 4 July 1984) . The teacher was released after a few days 
and an apology subsequently was received from Nyaro, who said that 
the kidnapping had been intended to avenge police action along the 
border (Niugini Nius 19 September 1984) . However the incident 
resulted in the closure of schools in the border area for about ten weeks 
and appears to have been the main reason for a special military opera­
tion in the Amanab -Green River- Imonda area which resulted in the 
apprehension of twelve suspected OPM guerillas. (In another sequel, 
the officer in charge of Amanab patrol post, who had played a major 
role in securing the release of the kidnapped teacher, was charged with 
harbouring an illegal immigrant - allegedly the nine-year-old daughter 
of James Nyaro. )  
During July 1984 : a group of Indonesian officials, led by the direc­
tor of Indonesia's Center for Strategic and International Studies, vis­
ited Port Moresby for a seminar on Indonesia-Papua New Guinea rela­
tions ; the annual joint border meeting was held in Surabaya , and the 
formal process of drafting a new basic border agreement (the 1979 
agreement being due to expire in 1984) commenced. These three 
events provided further occasions for the expression of Papua New 
Guinea's firmer stand on border issues. In an address to the joint semi­
nar Namaliu told delegates that events in Irian Jaya directly affected 
Papua New Guinea and that Papua New Guinea had 'an immediate 
interest in the way in which Irian Jaya is governed and developed' (re­
ported in Post-Courier 24 July 1984) , and that Indonesia was not doing 
enough to understand the Melanesian cultures of the lrian Jaya 
people . Matane , on his return from Surabaya (where discussion had 
been primarily concerned with repatriation of border crossers) , 
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expressed his obvious frustration with Indonesian denials of the latest 
border violation in the suggestion that in future any soldiers found on 
the Papua New Guinea side of the border who did not look like 
Melanesians should be shot in the leg, so that Papua New Guinea could 
provide the required evidence (Niugini Nius 30 July 1984). And with 
reference to the new border agreement it was made known that Papua 
New Guinea would press for the inclusion of provision for compensa­
tion for damages arising from border incursions (Times of PNG 19 July 
1984) . 
Nevertheless during August prime minister Somare appears to 
have gone to some trouble to dissuade Vanuatu's prime minister, Wal­
ter Lini (whose Vanuaaku Pati had voted in late July to recognize the 
OPM) , and Solomons prime minister Solomon Mamaloni from raising 
the West Papua issue at a Commonwealth Heads of Government Reg­
ional Meeting (CHOGRM) and a forthcoming South Pacific Forum 
meeting (Niugini Nius 9, 13 August 1984 ; Post-Courier 13 ,  27 August 
1984). Somare was alleged to have had a 'sharp exchange' with Lini, 
telling him that so long as Vanuatu was not prepared to accept Irianese 
refugees there was no point discussing the matter. 
By the end of September, obviously irritated by Indonesia's proc­
rastination on the repatriation issue - in the face of a continuing steady 
flow of border crossers - and stung by the criticisms, domestic and 
foreign, generated by the deteriorating conditions in refugee camps 
along the border, Namaliu had resolved to air Papua New Guinea's 
grievances at the UN. In a speech to the General Assembly on 1 
October Namaliu referred to recent developments along the border 
and told delegates that Papua New Guinea had not been satisfied with 
most of the replies it had received from Indonesia about border viola­
tions. The Indonesian ambassador in Washington replied that his 
country was 'painfully surprised' at these accusations, that he thought 
'misunderstandings' had been resolved, and that Indonesia 'had shown 
great restraint' (reported in Times of PNG 4 October 1 984 ; Niugini 
Nius 5 October 1984) . Apparently provoked by Namaliu's UN speech, 
at a press conference in Jakarta in mid October foreign minister 
Moch tar was quoted as saying that Indonesia had 'run out of patience' 
and was ready to respond to charges made by Papua New Guinea con­
cerning the border ; Namaliu replied that although Mochtar's state­
ment 'sounded quite tough' he was pleased that it showed the Indone­
sian government realized just how serious and concerned Papua New 
Guinea was about the border situation (Post-Courier 18  October 
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1984). Mochtar in turn countered with a complaint that Papua New 
Guinea had not prevented OPM rebels from taking sanctuary on its 
side of the border, and cast doubts on his planned visit to Moresby for 
the signing of the revised border agreement (Niugini Nius 22 October 
1984) . 
The visit did go ahead, and a new border agreement was signed on 
29 October. The agreement (which is summarized by Prescott in chap­
ter 1 and is reproduced as an appendix to this volume) contained new 
provisions concerning exchange of information on major constructions 
within 5 km of the border, and compensation for damages caused by 
'acts and related activities' within the border area. 
At a press conference after the signing, Mochtar said that he was 
satisfied that Papua New Guinea was doing all it could to prevent the 
OPM using its territory, though there was still room for improvement. 
Mochtar also invited the Papua New Guinea government to establish 
a consulate in Jayapura to serve as a conduit for information on condi­
tions in the province (Post-Courier 30 October 1984) . 
Days before the ministerial meeting in Port Moresby the local 
press revealed that, unknown to the government or DFAT, deputy 
opposition leader Momis had had talks with Nyaro on the Papua New 
Guinea side of the border near Kamberatoro (Niugini Nius 25 , 26 
October 1984) . Mochtar made reference to this meeting, and warned 
that meetings with rebels on the Papua New Guinea side of the border 
would not be tolerated ; 'if nothing is done about it' , Mochtar is 
reported to have said, 'we are quite entitled , I think, to consider it an 
unfriendly act' (Post-Courier, Niugini Nius 30 October 1984) . The ini­
tial reaction to the news of Momis's meeting, expressed by Somare 
(Post-Courier 26 October 1984) , was tolerant ('If Fr Momis has talked 
to these people , well that's something entirely up to him . . . .  ' ) ,  but 
Momis's action was later strongly condemned by Namaliu, who 
described the contact as 'not only embarrassing to the government, but 
potentially a real source for actions which could seriously undermine 
national security' (quoted in Post-Courier 8 November 1984) . 
Shortly after this, Defence Force personnel were called out to 
assist police along the border following unconfirmed reports of OPM­
Indonesian military clashes spilling across the border near Wutung. In 
the event, there was no sighting of either OPM or Indonesian troops, 
though in the following weeks a further 660 refugees crossed into the 
Sandaun Province (Post-Courier 9, 13,  28 November 1984). 
The next significant incident on the border occurred in April 1985 , 
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when a helicopter containing a Papua New Guinea Post and Tele­
graphs maintenance crew landed, by mistake , at an OPM camp in the 
border area near Bewani. The group was taken into custody by about 
forty OPM guerillas , but released after promising not to reveal the 
location of the camp. (One man, from Central Province, narrowly 
escaped being killed because he was taken for an Indonesian. )  On 
hearing of the incident, more than four weeks later, the government 
mounted a special operation involving about 200 Defence Force per­
sonnel and police , but by the time the force moved on the camp 
(twenty-five days elapsed between the government learning of the inci­
dent and troops entering the camp), the OPM had disappeared (Post­
Courier 14, 15 ,  22 May 1985). The incident was noted by Mochtar, who 
was prompted to make the curious comment (as reported in Sydney 
Morning Herald and Canberra Times 25 May 1985) that since the OPM 
had failed to gain independence for Irian Jaya it may now 'try to stir 
rebellion in Papua New Guinea to establish an independent Papuan 
State'. Less than a month later another, more successful, operation 
was conducted near Wutung, Sandaun Province, in which six sus­
pected OPM members were arrested and weapons and explosives cap­
tured. Several Papua New Guinean villagers were also charged with 
harbouring illegal immigrants (Post-Courier 27, 28 May 1985) .  
Public opinion on the Irian Jaya issue 
This account of Indonesia-Papua New Guinean relations relative 
to the border and the situation of the Melanesians in Irian Jaya has so 
far been principally in terms of the relations between governments, 
though passing reference has been made to broader public awareness 
and attitudes, and to relations between the Papua New Guinea govern­
ment, OPM leaders and the Irianese community in Papua New 
Guinea. Following the expression of popular sentiment towards the 
'Act of Free Choice' in 1969 Irian Jaya was not a subject of great con­
cern in Papua New Guinea for several years , Papua New Guineans 
being generally preoccupied with the domestic circumstances of the 
immediate pre-independence and post-independence periods . As 
noted above , the Papua New Guinea government under Michael 
Somare (1972-77) broadly accepted the policies of the colonial govern­
ment in relation to the border and border crossers , although, following 
the elaboration of a universalist foreign policy, there was a suggestion 
that the new government was less conciliatory towards expressions of 
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Irianese nationalism than the colonial government had been (see 
p . 9 1 ) .  
In 1976 Somare and Kiki stated clearly that their government was 
not prepared to countenance support for the OPM within Papua New 
Guinea (see p .  93 ) .  I have suggested, however, that this position 
was determined more by realpolitik and expedience than by the feel­
ings of the mass of Papua New Guineans , among whom there was a 
widespread, if generally poorly informed,  sympathy for their 'Melane­
sian brothers' .  Some influential commentators , indeed, have spoken 
with concern of what they regard as 'Indophobia' among educated 
Papua New Guineans, an attitude which they frequently attribute to 
outside influences (for example, Hastings 1979 and in Sydney Morning 
Herald 2 May 1983 ; Whitlam 1980 : 5 ;  Mochtar quoted in Post-Courier 
24 April 1984) . There has also been a suggestion that if only Papua 
New Guineans understood Indonesia's position on Irian Jaya (and 
East Timar) , their reservations about Indonesia's presence and 
policies there might be suspended. It should be clear from the histori­
cal survey presented here that I believe such a viewpoint not only reve­
als a patronizing attitude towards those Papua New Guineans who 
have helped formulate opinions and policies in their country, but vas­
tly oversimplifies a complex set of attitudes which has been shaped 
more than anything else by Papua New Guinea's own nationalist 
experience and political ideology, by shared language and kinship 
among border communities, and by the history of diplomatic and 
administrative dealings over the border. 
Developments in Irian Jaya and along the border in 1977-78 
increased the salience of the border issue in Papua New Guinea and 
revealed a growing popular sympathy for the Melanesian population in 
Irian Jaya. At the same time, in the intensified activity along the bor­
der in 1977-78 relations between the Papua New Guinea government 
and the OPM - and consequently between the government and the 
Irianese community in Papua New Guinea - appeared to deteriorate 
markedly . This latter development was in part the inevitable consequ­
ence of the government's tougher attitudes towards border crossings 
and towards visible support for the OPM within Papua New Guinea ; 
but it also reflected the difficulties of dealing with a movement sharply 
divided within itself and of coming to terms with a leadership which, 
from about 1977 , threatened to resort to terrorism against Papua New 
Guinea in pursuing its demands (see, for example, Post-Courier 29 
April 1977, 2, 3 May 1977, 27 September 1977, 10 November 1977, 23 
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October 1978 ; Age 13 June 1978). After the capture of Prai and 
Ondowame in 1978 , and the decision not to grant them asylum in 
Papua New Guinea, several members of the government received 
threats of violence and at a cabinet meeting in Wewak , usually a very 
casual affair, ministers were heavily guarded by police with armalite 
rifles. The removal of two Irianese refugees in an OPM raid on the 
refugee camp at Yako in April 1979 brought a very strong reaction 
from Somare , who said the incident could lead to a hardening of the 
government's attitude towards the separatists, and indeed shortly after 
i t  was reported that the government was preparing legislation to stop 
citizens actively supporting the OPM (Canberra Times 4 April 1979 ; 
Post-Courier 25 May 1979 ; Sydney Morning Herald 25 May 1979) . 
(Such a proposal , it seems, had been discussed in June 1978, but Jus­
tice secretary , Buri Kidu, had advised that any attempt to restrict the 
movement of Papua New Guinean citizens would be unconstitutional. 
See Post-Courier 31 January, 5 February 1979.) 
Since 1979, and especially since 1984, popular concern over the 
situation on the border has undoubtedly increased, while relations bet­
ween the Papua New Guinea government and the OPM and its suppor­
ters appear to have deteriorated still further. It might be useful , there­
fore, to look more closely at the various elements of what earlier I 
referred to as 'the Irian Jaya lobby' (May 1979a :98) and to offer some 
comments , in summary, on attitudes towards the OPM. 
The Irianese community in Papua New Guinea 
There appears to be some uncertainty about the number of Irian­
born residents in Papua New Guinea. A figure given to me by official 
sources in 1983 put the total of naturalized citizens and permissive resi­
dents from Irian J aya at 567, but the usual estimate of Irian-born resi­
dents is about 2,000 to 3 ,000 (with guesses as high as 10,000) . Of these, 
217 have been granted Papua New Guinea citizenship . 12 Some of these 
people migrated from West New Guinea before 1962 ; the rest are 
12 Between September 1975 and June 1977, 157 Irianese were granted citizenship. In 
November 1978 it was reported (Post-Courier 13 November 1978) that the government 
was imposing a freeze on citizenship to Irianese, and there has been no evidence of a 
thaw despite a subsequent announcement of a freeze in March 1984. In March 1980 
members of the Irianese community approached the then foreign minister, Levi, seeking 
clarification of the status of citizenship applications, some of which had been outstanding 
since 1976, but received no response. 
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either refugees with the status of permissive residence (or citizenship) 
or people who slipped across the border in the 1960s or early 1970s and 
took up residence in villages or towns in Papua New Guinea. The 
number in the latter category (particularly in the Sandaun and East 
Sepik provinces) is possibly quite large. 
For most of the 1960s and early 1970s the Papua New Guinea gov­
ernment, while discouraging boarder crossing in general , 13 seems to 
have granted permissive residence fairly readily to those who could 
plausibly claim that they would suffer persecution if they were 
returned to Indonesia. Those granted permissive residence , however, 
were required to accept two conditions : that they would settle where­
ver they and their families were directed (in practice , where jobs were 
available away from the border) , and that they would 'never directly or 
indirectly get involved in political activities which caused [them] seek­
ing for asylum in Papua New Guinea' (Verrier 1976 : Appendix F) . The 
first of these conditions had the effect of distributing the Irianese com­
munity fairly widely throughout the country and mostly in towns (par­
ticularly in Manus - where in the 1960s and early 1970s large numbers 
of permissive residents were accommodated temporarily - and Port 
Moresby) . The second condition, I suggested in 1979, had not been 
very strictly enforced : 
The circumstances of gaining permissive residency virtually 
ensure that the Irianese community will be antipathetic, if 
not actively hostile, towards Indonesia and even without 
engaging in formal political activity some Irianese are likely 
to find sympathetic voices among their Papua New Gui­
nean neighbours (one prominent Papua New Guinean 
spokesman for Irian Jaya has joint business interests with 
Irianese ) .  Many Irianese now hold senior positions in gov­
ernment, private enterprise and the church and there is no 
doubt that some have used their positions to publicize the 
grievances of the Irianese people. Moreover, since 1962 the 
Irianese community has provided an effective underground 
channel for OPM propaganda . . .  (May 1979a :99-100) . 
In the 1970s a South Pacific News Service, the mouthpiece for the Pro­
visional Revolutionary Government of West Papua New Guinea, 
13 For a summary of policy and procedures on border crossing see May 1979a :98-99. 
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operated from Port Moresby with agencies in Sydney and London, 
and, as noted above , the de facto West Papuan cabinet announced in 
1977 included the names of Irianese residents in Papua New Guinea, 
though some of these disclaimed any involvement. 
In 1976 and again in 1978 , however, the government threatened to 
take action against Irianese residents giving visible support to the 
OPM, and early in 1979 an Irian-born permanent resident, Nicolaas 
Messet , was deported for his part in assisting Jacob Prai and Otto 
Ondowame to seek asylum in Papua New Guinea. Further deporta­
tions followed later in 1979 (see above page 100) and in 1980 it with­
drew the travel documents of a permissive resident Rex Rumakiek, 
when it was reported that Rumakiek had been invited to establish an 
OPM office in Vanuatu. The Chan government's concern with internal 
security in relation to the border was also evidenced in 1980 by the 
arrest of an Irian-born naturalized citizen who had in his possession 
'prohibited literature' , including 'diagrams of how to make bombs and 
how to destroy a railway' (Post-Courier 1 1  December 1980) . Even 
more melodramatic was the 'exposure',  in March 1981 ,  of an OPM plot 
to obtain Soviet arms and smuggle them into Irian Jaya through Papua 
New Guinea. This 'plot' came to light when a letter, signed by the 
'chairman of the OPM Central Committee' and addressed to a 'Mr 
George , c/o Poste Restante , Turkey' , was returned, unclaimed, to its 
sender in Madang. A DFA T spokesman told the press that the govern­
ment had 'substantial documentary evidence' of the OPM's Papua 
New Guinea connection and was treating the matter with the 'utmost 
seriousness' . He was probably not reassured by a statement by self­
described OPM spokesman Henk Joku, who said that approaches by 
the OPM to the USSR and Cuba (but not involving Papua New 
Guinea) had been made public five years previously (see Post-Courier 
19 ,  20, 23 March 1981 ; 31 July 1981) .  The repatriation to Indonesia of 
another three long-time residents four months later was apparently 
related to this episode (see page 104) . In the meantime another 
three had been deported following their participation in the Human 
Rights Tribunal organized at UPNG (ibid.) and the government had 
stopped issuing from Port Moresby visas to residents of Irian Jaya, 
claiming that the system had been 'abused by some people' (Post­
Courier 21 January 1981) . 
Although there was in the 1970s an Irianese community organiza­
tion in Papua New Guinea14 the government's dealings with the local 
community were complicated by divisions within the community , 
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which in part reflected the ideological and regional factionalism which 
characterized the nationalist movement within Irian Jaya and 
elsewhere overseas (see Osborne's chapter above and also May 1980) . 
These divisions were evidenced in 1978 when a faction calling itself the 
South Pacific Group opposed an officially sanctioned visit by Nether­
lands-based Irianese emigre Nicolaas Jouwe (see Post-Courier 12, 24, 
25 , 30 January 1978) , and they became more apparent when in mid 
July 1981 twenty-three 'West Irian refugees' were charged after 
attempting to abduct Henk Joku from his office in Port Moresby (Post­
Courier 17, 20 July 1981 ) .  Joku, born in Sentani , but a naturalized 
Papua New Guinea citizen, had been an outspoken, if perhaps erratic, 
member of a relatively militant element of the Irianese community in 
Port Moresby which was identified with Elky Berney and later James 
Nyaro and which in 1984 was accused of threatening lrianese residents 
not directly supporting the OPM (Times of PNG 9 August, 6 Sep­
tember 1984). Other members of this group included Ruben Victor 
Kambuaya , Melky Salosa, Matthew Mayer, and the three deported in 
July 1981 .  A self-confessed member of the Melanesian Socialist Party, 
which advocated armed resistance to Indonesia and had threatened 
terrorist action in Papua New Guinea, Joku appears to have been 
involved in the abortive attempt to obtain arms from the USSR and 
had he not been a Papua New Guinean citizen would probably have 
been deported. 
In 1982 the Irianese community came under close surveillance fol­
lowing threats against some leading politicians (see Post-Courier 28, 29 
July 1982 ; the unlikely collection included Levi , Somare, Bais and 
East Sepik premier Dambui) and after an Irianese man had forced his 
way into DFAT offices in Port Moresby wielding an axe . The following 
year there was another report of alleged attempts to smuggle arms into 
Irian Jaya from Australia via Papua New Guinea (Niugini Nius 10 
August 1983) . But generally the community maintained a fairly low 
profile . 
Circumstances changed somewhat , however, following the influx 
of border crossers beginning early 1984 and as negotiations proceeded 
with Indonesia over repatriation. As early as February a group of 
Irianese residing in Papua New Guinea circulated amongst foreign 
14 According to the Post-Courier 24 February 1976 a community organization had been 
established earlier for proposed round table talks with the Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea governments and represented about 200 people. 
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embassies and Papua New Guinean officials in Port Moresby an urgent 
appeal for the raising of the 'West Papua issue' with the UN Commit­
tee on Decolonization and for a round table conference between the 
Indonesian government and the provisional government of West 
Papua to implement West Papuan independence (Post-Courier 27 
February 1984) . The request for Papua New Guinea to represent West 
Papuan demands in New York was repeated by Henk Joku and in 
interviews with OPM leaders reported by Papua New Guinean jour­
nalists Alfred Sasako (Niugini Nius 29 February 1984) and Neville 
Togarewa (Times of PNG 8 ,  15 March 1984) and was taken up by a 
number of Papua New Guineans, though it was firmly rejected by the 
foreign minister and by Papua New Guinea's ambassador at the UN. 
In mid March 1984 the chairman of the Citizenship Committee reacted 
by announcing a temporary freeze on citizenship applications from 
Irianese (though , as noted above , a freeze appears to have been in 
effect already since 1978) ; some Irianese permissive and naturalized 
citizens, he said, had supported the OPM and were 'a real headache to 
the community in which they live' .  The chairman went on to announce 
that steps were being taken to amend parts of the Citizenship Act to 
enforce stricter criteria in assessing applications and to revoke , if 
necessary , citizenship or permissive residency status granted previ­
ously (Post-Courier 16 March 1984) . 
The situation deteriorated further with the kidnap of Werner 
Wyder and the conveying, through Henk Joku, of a demand for ran­
som (see p . 1 19). Although the Irianese community as a whole seems to 
have been embarrassed by this incident - some calling on the OPM to 
release Wyder and some expressing doubts that the OPM was in fact 
involved - it almost certainly had an adverse effect on sympathy for the 
OPM and indirectly for the Irianese community generally (see Times 
of PNG 5 April 1984) ; the Police Association, for example , urged the 
government to increase its surveillance of OPM sympathizers and to 
strengthen its internal security organization, warning that otherwise 
the country was laying itself open 'to becoming the Pacific Lebanon' 
(Niugini Nius 8 April 1984) , and Somare was quoted as saying, 'If these 
people persist in these activities, they will be expelled from our coun­
try' (Post-Courier 11 April 1984). The subsequent abduction of a West 
Sepik headmaster, during the midst of negotiations over repatriation 
of border crossers, though disclaimed on behalf of the OPM by Joku, 
further alienated some sympathizers, the usually supportive Bais, for 
example , accusing the OPM of 'illegal and irresponsible conduct' and 
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warning, 'So far we have been very good to them [the OPM]' (Post­
Courier 4 July 1984) . 
About this time, also, the more militant element of Papua New 
Guinea's Irianese community carried its campaign to Australia. In 
June Henk Joku attended a conference in Canberra of the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples ; three months later an Australian 
former mercenary soldier with contacts in Papua New Guinea was 
arrested in Sydney for allegedly attempting to supply arms to OPM 
guerillas (Niugini Nius 27 September 1984 ; Times of PNG 4 October 
1984 ; Sydney Morning Herald 4 June 1985 ; Post-Courier 4 June 1985) .  
In the same month that Joku visited Canberra, Matthew Mayer, a per­
missive resident, visited Australia and subsequently (on the eve of the 
Australian foreign minister's departure for Indonesia) sought political 
asylum there . Mayer claimed that he had been harrassed by 'thugs' 
hired by both Indonesian and Papua New Guinea intelligence agen­
cies. A report by Irian-born journalist Franzalbert Joku (Times of 
PNG 9 August 1984) suggested that Mayer had been sent to Australia 
by the OPM to try to organize military and financial support for the 
movement . It was further claimed (ibid. , also 16 August 1984) that 
Iambakey Okuk had been involved in arranging Mayer's travel and in 
advising him to apply for refugee status in Australia. Mayer was sub­
sequently refused residence in Australia - and refused re-entry to 
Papua New Guinea. 
Again, in September-October 1984, as plans for the repatriation 
of border crossers appeared to be reaching finality, the government 
received threats from OPM sources that if the planned repatriation 
went ahead the movement would disrupt the exercise and would sabot­
age the Ok Tedi mine (Post-Courier 12 September 1984, Niugini Nius 
19 ,  23 , 25 October 1984). There were also renewed threats of violence 
against several Papua New Guinean politicians and officials and, from 
within the refugee camps, warnings not to proceed with proposed visits 
by Indonesian verification teams and suggestions that retaliation 
against abuses of camp inmates by government officials (see Niugini 
Nius 22, 26 , 29 September 1984) might be carried out by OPM guerillas 
from the other side of the border. Again the foreign minister issued 
counter-threats (Niugini Nius 25 October 1984) . 
Early in 1985 AAP correspondent Craig Skehan reported (Post­
Courier 14 February 1985) that OPM members were moving freely in 
and out of border camps, and a proposed visit to border camps by 
Australian foreign minister Bill Hayden was called off after armed 
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guerillas had been seen in the area . (According to Joku, reported in 
Post-Courier 25 February 1984, the guerillas - eight of whom were later 
arrested as illegal immigrants - had hoped to deliver letters to Hayden 
for the UN secretary-general and the ALP ; the latter was requested to 
give substantial financial assistance and military equipment to the 
OPM.)  Shortly after this it was revealed that the Swiss consulate had 
received a demand for K50 ,OOO , representing the cost of looking after 
Wyder while he was in OPM custody. The 'account' was signed by 
Melky Salosa , and according to Joku was not authorized by the OPM 
(Post-Courier 3 May 1985) . Salosa, a permissive resident in Papua 
New Guinea, had left Port Moresby early in 1984, allegedly to take 
weapons collected in Port Moresby to Nyaro (Times of PNG 4 October 
1984) ; he was subsequently involved in the kidnapping of Wyder and 
of the West Sepik schoolteacher. In a strongly worded editorial, the 
Post-Courier (2 May 1985) urged the government to act immediately: 
'These are desperate people and there is no knowing how far they are 
prepared to go' .  Less than three weeks later Salosa was arrested near 
the border and brought to Port Moresby for charging (Post-Courier 20, 
22, 27 May 1985) .  
The net effect of all this has been that at the same time as a massive 
exodus of refugees has given rise to a widespread popular sympathy for 
the Irianese people, the actions of what appears to be a small section 
of the lrian-born population in Papua New Guinea has prompted the 
government to keep a closer watch over the resident Irianese commun­
ity and to take a harder line against both permissive residents engaging 
in political activity and refugees seeking political asylum. It is still 
nevertheless true that lrian-born citizens and permissive residents 
exercise an important influence, through the media and the church 
especially , on popular perceptions of the border issue and that this 
influence will increasingly test sensitivities on both sides. 
The border villages and the Sepik connection 15 
Although the border passes through areas which are for the most 
part only sparsely populated, it is none the less an arbitrary boundary 
which ignores traditional rights to land and hunting and gathering, and 
15 The attitude of border villagers to the border problem is discussed in greater detail by 
Herlihy , below . A recent population survey of the border census divisions of Western 
Province (Pula and Jackson 19184) a1so contains useful information. 
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divides groups of people who are bound by ties of language , kin and 
relations of exchange [Figure 5 . 1] .  Successive border agreements bet­
ween Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have recognized this in provi­
sions which safeguard the rights of border villagers to cross for tradi­
tional purposes (principally sago making) . 
Hence when Irianese began to cross into Papua New Guinea after 
1962 they were generally well-received , especially since many border 
villagers saw themselves as standing to gain from associated border 
development plans. It was no coincidence that the most prominent 
early spokesmen for the Irianese (apart from Guise) were Ke nu and 
Langro and the expatriate member for the Madang-Sepik special elec­
torate - all from electorates adjoining the border. There was , also, in 
the West and East Sepik provinces in the 1970s a millenarian-style 
movement whose supporters sold 'freedom fighters" stripes and 
epaulettes to villagers for amounts ranging from K2 to K20 (though the 
reasons for acquiring the insignia were not clear) . Moreover in 1974 
Papua New Guinea's minister for Defence, Foreign Relations and 
Trade , Kiki, informed the Australian high commissioner that reports 
indicated that the OPM had extended its influence quite widely among 
villages on the Papua New Guinea side of the border 'and to a depth in 
the area behind Wanimo not previously suspected' (Kabar Seberang 8/ 
9 ,  1981 :155) . 
With the increased level of activity along the border in 1977-78, 
and frustrated expectations of development in the border areas , it 
seemed possible that this sympathy might diminish. However Defence 
Force commander Diro was quoted as saying in April 1978 that sup­
port for the West Papuan nationalists among Papua New Guineans 
near the border was so strong that no military campaign by Papua New 
Guinea against the guerillas could succeed (Sharp 1978 : 105 , quoting 
the ABC) and reports of operations in July 1978 tended to confirm this 
(for example , Sydney Morning Herald 13 July 1978). In December 
1978, following the arrest of Prai and Ondowame, a letter appeared in 
the Post-Courier (20 December 1978) , signed by 'The Bush People , 
Bewani' , which asked the government to return Prai and Ondowame 
to the West Sepik. There is no doubt that over a number of years there 
has been support for the OPM in some border villages, and in 1981 vil­
lages along the northern sector of the border were involved in OPM 
faction in-fighting. But many observers were surprised by a statement 
of the Sandaun deputy premier in 1983 , that young men from Wutung, 
Amanab , Yabsiei and Telefomin were deserting their villages to join 
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the OPM (Post-Courier 20 July 1983) .  The events of 1984-85 brought 
the situation of the Melanesians in Irian J aya more immediately to the 
attention of villages in the border area, which showed a remarkable 
willingness to accommodate large numbers of border crossers and gen­
erally strong opposition to proposals for repatriation. In a letter to the 
Post-Courier (12 April 1984) , for example, the Sandaun premier, 
Andrew Komboni , argued that the 'family aspects' of the border situa­
tion had been evaded by Australian , Indonesian and Papua New Gui­
nean governments : 
. . . .  the traditional ties among the border villages in the 
northern sector have not changed since the white men 
declared an invisible border line . . . .  a good number of the 
current refugees . . .  have run this way with the natural incli­
nation to seek family refuge. It must be shocking, and many 
families around Vanimo have expressed as inhuman, to see 
blood relatives being jailed or being held at camps . . . .  I am 
proud of my people of the border villages that they have not 
taken too drastic rebellious action against the Papua New 
Guinea government. 
The extent of support for OPM guerillas, on the other hand, is difficult 
to judge, though the opinion of the Post-Courier's defence correspon­
dent was that 
. . .  . it is becoming more and more apparent that our village 
people on the border are, voluntarily or through fear, aid­
ing and abetting the continued sanctuary of OPM rebels 
(Ian Glanville, Post-Courier 22 May 1985) .  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, among the most consistent 
critics of successive governments' handling of the border situation -
specifically with regard to border crossers/refugees - there has been a 
disproportionate number of politicians and others from the Sepik 
(West and East) and Western provinces. Of the Sepik politicians, the 
former East Sepik district commissioner and member for Wewak, 
Tony Bais, has been particularly outspoken : when early in 1979 diffi­
culty was being experienced in finding a third-country home for Prai 
and Ondowame, Bais (then a government backbencher) said over the 
NBC that his village would provide them with a home ; in 1981 he was 
a member of the South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal ; and though 
since 1982 he has been occasionally acting foreign affairs minister he 
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has continued to speak out against Indonesian border violations and in 
support of granting refugee status to border crossers. He has been sup­
ported in this by fellow Sepiks Lus, Jaminan , and, since 1982, the 
member for Aitape-Lumi, Gabriel Ramoi, who as a student leader had 
organized the first Melanesian Solidarity Week and had been arrested 
for harbouring an Irianese permissive resident whom the government 
was seeking to deport (see p .104) . It was Ramoi who in August 1984 
accused the government of trying to starve refugees back across the 
border ; several months earlier he had expressed the view (Post­
Courier 2 March 1984) that Papua New Guinea had a better claim to 
Irian Jaya than Indonesia did. Another Sepik , the Melanesian 
Alliance deputy chairman Narokobi has also been a longstanding 
champion of Irianese interests (see below) . Among Western Province 
politicians, the member for North Fly, Warren Dutton, emerged as a 
strong advocate of refugee status for border crossers in 1984. In May 
he told parliament that Papua New Guinea should be prepared to 
accept border crossers as refugees, and in August , when repatriation 
seemed imminent, Dutton defended a group of about 6,000 refugees in 
camps at Atkamba and Kungim saying that they were not illegal cros­
sers, that the government appeared to be starving the people in the 
camps in order to encourage them to go back, and that the proposed 
repatriation of border crossers was 'inhumane, illegal and impossible' 
(Post-Courier 2, 13 August 1984 ; Niugini Nius 2 August 1984) . Sub­
sequently Dutton announced that villagers in the Kiunga area of the 
Western Province had offered to accommodate border crossers on 
30,000 ha of their traditional land (an area which was under considera­
tion for a major rubber development scheme) (Post-Courier 19 Sep­
tember 1984, 7 November 1984, 8 March 1985). Dutton's resettlement 
proposals have been supported by the Western Provincial member and 
minister for Physical Planning and Housing, Kala Swokin. 
Writing in 1979, I suggested that the existence of local sympathies 
in the border areas might raise problems for the national government 
as powers were progressively transferred to provincial governments . 
In fact, however, though provincial politicians were occasional critics 
of government policy (see, for example, Post-Courier 13 January 1981 , 
21 September 1981 , 23 June 1982, 26 May 1983) there was little conflict 
between the national and provincial governments over border 
administration or related issues until 1984. In that year, with thousands 
of refugees pouring across their borders, it was inevitable that the pro­
vincial governments would become involved in the politics of the situ-
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ation , and involved they became, primarily as opponents of the 
national government's handling of border crossers . As early as March 
1984 the Western (Fly River) Province's premier called on the prime 
minister to 'support UN moves to enable the people of Irian Jaya to 
determine their own future' (Post-Courier 15 March 1984) . Later in 
the year the premier was removed from an official function in Port 
Moresby after he had interjected during a speech , accusing the 
national government and its official guest, Gough Whitlam, of being 
'afraid of Indonesia' (Niugini Nius 8 August 1984) . The following 
month the Sandaun provincial government, also, passed a resolution 
deploring violence on its border and calling on the prime minister to 
ask the UN to re-examine its 1966 decision [sic] on West Papuan inde­
pendence . The Sandaun premier, Komboni16, continued to oppose 
repatriation of refugees throughout 1984, establishing a provincial 
refugee co-ordinating committee , placing the repatriation issue before 
a generally sympathetic Premiers' Council meeting in May, and 
announcing in October that provincial leaders had expressed the 
desire to resettle the 4,000 or so refugees in the province. Support for 
resettlement also came from the Western Provincial government 
(Post-Courier 10, 14 August 1984). 
Whether such sympathetic attitudes can be maintained in the bor­
der areas if anything like the present number of border crossers 
remains there, is another question. Already in April and May 1984 
there were isolated reports (one from the Bewani area) of complaints 
from border villages, who felt that the refugees were being treated bet­
ter than the local villagers, and feared that their presence might attract 
military action from the other side of the border (for example , Niugini 
Nius 21 April, 30 May, 5 November 1984 ; more recently, see Wantok 
20 July 1985) .  Moreover, despite outside assistance, the massive 
increase of population in a generally fairly inhospitable environment17 , 
and apparently increasing demands by OPM guerillas, must place 
strains on traditional food supplies which cannot be maintained for any 
length of time. 
1 6  In 1985 Komboni Jost office, and was succeeded as premier by former national politi­
cian Paul Langro. 
17 In the Komokpin area of Western Province, where it was first reported that large num­
bers of refugees had died from starvation, it was estimated that over 2,000 refugees were 
camped in an area which normally supported about 150 people. 
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The church 
The church exercises a strong influence over public opinion in 
Papua New Guinea. Apart from the influence exerted through pastors , 
priests and missionaries, the nation's weekly Tokpisin newspaper, 
Wantok, and the major weekly Times of Papua New Guinea are pub­
lished under the direction of a board comprising representatives of the 
Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran and United churches (and their editorial 
staff has included Irian-born journalists who have contributed to an 
extensive and sympathetic coverage of the Irianese position) . On the 
Irian Jaya issue the church's general concern over human rights has 
perhaps been reinforced by sympathy for a predominantly Christian 
population in a predominantly Muslim state . Also, as the major out­
side presence in the generally remote areas along the border, church 
and mission workers are often in closer touch with the situation than 
government officials - as became conspicuously apparent in 1984. 
Although church bodies had been relatively quiet on Irian Jaya bet­
ween 1969 and 1977, the events of 1977-78 prompted several strong 
statements on the subject. In June 1977 the National Catholic Council 
called on the Indonesian government 'to refrain from acts of savagery 
against Melanesians in Irian Jaya' (Post-Courier 1 June 1977) . In 
October 1978 the Melanesian Council of Churches (MCC) - which rep­
resents the Anglican , Baptist, Catholic, Lutheran and United 
churches and the Salvation Army - established a Committee on 
Melanesian Refugees (under the chairmanship of an Irian-born Papua 
New Guinea citizen) to protect the rights of Irianese refugees and to 
raise public awareness ; one of its first acts was to criticize the govern­
ment's handling of refugees in the West Sepik. Early in 1979 the MCC 
told the government that to deport Prai and Ondowame would be 
unchristian (Wantok 17 February 1979) . And again in mid 1981 the 
MCC attacked the government over its decision to deport Bonay, 
Kafiar and Hamadi (see p .  104) . 
It was, therefore, perhaps predictable that when in early 1984 the 
government reacted to the influx of border crossers by charging them 
with illegal entry, the bishop of Vanimo , John Etheridge , should be 
critical. In a letter to the Post-Courier (12 March 1984) and Niugini 
Nius (9 March 1984) Etheridge wrote : 
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ment to decide their fate . . . .  I trust and pray that the credi­
bility of this country be restored with the resumption of the 
very basic rights that are expected of all countries, let alone 
a country that professes to be a just and Christian one. 
During the following months the Catholic church bore much of the 
brunt of providing for the maintenance of refugees along the border in 
the northern sector, and the bishop of Vanimo was heavily involved in 
the relief programme and consistently outspoken in his opposition to 
repatriation of border crossers against their will. Later in the year, as 
the influx of border crossers shifted south, the bishop of Kiunga, 
Gerard Deschamps, took a similarly strong stand. The two bishops 
have been supported during 1984-85 by the Catholic Bishops' Confer­
ence and by other denominational and inter-denominational bodies in 
Papua New Guinea, including the Evangelic Lutheran Church of 
Papua New Guinea, the Evangelical Church of Papua, and the MCC -
all of which have also contributed materially to the maintenance of the 
refugee camps. Support has also come from Australian church bodies, 
a group of which visited refugee camps in July 1984. 
Since 1977-78, however, there have been suggestions within gov­
ernment circles that mission stations along the border have sometimes 
known more about what is happening along the border than they 
should, and in 1982 a Catholic priest was charged over an incident in 
which he was alleged to have incited a group of Irianese due to be 
repatriated to Jayapura to flee into the bush (see Post-Courier 19, 28 
July 1982) . In April 1984 following the negotiated release of the Swiss 
pilot Wyder, it became known that the final negotiations with OPM 
leader Nyaro took place well within the Sandaun Province , at a church­
run vocational training centre , and that the negotiators had been flown 
there in a mission plane. Although Etheridge insisted that he had been 
in constant contact with the NIO and that no Papua New Guinea citi­
zens had crossed into Indonesia, the government was reported as being 
angry about the incident (Niugini Nius 1 1 ,  21 April 1984 ; Times of 
PNG 26 April 1984) and subsequently, in the National Parliament, two 
government members - Carl Stack, the member for West Sepik Provin­
cial , and John Giheno, who later became Foreign Affairs minister -
accused Bishop Etheridge of influencing Irianese to cross the border 
and called for the deportation of the bishop. Sensibly the government 
chose not to become involved in a confrontation with the church, but 
the incident illustrated a degree of tension which has existed in rela­
tions between the government and the church on matters concerning 
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the border. 
Students and intellectuals 
In 1969 the then recently established Politics Club at UPNG 
became the first predominantly Papua New Guinean organization 
(apart from the House of Assembly) to take up the Irian Jaya cause. 
Participant commentator Davis (1970 :295) compared Papua New Gui­
nean student involvement over Irian J aya at this time to Australian stu­
dent involvement over Vietnam, though the former proved to be rela­
tively short-lived. Indonesia's invasion of East Timor provided the 
occasion for a further anti-Indonesian demonstration by students who 
presented petitions to the Indonesian embassy and the Papua New 
Guinea government which referred also to Irianese demands for free­
dom. (For an account of the student protest see Samana 1976.) During 
1977 and 1978 students again identified with their Melanesian brothers 
in criticizing the government's handling of the issue : in July 1978 there 
was another march on the Indonesian embassy and in November stu­
dents offered assistance to Prai and Ondowame. And during Suharto's 
visit in 1979 800 students marched to the airport to protest against 
Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya. 
The high point of student protest, however, was in 1981 when, 
under the leadership of Gabriel Ramoi , UPNG students staged a 
Melanesian Solidarity Week, whose activities included a 'solidarity 
march' , allocation by the Students' Representative Council (SRC) of 
K2000 to assist the OPM, and the organization of the South Pacific 
Human Rights Tribunal after which a petition was presented to the 
Indonesian embassy. Subsequently Ramoi and other UPNG students 
protested the deportation of Irianese permissive residents involved in 
the forum (concealing one of them from the police for several weeks) , 
and later still another three deportations (see p.104) .  
Between 1981 and 1984 student interest in the border issue sub­
sided, but in 1984 students - from the University of Technology, 
Goroka Teachers College and high schools, as well as UPNG - were 
quick to respond to developments on the border, urging the govern­
ment to show its concern for the refugees and to support a West 
Papuan petition before the UN. In April, Indonesian foreign minister 
Mochtar managed to further antagonize students when he suggested 
that fears of Indonesia were being whipped up by 'a certain segment of 
Australians, young people and progressives from universities' ;  the 
statement drew firmly worded responses from the UPNG's vice chan-
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cellor and from the vice president of its SRC (Post-Courier 23 , 24, 26 
April 1984) . Later in the year, as the issue of repatriation became a 
focus of discussion, UPNG students marched to the Indonesian 
embassy to present a petition calling for UNHCR involvement in the 
exercise , and the Sandaun Students' Society and the Fly River Stu­
dents' Association expressed support for a call to take the government 
to court if it denied refugee status to border crossers (Post-Courier 6,  
9 August, 20 September 1984) . 
In addition to the activities of student bodies, several student 
leaders of earlier years (apart from Ramoi, whose views have already 
been noted) have continued to espouse the cause of the Melanesians in 
Irian Jaya after their student careers. 
John Kasaipwalova, former student and village leader, poet , 
playwright and businessman, wrote in an article in the Post-Courier (28 
July 1978) : 'as a nation we are but dancing fools for Indonesian foreign 
policy', but he went on to suggest that 'we three brothers' (Papua New 
Guinea, Indonesia and lrian Jaya) sit down together to argue our dif­
ferences. Shortly after, and almost prophetically in view of the arrest 
of Jacob Prai, Kasaipwalova presented a new play, 'My Brother, My 
Enemy' , the subject of which is the capture and incarceration of an 
OPM leader who has crossed into Papua New Guinea. Although the 
play is essentially a satire against the Papua New Guinea government, 
the Indonesian ambassador felt moved to walk out of the first perfor­
mance. 
Another former UPNG SRC president , Utula Samana, who as a 
student had taken an active part in the 1976 demonstration over East 
Timar, was arrested (but in the event not charged) when in December 
1978 he attempted to hand a petition to Mochtar ; he was at the time he 
was arrested a member of the official welcoming party in Lae. Samana 
subsequently became premier of Moro be Province and as such in 1984 
he spoke out against repatriation of border crossers and in support of 
moves to refer the question of self-determination for Irian Jaya to the 
UN (see, for example, Niugini Nius 30 April , 14 August 1984, and 
interview with Samana in Asian Bureau Australia Newsletter No. 77 
December 1984) . 
Perhaps most consistently vocal among the intellectuals, how­
ever, has been lawyer, writer , philosopher, unsuccessful political can­
didate, and Melanesian Alliance vice chairman Bernard Narokobi. As 
early as 1975 Narokobi warned against ' Indonesian imperialism' and in 
1978 he frequently attacked the government for not supporting 
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Irianese freedom fighters. In 1979, when the government was 
experiencing difficulty in finding a home for Prai and Ondowame , 
Narokobi criticized the Melanesian states which had refused them, 
saying 'When we reject a fellow Melanesian, we actually reject the the 
fundamental bases of our society - and our Constitution' .  He went on 
to describe Indonesian presence on Melanesian soil as 'immoral and 
unnatural' and ventured the opinion : 'The Melanesian struggle for lib­
eration is legitimate and honorable . . . .  They will, of course, win in the 
end' (Post-Courier 21 March 1981).  The same year Narokobi pre­
sented a petition on the subject to visiting US ambassador Andrew 
Young ; Young was reported, in a government newsletter (Papua New 
Guinea Newsletter 47, week ending 4 May 1979) , to have said that he 
'would bring the matter to groups which are sympathetic to the West 
Irian cause to bring it up at the United Nations for discussion' . In 1981 
Narokobi was one of the principal forces behind the South Pacific 
Human Rights Tribunal. As a political candidate in 1982 (he stood 
against Somare) , Narokobi appeared to have moved to a less militant 
stand, though in June of that year he urged the cutting of diplomatic 
ties with Indonesia in protest against recent border incursions. During 
1984 Narokobi was a frequent critic of Indonesian actions and of the 
government's attitude to border crossers. In October 1984 as a 
member of a non-government 'Centre for Concern' he announced a 
proposal for the resettlement of Irianese refugees 'traditionally' with 
people who have land in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu ; there were, he said, already 600 people in Maprik (East 
Sepik) willing to adopt refugees (Niugini Nius 25 October 1984) . And 
in 1985 it was reported (Post-Courier 24 April, 24 May 1985) that an 
application had been filed with the Supreme Court, by Narokobi on 
behalf of the border crossers , seeking a ruling on the rights and free­
dom of those who had crossed and were facing repatriation. 
Parliamentary opposition 
Between 1969 and 1976 Irian Jaya was not a prominent issue in 
domestic politics . Apart from questions by Langro, Chatterton and 
Pondros, the subject was seldom raised in parliament and when it was 
there was no systematic difference of opinion between government 
and opposition. As noted above, however, the government's handling 
of the border situation became a significant issue during the national 
elections of 1977 and a recurring subject for question and debate in the 
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second parliament. 
Although Langro (who had been deputy leader of the opposition) 
was a casualty of the 1977 election his concern over government policy 
on Irian Jaya was taken up by several new members on both sides of 
the House - notably Levi, Jaminan and Bais - as well as by Guise , Pon­
dros, Okuk and Papua Besena member James Mopio. Under the new, 
confrontationist style of politics employed by Okuk when he became 
leader of the opposition in 1978, opposition members were quick to 
make political capital out of the Irian Jaya issue, accusing the govern­
ment of being weak in its dealings with Indonesia and wrong in its deci­
sion to deport Prai and his colleagues (see, for example, Draft Hansard 
7 ,  17 August 1978). But there was no evidence that opposition mem­
bers had a significantly different policy to offer . Moreover Okuk's own 
position seemed to fluctuate : up till October 1978 he appeared mostly 
as a champion of Irianese refugees (for example, see Post-Courier 9 
June, 7 July, 20 October 1978) but at the end of that month he returned 
from Indonesia with glowing reports of Indonesia's administration of 
Irian Jaya and East Timor (Post-Courier 1 November 1978) ; by early 
1979 he was again attacking the government over its decision to deport 
Prai and Ondowame but in June advocated large-scale Indonesian 
investment in and aid to Papua New Guinea (see p.99) .  
As noted above, the change of government in 1980, following a 
vote of no-confidence, did not bring any noticeable change in policy, 
except perhaps that the new government, and particularly its foreign 
minister Levi , appeared to be taking a stronger stand against border 
crossers and against support for the OPM. Indeed although members 
of the previous government were occasionally critical of the Chan gov­
ernment's handling of the border situation, the strongest challenges to 
government policy came not from the opposition but from within the 
governing coalition itself. As deputy prime minister, Okuk launched a 
strong attack on Indonesia in late 1981 ,  which caused Mochtar to 
observe that Okuk's statement differed from the views of the prime 
minister (Post-Courier 26 November 1981) ,  and in 1982 the minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Levi, and his department felt it necessary , ini­
tially , to counter a series of anti-Indonesian comments by Okuk which 
produced the 'Indonesian Newsletter affair' (see pp. 105-107) and cul­
minated in Okuk's call for the closure of the Indonesian embassy. The 
Melanesian Alliance , also , though a member of the coalition, declared 
support for the OPM in 1980, criticized the government's action in 
deporting Irianese permissive residents in 1981 , and in 1982 called for 
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a tougher stand on border incursions. 
In 1982 as in 1977, activity along the border intensified coinciden­
tally with Papua New Guinea's national elections, yet Irian Jaya failed 
to emerge as an election issue and with the return of a Pangu govern­
ment existing policies were broadly maintained. What did change in 
1984-85 , however, was the scale of the problem. The difficulties posed 
by a massive influx of border crossers , the repetition of.border viola­
tions by Indonesia, and the difficulties, both at administrative and at 
diplomatic levels, of communicating with Indonesia provided ample 
scope for criticism from the political opposition, and it was not slow in 
coming. While he was in the house as opposition leader 18 , Okuk 
made his presence felt ,  criticizing the government's actions with regard 
to border crossers , urging it to support lrianese self-determination at 
the UN, and revealing his fundamental concern in arguing that if 
Papua New Guinea could not help resolve Irianese demands for inde­
pendence (or at least for political asylum) the OPM and its supporters 
would turn to the USSR and thus threaten the security of the region 
with communist intervention (see, for example, Post-Courier 13 April, 
16 May and 12 October 1984 ; also see Times of PNG 20 September 
1984, 2 December 1983). Interestingly , former foreign minister Levi, 
now in opposition, also came out strongly against Indonesia's actions 
in Irian Jaya. In a remarkable letter to the Times of Papua New Guinea 
(23 February 1984) Levi expressed his opposition to Papua New 
Guinea's seeking full membership of ASEAN, on the grounds that 
such a move 'will endorse Indonesia's claim over West New Guinea' ; 
'Papua New Guinea to me is not complete without the western half of 
the island' ,  the former foreign minister wrote , 'The only grounds upon 
which I would accept full ASEAN membership for PNG is for ASEAN 
to accept the fact that West New Guinea is not part of Indonesia, but 
part of Papua New Guinea'. Levi threatened to boycott the forthcom­
ing parliamentary session in May, and was supported in this by Okuk. 
Newspaper editorials, however, noted with a certain cynicism that 
although Okuk and Levi were strong critics of government policy in 
1984 
18 Okuk Jost his seat in 1982 but was returned to the parliament in a by-election in July 
1983 and took over as leader of the opposition from former Defence Force commander, 
Diro. In Decmeber 1984 Okuk lost his seat as the result of a challenge to his residential 
qualifications as a candidate in the by-election, but he stood again in a new by-election 
in May 1985 and was re-elected. 
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. . . .  there was no discernible difference in policy when they 
were in power and there is no reason to believe it would be 
different now (Post-Courier 18 April 1984. Similarly see 
Niugini Nius 18 April 1984 and Times of PNG 23 April 
1984). 
Momis and the Melanesian Alliance , on the other hand, maintained a 
consistent line in and out of office, opposing repatriation and urging 
the government to resettle refugees. When Momis visited the border 
area in October 1984 and held discussions with Nyaro ( p. 132). it 
appears that one of the main purposes was to consider options in the 
event of a successful challenge to the Somare government (Niugini 
Nius 25 October 1984). 1 9  On his return he told a press conference that 
Papua New Guinea would be 'committing an act of genocide' if it sent 
the refugees back (Niugini Nius 10 October 1984). In the latter part of 
1984 and early 1985 , opposition to repatriation and support for Papua 
New Guinea's raising of the question of West Papuan independence at 
the UN came also from former prime minister Chan, from United 
Party leader Torato, from National Party and deputy opposition 
leader Tago , and from Diro. 
Looking at the discussion which has taken place during 1984-85 
and at what the Papua New Guinea government has actually done, 
however, it would seem that whatever differences of approach to the 
problems of the border might exist between government and opposi­
tion in parliament , they are essentially differences of degree, and 
perhaps, more than anything else, have to do with whether a group is 
in office or not. In the final analysis policy positions appear to have 
been determined by the circumstances of the time - the crises , the frust­
rations, the pressures of international diplomacy - rather than by dif­
ferences of ideology or disposition . The possible exception to this is the 
Melanesian Alliance, whose leading members inside and outside parli­
ament have consistently demonstrated a deeper concern for their 
Melanesian neighbours than other political groups. But even if the 
Melanesian Alliance were allowed to dictate policy it seems highly 
unlikely that there would be any significant shift in the Papua New 
Guinea government's well-established policy of unquestioningly rec-
19 A no-confidence vote had been foreshadowed for the November sitting of parliament, 
with Momis as a possible alternative prime minister. In the event, the motion, which 
nominated Okuk as alternative prime minister, was defeated in March 1985, and the 
Melanesian Alliance joined Pangu in a new governing coalition. 
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ogmzmg Indonesia's sovereignty in Irian Jaya, discouraging OPM 
movement across the border, and, while assisting a small number of 
refugees to find political asylum in third countries and granting permis­
sive residency to some , generally seeking to push border crossers back 
into Irian Jaya. 
The army 
Towards the end of 1977 much publicity was given to the fact that 
Defence Force commander-in-chief, Ted Diro, was summoned to a 
cabinet meeting and reprimanded for having had contact with rebel 
leaders. It was even reported that there were demands from within 
cabinet to remove Diro from the position of commander-in-chief but 
that these demands were overruled when it became clear that the 
Defence Force stood firmly behind Diro (Post-Courier 30 September, 
6, 10, 12, 14 October 1977. This incident seems to have provided the 
basis for later stories of an 'army coup plot' in 1977 ; see for example 
Sydney Morning Herald, Age 23 August 1983) .  Then in December 
1978 a senior officer of the Defence Force, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom 
Poang, was forced to resign because of his alleged involvement in 
negotiations between the OPM and an arms dealer from Senegal for 
the purchase of weapons (Sydney Morning Herald 19 December 1978). 
In both cases personal antagonisms seem to have played some part in 
the government's handling of the situation but the incidents did raise 
questions about the extent of accord between the government and the 
army and lerit weight to a commonly held view that there is a good deal 
of antipathy towards Indonesia among army officers. 
On the basis of casual discussion with Defence Force personnel in 
Port Moresby and Wewak over a number of years I suspect there is 
some truth in this view. And perhaps one should not be surprised to 
find such an attitude among soldiers given that, in a leaked Defence 
Department document in 1984, Papua New Guinea's other close 
neighbour, Australia, nominated Indonesia as its most likely military 
threat. There is no evidence , however, that antipathy to Indonesia 
within the Defence Force has influenced government policy or the 
deployment of troops along the border. Moreover, when Diro, having 
resigned from the Defence Force in July 1981 , contested the 1982 elec­
tions and subsequently became leader of the opposition in the National 
Parliament during a period of border tension in 1982c83 he displayed 
no signs of being a 'hawk' (though he was reported (Canberra Times 7 
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July 1982) as saying that Indonesia probably had plans for the takeover 
of Papua New Guinea 'one day') . In 1983 the newly appointed 
Defence Force commander, Brigadier-General Ken Noga, supported 
Indonesian suggestions that a military attache be appointed to the 
Papua New Guinean embassy in Jakarta, saying that, 'Internationally, 
the military seem to talk to other military a lot more regularly and eas­
ily' (Canberra Times 22 September 1983).  
These six categories - the Irianese community, border villagers, 
the church , students and intellectuals ,  parliamentary opposition, and 
the army - obviously do not represent an unbiased sample of 'public 
opinion' . However, an examination of letters to the press (including 
the Tokpisin Wantok) , casual discussion with people in some quite 
remote villages of East Sepik, and the fact that offers to resettle 
refugees have co.me from as far afield as the East Sepik, Gulf, Morobe 
and North Solomons provinces , suggests that the general concerns 
expressed by these groups are felt, in varying degrees, by a large seg­
ment of the population throughout the country. An extreme viewpoint 
is represented by people who fear that an Indonesian invasion of 
Papua New Guinea is a future possibility. This view persists despite 
Indonesian assurances that it has no expansionist ambitions (though it 
is perhaps nourished by repeated statements that Indonesia has acted 
with 'restraint') . I do not think that such a fear is widespread, but it has 
been expressed by people ranging from the former Defence minister, 
Tito, and one of his predecessors, Gai Duwabane (who told the Post­
Courier (14 March 1984) that Indonesia might try to capitalize on a vol­
canic eruption in Rabaul to invade Papua New Guinea) , to groups of 
villagers such as the highlanders reported in Niugini Nius (10 April 
1984) as preparing themselves for a third world war. Among those who 
foresee the possibility of invasion, responses vary from the belligerent 
- mostly demands that Papua New Guinea take an unspecified 
'stronger stand' against border violations - through the practical - par­
ticularly, seeking stronger and more explicit defence links with 
Australia - to the conciliatory. Much more common, however, is a 
broadly articulated sympathy with the situation of the Melanesian 
population of Irian Jaya, a belief - founded on newspaper reports and 
word of mouth - that the Melanesians of Irian Jaya have been badly 
treated by the Indonesian government, and a feeling that the Melane­
sians of Irian Jaya do not belong in an autocratic Asian nation. These 
sentiments find expression in a variety of forms, from demands that the 
Papua New Guinea government support demands for West Papuan 
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independence at the UN, through offers to assist Indonesia to under­
stand its Melanesian cultures, to offers to accommodate refugees. It is 
important to recognize that most of those who press such views see 
themselves not so much 'anti-Indonesian' as 'pro-Melanesian' .  
Not all expressions of popular opinion in Papua New Guinea have 
been unreservedly sympathetic to the Irianese . Between 1979 and 1981 
there were several complaints about the Wabo camp in Gulf Province 
and suggestions that the camp be closed and some refugees deported 
(Post-Courier 10, 14 September 1979, 26 November 1980 , 23 January 
1981). In 1981 there were complaints from Manus about politically 
active Irian-born residents (Post-Courier 21 April 1981 ) .  At the time of 
the 1984 kidnappings there were calls for tough action against those 
who broke Papua New Guinea laws. In 1984-85 there were complaints 
from some border villagers that border crossers were raiding gardens, 
and stealing canoes and that those in refugee camps were receiving bet­
ter treatment than local villagers (page 145). Other instances of nega­
tive attitudes have been cited above . But on the whole these have been 
vastly outweighed by a general sympathy and concern . 
The developments of 1984-85 not only raised awareness locally 
but brought greater international attention to the border situation. 
Among a number of international organizations which in 1984 expres­
sed their concern over the situation in Irian Jaya and the fate of the 
border crossers (apart from the UNHCR and TAPOL - the British 
Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in 
Indonesia - whose concerns are longstanding and well known),  were 
the Anti-Slavery Society (UK) , Survival International (UK) , the 
International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (Denmark) , the 
UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group, the Australian Council for 
Overseas Aid, the Refugee Council of Australia and the Australian 
branch of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). An ICJ team, 
which visited the refugee camps in September 1984, produced draft 
and final reports which were well publicized in Papua New Guinea, at 
one stage prompting an irritated response from Somare : 'The ICJ does 
not run this country' (Niugini Nius 5 October 1984) . 
In summary : there appears to be within Papua New Guinea a 
widespread general awareness of the grievances and the demands 
expressed by Irianese nationalists , and a good deal of sympathy 
towards their motives and to the idea of accommodating refugees. 
Developments along the border during 1984-85 undoubtedly raised 
this awareness and, overall, probably increased sympathetic feelings. 
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As such, 'public opinion' probably had a significant influence on gov­
ernment policies relating to the border - particularly with respect to 
repatriation and joint patrols. On the other hand, few people seem to 
believe that an independent West Papua is a likely prospect, and 
attitudes to Papua New Guinea's relations with Indonesia are gener­
ally pragmatic. Popular opinion, in other words, has been questioning 
the policies of the Indonesian government in Irian Jaya, and occasion­
ally the policies of the Papua New Guinea government towards 
Indonesia and towards border crossers , but it scarcely seems to merit 
the label 'Indophobia' , and still less to be seen as the product of outside 
manipulation . 
Conclusion 
In 1977-78 - less than three years after Papua New Guinea had 
gained independence - events on the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea 
border raised the border, and the situation of the Melanesian popula­
tion of Irian Jaya, to a level of major public concern within Papua New 
Guinea.20 Towards the end of 1978, with the easing tensions, brought 
about by military de-escalation on the Indonesian side and the 
announcement of a new 'smiling policy' for Irian Jaya, the capture of 
OPM leaders Prai and Ondowame, and threats by the Papua New 
Guinea that it would take stern action against overt supporters of the 
OPM within Papua New Guinea, the salience of the border issue 
diminished. Cordial relations with Indonesia were restored. Writing in 
1979 I ventured the opinion that public concern over the border would 
not be sustained (May 1979a : 106) , while Rex Mortimer in the same 
volume wrote of the 'smiling policy' as marking, perhaps, the begin­
nings of 'a more fruitful phase' in Indonesia-Papua New Guinea rela­
tions (Mortimer 1979) . 
In the event, the 'border problem' did not go away. Between 1979 
and 1983 , in various manifestations - territorial violations by Indone­
sian troops, influxes of Irianese refugees to Papua New Guinea, a road 
incursion, and expressions of support within Papua New Guinea for 
20 A crude indicator of public concern over border related issues is the number of times 
Irian Jaya or Indonesia-Papua New Guinea relations occur in the Post-Courier as a news 
item or in letters to the editor. Annual figures to 1978 are as follows : 1972, 26 ; 1973, 40; 
1974, 8 ;  1975, 1 1 ;  1976, SO ; 1977, 71 (of which 61 were after 1 May) ; 1978, 220. (Source : 
Post-Courier indexes, IASER, Port Moresby). 
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Irianese separatism - it kept recurring in short cycles of incident , minor 
confrontation and renewed cordiality . 2 1  Despite two changes of 
government in Papua New Guinea in this period, however, successive 
governments remained unwavering in their acceptance of Indonesia's 
sovereignty in Irian Jaya, their commitment to maintaining friendly 
relations with Indonesia, and their refusal to countenance the use of 
Papua New Guinea as a base for OPM activity . Nor, despite frequent 
criticisms from the parliamentary opposition of the government's 
handling of border-related issues, has there been any evidence that any 
opposition group has had anything significantly different to offer on 
the issue . 
At the same time, although reliable information about conditions 
in Irian Jaya is difficult - even for the Papua New Guinea government 
- to obtain, it became clear that, despite predictions to the contrary, 
support within Irian Jaya for the OPM was not disappearing but was 
quite probably on the increase. 
The developments of 1984, which brought some 1 1 ,000 Irianese 
across the border into Papua New Guinea, again raised public con­
cern , this time dramatically and perhaps irreversibly. They also gener­
ated new levels of tension in the relations between the two govern­
ments - to the point that Papua New Guinea felt moved to express its 
concern at international forums - and in the attitudes of the Papua New 
Guinea government towards some Irian-born residents in Papua New 
Guinea. Moreover, even if they did not actually threaten the stability 
of the government in Papua New Guinea, events along the border in 
1984-85 certainly intruded into Papua New Guinea's domestic politics 
to the extent that one minister lost his portfolio for an indiscreet 
remark and two others faced calls for their resignation following reve­
lations about the situation in border camps. This was reflected,  in 1984, 
in repeated statements to the effect that , while Papua New Guinea rec­
ognized Indonesian sovereignty in Irian Jaya, the growing volume of 
border crossers and problems of security in the border area made it 
clear that Papua New Guinea did have some direct interest in what was 
happening in the Indonesian province. 
Questions concerning the fate of border crossers/refugees and 
concerning border security remained dominant issues throughout 1984 
21 The numbers of Post-Courier entries between 1979 and 1983 were : 1979, 98 ; 1980, 56 ; 
1981, 102 ; 1982, 99 ; 1983, 68. During 1984, items on Irian Jaya or Indonesia averaged 
something more than one per day. 
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and the first half of 1985 and the generally poor record of attempts to 
resolve problems through diplomatic channels and through the 
machinery established to deal with border administration and liaison 
cast serious doubts on their effectiveness. 
As of mid 1985 Papua New Guinea still has a problem of major 
proportions, in the form of a continuing flow of border crossers, while 
a sharpened public awareness of and sympathy with the situation of the 
Melanesian population seems likely to ensure that no government can 
afford either to ignore the problem or to employ repressive measures 
in an attempt to solve it. 
Projected inflows of transmigrant settlers, combined with a con­
tinuation of the repressive policies which have to date characterized 
Indonesia's administration in Irian Jaya, seem likely to ensure that 
West Papuan nationalism will remain a problem for the Indonesian 
government, and to the extent that border crossing appears to offer a 
way out for disaffected Irianese the situation in Irian Jaya will also con­
tinue to present problems for Papua New Guinea, both in its interna­
tional relations and in its domestic politics. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TRANSMIGRATION TO IRIAN JAYA 
H. Arndt 
The idea of trying to alleviate population pressure and poverty in Java by organizing and encouraging the movement of people from 
Java to the outer islands is almost a hundred years old. A census con­
ducted by the Dutch colonial administration in 1905 had shown that, of 
the total population of the Netherlands East Indies of 37 . 5  million, 80 
per cent (30 million) lived in Java-Madura which accounted for little 
more than 7 per cent of the land area. Mounting evidence of declining 
welfare in rural Java led to the adoption of a 'colonization' policy 
aimed at relieving population pressure in Java by settling 'colonies' of 
Javanese on the sparsely populated outer islands, initially mainly in 
southern Sumatra. By 1940, some 200 ,000 government-sponsored 
migrants are estimated to have been settled under this policy. There 
was also, during the 1930s, a large flow of spontaneous migration of 
labour to the Sumatran plantations. With the Japanese occupation in 
1942, colonization came to an end. 
After the attainment of independence , the idea was revived. 
Ambitious, and quite unrealistic, plans for massive transmigration 
were put forward. In practice , during the Sukarno period the Dutch 
policy of transmigration and land settlement of Javanese subsistence 
farmers continued on a modest scale. The numbers moved rarely 
exceeded 25 ,OOO persons in any one year and declined to a trickle in the 
chaotic years of the mid-1960s. 
As rational economic policy making again became possible after 
the 1965-66 change of regime, interest in transmigration revived, but 
with a different perspective .  It came to be recognized that transmigra­
tion could not solve , or even substantially alleviate the problem of 
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'population imbalance' between Java and the other islands, or even the 
problem of population pressure on Java. As Table 6 . 1  shows, the 
balance of Indonesia's population has shifted somewhat in favour of 
the outer islands since 1905 , but population pressure on Java has 
increased very much further. Java has a population density even grea­
ter than that of Bangladesh and nearly double that of the Netherlands, 
with land holdings averaging less than 0.5 hectares and one quarter or 
more of the rural population landless. Even an ambitious transmigra­
tion programme involving the movement of 200,000 persons a year 
would be equivalent to only one tenth of the annual increase in Java's 
population. 
In the past fifteen years, transmigration has been seen by Indone­
sian policy makers primarily as having a welfare objective , to raise the 
standard of living of the migrants themselves and perhaps, by reducing 
the number of mouths to feed , that of their home villages in Java. A 
secondary motive has been to promote lagging economic development 
on the outer islands. 
The first half of this chapter will give a brief account of the 
development of the transmigration programme in recent years and of 
some of the problems it has encountered. (For a more detailed study 
see Arndt 1983 .) The second half will focus specifically on transmigra­
tion to Irian Jaya. 
Table 6.1  Population density in Indonesia, 1983 
Area Population Density 
'000 km2 million persons per 
km2 
Indonesia 1 ,904 155.8 82 
Java 127 95 .9 755 
Other islands 1 ,777 59.9 34 
(Irian Ja ya) (416) (1 .2) (3) 
Bangladesh 143 99.4 695 
Netherlands 34 14.4 424 
Australia 7 ,617 15.5 2 
Source : Extrapolated from World Bank (1982). 
Transmigration: Progress and Problems 
During the period of the first Five Year Plan (Repelita I ,  1969/70-
73/4) transmigration was resumed, with the emphasis on expanded 
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food production. As the older settlement areas in southern Sumatra 
became overcrowded and increasingly resembled some of the worst 
areas of Java itself, attention shifted to swamp reclamation in coastal 
regions of southern Kalimantan and eastern Sumatra and to unirri­
gated (rainfed) land in other provinces of Sumatra, Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi . The OPEC oil price increases of 1973/4 and 1979/80 which 
brought hitherto undreamed-of foreign exchange earnings to the coun­
try and revenue to the government , raised Indonesian development 
targets all round. Transmigration became one of the main beneficiaries 
of the windfall . Both the scale of the programme and its regional 
development objectives became more ambitious. 
The income of migrant settlers was to be raised by giving them 
enough land to grow cash crops as well as food for their own needs, 
with special emphasis on tree crops such as rubber and palm oil. The 
pace of transmigration was to be accelerated to the point where settle­
ments would economically j ustify the provision of new infrastructure 
and community facilities , such as schools , clinics and local govern­
ment. The land settlements themselves were increasingly to serve as 
growth centres by attracting spontaneous migrants from Java and by 
promoting regional development beyond agriculture, in processing 
and other industries, as well as in trade and services .  
The second Five Year Plan (Repelita II, 1974175-78/79) at first 
adopted a transmigration target of 50,000 families (200,000 persons) a 
year, a figure four times as high as the highest achieved in any previous 
year. This was subsequently recognized as unrealistic and scaled down 
to about 20,000 families a year. The third Plan (Repelita III , 1979/80-
83/84) set its sights even higher, with a transmigration target of 500,000 
families or over 2 million persons over the plan period, and within a 
year of its adoption the second oil price increase seemed to make so 
vast a programme financially feasible. Development budget alloca­
tions for transmigration were raised from about $USS million a year in 
Repelita I to $US340 million in Repelita III , equivalent to almost 6 per 
cent of the development (capital) budget. Since the early 1970s, the 
transmigration programme has also received a substantial flow of 
external assistance , from the World Bank and other international 
banks and agencies. 
Judged merely by the number of people moved from Java1 , the 
1 Transmigrants (and spontaneous migrants) have come from Bali, and recently also 
from Lombok, as well as from Java. Unless specifically indicated, 'Java' as the source of 
migrants in this chapter includes the latter two small islands. 
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transmigration programme has achieved remarkable results in the past 
ten years . Admittedly, the Repelita III target of 500,000 families has 
proved over-ambitious. (Official statistics which show it to have been 
reached include a substantial number of voluntary migrants .) But to 
have managed the movement and settlem'ent even of 50-60,000 trans­
migrant families a year in the often extremely difficult conditions of the 
Indonesian archipelago represents an organizational achievement of 
no mean order. 
Even in terms of numbers, the effort has not been pointless. The 
removal of 200-300,000 people a year must have done something to 
relieve population pressure and consequent social problems in some of 
the poorest areas of Java : and in so far as low population density and 
labour shortage constitute an obstacle to the economic development of 
the outer islands, the influx of 300,000 transmigrants represents a sig­
nificant addition to their natural increase. Nor is there much doubt that 
the welfare of the great majority of the transmigrant families has been 
improved. Such scanty estimates of income per head in transmigrant 
settlements as are available suggest that in most areas , especially those 
where there is scope for little more than subsistence farming, it is not 
significantly above the average for Java. But even this, with the owner­
ship of a piece of land, represents a substantial improvement for land­
less labourers from the poorest parts of Java. Certainly, very few trans­
migrants , on the publicly available evidence , have returned to their 
home villages in Java. 
There is also statistical support for the presumption that transmig­
ration has contributed to one of the major objectives of the three Five 
Year Plans , increased food production . Both harvested area under rice 
and rice yields have risen rapidly in recent years in the main transmig­
ration settlement areas of Sumatra. There is little evidence that trans­
migration has as yet significantly stimulated regional development in 
the sense of modern industrial development on the outer islands. But 
by opening up large tracts of j ungle and swamp, and inducing substan­
tial investment in roads and other infrastructure , the programme has 
undoubtedly laid the foundations for a process that must be thought of 
in terms of decades. 
To achieve these results , the transmigration programme has had 
to overcome immense obstacles. Some of these problems now cast 
serious shadows on its future . The selection of transmigrants has from 
the beginning presented a dilemma, between need and suitability. The 
poorest who most needed help (and were often the first to volunteer or 
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to be pushed by village officials anxious to be rid of them) were not 
necessarily the most enterprising, vigorous and capable settlers. Nor 
did their skills as wet-rice farmers in Java necessarily help them farm 
efficiently in the very different soil and other conditions of the outer 
islands. Other dilemmas were presented by transport to and land pre­
paration in settlement areas. To meet the targets of the accelerated , 
programme during Repelita III , there was a tendency to resort to 
mechanized land clearing and to air transport of transmigrants which 
increased cost and reduced employment generation . The magnitude of 
the organizational tasks imposed severe strains on the vast and com­
plex but not very robust Indonesian bureaucracy. (By 1978 over fifty 
directorates-general , spread among seven central government depart­
ments and numerous local authorities were involved in administering 
the programme in Jakarta and in the provinces of Java and the outer 
islands.) As the facilities provided to transmigrants improved, espe­
cially in the effort to shift from mere subsistence farming to cash crop 
production, so the costs of the programme rose . By 1983/s3,  the cost 
per transmigrant family had reached $US12,000. At this average 
figure , the direct cost to the development budget during Repelita IV of 
a target programme of 800,000 families would reach at least $US2 bill­
ion a year. While such a figure might have been accommodated in the 
years of the oil boom , it could not really be contemplated in the period 
of financial stringency which began with the world oil glut of 1982. 
The most serious problem of all, however, and the most surprising 
at first sight, has been the increasing difficulty of finding suitable land 
for transmigrant settlements on the outer islands . The land area of the 
outer islands is enormous, fourteen times that of Java, but most of the 
soil is much less fertile than the rich volcanic soil of Java. By 1965 , most 
of the areas suitable for wet rice cultivation and other good agricultural 
land were already under cultivation. The choice for new transmigra­
tion settlements was between the relatively poor soils of rainfed 
upland, whether under primary forest or under grass with secondary 
timber growth , and reclaimable tidal swamp. 
For some years after 1966, the latter attracted most interest 
among transmigration planners, but the technical difficulties and costs 
of reclamation and tidal irrigation have proved very great. A few 
thousand families were settled on swamp land during Repelita II, but 
little further progress was made during Repelita III. Most settlement 
in the past ten years has therefore been in upland regions of Sumatra 
and Kalimantan. These generally consist of reddish-yellow podzolic 
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soils which are highly susceptible to erosion and leaching. Their 
natural fertility is low, more suited to tree than to food crops. 
Three factors have increasingly limited the choice of suitable sites 
even here . One is concern about the rate of which Indonesia's tropical 
forest resources have been exploited. As forest conservation has been 
given higher priority and been more effectively enforced, clearing of 
primary forest for settlement sites has virtually come to an end. A sec­
ond major problem has been the infestation of cleared and grass lands 
by alang-alang grass which renders large areas unusable for agricul­
ture. None of the mechanical , chemical or vegetative methods of 
eradication which have been tried has yet proved wholly effective. The 
third persistent difficulty has been the fact that even sparsely popu­
lated land in the outer islands has been subject to land claims, custom­
ary and often communal , by the local population . Disputes over land 
have been the commonest source of friction between the Javanese 
settlers and the indigenous people who, with their different traditions , 
language and culture, have generally not welcomed the intrusion of 
Javanese settlers . 
The net effect of all these factors has been to render site identifica­
tion in the traditional areas of settlement increasingly difficult. 
'Sumatra and Kalimantan are full ' ,  one heard it said in the latter years 
of Repelita III. This is the reason why, in planning for transmigration 
during Repelita IV (1983/84-88/89) , Irian Jaya has been seriously con­
sidered as the major target area for transmigration settlements. 
Transmigration to Irian Jaya, 1963-83 
So long as ample land for transmigrant settlements seemed avail­
able nearer by, little thought was given to the remote and inaccessible 
province of Irian Jaya as a recipient area. It never figured significantly 
in the Dutch colonization policy, and only a trickle of transmigrants 
was sent to Irian Jaya in the 1960s. 
Before 1969 only 267 families were moved to a few tiny settle­
ments, initially under the policy favoured by the National Transmigra­
tion Movement of having projects in every province, irrespective of 
economic feasibility. Three of these settlements were near Merauke 
(Kumbe, Kurik, Kuprik) , and one each near Jayapura, Nabire and 
Manokwari on the north coast. Another 260 families were brought to 
these settlements in 1971 and 1972, chiefly by the provincial 
authorities , bringing the total number of people living in the six vil-
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lages to 2,539 by the end of Repelita I (Hardjono 1977 :89). Garnaut 
and Manning's study of the economy of Irian Jaya based on intensive 
field work during 1972 presented the following picture of these early 
transmigration experiments in the province : 
Although the prospect of filling empty Irian Jaya with far­
mers from overpopulated Java has had romantic appeal in 
Indonesia, the province has not been a priority region for 
official resettlement. Only about 450 families had arrived 
under the official transmigration scheme to the end of 1971 .  
Most of these have begun farming close to  Merauke, J ayap­
ura and Manokwari . Faced with unfamiliar soils, terrain 
and climate, the need to change consumption patterns (rice 
cannot be grown in the highlands) , marketing difficulties 
and some hostility from local people, some settlements 
have broken up and their members have moved into com­
merce and other employment in urban areas . The transmig­
ration schemes in the highlands broke up and settlers now 
make up a large proportion of the shop and market traders 
in Wamena. A majority of transmigrants to Kurik have 
moved to Merauke to take up labouring and artisan jobs. 
Some small groups of transmigrants have done very 
well in Irian Jaya. Settlers near Jayapura and Nabire have 
become market gardeners and important suppliers of veg­
etables to the towns. With these and larger, better planned 
future projects the government hopes to introduce new 
farming techniques and to encourage commercial farming 
by the local people. Problems of adjustment have been 
least severe in settlements adjacent to Merauke, where rice 
can be grown either in remnants of the technically irrigated 
scheme commenced by the Dutch (at Kumbe) or through 
reliance on wet-season rain (at Kurik and Kuprik) . There 
seems to be considerable scope for new paddy farming in 
the Merauke area (Garnaut and Manning 1974:38-39) . 
Until the end of the 1970s, the number of Javanese transmigrants 
moved to Irian J aya was trifling compared with the large influx of other 
immigrants into the province from various parts of Indonesia. These 
other immigrants have been of two types : government officials and 
skilled employees of large companies arriving to take up employment 
arranged in advance , and self-financed settlers hoping to find employ-
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ment on arrival . 
After the initial large transfers of Indonesian officials to restaff 
government following the departure of the Dutch in 1962 and 1963, 
immigrants with technical and administrative skills continued to be 
recruited on a small scale . By 1968, official statistics put the number of 
non-local officials at 4, 150, just under one-third of civil servants 
employed in lrian J aya. In the following years almost one half of these 
were replaced by local civil servants , although a considerable propor­
tion may have been immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. Foreign 
mining and fishing companies also attracted skilled workers and staff 
from other provinces, as well as from abroad. Unsponsored (spontane­
ous) immigrants, chiefly from Sulawesi and Maluku, arrived in large 
numbers , especially after the requirement of a special permit was 
abolished in 1969. Attracted by the very much higher wage rates ruling 
in Irian Jaya than in their home provinces , they came by inter-island 
ships, mainly to the four northern ports, Jayapura , Biak, Manokwari 
and Sarong. Garnaut and Manning quoted an estimate by the regional 
shipping authority that net migration from all ships rose from a little 
over 5 ,000 in 1970 to just under 10 ,000 in 1971 (ibid :40) . 
As Table 6.2 shows, there was only a slight increase in the number 
of official transmigrants sent to Irian Jaya during Repelita II, little 
more than 200 families a year on average . By the end of Repelita II, 
however, the problem of shortage of suitable sites in the traditional 
areas in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan was beginning to become 
evident. Writing in 1977, Joan Hardjono concluded her study of trans­
migration with the ominous prediction that, 'as population continues 
to increase in Java, it is very likely that in the 1980s migrants may have 
to be settled in Irian Jaya, despite geographical obstacles , through Jack 
of land elsewhere' (Hardjono 1977 :90) . 
During Repelita III , Irian Jaya assumed greater importance as a 
recipient area, some 12,000 transmigrants being sent there in the first 
three and three quarter years (to 31 December 1982) . Even this consti­
tuted only j ust over 4 per cent of the greatly enlarged programme, but 
with the settlement of some 50,000 people in the concentrated settle­
ment areas in the northeastern and southeastern parts of the province 
and the associated large expenditures on roads and other infrastruc­
ture, transmigration for the first time became a significant factor in the 
economic development and in the internal and external politics of the 
province. 
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UNHCR Commissioner lorn Unwin ialks with lnanesc at Yako Camp, March 1979. This group 
subsequently returned to lrian Jayo Photo-times of f'apua New Guinea 
Yako refugee camp, Sandaun Province (now closed). Photo-Times of Papua New Guinea 
OPM leader, Jacob Prai, and some of his forces posing in front of the West Papua flag, 
1977. Phot<>--Mark Baker 
Max lreeuw (left) and Ben Tanggahma attending an African national liberation movements 
solidarity week in Dakar, Senegal, 1980. Phot<>--Mark Baker 
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Table 6.2 Transmigration to Irian Jaya 
Families Persons 
Total Irian Jaya Total Irian Jaya % 
('OOO) ('OOO) ('OOO) ('OOO) 
1950-68 0.3 424.4 1 . 3  0.3 
1969170 3 .9 
} 0 3  
17.8 } 1 .2 1970/71 4.4 20 .0 
1971/72 4 . 1  18 .9 
1972173 1 1 . 3  5 1 .9 0.5 
1973174 22.4 73 . 1  
Repelita I 46.I 0.3 I8I . 7  I . 7  0.9 
1974/75 13 .3 0.2 56.8 0.7 
1975/76 1 1 .0  0.2 48 .0 0.7 
1976/77 1 1 . 8  53 .7 
1977/78 23 . 1  0.2 95 . 1  0 .7 
1978/79 28. 8  0.5 123.2 2.3 
Repelita ll 88.0 I .O  376. 9 4.3 I . I  
1979/80 50.7 2. 1 210. 1 8 .9  
1980/81 79.9 2.0 327.5 8 .4 
1981/82 88.0 5 .3 357 .9 22. 1  
1982/83(b) 67.4 2 .7 272. 6  1 1 .3 
1983/84 n.a .  n .a .  n .a .  n .a .  
Repelita III 286.0(a) I2. I(a) I ,I68. I (a) 50. 7(a) 4.3 
Repelita lV (800) (137) (4,000) (600) (15 .0) (planned) 
Source : Arndt (1983 :52f) 
(a) 1 .4.79-3 1 . 12.82 
(b) 1 .4 .82-3 1 . 12.82 
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By 1983 , the number of spontaneous immigrants into Irian Jaya 
from other parts of Indonesia is estimated to have reached 160,000 
(Peter Hastings, 'Inside Irian J aya' , Sydney Morning Herald 30 August 
1983) .  
Little information is available on the progress of the transmigra­
tion settlements in Irian Jaya. One of the few recent eye witness 
reports is that published by Peter Hastings following a visit to the reset­
tlement areas at Koya, Arso and Dosay south of Jayapura and at Sota 
near Merauke in mid-1983. Some of his impressions are worth quot­
mg : 
Koya is quite an eye opener. It is a huge area of neat inter­
secting roads , new houses with tin roofs , laid out in equally 
neat rows, two primary standard schools, dispensaries, a 
central mosque and a Protestant Church, to meet the needs 
of the Irianese community , which accounts for about 25 per 
cent of an estimated settlement of 2,160 people or 500 
families. Most of the non-Irianese are Javanese settlers . 
Most arrived there last year. The Indonesian Government 
paid their transport by ship and helped them build their 
homes. For one year each family will receive free sugar, 
salt, rice , kerosene and cooking oil. The rice ration is cru­
cial until newly planted paddy starts to grow. 
TMs are all volunteers . They must settle and make the best 
of where they are sent. At a packed meeting of settlement 
leaders I could not find one who wished to return to Java. 
Most, in fact , were trying to bring other family members to 
join them. The big attraction was the two hectares of land 
- the first they had ever owned - to which they had been 
given title. The usual arrangement is a quarter hectare for 
house and private garden and the remainder for crop culti­
vation. In the fields I saw rice , soybean , peanuts, chillies, 
cucumbers , green beans and tomatoes. At Arso, some 20 
kilometres further south , oil palm has been put in on a large 
scale, the highway is being pushed further south and new 
houses are ready for an expected 500 Javanese families 
(ibid) . 
At the southern end, the highway begins at Merauke : 
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traffic, pushed across one of the world's largest swamps 
about a metre above wet season flood level . It is part of the 
projected southern half of an all-weather compact road 
which will eventually link, some say in five years, but more 
likely 10, north and south Irian Jaya and form the basis of 
a large-scale Javanese resettlement scheme (ibid) . 
The main local problem Hastings reports to be, in Irian Jaya as in 
other parts of the outer islands, that of land ownership. Traditionally, 
in Irian Jaya as in much of Sumatra and Kalimantan, land is owned 
communally, individuals merely having the usufruct . Land alienation 
is a potential source of resentment by indigenous people, even where 
the land appears unused, and compensation for land use is crucial. The 
official Indonesian policy of trying to integrate Irianese and Javanese 
transmigrants in the settlements, partly with a view to encouraging the 
spread of farming techniques to the local people, can alleviate but not 
always resolve the problem . 
Integration of Javanese and Irianese farmers, on the other 
hand, offers some surprises. One of the oldest TM settle­
ments is at Dosay, about 60 kilometres from Jayapura, on 
relatively good soil. There is found a well-integrated com­
munity of both races. The settlement started in 1966 with 
five Javanese TM families. It now has about 200, nearly half 
of them Irianese busily growing cocoa, coffee, vegetables 
and a variety of tropical fruit. . .  for the markets at Jayap­
ura . . . .  A similarly encouraging situation seems to exist in 
the much larger TM settlements which spread , their tin 
roofs gleaming in the sun, 60 kilometres and more in all 
directions from Merauke. This former tiny Dutch settle­
ment has developed into a centre of 20,000 people, about 
half of them Indonesians from all over the archipelago . . . .  
The successfully integrated settlements share a common 
factor. The Irianese have already become largely 
Indonesianised (ibid) . 
Not all the integrated transmigration settlements , however, have 
been successful. Those in the west, at Nabire and at Timika, have been 
'fairly disastrous' . The latter has been closed down (ibid) . Generally, 
while there appears to be little friction in the lowland areas of Irian 
J aya which have for long been exposed to external influence and con­
tacts, transmigration settlement among the people of the highlands , as 
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indeed any other efforts to Indonesianize them, are liable to run into 
severe difficulties. Hastings quotes a Catholic priest : 'It is for the bush 
people we fear. They are increasingly angry over land and confused by 
the Javanese preoccupation with civilising them' (ibid) . 
Transmigration to Irian Jaya: Prospects 
In the early stages of Jakarta planning for Repelita IV (1984/85-
88/89), transmigration target figures as high as 1 ,000,000 families over 
the five-year period were under discussion, and a substantial propor­
tion of these was to be settled in Irian Jaya. In the last two years, as the 
financial stringency imposed by the ending of the oil boom has become 
apparent, the overall target has been scaled down, probably to 800,000 
families including some 300,000 of spontaneous migrants , so that the 
target for officially sponsored transmigrants would be the same as for 
Repelita III, 500,000 families or some 2.0-2 .5 million persons. 
It has also come to be recognized in Jakarta that transmigration of 
one million or more Javanese to Irian Jaya, where they would swamp 
the local Irianese population , was bound to invite political trouble 
within Irian J aya and in consequence also with Papua New Guinea and 
conceivably Australia . The target for transmigration to Irian Jaya 
included in the Plan has therefore been substantially reduced, but it 
remains worryingly high at 137,000 families or about 600,000 persons 
over the five years . Table 6 .3  shows the proposed distribution of this 
total among the kabupaten of Irian J aya2 . 
Table 6.3 : Transmigration to Irian Jaya : 
Repelita IV Targets 
('OOO families) 
Kabupaten 
Jayapura 
Merauke 
Sorong 
Singgi 
Other 
Source : Repelita IV 
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35 .0 
14.8 
10.0 
31 .2 
137.0 
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The Indonesian government is preparing to allocate very large 
funds to integrate the people and promote the economic development 
of the province . The allocation for transmigration in Irian Jaya in the 
1983/84 development budget was Rp 20 billion ($US20 million) and 
total government expenditure in the province was budgeted to exceed 
$US250 million. Further increases in real terms are planned through 
Repelita IV. But this may exacerbate rather than alleviate the prob­
lem. 
Hastings argues that the danger of external repercussions arises 
not so much from political hostility to Indonesia within Irian Jaya but 
from the contrast between economic development on the western side 
of the border and the almost total lack of it on the eastern side. 'The 
greater the development on the west side, the more it will attract PNG 
border dwellers and the more it will shake their allegiance to Port 
Moresby' (Peter Hastings, 'PNG's border of suspicion' ,  Sydney Morn­
ing Herald, 2 May 1983) . 
Whatever the precise reasons for fearing political repercussions of 
massive transmigration to Irian Jaya, the risk is bound to weigh with 
the Indonesian government and its policy advisers. There are two 
alternatives , neither of them easy. One is a still more determined effort 
to identify and develop suitable settlement sites on the other islands, 
chiefly Sumatra and Kalimantan , which involves allocation of funds 
and enlistment of foreign technical assistance in the development of 
effective methods of eradication of alang-alang grass and of more 
efficient and less costly methods of swamp reclamation. The other 
alternative is to abandon , or at least greatly cut back, the transmigra­
tion programme and put the resources now devoted to it to more inten­
sive economic development and employment creation in Java3 . 
There remains the question of spontaneous migration to Irian 
J aya which , as we have noted, has in the past two decades brought far 
more people from other parts of Indonesia to Irian J aya than official 
transmigration. Hastings quotes a Protestant pastor in Irian Jaya : 'I 
would stop unsponsored migrants . '  But Hastings adds that 'as Indone-
2 Since this chapter was written, the head of the provincial transmigration office in J ayap­
ura, Mr Eko Sarwoko, has given a target figure of 689 ,OOO transmigrants to Irian Jaya for 
Repelita IV (The Australian 13 April 1984). 
3 For an alternative approach to transmigration which would, however, not in itself alter 
the Irian Jaya dilemma, see Arndt and Sundrum (1977). 
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sian citizens they have every right to visit and settle another part of 
Indonesia. They cannot be stopped, for they are as much part of the 
process of Indonesianisation as the communicants streaming to early 
morning Mass at Merauke's cathedral - or the brand new mosque tak­
ing shape not a kilometre from it' (Hastings , Sydney Morning Herald, 
30 August 1983). This is the wider context in which the issue of trans­
migration to lrian Jaya has to be viewed - in Jakarta and abroad. 
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BORDER DEVELOPMENT: A 'POLITICAL 
NECESSITY' AGAIN 
J.M. Herlihy 
CHAPTER ? 
In the relatively few years since the exigencies of international rela­tions revived interest in the Papua New Guinea-Indonesian border, 
most observers and government officials have been cautiously optimis­
tic about the new rapport between the two uneasy neighbours. With 
the surprise capture in Vanimo in September 1978 of OPM leader 
Jakob Prai , the hostility, concern and emotionalism which had swept 
Papua New Guinea after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 
1975 received an abrupt check. The Somare government , which in the 
immediate aftermath of the East Timor issue had moved quickly to 
initiate a border development programme to strengthen its influence in 
the area, in 1977/78 became increasingly conciliatory towards Indone­
sian anti-rebel activities. As these diminished with the 'hard line' taken 
by Papua New Guinea towards rebel sympathizers and the concurrent 
'smiling policy' introduced by Indonesia in 1978 on the Irianese side of 
the border, the issue of border development became a priority for both 
countries. The new Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Border Agreement 
of 1979, the first to be negotiated by an independent Papua New 
Guinea government, made provision for a Joint Border Committee 
comprised of senior officials from both sides, to ensure 'balanced 
development' .  Papua New Guinea in the same year allocated the first 
funds to the Border Development Programme which the Inter­
Departmental Border Committee had proposed under the National 
Public Expenditure Plan in 1977, and formed a Division of Defence 
and Border Administration within the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade to oversee its administration. 
One factor which has been consistently underestimated in the 
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plethora of resolutions and recommendations that has accompanied 
the recent interest in border development is that the response within 
the border zone itself will be a crucial determinant of the success or fai­
lure of the new government initiatives. This chapter outlines briefly, 
for the Papua New Guinea side of the border, some of the situational 
variables which in the past have hindered village response to govern­
ment initiatives and which are likely to vitiate governmental capacity 
to institute effective change within the border zone . These suggest that 
the achievement of the Papua New Guinea government's objectives 
with regard to the communities in the vicinity of the border will be a 
complex and costly task, the difficulties of which could well outweigh 
the time and resources that can be diverted to it. Previous experience 
and present patterns already indicate a high probability that the recent 
concern for border development will be a transient phenomenon, and 
survive only as long as the border and the tensions between the two 
countries over it remain national political issues. 
The relevance of a border development programme to the politics 
of the border in recent years depends largely on the validity of several 
assumptions . The first of these is that it will bring about a decline in 
Papua New Guinean support for Irianese rebels and dissidents - which, 
within the border zone, is confined to a relatively small area - and that 
this will neutralize the long-standing conflict of interest between 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea over their mututal land boundary. 
The second assumption is that sympathy and support for the rebel 
movement among border communities will show an inverse correla­
tion with development of the area, which again is debatable. The third 
assumption , that the Papua New Guinea government will be able to 
supply the type and quantity of inputs necessary to implement an effec­
tive development programme, was a moot point even during periods of 
considerable colonial and later national prosperity. The fourth and 
possibly most important assumption for a programme that aspires to 
influence communal attitudes , is the hypothesis that the border com­
munities will be able and willing to take advantage of the government's 
scheme . Many social, spatial and situational factors , and a long history 
of lumpy and unreliable administration, make this assumption particu­
larly suspect. The significance of these factors is examined in the fol­
lowing pages. 
The border zone 
The term 'border zone' is used here to refer to the 32 km (20 mile) 
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quarantine strip or cordon sanitaire which parallels the actual border 
across Papua New Guinea. Within this zone, border issues have a 
direct impact on the daily lives of the people , even though many have 
little knowledge of, or interest in, the political considerations. The ter­
rain within the cordon sanitaire varies from the lowland swamps of 
most of the Western Province, through the inaccessible central cor­
derilla to the Sepik River grasslands , the Bewani and border ranges , 
the swampy alluvial reaches of the Neumeyer Plain, and northwards 
across the Oenake Mountains to the coastal lowlands around Vanimo. 
Average population densities for the two border provinces ,  at approx­
imately 0.9 persons per sq km for Western Province and 3.3 per sq km 
for Sandaun (West Sepik) Province in 1980, are very low. Average 
densities along the Sandaun side of the cordon sanitaire , on a break­
down by census division, range from 0 to 4 persons per sq km for most 
of the zone with a small pocket of about 6 per sq km around Amanab . 
Due to the dispersed settlement pattern and uneven distribution these 
figures are merely indicative . Nonetheless, they have important impli­
cations for the government's development programme, since ceteris 
paribus they mean that the costs involved in provision of services of 
accessibility equivalent to that in more densely populated areas may be 
magnified by as much as five to fifteen times. 
Physical and demographic diversity within the border zone is 
echoed in marked cultural differences between border communities , 
which also inhibit across-the-board planning for the area. Most border 
communities , however, with the possible exception of the Wutung­
Vanimo people, and, more recently, those in the vicinity of the Ok 
Tedi mining project, have in common their isolation from each other 
and from other areas of Papua New Guinea, relatively low standards 
of living and economic opportunity , and a history of administrative 
neglect and unreliability which has left deep though usually hidden 
resentments . 
Most traditional communication and trade routes for the zone, 
such as they were, ran east-west rather than north-south, so that con­
tacts across the border were more important for some communities 
than linkages on the same side. These 'traditional' contacts , nonethe­
less, probably are less significant in the overall context of border diplo­
macy than the emphasis given them in recent negotiations (Papua New 
Guinea Foreign Affairs Review 1 (2) :5) suggests . Though some villa­
gers still have kinship links and land or hunting rights on both sides of 
the border , their range is fairly limited. Formal linkages inland on the 
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Papua New Guinea side around the main crossing points of the 
Bewani-Kilimeri area rarely extend beyond a few kilometres. Far 
more extensive , and of far greater political significance , is the residue 
of contacts established through more sophisticated exchanges and 
movement to and from Hollandia, which prior to the Indonesian 
takeover of Dutch New Guinea was one of the largest and most attrac­
tive urban centres on the entire island (Garnaut and Manning 1974) . 
As Jayapura, the town suffered a period of relative stagnation in the 
early years of Indonesian control , but by the 1980s it was once again 
attracting increasing numbers of visitors from the Papua New Guinea 
side (Sydney Morning Herald 2 May 1983).  
For most villagers within the border zone , however, movement 
beyond traditional boundaries , and knowledge of living conditions and 
attitudes outside that range, are relatively slight. The loose identifica­
tion of mutual interest which some villagers feel as a result of the 
difficulties they have been caused by the manoeuvres of their respec­
tive governments usually is subordinated to commonplace considera­
tions of survival . Despite the apparent contiguity between cross-bor­
der sympathies and the 'Melanesian brotherhood' theme on which 
many members of the educated elite, including parliamentarians, have 
based their support for the Irianese cause, the latter is of little impor­
tance to border villagers . Many in fact have criticized elite articulation 
of the Irianese issue, with good reason, as political opportunism. As 
the 1977 and 1982 election results demonstrated, the Irian Jaya situa­
tion per se has very little electoral pull by comparison with pragmatic 
parochial concerns. 
Many of the border communities are basically hunter-gatherers. 
Cultivation usually is regarded as a secondary activity (Gell 1975) 
though most communities , especially in the mountains, maintain small 
gardens, and the swamp dwellers depend heavily on natural or culti­
vated stands of sago. This means that cash-cropping, the central com­
ponent of most development programmes for rural communities , 
involves a double transition : the first to permanent or semi-permanent 
settlement - with all that entails in terms of land use capacity and cul­
tural readjustment - and the second to the stability of production 
required by the monetary economy. 
The hunter-gatherer mode of production also encourages a rela­
tively high level of individualism, and is thus frequently at variance 
with the assumptions of the Papua New Guinea stereotype in relation 
to communal bonds . As in other areas of the Sepik, village elders can 
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advise and exhort, but cannot control (Thurnwald 1916; Huber 1977) . 
Mobilization for a communal activity is difficult and infrequent. In 
areas which operate on a particularly narrow survival margin, welfare 
matters such as care for the sick and elderly usually are a personal or 
familial concern rather than the communal responsibility that they are 
elsewhere. In some cases those without nuclear family support or first 
degree kin may be left to fend for themselves. 
A variety of cultural factors also reinforces locational isolation 
and inhibits development in the border area. Notable among such fac­
tors are the multiplicity of languages, the dominance of sister exchange 
marital alliance , and, for the Kilimeri1 area in particular, the perva­
siveness of sangguma or assault sorcery. 
The Sepik provinces contain approximately one third of Papua 
New Guinea's listed languages. The population to language ratio is 
about half the average for the rest of the country, and drops to approx­
imately 500 speakers per language in the border area (Laycock 1973) . 
A sample of Kilimeri people taken in 1975176 showed very little con­
tact with neighbouring linguistic groups and no knowledge of their lan­
guage patterns, though 96 per cent of males and 75 per cent of females 
could communicate to some extent in Pidgin. As levels of literacy are 
exceptionally low (only 4 per cent of the Kilimeri sample could read or 
write even at an elementary level) , effective communication is 
restricted to word of mouth. While oral information flows through kin­
ship networks and migration, usually one of the most efficient links 
with the modern sector (Lasaqa 1972 ; Allen 1976; Young 1977) , in the 
border zone they are relatively ineffective . Physical and cultural isola­
tion, the paucity of government patrolling, the closing down of the 
indentured labour system, the dearth of employment and educational 
opportunities, and, overall , the lack of cash severely constrain both the 
quantity and quality of information available to border villagers . 
In many areas of Melanesia ties of kinship and marriage are the 
major determinant of informal village access to political and economic 
power and, paradoxically, of village ability to do without them. Even 
in the border zone, villagers with wide-ranging ties on occasion are 
able to substitute kinship obligations for cash to gain access to develop­
ment opportunities outside their immediate vicinity. Rigid adherence 
to traditional sister exchange marriage in some border areas , however, 
1 The Kilimeri data quoted in this paper is drawn from fieldwork carried out in the area 
by the author between 1975 and.1977. 
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severely constrains the outward spread of such ties. 
Sister exchange marriage in the border zone is almost entirely 
endogamous, and dissociated from the cash economy. As it tends on 
the whole to reinforce the dependence of young people on their village 
elders, the ability of young working-age adults to innovate or provide 
an impetus for change and development often is seriously curtailed. 
Under sister (or daughter) exchange a man who wishes to marry must 
supply in return a female relative as wife for a male member of the fam­
ily or clan from whom he seeks his wife. Though traditionally the sys­
tem was fairly flexible, the social structure which has resulted is now 
characterized by older men married to one or more young wives while 
the young men , lacking female relatives or female children from an 
earlier marriage , often wed widows many years their senior, who were 
unclaimed by their previous husband's kin. The result is poor marital 
cohesiveness , a tendency for productive young males to migrate more 
or less permanently , and a very narrow spread of kinship ties within 
operative range . In the Kilimeri sample all adults had married within 
their own area, with about 50 per cent married to someone from the 
same village and the bulk of the remainder no further afield than a 
neighbouring village . Kinship reciprocity in consequence rarely oper­
ated to their developmental advantage. Many Kilimeri villagers , for 
example , were unable to utilize the school at Bewani station when 
opportunistic Bewani villagers began to impose cash charges , such as 
land rents for school children's food gardens, on villagers to whom 
they had no kinship obligations . Similar problems arose when Kilimeri 
villagers wished to establish cattle on land outside the cordon sanitaire, 
where the rent demanded was equal to 50 per cent of a beast's sale 
value (then equivalent to approximately $40 per annum for about two 
hectares of unimproved pasture) . 
The inhibitory effect of sangguma on societal cohesiveness, 
entrepreneurial innovation and response to external development 
stimuli is also a major problem for the border area. Border villages on 
the whole do not have the tradition of endemic violence which charac­
terizes other parts of Papua New Guinea, though warfare was a recur­
rent pre-contact hazard. Possibly as a result, very few border villages 
have become actively involved in the OPM guerilla campaigns and, 
unlike some of the highlands communities , they exhibit little serious 
interest in the military defence of the border. Though outbreaks of 
overt violence in the mountainous Telefomin area caused periodic 
concern , covert violence by sangguma was more common for most 
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border villagers , and more widely feared. Sangguma practices along 
the border vary from the 'death threat' or magic forms familiar in many 
parts of the country to the ritualized execution of the Kilimeri . Unlike 
most variants , for which counteractive rituals are available, Kilimeri 
sangguma is irrevocable. Villagers claim that, until the suppression of 
warfare , sangguma was a 'last resort' method of social control and 
rarely used ; but that now 'we are afraid to talk strong , we are afraid to 
try anything new, it is sanguma that holds us back' .  The actual strength 
of this variable is still unknown. Estimates by government, mission and 
other observers in 1976 of the importance of sangguma to the develop­
ment of the area ranged from 'very little' to attributed responsibility 
for about 80 per cent of deaths in Kilimeri , a range matched only by the 
wildly fluctuating estimates of support for the OPM. While fear of 
sangguma certainly is used at times as an ex post rationalization for 
inertia or developmental inactivity, the awareness that one's 
neighbours could become a sangguma squad is, equally certainly, a 
strong disincentive on any activity that is not in accordance with com­
munal norms. 
Nutrition is one such case. For most of the border area, problems 
of isolation and access are compounded by very serious levels of mal­
nutrition which , inter alia , reduces tolerable distance to services by its 
effect on energy and work capacity. In some villages malnutrition, 
especially among young children , is the accepted communal norm. 
The well-nourished child , by this criterion, is 'abnormal' .  Whether his 
condition is attributed to sorcery, white man's magic or simply to new 
and strange feeding practices , villagers tend to regard it as a contraven­
tion of the norm and the nutritionally aware parent or parents as eccen­
tric if not socially disruptive . Improved pre-natal nutrition in some 
areas is also seen as a threat to community survival . Some traditional 
pregnancy tab us, notably on protein sources , are designed to restrict 
foetal growth in small , malnourished moth(irs and thus safeguard the 
life of mother and child during the birth. Some medical workers in 
areas where pre-natal maternal nutrition has resulted in an increase in 
infant size at birth have reported an increase in the number of difficult 
births requiring specialized hospital care . To many border villagers , 
whose access to such care is limited, improved pre-natal nutrition 
involves an unacceptable risk . 
Improvement of nutrition has been a perennial aim of the West 
Sepik administration, but for the border area in particular has proved 
very difficult to implement. Partly this has been due to the spasmodic 
181  
BElWEEN TWO NATIONS 
and often inappropriate nature of official attention to the problem, and 
to the difficulty of isolating the causal social and economic factors . A 
study in 1962 identified nutritional deficiencies in the Bewani area 
which were more serious than those of the Wosera and other known 
problem areas of Papua New Guinea (McLennan n .d . ) ,  but its findings 
were not followed up. A decade later other studies, based primarily on 
clinic records2, confirmed that malnutrition was a problem for the 
majority of inland border stations. In some cases the level of malnutri­
tion exceeded by a considerable margin that for the province as a 
whole which , with an average of 63 malnourished children per 100 
attending clinics and up to 80-90 per cent of children under two years 
malnourished in some areas (Salfield 1973 ; Korte 1974 ; Korte and 
Kamilakai 1975),  is among the most seriously malnourished in the 
country. In the Kilimeri area the poor nutrition and general low level 
of health care was reflected in 1975176 in a crude death rate of 3.8 per 
cent. One third of these deaths was among women of child-bearing 
age.3 Over one third of children died before they reached maturity, 
with 69 per cent of child deaths in the under six months age bracket and 
83 per cent under two years. The high mortality, however, was dis­
guised to some extent by a relatively high birth rate , 6.7 per cent, which 
held the rate of natural increase to 2 .8 per cent or approximately the 
average level for the country. This in turn has tended to conceal the 
fact that the age-sex structure on the border often is inimical to effec­
tive community involvement in the standard type of government 
development programme. 
Border development 
The early phase. Though border issues, including border develop­
ment, have been a recurrent government concern for most of this cen­
tury , the border is still one of the most backward and administratively 
neglected areas of Papua New Guinea. To a large extent this is 
attributable , ironically, to the preoccupation of government officials 
2 A comparison of village data with clinic records in 1976 indicated that the latter unde­
restimated the degree of malnutrition, largely as a result of poor or irregular clinic atten­
dance, lack of awareness among many villagers about nutritional deficiencies, and the 
tendency of some mothers to hide malnourished children from health staff to avoid criti­
cism or interference. 
3 Division of District Administration (ODA), Pagei, Patrol Report 2175-76. 
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with the political ramifications of border administration. While these 
resulted in a theoretical commitment to border development, in prac­
tice the outcome was a sequence of ad hoe, reactive decisions and the 
relative neglect of the developmental constraints and areal idiosyn­
cracies that were reported regularly by field staff. The gap between 
policy objectives and practice was aggravated by official difficulties in 
reconciling observed needs with available resources. In 1947, for 
example , the then district officer stressed the importance of border 
development to amicable border politics and recommended 'continual 
urging to improve their living and health conditions', but felt unable to 
divert staff to the area. 4 Government officials in later years , cognizant 
of the logistic difficulties of cash crop development, regularly evaded 
the issue by announcements that government would concentrate on 
improvement of subsistence - an even more difficult task and one 
rarely followed through . 
The inhibitory effects of the government's policies on border 
development were evident as early as the transfer from German to 
Australian control after the First World War. The first consequence of 
this was that the Sepik area was no longer seen as the 'centre for future 
agricultural development' (Whittaker et al. 1975 :263) that it had been 
to the German administration, but as a peripheral administrative dis­
trict. A second consequence was the removal of all settlers on the coast 
between the only significant centre , at Aitape , and the border in an 
attempt by the district officer to prevent illicit communication via the 
Dutch between German settlers and their home country (Rowley 
1958 :42). This meant that the westward spread of developmental 
demonstration effects from Ai tape was halted almost entirely, and a 
communications lacuna was formed between the border and the east­
ern Sepik area which has lasted with little improvement to the present 
day. 
Until the Second World War European influence on the border 
area came mainly from Netherlands New Guinea. Government super­
vision on the Papua New Guinea side was represented by a border sur­
veillance post which was opened at Vanimo in 1918 and which pro­
vided (for the periods in which it was staffed) a desultory check on 
trade and contact across the border. Restrictions on trans-border 
movement tightened after the Second World War, when a patrol offi­
cer was posted to Vanimo 'mainly to prevent Indonesians from eras-
4 Sub-district office (SOO), Wewak , file 30/2-23, 12 May 1947. 
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sing the border' .  At the same time, rumours that the Dutch intended 
to establish a city at Hollandia triggered proposals for the development 
of the New Guinea side, 'otherwise they [border villagers] may tend to 
prefer the Dutch administration to ours' . 5 This rivalry, and the desire 
to prevent movement either from the western side to the eastern or 
vice versa, became - though the rationale behind it varied over the 
years - a recurrent theme. The possibility of an Indonesian takeover in 
Dutch New Guinea brought a further flurry of restrictions. Officially 
the Australian government in the 1950s favoured the 'side-by-side' 
development of east and west New Guinea based on the view that 'the 
peoples of the island of New Guinea were one people . . .  [and] the hope 
that they would find one destiny' (Hasluck 1976 :362) . Nonetheless, 
after a report in 1953 of projected Indonesian activity in the Dutch ter­
ritory, a directive was issued in 1954 that 'natives from across the bor­
der, or villages now regarded as under Dutch influence were not per­
mitted to enter employment' on the Australian side.6 
After the transfer of control over Netherlands New Guinea to 
Indonesia in the early 1960s, the Australian administration, in what 
later became the standard response to shifts in border equilibrium, 
announced a massive development programme along the border. New 
patrol posts were opened, schools and health centres built, local gov­
ernment councils introduced, and an intense campaign of 'political 
education' commenced. Money was poured into the area to win the 
support of local people who in many cases had exhibited a marked pre­
ference for the material benefits they had gained from Hollandia under 
the Dutch. The result of this , complained one patrol officer, was that 
the people afterwards expected to be paid for everything. 7 At the same 
time, however, an instruction to border officials that 'border surveil­
lance is to be maintained as a priority over all other activities'8 ensured 
that border development, such as it was, was effectively subordinated 
to political considerations. The development programme, apart from 
the improvements it brought to the border stations and to the living 
5 SDO, Wewak, file 30/2-23. 
6 Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDS & NA), file NLB 31/1-1407, 
6 December 1954. 
7 DDA, Wewak , patrol report 5169170. 
8 District Commissioner (DC), Wewak, file A2-2-10/376, 6 September 1963. 
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and working conditions of border administrative staff, soon flagged. 
Official attention for some time thereafter focused on the political 
gamesmanship of the small community of Sekotchiau (later Skotiau) , 
which was the centre of most movement across border tribal lands in 
the early to mid 1960s and which shrewdly played one government 
against the other to its considerable material advantage and the envy 
of neighbouring villages . 
In the late 1960s the peripheral border villages began to complain 
of their exclusion from administrative attention and from the antici­
pated benefits of the border development programme. By that time it 
was clear that direct benefits such as education and health facilities, 
and flow-on benefits such as income-earning opportunities from the 
Bewani patrol post, accrued mainly to the 19 per cent of the adminis­
trative area in its immediate vicinity. Vanimo and the border posts 
were a poor substitute for Hollandia as a source of trade goods , and 
had insufficient attractions to overcome the distance constraint 
involved for most border villagers . One consequence of the develop­
ment of the border stations, however, was that villagers outside their 
range became more sensitive to the inferiority of their 'catechist 
schools' and unreliable health facilities vis-a-vis the new 'certificate' 
schools and government health centres, and utilization of the former 
declined. Resentment at being 'left out' mounted after a government 
order that shotguns , the most valuable and coveted possession of a 
subsistence hunter, were to be kept to a minimum on the border9 to 
reduce the chance that they might be sold or used to support guerilla 
resistance to Indonesian control on the western side. These resent­
ments intensified when cash-cropping activities , which had been prom­
oted by the mission network and the new councils , were discouraged 
by government officials. 'Be extremely wary on the introduction of 
crops' ,  the district commissioner advised his staff in 1963 , 'I  do not 
want these people to get a cash-crop idea, we will never get the stuff 
out'. 10 
The tendency for administrative convenience to dictate border 
development practice, if not policy, has been a recurrent and often 
unavoidable necessity. Administrative problems were compounded in 
the area by a very rapid turnover of staff, the spasmodic use of border 
9 DDA, Wewak, file 67-3-7, 5 April 1965. 
10 DDA, Wewak, file 67-3-8, 12 July 1963. 
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stations as 'exile' or training posts for 'difficult' or inexperienced 
officers and, especially in recent years , by the youth and inexperience 
of many indigenous officials. Delays in departmental funding, irregu­
lar availability of staff, and the burden of office obligations were 
reflected regularly in the postponement of patrols . In addition, the 
simple logistics of patrolling a large, sparsely populated area meant 
that over a given period the client coverage which staff in the border 
area could achieve was less than half the national average . Such prob­
lems were exacerbated by the changes which occurred prior to and dur­
ing Papua New Guinea's decolonization, notably the relatively rapid 
'localization' of administrative positions, the concurrent decline of the 
kiap (patrol officer) system of administration, and the introduction of 
provincial government. On the border, as in other areas of the Sepik, 
the consequent lumpiness of administrative operations created a vic­
ious cycle of diminished government effectiveness at village level and 
diminishing village enthusiasm for government intervention. At the 
same time a number of factors , including lack of political sophistica­
tion, the scarcity of alternative sources of development assistance, and 
the official discouragement of visitors to the sensitive border area, 
meant that power in the border zone was increasingly concentrated in 
a narrow administrative spectrum. 
The cordon sanitaire. The major government-initiated constraint 
on economic development of the border area, both for government 
officials and for villagers, undoubtedly has been the cordon sanitaire. 
The bulk of the border population lives ten or more kilometres away 
from the actual border. Most border villagers have little contact with 
the border patrol posts and little comprehension of, or interest in, bor­
der political issues. For all practical purposes, due to the land tenure 
system, these villagers are locationally bound into a situation from 
which they gain little if any advantage but as a result of which they are, 
in effect, subsidizing development elsewhere. They bear a large part of 
the costs of quarantine protection for crops and herds in other parts of 
Papua New Guinea and, since the Indonesian side has no equivalent 
arrangement, they also provide a buffer zone which enables Indonesia 
to evade responsibility for containment of its communicable diseases 
and pests. Since the existence of the cordon sanitaire reduces the likeli­
hood of conflict between representatives of the two countries over 
quarantine matters , the border villagers are paying, through the 
restrictions on income-earning opportunities that are available to all 
other Papua New Guineans, for a benefit that accrues mainly to the 
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diplomatic levels of Indonesian , Papua New Guinean and even 
Australian governments. In addition, maintenance of the quarantine 
strip has allowed agricultural and health staff on the Papua New 
Guinea side to avoid the expense and difficulty of regular field patrols 
and active quarantine supervision. It has also provided government 
officials with a blanket excuse for neglect of border development. Vil­
lagers have been told that in the absence of cash crop and livestock pro­
jects regular visits by agriculture staff would be superfluous, and that 
such assistance would only be necessary after they had established 
economically viable projects. 
In the early 1950s moves were initiated by the Dutch and Austra­
lian colonial governments to establish uniform quarantine regulations 
and procedures on both sides of the border (Hasluck 1976 :360) . When 
these were aborted by the Indonesian takeover of Netherlands New 
Guinea the Australian administration, fearful of the possible threat to 
Australian as well as Papua New Guinean immunity , tightened the 
controls on the Papua New Guinea side of the border. The effects of 
the cordon sanitaire thus were felt most severely at a time when the 
border development programme and the accelerated pace of cash-crop 
and pastoral development in other parts of Papua New Guinea had 
aroused widespread interest in such economic development among 
border villages . Villagers were particularly anxious to start coffee and 
cattle projects, which they knew had been successful in other parts of 
the East and West Sepik. Some, undeterred by the lack of government 
assistance and by the difficulties of transporting their produce, estab­
lished plots of rice , coffee or cocoa with planting materials brought 
back from other areas, built local material fowl runs, and endeavoured 
to replicate the projects that they had seen elsewhere. These efforts 
usually were short-lived. 
Responsibility for the quarantine zone devolved primarily upon 
the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF, later 
DPI) , a specialist and somewhat autonomous department which was 
singularly ill-attuned to the political ramifications of border manage­
ment. By virtue of its control over quarantine and stock movement, 
however, DASF was one of the most powerful political forces in the 
area. For some time confusion in DASFranks led to a series of conflict­
ing directives as to what could and could not be grown or kept within 
the border zone. As a result of this, and of inconsistent and unreliable 
DASF sponsorship of various projects , border villagers soon became 
very sceptical about DASF advice . Further confusion arose from po!-
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icy conflicts at senior levels of the Department, and the consequent 
uncertainty among DASF field staff as to which policy they were to 
pursue. On one occasion , for example ,  DASF proposed to allow pig 
and poultry projects on the border, but in its general policy and staff 
training discouraged these because of their low economic returns, 
need for close supervision, and competition for foodstuffs required for 
human consumption - all factors of particular relevance for the border 
communities. Many villagers came to regard the quarantine zone as a 
'total development ban' (West Sepik Province 1976 : 16). 
The 1970s saw increasing recognition of the futility of a ban on cat­
tle and coffee , which could be controlled, when disease could be car­
ried by dogs, pigs, deer and people, whose border crossings could not 
be policed. This led several government officials and West Sepik politi­
cians to press for a relaxation of the policy. Several alternatives were 
mooted, including the establishment of sentinel herds and the realign­
ment of the perimeter , but these were rejected by agriculture and 
health officials in Port Moresby. Citing international precedent, 
DASF advised that it considered that twenty miles was the minimum 
acceptable for a cordon sanitaire and that preferably the zone should 
be widened. 11 This intransigence reflected adversely on village rela­
tions with other government officials, in particular Division of District 
Administration (DDA) field staff, who were forced to justify a govern­
ment stance which many personally opposed. 
The renegotiation in 1979 of the Papua New Guinea-Indonesia 
border agreement brought initial indications that Papua New Guinea, 
Indonesia and Australia were beginning to see certain advantages to a 
syndicated approach to the quarantine problem. In the face of the 
complexity of the issues involved, however, this was not followed up 
though the establishment of sentinel herds (for quarantine rather than 
income-earning purposes) was included in the border development 
programme for 1982. Once again government officials in Papua New 
Guinea concentrated on administrative infrastructure for border 
development, and on the promotion of economic activities such as rub­
ber, fisheries and crocodile farming , which did not entail significant 
changes to quarantine policy . The new, albeit shaky, rapport between 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea over the border brought little indi­
cation that the burden of the cordon sanitaire on border villagers would 
1 1  DASF, Port Moresby, file 1-14-103, 27 December 1972. 
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be eased ; indeed, it gave some disquieting hints that the problem could 
intensify. The massive Indonesian transmigration programme, the 
proximity of the major trans Irian Jaya highway construction to the 
Papua New Guinea side of the border, and the important resource pro­
jects of Ok Tedi mining and Vanimo timber are fraught with possible 
problems for quarantine, which could well make the cordon sanitaire 
a serious political issue in the long term. 
Cash-earning in Kilimeri. For the Kilimeri , as for much of the bor­
der population , regular cash earning activity in the mid 1970s was 
almost non-existent . The scarcity of cash , however, meant that the 
overriding development priority for Kilimeri villagers was cash-earn­
ing opportunities. To many villagers , aware of their locational , educa­
tional and governmental difficulties, the economically optimal choice 
was the 'minimal involvement' one. In 1972, when foreign ownership 
of land was becoming a major political issue throughout the country, 
one Kilimeri village astounded government officials by offering land 
for any available European businessman to start an enterprise of his 
choice in their area. 12 The same year brought an outbreak of chain let­
ters , which originated in Rabaul and Australia and which promised 
enormous returns for a tiny investment. 13 Visiting resource assessment 
teams were welcomed for the relatively high prices they paid for 
supplies and services , and for many years villagers placed their main 
hope in recurrent government promises of imminent exploitation of 
the Vanimo/Pual River timber resource . 
As village hopes for large-scale development were repeatedly dis­
appointed, some turned to 'self-help' initiatives . Lack of knowledge of 
the availability of government-sponsored self-help schemes, however, 
and the chronic shortage of cash and manpower which these usually 
demanded as the village contribution , meant that these often were 
poorly conceived and difficult to manage. The unreliability of govern­
ment direction and encouragement resulted in many cases in imitative 
gestures and confused efforts to replicate projects that villagers had 
heard about or seen in operation elsewhere . 
12 ODA, Pagei, patrol report 4/71/72. 
13 The chain letter problem reached such proportions throughout the country that chain 
letters were declared a prohibited import shortly afterwards (PNG Government Gazette 
93 , 26 October 1972) . 
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Most of the 'cash crops' reported by the Kilimeri sample had been 
encouraged at one time or another by government officials, but none 
had received much, if any, attention past the planting stage. Though 16 
per cent of the sample claimed to have coconut plantings (two thirds of 
which were immature) and 3 per cent had minor crops such as cocoa, 
chillies, coffee or spices (mostly in minute quantities and usually the 
untended remnant of experiments from many years earlier) , none had 
ever received any income from their holdings. Two people claimed a 
share in a cow or domesticated feral pig as 'livestock projects' . Ten 
were 'businessmen' with an interest in a trade-store , though in seven of 
the ten cases the store was temporarily or permanently closed, and the 
remaining three were 'just starting' and had done little if any business. 
The expenditure of $6 on a council licence to operate a trade-store , 
however, was an important status symbol and some of these 
businessmen maintained a current licence though they had not held for 
some time, and could not afford, any trading stock . Twenty-seven per 
cent of the sample kept chickens, which originally had filtered into the 
area from Hollandia 14, but these were generally regarded as the nuc­
leus of an economic enterprise and too valuable for domestic consump­
tion. Moreover , villagers could not afford to purchase chickens from 
each other, as the standard asking price was based on DASF charges 
for imported breeding stock and many owners feared a government 
rebuke if they set their own price . The fact that three men in 1975/76 
had sold poultry to passing government patrols was sufficient to main­
tain the asking price and the general interest . Total income for the area 
from all these sources in twelve months was $34. This amounted to an 
average of $5.67 for the six income earners concerned, or approxi­
mately nine cents per capita for the entire sample. 
The only other significant non-wage source of income for about 20 
per cent of the sample was the infrequent sale of game, sago grubs or 
other wild produce at the nearest station . Some other border areas 
were more fortunate, largely as the result of their ability to 'capture' 
government or mission interest. Long before the Ok Tedi develop­
ment created a need for nearby sources of foodstuffs, villagers in 
Oksapmin, encouraged and assisted by their patrol officers , were pro­
ducing European vegetables for markets in Vanimo and Wewak. Vil­
lagers in Green River, who unilaterally started a rice project, were 
14 ODA, Aitape, patrol report 6/48-49. 
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able to tap mission transport when the freight charges out were found 
to be higher than the returns for sale of the crop. Development in both 
cases was discontinuous, highly personalized and heavily subsidized -
and resented proportionately by less fortunate areas - but enabled the 
two centres to win preferential treatment in the subsequent search for 
economically viable projects to include in the border development 
programme. For most parts of the border, however, the difficulties of 
access, high freight costs, staff turnover and local preferences have 
given spontaneous attempts to promote income earning activities a 
relatively brief life . 
By far the most important contribution to income in the Kilimeri 
area was wages. From the Second World War to the end of the contract 
labour period in the 1960s , wage labour on plantations provided a 
steady trickle of goods and cash into the area, an escape from the 
hardships of the home environment , and a much more reliable source 
of income than the dubious development prospects offered on the bor­
der. As this source dried up , the horizon for wage migration narrowed 
and employment-related moves outside the West Sepik dropped from 
approximately 80 per cent to 50 per cent of total movement between 
1965 and 1975 . More men began to compete for the few job oppor­
tunities closer to home. For a few years they were able to earn enough 
for their basic needs from predominantly casual labour in Vanimo or 
at government, council or mission stations nearby, but these sources 
also diminished in the 1970s. New regulations imposed , in the 
nationalist thrust of imminent independence , by the new National 
Investment and Development Authority (NIDA) drove Goldore 
Timber Company, the West Sepik's largest private employer, out of 
the province . Increases in the basic wage, intended to improve the 
relative position of the unskilled labour force , made employers of 
casual labour more selective and less prepared to spend money on 
additional labour for minor or unproductive tasks. The rapid localiza­
tion of public service posts , followed after 1974 by general financial 
stringencies ,  also reduced severely the amount of money released to 
the casual or unskilled labour force . At the same time, monetary 
requirements for council rates, education expenses , purchase of trade 
store goods and other domestic expenditures increased. Acquisition of 
saleable skills, either through formal education or through informal 
channels such as work experience , had always been a problem for bor­
der villagers. As the employment situation tightened across the coun­
try and the national education system was adjusted to limit the num-
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bers of unemployed 'drop-outs' , border villagers were further hand­
icapped . Many, reluctant to settle for an inferior role in the modern 
world and seeing one avenue after another close down , have turned 
their backs on the partial solutions proposed by government officials 
and resigned themselves to wait for better days. 
Development in the East Timor aftermath . In 1975176 Indonesian inter­
vention in the then Portugese territory of East Timor revived old fears 
about the possibility of Indonesian expansionism . Perceived parallels 
with the Indonesian takeover of Netherlands New Guinea directed 
these fears , in particular, towards the security of Papua New Guinea's 
border with Irian Jaya. At the instigation of the secretaries of the 
Prime Minister's Department and the Department of Defence , and 
with the support of the influential and opportunistic Sir John Guise , 
the issue of border development became a priority. This resulted in the 
preparation of a new set of 'border development proposals' , which 
purported to 'represent the views of all sectors of the border commun­
ity' (West Sepik Province 1976 : 1) but which in fact was largely the 
work of one expatriate administrator. Predictably, it concentrated on 
upgrading the border stations and on improving administrative condi­
tions and capacity. Essentially this was a repetition and extension of 
the 1960s development programme, for much the same reasons, and 
was carried over a few years later into the National Public Expenditure 
Plan. 
As with the earlier programme, the 1976 proposals and the 
development programme which was initiated under the auspices of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs were limited in their ability to meet the 
main perceived need of border villagers : wage employment . In 1975/ 
76 49 per cent of total cash income for the Kilimeri sample came from 
the earnings of two unskilled labourers. A further 33 per cent came 
from casual labour, rarely of more than two weeks' duration, and from 
quasi wage sources such as stipends and allowances. Since the sample 
had an annual median and modal per capita cash income of zero, and 
an annual mean per capita cash income of only $5 .42, for most villagers 
even the lowest wage or stipend represented enormous riches. This 
was reflected in the very high proportion (79 per cent) of adult males 
between ages 20 and 45 who in the previous year had actively, albeit 
unsuccessfully, sought employment. By comparison , very few were 
prepared to walk the same distance to receive medical treatment , and 
none had done so to seek advice or assistance from government offi­
cials. For most villagers the dramatic difference between average 
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wages for full-time wage-earners in their vicinity and average cash 
incomes from other sources (Herlihy 1981) made involvement in the 
government's development programme a decidedly inferior option. In 
addition , wage employment even for very brief periods was a socially 
acceptable means of cash-earning for any age cohort, allowed the par­
ticipant to enter and leave the monetary economy at little or no cost 
and in harmony with seasonal subsistence obligations, and usually 
entailed less disruption of the traditional socio-economic system than 
did cash-cropping. 
In this situation the development of the Ok Tedi mineral resource 
in the Star Mountains and of the Vanimo/Pual River timber stands 
opened opportunities that were not easily matched by the more 
egalitarian proposals for border development. In the idealism of the 
early 1970s, however, this was not at first recognized .  While official 
hopes for major economic development in the West Sepik rested on 
these projects in the late 1960s and again in 1976 (Hinchliffe 1976) , 
government policy under the first Somare government favoured 
improvement of rural life styles, village participation and equalization 
for less developed areas . On these criteria ,  Ok Tedi mining and Van­
imo timber did not rank highly. Several analyses of village capacity to 
benefit from the projects reported that the likelihood of significant 
local advantage from copper mining, even for the Min people in the 
immediate vicinity, was very small (Rendell & Partners 1975) and that 
the population of the Vanimo/Pual River timber area was insufficient 
to develop the deforested area. For the border people , who had been 
inundated for a decade by consultations, official requests for coopera­
tion and promises of enormous returns at an ever-receding future date, 
government procrastination over the two major resource develop­
ments was a major constraint on any other form of development, and 
correspondingly resented. As with the cordon sanitaire, inadequate 
explanations and weak rationalizations for the delays in exploitation of 
the timber resource, in particular, severely damaged the government's 
credibility in the area and in Kilimeri resulted in a marked lack of 
enthusiasm for government development proposals. 
The damage to social welfare and economic development in 
Kilimeri from almost twenty years of government procrastination over 
the timber development was such that, by the 1980s, villagers saw any 
form of timber exploitation as less destructive than continuation of the 
status quo. Until the discovery of minerals in the Star Mountains the 
Vanimo/Pual River timber stands, one of the largest in Papua New 
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Guinea, were considered to be the West Sepik's only economically 
exploitable asset. A detailed survey of Pual River potential was carried 
out in 1963, after an inquiry from Japan for logs 1 5 ,  and by 1965 discus­
sions had reached the point of proposals for reafforestation, since a 
'world-wide shortage of increasing severity' was predicted 'at least as 
far ahead as 2000 AD' . 1 6 A firm of international consultants from the 
United States was retained to advise on the development of a large 
industrial complex at Vanimo. By the end of 1966 the Department of 
District Administration (DDA) regarded the acquisition of the timber 
rights as 'urgent. . .  as time becomes the essence of success in this pro­
ject' . 17 Frequent visits from survey teams for major timber companies 
and for a plethora of departmental analyses kept village expectations 
high for a few years , and in 1967 Goldore Timber Company, a sub­
sidiary of New Guinea Goldfields , commenced small-scale operations 
on 14,000 hectares near Vanimo. The proposed multi million dollar 
complex, however, failed to materialize . 
By the 1970s many villagers , not fully understanding the reasons 
for the difference between the initial payment for the timber rights and 
the subsequent six-monthly interest payment on the investment of the 
balance (in 1975/76 this payment, when divided among each recipient 
group, varied on average between 20c and $1 per capita) , pressed for 
immediate payment of the full balance so that they could use it for 
other development projects . Further, since life expectancy in the area 
was very low, villagers were beginning to realize that those involved in 
the original negotiations might never see the lump sum repayment on 
maturity of the investment in the years 2007 and 2008. As inflation in 
trade store prices curtailed the real value of the interest dollar, and as 
its monetary value per head decreased with the rate of growth of the 
population, the interest became little more than a token compensation 
for the loss of the use of village land. An additional source of dissatis­
faction was that timber lease land could be cleared only for traditional 
subsistence use (which, for hunting communities, was slight) , while 
most land which was not leased was marginal or unsuitable for cash­
crops . 
1 5  Department of Forests, Port Moresby, file 87-8-10, 23 November 1964. 
16 Department of Forests, Port Moresby, file 88-0-0, 4 February 1965. 
17 Department of Forests, Port Moresby, file 88-0-5, 31 October 1966. 
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In the late 1970s the new Sandaun provincial government, 
through its business arm, established a logging operation on 8 ,000 ha 
in the erstwhile Goldore area near Vanimo. When the national gov­
ernment, through the National Investment and Development Author­
ity (NIDA) , once again sought foreign investment for the large-scale 
development of the resource, the provincial government expressed 
fears that its infant industry would be 'frozen out' by multi-national 
interests (Post-Courier 24 January 1980) . In February 1981 the 
announcement that a proposal by an unknown Philippines company 
had been accepted over the recommendations of the Department of 
Forests sparked accusations of 'back door dealings' (Post-Courier 5 
February 1981) and an inquiry by the Ombudsman Commission. The 
Sandaun provincial government, which had recommended the com­
pany 'because they have the money - and that is important' (Post 
Courier 2 February 1981) and which at first had supported the prop­
osed contract , asked that the negotiations be postponed pending 
further consultation . The provincial government's Forestry Steering 
Group was reluctant to involve people from the timber area in the 
committee set up to handle negotiations, however, or to approve inde­
pendent consultation with them. 
The controversial deal was eventually signed during the last 
months in office of the then Chan government, and the firm given five 
months to submit detailed proposals for the timber development . But 
as had happened so many times before the deal collapsed. Shortly after 
the new Somare government took office in August 1982 , the prime 
minister announced in Vanimo that the timber contract was to be 
renegotiated. 
The 1 982 elections. The West Sepik by 1982 had a ten-year tradition of 
'missing the boat' in its attempts to select representatives who could 
tap national power and resources on behalf of the province . In some 
parts of the province a vigorous outmigrant wage-earning tradition 
meant that kinship linkage , the standard unit for political mobiliza­
tion, was often distorted by migrant worker ties. For border villages, 
which usually lacked the community of cropping, pastoral or other 
business interests that formed the basis of political pressure groups 
elsewhere, and which traditionally tended to acephalous political 
organization, representatives often were selected on the basis of local 
entrepreneurial skills. Until the division of the Sepik in 1966 into East 
and West, and the emergence in the 1968 parliament of party politics, 
such representation was reasonably effective . With the formation of 
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the radical new Pangu Pati, the Sepik politicians divided. Paul Langro, 
West Sepik regional member, resigned his position of assistant 
ministerial member in late 1969 and joined Pangu, but the Pangu 
stance on early independence proved unacceptable to the bulk of his 
electorate . Four of the five West Sepik parliamentarians in 1972, 
including Langro, aligned themselves with the United Party, which 
opposed early independence and which prior to the 1972 elections was 
expected to form the government. 
In April 1972 Somare and Pangu put together a coalition govern­
ment. Throughtout the life of the 1972 parliament, the emphasis which 
the coalition placed on improvement for less developed areas was vit­
iated for the West Sepik by the province's association with the par­
liamentary gamesmanship of the opposition. The consequent lacuna at 
national political level, and the impuissance of the local councils, left 
border development for five years to public servants who on the whole 
were professionally and locationally inexperienced, and ill-equipped 
to tackle developmental problems of such magnitude. At the 1977 
elections representative turnover was 100 per cent. 18 The three largest 
electorates voted Pangu and the two border representatives crossed 
the floor to Pangu in the Opposition reshuffle of early 1978 (Post­
Courier 21 March 1978). Party loyalties and even personal preferences 
were less important to the West Sepik electorates, however, than the 
potential access to government resources represented by staying with 
the strength . The purse-string vote was again demonstrated, but in the 
opposite direction , when the Somare government was voted out in 
1980 and several West Sepik parliamentarians swung overtly or 
covertly towards the new government benches. 
The defeat of the second Somare government half-way through its 
term focused political activity earlier than might otherwise have been 
the case on the 1982 elections. By 1981 the border development prog­
ramme had become caught up in the politicking for the next election. 
Deputy prime minister Iambakey Okuk took up the West Papua cause 
and adopted a quasi-confrontationist stance towards Indonesia, while 
Paul Langro in the West Sepik led public service and provincial gov­
ernment complaints over the lack of communication between the 
national government and the province over border development. 
18 This refers to the members who represented the West Sepik in the 1972-77 House. The 
extent of actual change in electoral support is difficult to assess, as electoral boundaries 
in the border area have been redrawn between every election until 1982. 
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Through 1982 the programme was largely subordinated to party cam­
paigning , and one member of Foreign Affairs staff on the border 
development programme resigned to contest the West Sepik regional 
seat. Despite vigorous and often extravagant campaigning by other 
candidates, the results of the election were overwhelmingly Pangu and 
the West Sepik was with the new government. 
The border development problem 
By 1983 , despite the continuation of the border development 
programme and improved communications with Indonesia through 
the Joint Border Committee , the benefits were mainly administrative . 
Kilimeri villagers gained a road connecting Ossima to Bewani and thus 
to Vanimo, but little improvement to their overall situation from it. In 
some areas conditions had deteriorated so much that development was 
an even more difficult task than it had been in the colonial era. The 
decline in employment opportunities and cash incomes, especially 
marked after 1974/75 , brought a reduction in modern supplements to 
subsistence . Most Kilimeri households in 1976 were using worn uten­
sils which had been brought back in the 1950s and 1960s by returned 
labourers , and were unable to replace worn-out items such as axes and 
saucepans which previously had been regarded as bone (essential) . 
Unwilling or unable to return to arduous traditional techniques for the 
manufacture of such items as salt, many villagers simply discontinued 
their use. 
The range of foodstuffs consumed regularly also appears , for var­
ious reasons, to have diminished. In Kilimeri the most common morn­
ing and evening meal consisted of boiled sago and tulip (the flavour­
some and nutritious Gnetum gnemon tips) . One village, which used to 
consume the surplus from market garden produce that it cultivated for 
sale to a nearby boarding school , ceased consumption of introduced 
crops entirely when the boarding school became a day school and its 
market collapsed. Another group joined the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church to obtain a school . By the time the mission withdrew , a few 
years later, the group had acquired a new range of food tab us which 
included most of its hunter-gatherer protein sources, and refused to 
assist with communal pig hunts. In the absence of cultivated dietary 
alternatives, this marginalized their own diet and to some extent also 
affected the balance for the rest of the community . With the decline in 
other cash-earning opportunities, many villagers retained a greater 
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proportion of saleable bush products such as game, wildfowl eggs and 
sago grubs for market or for the gift exchanges with town contacts 
whereby they obtained cloth and a few other coveted trade goods. 
Educational and employment potential declined concurrently. As 
the costs of education and the standard required for regular employ­
ment rose, village interest in pursuing primary or vocational education 
fell, and schools reported a drop in attendance. In 1976 31 per cent of 
Kilimeri adults interviewed had received some basic education, but 
only 27 per cent of their children. Seventy-seven per cent of school-age 
children at the time of the survey were not attending school , and only 
three villagers in the sample area had completed primary education. 
Of those children who had some schooling, most, like their parents , 
had dropped out by Grade 3 despite the improvements which had 
taken place in primary facilities in the area. Informal acquisition of 
skills and work experience also declined with the marked reduction in 
the range and duration of outside experience after the mid 1960s. This 
was matched by a general decline in the number of outside contacts 
which villagers had and, as a result, in their informal access to informa­
tion and modern opportunities. 
Conclusion 
The recurrent dilemma for government in development of the 
border area, as its past attempts have demonstrated,  is that program­
mes which have been considered administratively feasible have been 
handicapped by situational constraints, while full-scale attack on bor­
der underdevelopment would be a high cost , low return and long term 
operation. To upgrade government services and village standards of 
living on the border, merely to a standard comparable with the average 
in other parts of the country, would in itself be expensive in terms of 
monetary resources, staff quantity and calibre , and in the possible 
political repercussions from other areas . To continue to divert 
resources indefinitely to the maintenance of such standards , when the 
per capita costs of doing so are inflated vis-a-vis other areas by dis­
tance , low population densities and difficult terrain , is not likely to be 
economically or politically practicable. The provincial government 
experiment has already indicated that the more advanced regions are 
not prepared to subsidize the less developed · areas to the extent that 
would be required, and neither the Western nor the Sandaun province 
has the capacity to mount a campaign of such magnitude without assis-
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tance. Moreover the uneasy relationship which currently exists bet­
ween the national and provincial governments , and the conflict of 
political interest involved, indicates that such assistance from the cent­
ral government may not be welcomed. Nor is it by any means certain 
that the national government's present concern for border develop­
ment is a lasting one. Ironically, the success of the new Joint Border 
Committee in easing tensions between Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia over their mutual border could well bear an inverse correla­
tion to border development . 
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CHAPTER 8 
1984 : REFUGEES, 'HOLIDAY CAMPS' AND DEATHS 
Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison 
In 1984 1 1 ,000 refugees crossed into Papua New Guinea. In previous years the flow of refugees had remained relatively small and man­
ageable, and the Papua New Guinea government (and the Australian 
administration before it) had been able to cope. It resettled some 
within Papua New Guinea, found third countries for a few, and repat­
riated (or turned back) the majority, probably a pragmatic balancing 
of Papua New Guinean public opinion and Indonesian pressure (see 
TAPOL 1984 :84-92) . The exodus in 1984, however, threatened to 
destroy the assumptions on which border management policy has been 
based. 
Nowhere has this been more obvious than in the dilemma con­
cerning the treatment of border crossers . Initially the Papua New 
Guinea government attempted to apply its tried methods, but as the 
number of crossers grew, so did the difficulties of pursuing such a pol­
icy, which stretched the resources of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to the limit. One of the major assumptions 
of DFAT policy has been that West Papuan nationalism , as expressed 
through the OPM, will wither as Irian Jaya becomes more closely 
integrated into the Indonesian nation. The unprecedented flow of 
refugees across the border in three major waves in 1984 seems closely 
related to OPM activity in Irian Jaya and the Indonesian government's 
continued attempts to suppress the movement . 
First wave - incident in Jayapura 
Following the flag-raising incident in Jayapura on 13 February 
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1984 and a series of OPM actions in and around the city the 
Indonesian authorities began a 'clean-up' campaign which radiated out 
from Jayapura into the nearby countryside. House-to-house searches 
were conducted in the city and surrounding villages and large numbers 
of Melanesian soldiers, police, civil servants, teachers , students and 
their families were reported detained or fleeing the authorities towards 
Vanimo in Papua New Guinea (Post-Courier 21 February 1984 ; 
Niugini Nius 22 February 1984) . Sandaun (West Sepik) provincial sec­
retary, Melchior Kapaith , stated : 
The story they [refugees] tell is pretty consistent, that there 
is fighting in Jayapura between OPM and Indonesian sec­
urity forces . It seems to be true because they are city 
people, which is unusual because we usually get village 
people coming across (Niugini Nius 16 February 1984) . 
The events of February were themselves a response to continued 
Indonesian action against West Papuan nationalism in all its forms. At 
the end of 1983 a number of prominent West Papuans, including 
Arnold Ap, curator of the anthropological museum at Cendrawasih 
University and director of the Membesak Melanesian folk theatre , 
were arrested by Indonesian paracommandos in what appeared to be 
the beginning of a new wave of repression (TAPOL Bulletin 61 ,  
January-February 1984). 
During and after the events of February, it was reported that staff 
and students of the university were amongst those to flee (Post-Courier 
20 February, 1 1 May 1984) . The first wave of refugees included many 
who, like these students , were articulate and politically conscious 
Melanesian nationalists . Some identified explicitly with OPM and 
stated that they were in Papua New Guinea temporarily : 'We came 
here because if we are killed, the guts of West Papuan hopes will disap­
pear with us' (Niugini Nius 23 February 1984). These refugees were 
said to have come originally from the towns of the north coast , their 
association with the OPM being through the Markas Victoria group -
the former Biak-based Rumkorem faction (Osborne 1984 :8) . 
Almost all of the refugees who crossed into Papua New Guinea at 
this time came as a direct result of the events in and around Jayapura. 
As refugees began to move into Papua New Guinea the government 
began to apply its standard policies on border crossing. In line with this 
both the Sandaun provincial government and DFAT attempted to use 
the border liaison hot-line to contact Jayapura and find out the cause 
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of the exodus . Jayapura could not be raised by either group nor by the 
Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby (Post-Courier 16 February 
1984) . The Papua New Guinea embassy in Jakarta was instructed to 
seek an explanation (Times of Papua New Guinea 16 February 1984) 
but to no avail . Foreign Affairs and Trade minister Rabbie Namaliu 
then sent two urgent telexed requests to his counterpart , Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, asking for clarification (Post-Courier 24 February 
1984) . Jakarta finally sent a reply stating that nothing major had occur­
red on their side of the border and that everything was under control. 
Apparently satisfied with this belated reply, the Papua New 
Guinea government then proceeded to offer limited assistance to the 
border crossers. However, prime minister Somare was quick to point 
out that the crossers would be dealt with under the provisions of the 
1979 Border Agreement as illegal immigrants . Somare stated : 'They 
will be arrested, questioned and a court will decide whether they are 
genuine refugees' (Niugini Nius 24 February 1984) . Meanwhile , the 
makeshift camp holding the crossers soon proved inadequate and the 
first hundred or so arrivals in Vanimo assisted the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force to construct a new camp at Blackwater, outside Van­
imo. The costs of running the camp were to be borne by international 
agencies - the UNHCR, with assistance from the Red Cross and 
Austcare (Mongi et al. 1984 ; Post-Courier 29 February 1984) . 
With the border crossers in their new camp, legal proceedings 
began ; eighty men were charged with illegal entry by the police in Van­
imo , apparently acting on directions from Port Moresby. The men 
appeared in Vanimo District Court on 27 February and pleaded guilty 
but their case was adjourned for a week by the presiding magistrate 
pending instructions from Port Moresby. Before the case appeared 
again, legal aid was arranged through the public solicitor on request 
from one of those charged (Niugini Nius 1 March 1984). When the case 
came up again, defence counsel from the Public Solicitor's Office chal­
lenged the legality of the government's direction to the police to charge 
the crossers. He also sought to change the 'guilty' plea to 'not guilty' . 
After a further two weeks' adjournment the case was heard against an 
expanded list of 1 1 1  refugees. The constitutional issue was resolved 
when the police prosecutor claimed he had mistaken National Security 
Council direction (permissible) for National Executive Council 
(cabinet) direction (non-permissible) . The change of plea was rejected 
by magistrate Salatiel Lenalia who had handled the case to date and he 
convicted 84 of the men, with 73 of them being gaoled for six weeks. A 
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second magistrate dismissed the same charge against the other 27 
(Post-Courier, Niugini Nius 22 March 1984) . 
The fate of those convicted was not immediately clear, but 
Namaliu stated that under normal circumstances illegal crossers were 
to be dealt with by the police (Post-Courier 22 March 1984) . Nor was 
it clear what the implications of a not guilty verdict were. While 
Namaliu had referred to the possibility of permissive residence for 
some and to the need for Indonesian assurances of safety for returnees, 
there was also concern in some quarters that a repatriation exercise 
would begin. For example, UNHCR representative Michael Shergold 
suggested that his office should be involved in the assessment of 
refugee status (Post-Courier, Niugini Nius 22 March 1984) . Before any 
repatriation could have commenced, however, an appeal was lodged 
against the conviction and those who had been gaoled were released on 
bail (Post-Courier 30 March 1984). When the National Court finally 
convened in Vanimo in mid June, Deputy chief justice Mari Kapi 
quashed the District Court convictions (Niugini Nius 22 June 1984). 
Between the first and second hearings of the Vanimo case, a spe­
cial border liaison meeting took place in J ayapura at the request of the 
Papua New Guinea government, with refugees being the principal 
topic (Niugini Nius 15  March 1984) . At this meeting, the first since the 
February events, a stalemate emerged that was to continue for most of 
the year : the Indonesians sought information on the border crossers 
which Papua New Guinea was reluctant or unable to provide ; Papua 
New Guinea sought satisfactory guarantees of the safety of returnees 
which the Indonesian government would not give (Post-Courier, 
Niugini Nius 19, 20, 21 March 1984) . 
Second wave - Jayapura hinterland 
By March 1984 it was reported that there were about 320 crossers 
in Sandaun Province , and even though there were reports of groups of 
refugees heading for Papua New Guinea the problem for the Papua 
New Guinea government remained at a manageable level (Post­
Courier 26 March 1984) . However, it was soon to become clear that the 
incident in Jayapura was not planned as a single event but rather as 
part of a general uprising (interview, Tom Ireeuw, Vanimo, 29 
December 1984) . It is not clear how widespread or coordinated these 
gestures of defiance were, but Indonesian military activity certainly 
fanned out from Jayapura and moved inland to the south and east 
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down the border (Post-Courier 26 March 1984). 
The second wave of refugees moving into Papua New Guinea 
came from this corner of Irian J aya as a result of search and pursuit 
operations carried out by the Indonesian military, and possibly also 
because of clashes between these troops and the OPM, fear of possible 
clashes, Indonesian harassment , or because OPM warned people that 
they should escape while they had the chance. It should be remem­
bered that this area is close to J ayapura where official and unofficial 
transmigration has caused considerable dislocation amongst Melane­
sians, and that it is an area which has a long association with OPM. 
Most recently , it has been the base area of regional commander James 
Nyaro. 
On 26 March it was reported that, almost a week earlier, more 
than one hundred people had fled into Papua New Guinea to escape 
clashes between OPM and Indonesian troops in and around Waris , 
about 20 kilometres from the border. From the villages of Woro and 
Kwana, these refugees were the first reported from the inland (Post­
Courier, Niugini Nius 26 March 1984). The movement of this relatively 
small group of refugees across the border signalled the beginning of a 
rapid increase in the number of refugees entering Papua New Guinea. 
OPM actions at Waris were followed by a raid at Ubrub (Niugini 
Nius 28 March 1984) , and by OPM's 26 March capture of Swiss pilot 
Werner Wyder, an Indonesian army officer and a doctor (both assassi­
nated) and a Melanesian teacher at the border station of Yuruf (Post­
Courier 2 April 1984) (see chapter 5) . The Indonesian government's 
response to these events included ground sweeps by troops, apparently 
supported by helicopters and jet fighters, two of which flew into Papua 
New Guinea territory near Green River (Post-Courier, Niugini Nius 
28 March 1984) , setting off a long series of diplomatic exchanges bet­
ween the two governments. 
As these events unfolded, the trickle of refugees across the border 
into Sandaun Province became a flood. By 7 April refugees were said 
to be congregating around the Catholic mission at Kamberatoro and 
Mamamura village, but it was reported that border officials had now 
been instructed to send the refugees back to their villages and not to 
give any help. The report quoted government officials as saying there 
was no money for help and the government did not want to ask for 
assistance from the UNHCR because it insisted that these people were 
not refugees. Niugini Nius claims to have been told at the border that 
since 26 March Indonesian troops had been dropped almost daily from 
205 
BElWEEN TWO NATIONS 
helicopters and were advancing towards the border and that there had 
been heavy fighting between Yuruf and Amgotoro (Niugini Nius 8 
April 1984) . By 12 April it was reported that as many as 3 ,000 Irian 
J ayan border crossers were either in or headed for Papua New Guinea, 
including 437 already in Vanimo, 320 at Kamberatoro and another 300 
heading there, about 1 ,000 heading for Green River from Ubrub, and 
hundreds from the Waris and Arso areas heading for Imonda and 
Bewani (Post-Courier 12 April 1984). The bulk of the new crossers 
were inland village people , and many were joining relatives on the 
Papua New Guinea side . The bishop of Vanimo , John Etheridge, 
became involved, warning of the danger of food shortages and taking 
full responsibility for feeding and clothing refugees at Kamberatoro 
(Niugini Nius 24 April 1984) . But the involvement of the church was 
not, according to Etheridge, without its critics (interview,  Vanimo, 29 
December 1984) . 
Third wave - focus on the south 
The third wave of refugees , again mainly villagers , crossed into 
Western Province along a 150 kilometre stretch of the border from 
about the northern end of the Fly River bulge to the mountains where 
Western Province meets Sandaun. The first report of the southern 
boundary crossers was of twenty-eight people from Sota village on the 
border who sought refuge on 9 April. It was reported that the village 
had connections with OPM, and following the arrest of two of their 
leaders all of the remaining villagers had fled (Niugini Nius 12 April 
1984) . But this was just the beginning, and by 1 May some 2,500 
refugees had arrived in the area north of Kiunga near the small town 
of Ningerum (Post-Courier 1 May 1984) . Already, this new exodus 
dwarfed that into Sandaun Province. 
The border crossers in the Western Province camps are people 
from two tribal groups - the Y onggom (or Muyu as they are known on 
the other side) and the Ningerum. Many have been in Papua New 
Guinea before , and on crossing joined their wantoks (members of the 
same language group, kin) . Indeed, many are people recognized by 
the 1984 border agreement as 'traditional' crossers, having sago stands 
and vegetable gardens on the Papua New Guinea side of the border. 
However this agreement does not allow for crossing the border for 
resettlement. According to missionaries of long experience in the 
Kiunga area, for many years there has been a certain amount of popu-
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lation drift across the quite artificial border. The drift was to the west 
into Dutch New Guinea during the 1950s and early 1960s, when Dutch 
mission activity attracted people ; more recently it has been to the east, 
with the Yonggom tending to displace the neighbouring Awin people. 
The Ok Tedi project , especially the construction of the Kiunga-Tabu­
bil road, seems to have caused a considerable population shift in the 
whole region (King 1983). This recent influx, however, has involved a 
large proportion of the Y onggom and Ningerum people from west of 
the border. According to reports in the camps, much of the tribal land 
has been depopulated. This was confirmed in a Jakarta press report of 
a tour by Irian Jayan governor, Isaac Hindom. It was reported that he 
found that 5,000 of the 8 ,500 population of the Mindiptanah subdistrict 
had fled ; a further 4,400 of a population of 6,100 had fled Waropko 
subdistrict. Whole villages were found to be deserted (TAPOL Bulle­
tin 64, 1984) . 
In most cases the newcomers have arrived amongst people who 
have traditional obligations to them and have made land available to 
them to live on and from. This has meant that although the situation 
may not have been entirely without friction, accommodation, rather 
than confrontation, has been the norm. Other observers have 
described the same kind of situation at the inland camps on the north­
ern end of the border at Kamberatoro and Green River. Referring to 
Kamberatoro, one investigating team found that the 'people from 
Yurup and Amgotoro are from the same Dera clan as the people of the 
Kamberatoro area . . .  The Ubrup people here are those who have ties 
by marriage to the Deras' .  At Green River, similarly , they reported 
'they are of the same clan as the Papua New Guinea people of the area 
and so are offered hospitality' (Mongi et al. 1984 :5 ,  7) . 
Despite Indonesian denials, it is clear that military operations or 
'exercises' have been conducted in the northern border region and all 
of the evidence points to OPM involvement also. For the south, how­
ever, news reports of OPM-Indonesian clashes emanate from OPM 
sources, either from letters released by OPM 'representatives' in Port 
Moresby or through OPM's southern regional (Merauke) commander 
Gerardus Thorny (e .g .  Niugini Nius 18  May, 13 August 1984) . Deter­
mining , with any degree of confidence , the causes of the southern 
exodus is thus a matter of conjecture, but there has been a number of 
suggestions. 
One possibility is that the refugees have spontaneously fled a 
generalized oppression. This seems unlikely , however, given the sud-
207 
BETWEEN TINO NATIONS 
den exodus of thousands of people. A second suggestion is that the 
people have been displaced by transmigration. While there are plans 
for transmigration in this area, little, if any, actual settlement has taken 
place ; transmigration could be seen by the people only as a future 
threat . The third possibility is in two variant forms, but centres on the 
assertion that OPM has forced the people to leave their traditional 
land. One variant suggests that OPM might have cleared a fighting 
zone and thus moved the population to safer areas . The other, sup­
ported by both Indonesian and Papua New Guinea officials, is that 
OPM has intimidated the people and forced them into Papua New 
Guinea in order to gain international publicity. The fourth possibility 
is that there have been armed clashes between OPM and Indonesian 
forces. In determining the veracity of these possibilities, the accounts 
of the refugees are significant . 
In the Western Province camps the refugees appear well 
organized and disciplined,  especially as they have tended to remain in 
village groups, with lines of communication through camp and village 
leaders and spokesmen. During the course of interviews two themes 
kept emerging, the first almost legendary in form . It was an account of 
the frustration of the West Papuan people and the denial of their aspi­
rations for independence ; it referred to their land having been stolen 
from them by the Indonesian people, who are different from them and 
have no right to Melanesian land. It spoke of oppression by Indonesia 
in the form of rough justice being handed out to any West Papuans who 
revealed their nationalist feelings. Transmigration was spoken of only 
in the sense of a component of cultural threat (interviews , Kiunga, 9 
September 1984). OPM did not figure prominently. Rather the people 
spoke powerfully and emotionally of their West Papua and their inde­
pendence . They clearly believe in the possibility of independence and 
say they will not return until they gain independence, with some claim­
ing they will fight for it. 
The second recurring theme concerned 'incidents' , clashes, 
reprisals and threats . The refugees referred specifically to an incident 
at Waropko near the town ofMindiptanah on 10 April when it appears 
there was a raising of the West Papuan flag. The incidents surrounding 
this event are said to have led (by one account) to a threat that the army 
would wipe out the people if there was another incident . A variant 
claim was that the threat was relayed by 'our leaders'. There were 
references to church desecrations and the destruction of houses and 
gardens (interview, Kiunga, 9 September 1984) . 
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These refugee accounts appear to be roughly in line with that pro­
vided by the OPM of clashes beginning in mid April and continuing 
through to July, and of Indonesian reprisals. Investigating teams from 
the Catholic church , while reluctant to accept all OPM stories of 
atrocities , reprisals and clashes , claim to have enough corroborating 
evidence to suggest that a church in Ninati , near Mindiptanah, was sac­
ked by Indonesian troops (interview, Bishop Deschamps, Kiunga, 9 
September 1984), and to at least take seriously the broad outline of the 
OPM claims of clashes (interview, Father Basil Peutalo , Port 
Moresby, 17 October 1984) . 
The reported flow of refugees across the border also tends to coin­
cide with the claimed armed clashes. While refugees continued to cross 
in the north (Post-Courier 27 April 1984) , the first reports of southern 
crossers, as noted above, was on 9 April . However, by the end of April 
it was reported that more than 1 ,000 people from four villages in Irian 
Jaya had crossed into Western Province a week earlier. The refugees 
claimed that their villages had been occupied by Indonesian soldiers 
and it was said that they were short of food in bush camps (Niugini Nius 
30 April 1984). The following day it was reported that 2,660 people had 
crossed into Western Province in the previous week and were camped 
at Komopkin and Benlim [sic.] (Post-Courier 1 May 1984). By mid 
May it was estimated that there were 5 ,000 refugees in Papua New 
Guinea, with 3,800 in Western Province (Niugini Nius 16  May 1984). 
The numbers continued to rise over the next few weeks with a joint 
churches team reporting 10,000 refugees by the end of July, including 
6,800 in Western Province . The discovery of three other bush camps ,  
holding about 1 ,500 people, west of Tabubil and south of Kiunga was 
reported in September (Niugirii Nius 26, 27 September 1984) . 
Papua New Guinea government policy on refugees 
As noted above , the Papua New Guinea government's initial 
response had been to offer assistance to border crossers but to charge 
them all as illegal crossers and to prepare to repatriate them. However, 
as the numbers of crossers dramatically increased, the government's 
response was not so clear. 
A churches investigating team reported that at the end of July all 
costs at the Blackwater camp, with about 1 ,000 people, were continu­
ing to be borne by the UNHCR, Red Cross and Austcare . At Kam­
beratoro (800-900 refugees) the Catholic mission had provided for the 
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basic needs of the refugees, the costs being borne by the Diocese of 
Vanimo. The situation at Green River was not so fortunate . The 
report stated that supplies were originally provided by the govern­
ment. However, in times of shortage the Catholic Church was asked by 
the Officer in Charge for assistance , which it provided. The report 
went on to observe that 'the government funds seem to be exhausted 
and the Catholic Church is prepared to extend its services there as well' 
(Mongi et al. 1984 :4-8) . The wording of the church report allows the 
government's position to be seen as benevolently helpless in a situation 
of emergency beyond its capacity. 
In mid May, according to Bishop Etheridge the food situation at 
Green River was desperate (Post-Courier 15 May 1984) . A month later 
when a further group of 200 refugees was brought to Green River, both 
the Sandaun provincial government and Bishop Etheridge warned that 
neither the government nor any agency was providing for inland bor­
der crossers , and it was left to the church to begin a relief operation 
(Niugini Nius 25 , 27 June 1984 ; Post-Courier 28 June 1984) . 
Following its visit to the Sandaun camps in July, the church inves­
tigating team warned that the condition of refugees at Green River was 
very poor, despite some outside assistance , especially when compared 
with those at Kamberatoro who had sufficient, church-supplied 
rations . They extrapolated from this a serious concern for the refugees 
in Western Province who 'had not been given any assistance' (Mongi 
et al. 1984 : 9). The investigating team had every reason for concern , for 
it was soon discovered that people were dying of starvation and starva­
tion-related diseases in the Komopkin camp. 
Initially, fifty-four deaths were reported, but the toll was up to 
ninety-two before an adequate relief programme was organized, and 
following charges of 'criminal neglect' by the opposition member for 
North Fly, Warren Dutton, (Niugini Nius 13 August 1984) the govern­
ment attempted to explain the situation. Provincial Affairs minister, 
John Nilkare , told parliament that he accepted responsibility for the 
deaths, stating : 
Obviously there has been some failure by my department 
that I take full responsibility for. The real responsibility lies 
with those who persist in telling fanciful stories to people 
with little knowledge of political reality. 
Nilkare went on to accuse OPM of 'killing their own women and chil­
dren for the sake of politics' .  While admitting that his department had 
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failed to cope , he claimed that the Irian Jayans were in Papua New 
Guinea on orders from OPM who must take the blame for the deaths . 
In other words, the people should not have been in Papua New Guinea 
in the first place, so those who 'sent' them were at fault. He went on to 
deny that the government had a policy of starving the border-crossers 
back into Irian Jaya, stating that the tragedy was not averted because 
some of his department's officers had failed to correctly interpret the 
situation and to pass on information to Port Moresby (Post-Courier 17 
August 1984) . 
However, Nilkare's statement failed to convince a number of 
people, and government backbencher Gabriel Ramoi accused the gov­
ernment of having a starvation policy (Niugini Nius 20 August 1984) . 
As the full story of what happened in the Western Province camps was 
pieced together , the evidence seemed to confirm Ramoi's claim, in the 
words of law lecturer Brian Brunton (1984 : 10) pointing 'more to delib­
erate design than to a series of serious but not necessarily intentional 
misjudgements' . It is necessary to look at the events which led to the 
deaths of ninety-seven refugees in the camps by the end of August 
(Post-Courier 30 August 1984) in order to examine the contention that 
deliberate neglect at the highest levels of government amounted to 
policy . 
The 'holiday camps' 
When the refugees first crossed into Western Province they 
camped in the bush or near villages or missions , but not in proximity to 
government stations. Their first contact with officials came when pat­
rols were sent out to the camps to supervise them. Initially, the 
refugees lived off local sago stands and vegetable gardens , but with 
numbers swelling these resources were soon exhausted. To offset this, 
two food supply drops of a week's food each were made by the govern­
ment in late April and early May, apparently paid for from a payment 
of K22 ,800 provided by the Indonesian government (Post-Courier 1 
May 1984). However, no further supplies from the government went 
to the camps until August, and the government would not allow any 
other relief agencies to become involved (interviews, Kiunga, 9 Sep­
tember 1984 ; Port Moresby, 13 August 1984). 
The period between May and mid August is an important one. On 
the one hand Foreign Affairs minister Namaliu was taking a strong line 
on repatriation, demanding that the Indonesian government provide 
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meaningful guarantees of the safety of any people repatriated. On the 
other hand, Namaliu's government and his own department were 
allowing refugees to starve . This is not the place to examine Namaliu's 
initiatives , but it is important to examine what was happening to the 
refugees ,  especially in Western Province. 
As early as 6 May, one representative of a major international 
relief agency claims to have expressed concern to DFA T about the 
camps in the south, and to have offered assistance, but was told 'at a 
high level of government' to keep out (interview, Port Moresby, 13 
August 1984) . At about the same time, Bishop Deschamps made the 
first of a number of offers of assistance but was told that he should 
'stand by' as the government seemed to have control of the situation 
(Niugini Nius 18 August 1984). 
Events during the remainder of May are not at all clear, but there 
are no reports of supplies reaching the camps although government 
patrols continued to have a presence in the camps. It seems clear that 
the government was aware of the situation in the camps at this time, for 
a report dated 1 June was prepared for Namaliu by Mataio Rabura 
(acting first assistant secretary for the Border Liaison Branch of 
DFAT). This report , apparently leaked to Niugini Nius (30 August 
1984) by 'cabinet sources' ,  pointed out that approaches to the Indone­
sian authorities for more money had been unsuccessful and added that 
the crossers would not be fed ;  the situation was described as 'critical' .  
If this was the case, then it should also have been clear to Paulias 
Matane, secretary of DFAT, who toured the Sandaun and Western 
Provinces in the last two weeks of May on a 'public awareness cam­
paign' designed to identify refugees who would be repatriated. Given 
that Matane claimed to have identified 5 ,OOO crossers in this category, 
it can only be assumed that he was aware of the existing conditions in 
the camps (Niugini Nius 4 June 1984) . 
In early June the UNHCR sent a formal note to the government 
requesting that it be given access to the refugees who were now in 
Papua New Guinea. While the UNHCR had been involved at Black­
water, repeated offers of assistance for the thousands of others had fal­
len on deaf ears , and this had meant, in journalist Alfred Sasako's 
words , 'thousands of West Irian refugees . . .  have been denied urgently­
needed food and medical supplies . . . ' (Niugini Nius 1 1  June 1984) . 
Throughout June , while an administrative presence was maintained in 
the camps, still no supplies were provided, despite offers and expres­
sions of concern about the seriousness of the situation. 
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On 6 July, for apparently routine reasons , all government officials 
at the camps in the southern border area were called into Kiunga 
(Niugini Nius 18 August 1984) . Ten days later a new style of adminis­
trative presence in the camps was introduced, with two patrols , one 
north and one south of Kiunga, doing weekly rounds of overnight visits 
to the various camps then returning to Kiunga for rebriefing. The pat­
rols consisted of a patrol officer, a police officer and a medical officer. 
It was a show-the-flag operation intended to check on conditions, and 
to check for new arrivals .  But during July conditions deteriorated to 
the level of disaster. 
The official account of how the situation was permitted to 
deteriorate so badly blames mismanagement, unforeseen difficulties, 
and a serious breakdown in communications. Nilkare explained : 
'The area is not rich [and there] are continuous difficulties 
maintaining adequate food supplies for the ordinary popu­
lation . The medical officers on the regular patrols may have 
been [so] used to seeing sick people that they did not think 
it unusual' (Niugini Nius 18 August 1984) . 
It is difficult to conceive how the situation could have been considered 
in any way 'usual' if the region is 'not rich' and is suddenly burdened 
with thousands of extra people. Further, when Pastor Roy Woods of 
the Evangelical Church, and a man of long experience in the area, 
went to Komopkin on 3 August he reported that he was 'shocked, 
really shocked . I could hear crying, crying and crying. The children 
were just sitting around ; they were just too weak to stand or follow us' 
(Times of PNG 27 September 1984). Pastor Woods certainly did con­
sider the situation 'unusual' and immediately got a helicopter into 
Komopkin to take out the sickest - seventy trips were reportedly made 
that day (Niugini Nius 21 August 1984). 
It was only Pastor Woods' report, relayed through local member 
of parliament Warren Dutton to Port Moresby, which brought any 
government action, and then, it seems, reluctant action. Earlier patrol 
reports were ignored. For example, Alfred Sasako (Niugini Nius 21 
August 1984) states that he met one officer who spoke of a visit to 
Niogomban : 
I was inside this camp and seven people died right before 
my eyes. I rushed back and told the provincial police com­
mander in Kiunga and other government officers and all 
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they said was 'worry blong ol' [their problem] . The OPM 
is causing a lot of headaches so let their people die. 
Even when reports of deaths in the camps reached senior Health 
Department officials , who wanted to rush aid to the area, DFAT 
remained immovable (Times of PNC 6 September 1984) . Only the 
publicity associated with Woods' report moved DFAT, with Matane 
finally inviting the UNHCR representative to visit the Western Pro­
vince camps. The UNHCR's visits to the camps resulted in the provi­
sion of K725 ,000 to aid the refugees in September, with a further 
$435 ,000 being allocated in December (Niugini Nius 10 September 
1984 ; Post-Courier 12 December 1984) . In addition, other non-gov­
ernmental relief agencies became involved following Woods' revela­
tions. 
The contradiction between the 'neglect' of the refugees and con­
cern for their welfare as reflected in prolonged negotiation over the 
repatriation of so-called illegal border crossers has already been 
pointed out. They are reconciled only on the basis of a common under­
lying starting point - a determined refusal to acknowledge the realities 
of the existence of a refugee problem. The calculated neglect reflects 
a determination to 'wish them away' , or 'ignore them and they'll go 
away' . The latter position seems to reflect the position of secretary 
Matane who saw that ignoring the refugees could also mean applying 
pressure to force them back across the border and, indeed , to dissuade 
others from coming across. Even in August , when reports of camp 
deaths were public, Matane, in briefing a meeting of non-governmen­
tal relief agencies (attended by Alan Smith) ,  stressed that the aid pro­
vided to border crossers should be minimal , since 'we don't want these 
people coming across for a holiday' . 
Given the conditions in the camps, and the deaths, the suggestion 
that they offered a 'holiday' is obscene. More significantly , the sugges­
tion reveals not a 'miscalculation' on the part of D FAT or Provincial 
Affairs but a cold-blooded gamble concerning the motivations and will 
of the refugees. And even when the bet seemed lost, it was stubbornly 
maintained . 
The publicity associated with the camp deaths continued well into 
September and brought with it impassioned opposition to the govern­
ment's policies and reasoned ,  yet scathing, criticism of policies (see 
Brunton 1984) . Perhaps in partial response to this criticism, Namaliu 
surprised many, not the least being the Indonesian government, by 
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raising Indonesian border violations at the UN General Assembly 
(Post-Courier 3 October 1984). Mochtar responded by accusing the 
Papua New Guinea government of interfering in Indonesian domestic 
affairs , with Namaliu then claiming that Papua New Guinea had a right 
to ask about events which had caused thousands of Indonesian citizens 
to flee into Papua New Guinea (Post-Courier 17, 18 October 1984) . 
Despite these exchanges and criticisms , repatriation remained on 
the agenda. Proposed visits by Indonesian verification teams brought 
hostile responses , especially from the Blackwater refugee camp where 
many of the more articulate refugees were held. Nevertheless, an 
Indonesian team did arrive to begin assuring the border crossers of 
their safety upon returning to Irian Jaya (Niugini Nius 2 November 
1984). Accompanied by two Papua New Guinea police riot squads , the 
group visited Green River first, then mo\ �d to the Blackwater camp. 
Despite warnings that the Indonesians would receive a hostile recep­
tion, Papua New Guinea officials allowed the Blackwater visit to pro­
ceed, arguing that adequate security would be provided (Post-Courier 
6 November 1984) . However, when the widow of Irian Jayan 
anthropologist Arnold Ap became involved, accusing the Indonesians 
of murdering her husband, some refugees attacked and injured several 
of the Indonesian delegation (Niugini Nius 5 November 1984) . In 
response , there was an official protest to the Papua New Guinea gov­
ernment (Post-Courier 5 November 1984) and a demonstration out­
side the Papua New Guinea embassy in Jakarta (Niugini Nius 7 
November 1984) . The Papua New Guinea government was quick to 
express its regret at the incident and stated that those responsible for 
the attack would be brought to justice (Niugini Nius 9 November 
1984). Perhaps some of the sincerity was taken out of the apology when 
Papua New Guinea's police commissioner, David Tasion, stated that 
his police did not take strong action to prevent the attack at the camp 
because , 'We are not like the Indonesians. We won't shoot people' 
(Niugini Nius 9 November 1984) . Following this, the Indonesian 
authorities were reported as saying that repatriation ' - if it takes place 
at all - will . . .  probably be deferred until mid-1985 , at the earliest' 
(Times of PNG 18  November 1984). Nevertheless , the last weeks of 
the year were still to prove surprising. 
At the end of November it seemed that the influx of refugees was 
not over, with a further 660 arriving at Kamberatoro and Green River 
(Niugini Nius 27 November 1984 ; Post-Courier 28 November 1984) . It 
was also known that there were groups of displaced Irianese living in 
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the bush along the border, many of whom were, according to Bishop 
Etheridge, becoming short of food (interview, Vanimo, 29 December 
1984) . Then, as the UNHCR made more money available for the care 
of the border crossers, it was announced from Jakarta , w.here Namaliu 
was signing the new Border Agreement , that the Indonesian govern­
ment had finally agreed to the involvement of the UNHCR in repatri­
ation (Post-Courier 13 December 1984) . 
Despite having achieved this diplomatic victory, N amaliu was 
removed from his Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio less than two 
weeks later. Somare claimed that Namaliu asked to move, but the lat­
ter denied this , stating that his work was unfinished. While his new 
portfolio of Primary Industry is not insignificant, it seems clear that 
Namaliu was one of the political casualties of the troubled year in 
DFAT. 
If Namaliu's removal from Foreign Affairs came as something of 
a surprise , then so did the announcement that about one hundred 
refugees had been repatriated from the Blackwater camp. The new 
minister , John Giheno, commented on the repatriation, which appa­
rently was carried out in the early hours of the morning when an 
Indonesian ship took the refugees from Vanimo to Jayapura where 
they were reported to have been given a welcoming feast. It appears 
that those who returned had crossed into Papua New Guinea in the 
wake of the Wyder kidnapping in March and had been anxious to 
return (Post-Courier 27 December 1984 ; Times of PNG 30 December 
1984). However, some questions remain about the exercise . First , 
while both Bishop Etheridge and Blackwater camp spokesman Tom 
Ireeuw agree that the refugees wanted to return , they claim that they 
had not been anxious to return through Jayapura (separate interviews, 
Vanimo, 29 December 1984) . More importantly , despite apparent 
Indonesian agreement that the UNHCR be involved in repatriation, 
there was no such involvement in this case. Monitoring the safety of 
the returnees , so much an issue throughout 1984 and pursued strongly 
by Namaliu , seems to have been forgotten. Papua New Guinea offi­
cials accompanied the refugees to Jayapura, but returned almost 
immediately with no effort being made to monitor their fate . 
The border remains the crucial issue in Papua New Guinea­
Indonesian relations, and never before has it seen so many refugees 
cross to Papua New Guinea. The refugees are still in their camps dot­
ted along the border and while they are there they continue to be a 
source of aggravation in the relationship between the two countries. 
2 1 6  
CHAPTER S 
The Papua New Guinea government remains hypersensitive about the 
border and refugees ,  having taken action against a number of jour­
nalists who have commented on the situation (Osborne 1985). The 
future of the refugees is no more certain in late 1985 than it was in early 
1984, although recent reports do suggest that small numbers of them 
are seeking asylum in third countries, particularly the Netherlands and 
Australia (Osborne 1985). 
What is certain , however, is that the problem will remain , and, as 
was so clearly demonstrated in 1984 , Papua New Guinea's policy 
towards refugees or, as the government prefers, 'border crossers', has 
not been able to cope with large numbers . Nowhere was this more trag­
ically demonstrated than in the deaths in the Western Province camps. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade , facing its first real crisis 
since independence , has appeared split within itself and has followed 
no consistent line on the treatment of border crossers . 
1984 has shown that many thousands of the border crossers have 
genuine reasons for leaving their side of the border, but the Papua New 
Guinea government's apparent refusal to acknowledge this seriously 
limits its options in dealing with the problem . While the government 
may well feel that the interests of a few border crossers must be sac­
rificed in the security interests of Papua New Guinea, the events of 
1984 do not suggest that the former necessarily achieves the latter. 
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CHAPTER 9 
PROSPECTS : 'A STATE OF MIND' 
Peter Hastings 
F or close Indonesia watchers, the arrival of five anti -Indonesian Irianese on Thursday Island, Australia , on June 26 1985 did not 
come as a surprise . Some have long anticipated it: Merauke is only 
250 kilometres northwest and adjacent to Wendu-Kumbe settlement 
camp which houses around 10,000 (mainly Javanese) transmigrants 
and 2,000 Irianese co-settlers. 
The five Irianese, who are Indonesian citizens, originally from 
Merauke, came by canoe from Papua New Guinea by way of Boigu 
Island. Earlier the five had crossed into Papua New Guinea at 
Morehead patrol post, and prior to their departure for Australia had 
spent six months in southern Papua. At first, the five made a request 
for political asylum, but when the meaning of that was fully explained 
to them in Indonesian, they changed their request to one for permis­
sion to 'preach' to Australians on the rights of the lrianese to indepen­
dence from Indonesia. All five were suffering severely from malaria 
and agreed that on recovery they would return to Papua New Guinea. 
Papua New Guinea, however, has since refused to accept them back, 
since technically they are illegal immigrants. 
These five are the first of many 'canoe people' that Australia may 
expect to arrive at Thursday Island and other northern ports in the 
future to claim asylum in one degree or another and for one reason or 
another. Many who come are likely to be 'economic refugees' and sort­
ing them out from those genuinely qualifying as refugees under the 
Geneva Convention may prove difficult. But whether genuine 
refugees or not, and whether seeking asylum or not, many human 
rights activists in Australia, already involved in protesting the activities 
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of the Indonesian administration in East Timor and Irian Jaya, will 
insist they stay in Australia. The future therefore promises new strains 
in Australian-Indonesian relations and it may be safely assumed that 
the Australian government will seek to minimize damage to those rela­
tions by returning 'canoe people' , where possible, to Indonesia. 
The five arrivals have claimed membership of a fairly new Irianese 
nationalist organization, MUFGAS, an English language acronymn 
for Melanesian Union from Gag to Samarai. (Gag is a tiny island west 
of the Bird's Head and Samarai an island off the tail of Papua. )  The 
acronym reflects the earlier slogan, espoused by Papuan leaders of the 
former Volksraad in seeking to promote a one island federation, From 
Sarong to Samarai. This in turn was a play on the Indonesian slogan of 
the 1950s, From Sabang to Merauke. According to the five, MUFGAS 
represents a new politicalmovement which rejects the OPM's 'armed 
terrorism' ,  seeking to promote one-island unity through means of 
peaceful propaganda and example. 
Their arrival in Australia coincided with reports of the arrival in 
Papua New Guinea of at least another 1 ,000 border crossers from Irian 
Jaya . About 1 ,000 were said to have come across at Skotiau, and, it is 
thought , a further 1 ,500 Min-speaking people came across at Yapsiei, 
west of Telefomin. The Skotiau arrivals contained a fair number of 
returnees from the results of a Papua New Guinea military exercise, 
Operation Rausim Kwik. This had involved six weeks planning and 
two days execution ; according to one ironic observer in Port Moresby , 
its failures became apparent within a week. The troops certainly forced 
a number of Irianese settlers near Skotiau to return to Irian Jaya, but 
as soon as the troops went back to Port Moresby the border crossers , 
augmented by others , returned to Skotiau. The Yapsiei crossers repre­
sent the northernmost extremities of the Min-speaking people , and 
they come from a mountainous area about 50 kilometres west of the 
border, which is only lightly administered ; available evidence points to 
OPM propagandists being able to induce the people to cross the border 
to avoid an alleged Indonesian/OPM clash. This brings the total 
number of border crossers in Papua New Guinea once again to about 
12 ,000. 
Definitions 
While many, especially in Papua New Guinea, refer to the 10,000 
or so border crossers in Papua New Guinea camps, prior to the most 
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recent crossings , as refugees, the description is not accurate except in 
so far as it applies to perhaps 400 or more of the 1 ,000 residents in 
Blackwater camp. These are primarily Irianese teachers , police , sol­
diers , two university lecturers , and small-time bureaucrats , who repre­
sent the growing number of Irianese evolues. They left Jayapura after 
the February 13 flag raising incident and subsequent events last year . 
They are certainly refugees by any definition because they would be in 
danger of life or liberty if they returned to Irian Jaya. They cannot 
return . Between 80 and 100 of the remainder have in fact returned. 
There are three main camps in the north : Green River, Kam­
beratoro and Blackwater. Until a year ago the northern border was the 
main centre of OPM operations and of Indonesian military incursions 
either in hot pursuit , in error, or to intimidate . Following the flag rais­
ing incident the OPM became much more active , virtually for the first 
time, in the south under the leadership of Gerardus Thorny whose raid 
in early April 1984 on the Indonesian administrative centre at 
Waropko , about 30 kilometres northwest of Ningerum, precipitated 
Indonesian military reaction and led to the large number of crossings 
later that month. 
Eventually more than 8,000 Irianese crossed the border, at least 
6,000 in various stages of exhaustion and hunger which for some time 
the Papua New Guinea government did little to alleviate . The majority 
were Roman Catholic and with the exception of 1 , 100 people, now at 
Tarakbits camp, all were Yonggom-speakers (some from as far west as 
Mindiptanah , a largish centre 25 kilometres west of the border) as are 
most Papua New Guineans around Kiunga. For this reason, all but the 
Ningerum-speaking Tarakbits people were able to get land from the 
locals, a difficult matter in Melanesia. They have thus been able to 
plant traditional food to supplement UNHCR food rations ; as well 
they get clothes, drugs and medical treatment. As a result the camps 
have taken on a semi-permanent character. The Y onggom-speakers 
are accepted, the Ningerum-speakers are suffered. 
The crossings 
It is difficult to sort out all the reasons for the crossings. Heavy­
handed Indonesian administrative practices, or unsympathetic ones ; 
over-reaction (including shootings) by military patrols, to raids such as 
that on Waropko , and genuine fears of land alienation through trans­
migrasi settlements, are among them. But I believe the main problem 
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to be the ineradicable cultural dislike of the Malay and Melanesian 
races for each other. This was pungently expressed in August 1984 at 
an Australian-Indonesian conference in Brisbane, by a senior Indone­
sian delegate , Brigadier-General Soebyakto, who said that Indonesia 
could not keep Irian Jaya as a 'zoo' or 'museum' and even more suc­
cinctly a hundred years earlier by Alfred Russell Wallace who said that 
' . . .  if the tide of [Malay] colonization should be turned to New Guinea , 
there can be little doubt of the early extinction of the Papuan race' 
(Wallace 1869 vol. 2 :448) . 
By the same token it would be unwise to ignore the increasing 
effectiveness with which the OPM, despite factionalism and small 
numbers , has been able to exploit lrianese grievances to promote fear 
among Irianese villagers , and to influence them to cross the border and 
to remain there. And like the Indonesian forces it opposes, it is not 
averse to burning villages. Observers of the southern border crossers, 
including Warren Dutton, the member for North Fly, and most border 
kiaps (especially the few expatriates remaining) , believe that the OPM 
is 80 per cent responsible for the crossings. This in itself is a signal 
achievement. 
The missions , especially the Catholic missions, are notable dissen­
ters from this view and have been an important element in the decision 
of border crossers to remain in Papua New Guinea. They have been 
active also in supporting Dutton 's proposal to resettle the crossers per­
manently in Papua New Guinea (see chapter 5 above) . 
In a long interview in Kiunga on 9 February 1985 , the bishop of 
Daru , Bishop Deschamps, a French Canadian Montfort missioner, 
told me that he was inclined not to accept information from the bishop 
of Merauke which cast doubt on stories carried by the border crossers . 
These stories alleged that within Merauke diocese Indonesian soldiers 
had wantonly killed teachers , catechists , villagers and children , had 
raped nuns and had shot up the church at Ninati. 
The bishop also said that he was disinclined to accept assurances 
from a Dutch priest , who had made a special visit from Merauke dio­
cese , that it was the experience of priests working in Irian J aya that 'by 
and large the Indonesian Army behaved with consideration of the 
Church. i  and that the Bishop should be careful of stories of church 
desecration. By the same token the following day a senior Montfort 
mission nun at Kungim camp told me that a number of border crossers 
had arrived 'in fair health, accompanied by teachers , catechists and all 
their pots and pans' ,  showing all the signs of a carefully planned exodus 
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rather than sudden flight in fear. 
The camps 
All eight camps on the border, especially those at Kuiu, Komok­
pin and Tarakbits , are within easy walking distance of the border. The 
majority of inmates comprises women, children and old people. 
Young and married men tend to live on the Irianese side of the border, 
visiting the camps by night or for some days on end and returning with 
food to Indonesia. 
While crossers tend to deny open OPM affiliations , hard core 
OPM members clearly have access to the camps at will. An old man 
told me that, in any case, 'the OPM is a state of mind' .  This is a more 
than accurate description to the extent that the vast majority of camp 
dwellers north and south along the border are strongly anti-Indonesian 
in sentiment . All strongly resist any suggestion they should return. 
The OPM 
The former panglima, Brigadier-General Sembiring, maintained 
that OPM hard-core numbers , as distinct from sympathizers , do not 
exceed 300 to 400 and are very poorly armed. They have few firearms, 
between 30 and 40, mainly old Dutch and US rifles and a few Indone­
sian firearms, and very little ammunition, mainly because Indonesian 
troops carry only five rounds per man for fear of ambush. Most OPM 
carry traditional weapons , mainly bows and arrows. Intelligence 
sources in Papua New Guinea and Australia believe this an accurate 
description of numbers and weapons. 
While OPM members at Blackwater camp tend to represent 
Irianese evolues , those in the south, including OPM members operat­
ing a few years ago around Tanahmerah and as far west as Akimuga 
and Tembagapura, are regarded as discontented village types . Even 
so, they include a number who have worked in Merauke, Mindip­
tanah, Agats and Timika in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations. 
Most leaders , however, are 'elite' and literate . 
1 It is well to remember in this regard that Indonesia has only three battalions, 735, 736 
and 737 in Irian Jaya, that more than 400 of its total strength of2,300 are Irianese, mostly 
christian, that many of the officers are christian, and that the former panglima, 
Brigadier-General Sembiring Meliala, a Batak, was a strict christian and Baptist lay 
preacher. He has been succeeded by another Batak christian in Brigadier-General 
Hasudungan Simandjuntak. 
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As an insurgency force the OPM amounts to little away from the 
border where it relies on being able to seek sanctuary in Papua New 
Guinea when the going gets tough. It is less effective in the far west, 
although it operates in Biak , the Bird's Head, Paniai (Wissel Lakes) 
and Akimuga. 
OPM organization 
The border area is divided into five KODAPs (komando daerah 
pasukan or troop command areas) . KODAPs 1 and 3 operate around 
Kamberatoro , northern border ; KODAP 2 around Wutung - probably 
the most contentious OPM group ; KODAP 4 around Merauke and 
possibly the Freeport Indonesia copper mine. at Tembagapura ; 
KODAP 5 ,  under Thorny, around Ambotweng, a tiny village on the 
Indonesian side of the northern section of the Fly River bulge. 
Despite impressive sounding command structures , and official let­
terheads to match, KODAP numbers are small. KODAP 3, for exam­
ple , has eight or nine central highlands Wamenas who operate around 
Bewani and Skotiau . The OPM is not only small in hard-core numbers 
but is badly factionalized by leadership, clan and linguistic rivalries .  
Two rival OPM groups - including one under Prawar who deserted in 
mid February with fifty to ninety followers from Blackwater camp -
operate around Wutung, not only against Indonesians but against each 
other. On 28 February 1985 Prawar's group in fact moved south and 
attacked the small group operating under James Nyaro , self-styled 
OPM commander-in-chief. On the orders of Papua New Guinea's 
foreign secretary, Pauli us Matane, seven leaders from Blackwater, 
with their families, were moved recently to Telefomin as a means of 
defusing internecine rivalries . 
Propaganda 
Despite factionalism and small numbers , the OPM groups on the 
border nevertheless show a greater talent for organization than one 
might have predicted several years ago, if we judge by their success in 
manipulating the large-scale southern exodus of Irianese into Papua 
New Guinea. This is especially true of the group under Thorny, who 
has shown organizational capacity. 
Propaganda, written and oral, has taken several lines. First, there 
have been ceaseless allegations of Indonesian atrocities throughout 
the province of the sort I have already mentioned : allegations of capri-
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cious, motiveless killings by the Indonesian military, or future genoci­
dal operations planned by them. Secondly, there have been accounts 
of (mostly fictitious) engagements with Indonesian forces, alleging 
high Indonesian casualties ; invariably there are no OPM casualties . 
The places mentioned are usually too far away for those to whom the 
propaganda is directed to be able to check . These accounts are mostly 
written . Thirdly, verbal propaganda has been spread in the camps. 
This plugs several themes : that Indonesian doctors forcibly sterilize 
Irianese women so that 'we will have no children and the Javanese will 
take our land' ; that Javanese settlers take over Irianese villages for set­
tlement in areas scarcely able to support sweet potato and yam subsis­
tence farmers, let alone rice eaters ; that Irian Jaya has all but achieved 
independence and that therefore those who have crossed the border 
must remain there 'until the final battle is fought' ; that any border cros­
sers returning to Irian Jaya will either be killed by the Indonesians or 
beaten up by the OPM for disobeying orders . Fourthly, special events 
are covered by written communications typed on special letterhead 
paper bearing the Papua Barat (OPM) flag, the PAPEN AL (freedom 
force) emblem and the legend, MARKAS PASUKAN PEMBEBA­
SAN NASIONAL MERAUKE or National Independence Group 
Headquarters, Merauke. Communications of this sort may be in Bah­
asa or English and are signed ' Gerard us Thorny, Panglima OPM Divisi 
Merauke' . The English version of several such communications which 
I have received recently are nevertheless authorized by 'Henk Joku, 
OPM Spokesman in PNG'.  They are almost certainly printed and 
typed in Port Moresby , not in Merauke where it would be difficult for 
a clandestine printery to operate undetected. Communications are 
addressed among others to UPNG's Student Representative Council ; 
the Papua New Guinea government ; Vanuatu's Fr Lini ; Warren Dut­
ton ; Ramos Horta ; Yann Uregei, Noumea ; UNHCR, Port Moresby ; 
Bernard Narokobi ; West Sepik Students Association ; Mr Somare . 
Dilemmas 
There is increasing evidence to suppose that OPM supporters in 
Port Moresby are responsible for trying to coordinate the uncertain 
activities of the OPM on the border , including terrorism. I h1ve refer­
red above to the attack by Prawar on James Nyaro but not its bizarre 
sequel . Fighting between the two became sufficiently serious for a 
leading OPM light, Melky Salosa, who runs a small group near Kam-
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beratoro , to visit Port Moresby in an attempt to get help in resolving 
factional problems. Salosa is a violent , unstable man twenty-three 
years of age who last year was responsible for the capture of Swiss pilot 
Werner Wyder and, according to Wyder, for the murder of two plane 
passengers and three Sulawesi timber cutters in the same exercise. The 
occasion caused prime minister Mr Somare to condemn OPM ter­
rorism ; more recently Vanimo's pro-OPM bishop , John Etheridge, 
has sounded a further warning. 
Sometime in February 1985 Salosa is alleged to have walked 250 
kilometres through extremely rough country from Amanab to Wewak 
and thence travelled to Port Moresby. A more credible alternative 
story maintains he flew from Amanab to Wewak by MAF (the Mission 
Aviation Fellowship) and onwards by Air Niugini. Without doubt , 
however, he stayed in Port Moresby with well-known Irianese dissi­
dents - all but one of them permissive residents under strict obligation 
to refrain from political activity - from 27 February to 5 March when he 
returned to the border. There are various stories as to the purpose of 
his visit . The one accepted by DFAT says that he came to persuade 
Henk Joku, Bas Fairio, Martin Kambu and other OPM sympathizers 
in Port Moresby to withdraw support from James Nyaro as OPM com­
mander-in-chief. He was arrested on the border in early June and 
taken to Port Moresby. 
Separate OPM groups on the border seem to have better contact 
with Port Moresby than with each other. Contact generally is main­
tained by couriers , letters, and, increasingly , by use of STD phones 
made available by some obliging mission stations and by equally oblig­
ing Melanesian kiaps from time to time in Vanimo, Amanab, Green 
River and Bewani in the north and Tabubil , Kiunga and possibly Daru 
in the south. It is hard to believe that the Indonesian embassy in Port 
Moresby is not aware of links between OPM sympathizers on the bor­
der and in Port Moresby or of the Papua New Guinea government's 
failure or reluctance to do much about them. 
Problems and options for Papua New Guinea 
In essence Papua New Guinea's problems boil down to two : what 
to do about border crossers already in Papua New Guinea, and what to 
do about future crossers? Papua New Guinea has consistently refused 
Indonesian requests for Sarawak-type 'hot pursuit' rights ,  on two 
grounds : (a) it is politically impossible ; any Papua New Guinea gov-
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ernment agreeing to such a request might well lose office ; (b) chasing 
Chinese communist terrorists around a Borneo swamp is one thing, 
they are easily recognizable because they do not look like Malays ; 
Indonesian troops in hot pursuit over the lrian border could not distin­
guish between Indonesian Melanesians and Papua New Guinea 
Melanesians. 
'Closing the border' Port Moresby often talks of, but knows it is 
impossible on both geographical and political grounds . There are 
insufficient disciplined forces, and too many of them are pro-OPM in 
sentiment , to close all but tiny sections of the border. 
A third option is returning the camp dwellers. But how? They 
show no signs of going and there is little chance they can be forced back 
at the point of a Papua New Guinean police bayonet, no matter what 
Matane says. If they are forced back they will possibly return again in 
greater numbers , as happened in June 1985 with the Skotiau crossers. 
There are, in any case, possibly constitutionally sanctioned legal 
restraints on the Papua New Guinea government's capacity to force 
them back against their will. Moreover forced return would damage 
Papua New Guinea's international image, not least in Australia. Yet 
their return one way or another may prove crucial. 
There is every inducement at this stage to border crossers to stay 
in Papua New Guinea. In addition to UNHCR food, drugs and 
clothes , all but 1000 have land. Dutton, supported by the Catholic mis­
sion at Kiunga and other interested bodies, has proposed resettling all 
8,000 on land suitable to future rubber, sugar and oil palm planting, to 
be purchased from customary owners in an area 75 km east of the bor­
der between the Elevala and Kaim rivers. Dutton has a sincere interest 
in the welfare of the border crossers , but it is fair to point out that he 
has also invested considerable capital in the Kiunga-Tabubil area and 
in economic development in the general Ok Tedi mining area. 
Government objections to resettlement are three in the main. 
First, the camps could become permanent OPM sanctuaries and invite 
an Indonesian attempt to 'sanitise' the border by way of limited milit­
ary action. Secondly, near border settlement will invite further groups 
of crossers . Many dispute this but Department of Provincial Affairs 
estimates that a properly organized OPM campaign from Wutung to 
Weam could force another 25-30,000 Irianese across the border. 
Thirdly , resettlement costs in Western Province, in terms of roads, 
schools and crops, would prove formidable and resettlement further 
east, even if land were available , prohibitive and politically undesira-
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ble. There are few in Somare's cabinet, Fr Momis excepted, who disag­
ree on the necessity for repatriation. 
Indonesian options 
In a change from earlier attitudes , Indonesia is currently showing 
a great deal of restraint, almost verging on indifference , over the bor­
der crossers , especially those in the south. The camps cost it virtually 
nothing ; they are a charge on Papua New Guinea and the UNHCR. 
However if the camps become effective bases - inviting more crossings 
- for OPM sympathizers to mount anti-Indonesian operations in Irian 
Jaya the present mood of forebearance will change . Two worst case 
scenarios offer themselves. One , much talked of in Papua New 
Guinea, is outright Indonesian invasion of Papua New Guinea. The 
other is one, two or a series of swift punitive military attacks on the 
border camps. 
I discount utterly the possibility of invasion. Papua New Guinea is 
not a colonial vacuum like East Tim or. An Indonesian attack on Papua 
New Guinea, with a view to subjugation or virtual annexation , is an 
attack on a sovereign , independent country, a member of the UN, the 
Commonwealth, the South Pacific Forum and an associate state of 
ASEAN, as well as a country with a special relationship with 
Australia. Invasion, a Security Council matter, would not be in any of 
Indonesia's perceived regional interests . For what ultimate benefit? 
If Papua New Guinea is perceived as in any way conniving at anti­
Indonesian activities from Papua New Guinea sanctuaries , or as being 
unwilling or unable to control them, then limited cross-border raids 
are entirely possible. This would particularly be the case if the OPM 
were able to obtain any of the several thousand shotguns estimated to 
be in Papua New Guinea's possession along the border area or other 
weapons. To date there is no evidence of Papua New Guinea shotguns 
or ammunition crossing the border or being used in the camps. 
Even limited strikes , few in number, would be extremely serious 
in their effects . They would tend to destabilize government in Port 
Moresby, place great strains on the Jakarta-Canberra relationship, 
thoroughly antagonize Forum states , including a Lange type govern­
ment in New Zealand, raise questions in the UN, and not least in coun­
tries like Singapore , the most reluctant ASEAN state to accept East 
Timor's incorporation into Indonesia. 
Under the border agreement each signatory expressly undertakes 
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not to allow its territory to be used for hostile purposes against the 
other. Papua New Guinea's seeming inability, or reluctance, to do 
anything about the 90 Irianese who deserted Blackwater camp with 
Sergeant Prawar - now operating around Wutung with the avowed pur­
pose of attacking installations at Jayapura - is a case in point where 
Papua New Guinea is clearly in breach of the agreement. A series of 
such breaches may well be seen ultimately by Indonesia as a threat to 
sovereignty and invite action . To date Indonesia has been restrained 
and seems determined to remain so. 
Australia's options 
On close examination, I believe these to be few. In the event of 
invasion I would simply point out that while Australia has no ground 
force capability, eastern Indonesia is extremely vulnerable to Austra­
lian air and sea power - the most formidable in the region - should 
Australia's government decide to go down that track. But would it? 
The consequences of such an action would be extremely grave. In the 
event of Indonesian cross-border attacks on camps believed to harbour 
Indonesian rebels operating against Indonesian forces in Irian Jaya, 
Australia's choices seem few indeed. 
It would be very difficult for Australia to support , and be seen to 
support, Papua New Guinea in a deliberate or uncontrolled policy of , 
encouraging, tacitly or otherwise, subversive operations against 
Indonesia. It would be difficult even if Australians were aroused and 
Australia's Papua New Guinea constituency - an increasingly 
unknown quantity as time goes by - agitated for it. 
We should not underestimate the difficult political problems fac­
ing Papua New Guinea in the border issue. Nor should we ignore , as 
friends , the dangers inherent in apparent drift. It may be that a major­
ity of the border crossers will return in small numbers over time. How 
perfect a solution. But there are as yet no signs of it happening. Until 
it does our proper role as friend may be to urge Indonesia to more 
acceptable policies in Irian Jaya and to warn Port Moresby, however 
unpopular it makes us , that if the present border camp situation is 
allowed to continue unchecked then sooner or later PNG may find 
itself looking straight down the barrel of an Indonesian gun. 
Changes in Irian Jaya 
To a large extent the OPM is only as strong as the Irianese resent-
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ment it feeds on. A major cause of Irianese fear generally, and an 
underlying cause of the record number of crossings in 1984-85 , is more 
than likely the effects of the transmigrasi programme . 
Between 60,000 and 70,000 transmigrants , mainly Javanese, are 
in numerous settlements in the Bird's Head, the north coast and 
around Jayapura and Merauke. One settlement, Koya-Arso, is right 
on the border. 
At the end of the fourth Five Year Plan in 1989, Indonesia hopes 
to move 136,000 transmigrant families , about 544,000 people, into 
mixed settlements in Irian Jaya. On past performance, the goal of half 
a million is unrealistic. But even if half that number is settled in the 
province during the next four to five years , the impact on Melanesian 
culture and the Melanesian land tenure system will be shattering, no 
matter how much expert care is taken implementing the programme. 
Land alone poses problems enough. About 3,000 hectares are 
required for every 500 people. About 700,000 hectares have already 
been alienated from Melanesian owners without compensation. In 
1989 this will amount to between 1 .5 to 3 .2 million hectares. Given 
Irian Jaya's generally poor soils, steep slopes and swampy terrain this 
is a far larger area than the figure suggests. Moreover, Melanesian 
landowners are not paid compensation and the Indonesian view main­
tains that development of roads, schools and crops is compensation in 
itself. The failure to pay compensation, even if a reasonable case can 
be made , must nevertheless create severe tensions in a traditional 
Melanesian society. 
The main purpose of transmigration is, allegedly , to help relieve 
pressure on Java's huge population of 92 million. This is largely delus­
ory because at least 20 million would have to move to have any real 
effect. Transmigration certainly makes a difference to the individual 
peasants who move : for the first time in their lives they own their land, 
even if in the Melanesian view it is not theirs to take. 
Transmigration's positive aspects are clear. It improves Irianese 
living standards, teaches them technological farming skills and furth­
ers their national integration, creating in them the sense of being 
Indonesian, of belonging to the great and varied Indonesian family. 
But questions can be asked about the effectiveness of transmigration 
programmes. In the first place transmigration settlements are designed 
to integrate non-Irianese (mainly Javanese) and Irianese. President 
Suharto has directed that each farming settlement must contain 25 per 
cent Irianese. But where do they come from? It will take a generation 
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to make rice farmers or fruit growers out of subsistence, shifting 
agriculturalists like the Melanesians. 
Moreover , under the Five Year Plan 81 ,000 families, about 
324,000 people, will be moved during the next four to five years into 
new settlements in Jayapura and Merauke districts , both of which are 
close to the border. The political implications of so many Javanese , or 
even half the number, being settled close to Papua New Guinea are 
alarming, even allowing for the positive aspects of transmigration 
programmes .  
It must be asked whether the rapid growth of the settlements and 
their culturally distorting effect on the Irianese will not prove counter­
productive . Many Indonesians working in Irian Jaya, including the 
commanding general , Sembiring Meliala, think so and have called for 
a rethink of the programme. 2 
The increasing number of settlements , with their implied threat to 
land and culture , leads to increased sympathy for the OPM, to acts of 
civil disobedience , and to the growth of Irianese nationalism - such as 
the murdered Arnold Ap represented - rather than to a sense of being 
both Indonesian and Melanesian , which is the most desirable end from 
all points of view, and not least Papua New Guinea's and Australia's. 
If border pressures and increasing numbers of border crossers 
cause Papua New Guinea to become politically destabilized, it would 
have political and defence implications for Australia. It would, in fact, 
affect the whole region . It would concern New Zealand, whose new 
Labour government will take a far more radical view of neighbour­
hood events than Sir Robert Muldoon's. New Zealand has considera­
ble influence in Papua New Guinea and in the South Pacific Forum and 
its views will carry considerable weight with the small Forum countries 
which, although mini-states, have votes in world and regional organi­
zations and already view Indonesia's Irian J aya policies unfavourably. 
Potential anti-Indonesian feelings are not restricted to the inde­
pendent island countries . New Caledonia's Kanaks , bargaining for 
their independence with the French, might follow the lead of Van­
uatu's Melanesian leaders and come to see Irian Jaya in terms of a col­
onial struggle . 
2 'The Irianese are still unable to accept the transmigration program whole because most 
do not understand the purpose, objective and benefit oftransmigration. They watch and 
think on the basis only of what they believe , that their land is being taken from them and 
their forests cleared by strangers who look different from them in many ways. 
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One should not underestimate the capacity of Indonesians to 
rethink policies and, when they have to , change them. I believe 
Jakarta is rethinking its Irian Jaya strategies and programmes. But , as 
an old Indonesian friend put it, this will take time like an ocean liner 
takes time to change course .  But by reason of its contiguity, size and 
resources, Indonesia knows it has a constructive role to play in the 
southwest Pacific, not least in relation to its Melanesian neighbours . 
The course that relationship takes depends to a large degree on 
how it handles its relations with Papua New Guinea. This in turn 
depends to a large degree on the course of events in Irian Jaya. Jakarta 
is nevertheless well aware that Irian J aya is not East Tim or. The 
Timorese people must eventually accept their future as part of the 
Republic ; they have nowhere else to go. The Irianese can 'vote with 
their feet' by crossing the border into Papua New Guinea and, as the 
five in Thursday Island have shown , by entering Australia as well . 
'Despite the world of enlightened field workers the lrianese 
are not convinced of the need for transmigrasi. That's why 
they so often ask for a share of transmigrants' harvests, 
believing that the land still belongs to them. Unrest 
develops as a result of their unreadiness to accept this real­
ity . . .  they feel strangers in their own land . . .  they are the 
ones who need help first . . .  it is not necessary to mix the 
Irianese with the newcomers (to provide development) but 
to bring development to their villages first. Assimilation 
will occur when the Irianese have acquired a sufficiently 
high level of consciousness' (Melaila 1983) .  
General Sembiring received no firm answer to his submission but the 
debate on the best way to handle the Irian Jaya problem, including 
transmigration, continues in Jakarta. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
While this volume was going to press , further developments along the 
border ensured that the subject continued to command attention, 
domestically and internationally. 
In September, on the eve of Papua New Guinea's tenth anniver­
sary of independence , there was suggestion of a major policy shift 
when prime minister Somare said that resettlement within Papua New 
Guinea would be 'sympathetically considered' for all those border 
crossers unwilling to return home (Canberra Times 16 September 
1985). This generosity appears to have dissipated on more mature 
reflection , however ; indeed shortly after this statement was made, the 
government forcibly repatriated twelve border crossers by plane to 
Jayapura, despite an attempt by Bernard Narokobi to block the depor­
tation by legal action . Although the government described the depor­
tees as 'criminals' (they had been previously arrested on charges 
involving firearms and smuggling and had later absconded from Black­
water camp, reportedly to join the OPM) , it seems certain that they 
were OPM supporters and as such, in terms of Papua New Guinea's 
stated policy on 'genuine refugees' , not candidates for repatriation. 
News of the deportation spread quickly through Blackwater camp, 
precipitating a protest by camp inmates who marched on Vanimo 
damaging the local DF AT office and overturning government vehicles 
before being restrained. The government's action was widely 
criticized ,  among others by Bishop Etheridge who had earlier warned 
of growing tension in the border camps and who described the deporta­
tion as 'disgusting and quite against all humanitarian values' (Sydney 
Morning Herald 14 October 1985) .  Over a hundred camp inmates were 
arrested following this incident but acting prime minister Momis sub­
sequently announced that there would be no further forced repatria­
tion. 
Subsequent reports (for example , Canberra Times 24 October 1985) 
said that the twelve were being 'intensively' interrogated by police in 
Irian Jaya, who had linked their activities to the OPM. Within days of 
this incident Momis also announced a 'new' policy with regard to bor­
der crossers. While emphasizing that Papua New Guinea would not 
tolerate the use of its territory as a base for guerilla or terrorist 
activities , Momis said that the government would not ignore those who 
crossed its borders to escape persecution as a result of political opin­
ions ; after a screening of camp inmates those granted refugee status 
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according to this criterion could be granted residency ; UNHCR assis­
tance would be sought in resettlement . Third country resettlement 
would be sought for some, but Momis challenged Papua New Gui­
neans to help refugee families settle in villages and communities in 
Papua New Guinea. He also referred, somewhat cryptically, to a prop­
osed 'private repatriation scheme' for camp inmates found not to be 
'genuine refugees' (see Sydney Morning Herald 26 October 1985) .  
It is  not obvious how far the approach outlined by the acting 
prime minister, and adopted by cabinet in Somare's absence , departed 
from the previous government policy . Within days, however, one new 
direction was indicated when the acting foreign minister, Tony Bais, 
strongly criticized Indonesia, Australia , Holland , the United States 
and the United Nations for not doing enough to solve a problem 
largely of their making : 'We are not satisfied with . . .  words of sym­
pathy . . .  or token financial contributions' , Bais said, 'We will be seek­
ing real and financial commitment in permanently resettling the 
refugees that PNG is unable to resettle' (Post-Courier 28 October 
1985) . In early November the subject of refugee resettlement was dis­
cussed during a visit to Papua New Guinea by the Australian foreign 
minister, Bill Hayden. Hayden's response was unsympathetic. Calling 
on the Papua New Guinea government to take 'resolute action' to 
separate political activists [from] the vast majority of people who 
would like to go back' ,  he said , :  . .  there is absolutely no evidence of any 
substantial policy in place to have those people returned to their 
homes'( Times of PNG 9 November 1985 . The statement that no sub­
stantial policy was in place appears to have found support in a com­
ment by Momis, who told journalists that there had not been any 
screening of border camps - see Sydney Morning Herald 8 November 
1985) . Hayden suggested that Papua New Guinea had 'plenty of room' 
in which to resettle the refugees and that until this was done there was 
little hope of internationalizing the refugee issue. Somare was 
reported to have told Hayden that Papua New Guinea was capable of 
handling the refugee situation, but Momis pointed out that the prime 
minister was bound by the policy accepted by cabinet in October and 
proposed that Australia accept some refugees as a gesture of goodwill' .  
Momis was supported by foreign minister Giheno, who described his 
Australian counterpart's statem.ent as patronizing and suggested that it 
cast doubts on the humanitarian basis for Australian refugee policy' ; 
Giheno pointed out that Papua New Guinea did have a policy on 
refugees and foreshadowed a formal request that Australia, amongst 
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others, accept some refugees (Sydney Morning Herald 7,8, 14 
November 1985 ; Times of PNG 9 November 1985 ; Post-Courier 12 
November 1985) .  
Before this apparent difference was resolved (and, indeed, 
perhaps partly because of it) , in a vote of no confidence in November 
the Somare government was defeated. A five-party coalition, headed 
by former deputy prime minister Paias Wingti (who , with a number of 
colleagues , had split from Pangu in March 1985 to form the People's 
Democratic Movement) came to office . A former D FAT officer, Legu 
Yagi, took up the Foreign Affairs portfolio. 
The border situation quickly reemerged as an issue of major con­
cern to the new government though not, it seemed, of general consen­
sus. During a protracted debate in cabinet at least three ministers -
Yagi , Dutton and Ramoi - appear to have supported proposals to offer 
resettlement to people in the border camps , and Yagi initiated a telex 
to provincial premiers seeking commitments on temporary resettle­
ment of the border crossers ( Post-Courier, 16, 17, 18 December 1985 , 
21 January 1986). But despite Wingti's promise of greater compassion' 
( Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1985) ,  the policy package 
which emerged in January 1986 did not differ greatly from that of the 
Somare government. The new government announced that it would 
accede to the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and would welcome UNHCR involvement in the administra­
tion of border camps and in the screening of border crossers to deter­
mine their status. Those granted refugee status would be allowed to 
remain as permissive residents until arrangements could be made for 
them to be permanently resettled in third countries ; others would be 
required to return to Irian Jaya. The number of border camps would be 
reduced in number and relocated away from the border (Post·Courier, 
22 January 1986). Although the prime minister repeated the assurance 
that no border crossers would be repatriated against their will , both 
Wingti and Yagi expressed the view that only a few hundred of the 
10,000 or so border crossers were genuine refugees' and that most 
would be repatriated ( Sydney Morning Herald 30 January 1986, Post­
Courier 6 February 1986). 
Within days of the policy announcement the new foreign minister 
left on his first official visit, which included Australia and Indonesia. 
After visiting Canberra (where he firmly declined an Australian 
request that Papua New Guinea accept eight Irianese refugees who 
had sought asylum in Australia) Yagi had talks with Indonesia's 
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foreign minister, Mochtar. A subsequent communique reiterated the 
two countries' commitment to closer border ties, harmonious rela­
tions, and respect for each other's sovereignty. It also recorded that 
Indonesia respected' Papua New Guinea's decision to give a greater 
role to the UNHCR and foreshadowed a treaty of friendship and coop­
eration' between the two countries, an extradition treaty, the exchang­
ing of military attaches (there having been no military attache in either 
country since the departure from Port Moresby of Colonel Ismail in 
1984 - see p .  117 ,  122) , and a study of the feasibility of expanded trade 
and transportation links . And in March 1986, coincident with the 
departure of PNGDF commander-in-chief, Brigadier-General Tony 
Huai, for a visit to Jakarta, Prime Minister Wingti raised the possibility 
of closer military ties between the two countries (Sydney Morning 
Herald 14 March 1986) . 
Meanwhile , shortly after the Wingti government had assumed 
office and with its border policy still under debate, two groups of OPM 
leaders crossed over into Papua New Guinea to seek asylum. In the 
south the OPM's regional commander, Gerardus Thommy, and two of 
his companions (Aries Wader and David Teimka) surrendered with 
eight other Irianese to government officials at the Kuiu refugee camp 
south of Kiunga. Five days later OPM president James Nyaro and his 
defence minister , Alex Donald Derey, surrendered to officials in San­
daun Province. When this volume went to press the five OPM leaders 
were being held in Port Moresby while the UNHCR sought third coun­
tries to take them. Meanwhile , in early February 1986 another forty­
four 0 PM guerillas were reported to have crossed over to seek asylum. 
Lack of food, medical supplies and ammunition , combined with the 
strain of a long guerilla campaign with little to show for it, contributed 
to the surrender of the OPM leaders . Nyaro's withdrawal, however, 
appears to have been primarily the result of opposition to his leader­
ship within the OPM, and in the opinion of Bishop Etheridge may sig­
nify the beginning of a new , more radical phase of the movement 
(Pacific Islands Monthly March 1986 : 12-14 ; see ibid. February 1986 ; 
Post-Courier 13 December 1985 ; Times of PNG 8 February 1986) . 
With the elaboration of a new policy on refugees and the conclu­
sion of a successful diplomatic visit, and with further depletions in the 
ranks of the OPM leadership , there is a temptation to predict a long­
term improvement in the border situation and in relations between 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The recent (March 1986) voluntary 
repatriation of 213 Irianese from camps in Sandaun Province would 
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seem to support this prediction . But considering all things, it seems far 
more likely that - just as in 1979 and 1983 a similar concurrence of 
events prompted commentators , including myself, to make such pre­
dictions, erroneously as it turned out - the events of early 1986 simply 
mark another phase in the recurring cycle of tension and self-conscious 
cordiality which has characterized relations between the two countries 
for over a decade. Given the continued existence of over 10 ,000 border 
crossers and an apparent upsurge in subnationalist sentiment in lrian 
J aya, this cyclical pattern of relations seems likely to continue into the 
foreseeable future as the government in Jakarta attempts to integrate 
lrian Jaya into the larger Indonesian society. 
R.J.M. 
237 
BETWEEN TWO NATIONS 
APPENDIX 
BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT 
OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON BORDER 
ARRANGEMENT� 
NOTING the provisions of the Agreement dated the 17th day of 
December one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine and in par­
ticular Article 19 which called for a review of the Agreement upon the 
expiration of five years from the date of ratification ; 
DETERMINED to further foster co-operation, goodwill and under­
standing between the two countries ; 
DETERMINED to further co-operate in the administration and 
development of the Border Area for the mutual benefit of their 
peoples giving due consideration to the traditional rights and customs 
of the people in the Border Area as already done by both Govern­
ments (in the past) ; 
RECOGNISING the need to replace the said Agreement dated the 
17th day of December one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine 
with a new Agreement ; 
As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co-operation ; 
HA VE AGREED as follows : 
ARTICLE 1 
THE BORDER AREA 
1 .  The Border Area shall consist of the Census Divisions within Papua 
New Guinea and the Kecamatan-Kecamatan Perbatasan within the 
Republic of Indonesia in respect of which the Border forms part of 
their boundaries.  
2 .  The Border Area may be varied from time to time by an Exchange 
of Letters and maps after mutual consultations. 
3. For the purposes of implementation of paragraph 1 of this Article , 
the two Governments shall consult and each make the necessary 
arrangements for the survey and demarcation of the Boundary and 
mapping of that part of the Border Area on their respective sides of the 
Border, by a mutually agreed method. 
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ARTICLE 2 
JOINT BORDER COMMITTEE AND CONSULTATION 
1 .  There shall be established a Joint Border Committee consisting of 
senior officials of both Governments. 
2. The Committee shall formulate guidelines and procedures for the 
effective implementation of this Agreement. 
3 .  Members of the Committee shall, as appropriate, advise and make 
recommendations to their respective Governments on all matters, pro­
cedures and arrangments relating to the implementation of this Agree­
ment and to the development and review of border cooperation. The 
Committee shall meet at least once a year, and additionally as and 
when necessary, upon request by either Government .  The venue for 
such meetings shall be by rotation in each country. 
4. The two Governments may,  if required , consult each other concern­
ing the implementation and operation of this Article. 
ARTICLE 3 
LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS 
1 .  To assist the Joint Border Committee there shall be established 
liaison meetings to discuss matters of mutual concern relating to the 
administration of the Border. Arrangements shall be made for regulat­
ing functions and working procedures for such meetings . 
2 .  The liaison shall comprise officials from Port Moresby , Western and 
West Sepik Provinces and officials from the Province of Irian Jaya. 
3. The main purpose of the liaison meetings shall be as follows : 
(i) to exchange information on all developments in the Border Area 
which are of mutual interest to both Governments ; 
(ii) to devise , amend or establish arrangements to facilitate the practi­
cal operations, particularly at local and district levels , of the provisions 
of this Agreement ; and 
(iii) to ensure that both Governments, through the Joint Border Com­
mittee, are kept informed of developments of significance relating to 
the Border Area and that their attention is drawn to any matters which 
may require consultation in accordance with this Agreement. 
4. The liaison meetings shall take place as and when required but not 
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later than three months intervals . 
ARTICLE 4 
BORDER CROSSINGS FOR TRADITIONAL AND CUSTOM­
ARY PURPOSES 
1 .  Each country shall continue to recognize and permit movement 
across the Border by the traditional inhabitants of the other country 
who reside in the Boirder Area and are citizens of the country con­
cerned for traditional activities within the Border Area such as social 
contacts and ceremonies including marriage, gardening, hunting, col­
lecting and other land usage, fishing and other usage of waters , and 
customary border trade. 
2. Such movement shall be the subject of special arrangements bet­
ween the two Governments and normal immigration, customs, 
quarantine and health requirements shall not apply. 
3 .  The Special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle that 
such movement across the Border shall only be temporary in character 
and not for the purpose of resettlement . 
ARTICLE S 
EXERCISE OF TRADITIONAL RIGHTS TO LAND AND WAT­
ERS IN THE BORDER AREA 
1 .  Where the traditional inhabitants of one country who reside in the 
Border Area and are citizens of the country concerned but enjoy trad­
itional rights of access to and usage of areas of land or waters in the 
Border Area of the other country , that country shall permit the con­
tinued exercise of those rights subject to its existing laws and regula­
tions on the same conditions as those applying to its own citizens. 
2. The traditional rights to use land and waters referred to in paragraph 
1 shall not constitute proprietary rights over the same. 
3 .  The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall be exercised by the per­
sons concerned without settling permanently on that side of the Border 
unless such persons obtain permission to enter the other country for 
residence in accordance with the immigration and other laws and or 
procedures of that country. 
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ARTICLE 6 
BORDER CROSSINGS BY NON-TRADITIONAL INHABIT­
ANTS 
1 .  Crossing of the Border by persons not falling under the provisions of 
Article 4 of this Agreement is to take place through designated points 
of entry and in accordance with the relevant existing laws and regula­
tions relating to entry . Designated points of entry shall be as agreed 
from time to time by an Exchange of Letters after consultations. 
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration laws 
and policies existing on each side of the Border in order to maintan 
more effective control of the Border Area. 
3. Persons who cross the Border other than in accordance with Article 
4 of this Agreement or the relevant laws and regulations relating to 
entry shall be treated as illegal immigrants. The preceding sentence 
does not apply to crossings for purposes as agreed upon by both Gov­
ernments. 
4 .  In administering its laws and policies relating to entry of persons into 
its territory across the Border each Government shall act in a spirit of 
friendship good neighbourliness, bearing in mind relevant principles 
of international law and established international practices and the 
importance of discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose 
of evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision of this Agreement. Each Government shall also 
take into account , where appropriate, the desirability of exchanging 
information and holding consultations with the other . 
ARTICLE 7 
SECURITY 
1 .  In the spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and in order to 
maintain and strengthen the existing good neighbourly and friendly 
relations, the two Governments shall continue to actively co-operate 
with one another in order to prevent the use of their respective ter­
ritories in or in the vicinity of the Border Area as sanctuary, staging 
areas , bases or routes for any kind of hostile or illegal activities against 
the other. To this end, each Government shall maintain its own proce­
dures of notification and control . 
2 .  The two Governments shall keep each other informed and where 
appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of the Bor-
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der Area, which are relevant to their security. 
ARTICLE S 
BORDER CO-OPERATION 
In the event of natural disaster or major accidents in the Border Area, 
the two Governments shall establish close contacts with one another 
and shall render all possible assistance, particularly in search and 
rescue operations . 
ARTICLE 9 
CUSTOMARY BORDER TRADE 
1 .  The two Governments shall make arrangements to facilitate the 
continuation of customary cross-border trade by the inhabitants of the 
Border Area. 
2 .  In making such arrangements the two Governments shall be mindful 
of the following limitations : 
(a) that such arrangements shall only apply to Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesian citizens who traditionally live in the Border Area ; 
(b) that the cross-border trade be of a traditional nature and conducted 
in order to satisfy the needs of the people in the Border Area ; and 
(c) that the goods traded are not prohibited by either Government. 
ARTICLE 10 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
The two Governments shall consider , in accordance with the normal 
procedures and practices : 
(a) The continuation of the operation of the existing direct trans-bor­
der telecommunication links for border-liaison purposes ; 
(b) Aeronautical communication between the Air Traffic Service 
Units of the two countries relating to international flights ; 
(c) Radio frequency co-ordination crossing trans-border areas ; and 
( d) Matters relating to the improvement of communication systems 
and direct trans-border transport. 
ARTICLE 1 1  
CITIZENSHIP 
The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of relevant 
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information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and citizen­
ship and the two Governments shall, if either so requests, consult each 
other on any problem being encountered in relation thereto. 
ARTICLE 12 
QUARANTINE 
1 .  The co-operation already existing in the field of health and quaran­
tine , including mutual visits of officials and exchange of information 
and periodical reports, shall be continued and developed. 
2 .  In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in the Border 
Area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement across the Bor­
der may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 4 of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 13 
NAVIGATION AND THE PROVISION OF NAVIGATIONAL 
FACILITIES 
1 .  Nationals of either country or vessels registered in either country 
may navigate freely throughout the boundary waters of the Fly River 
Bulge and the two Governments shall make arrangements for the pro­
vison of navigatinal facilities in the said waters . 
2. Where , for the purpose of a national development project, either 
Government requires a right of transit navigation between two points 
in its territory, through a river in the territory of the other country, 
then the two Governments recognise that such a right may be exercised 
in accordance with terms and conditions to be determined by them, 
according to the individual requirements of that project. 
ARTICLE 14 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MAJOR CONSTRUC­
TION 
The two Governments shall keep each other informed of any proposed 
major construction such as roads, dams, bridges and aerodromes 
within a 5 kilometer zone on either side of the Border, provded such 
construction could affect the movement of the people from one side to 
the Border to the other. 
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ARTICLE 15 
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
1. The two Governments, recognising the need which either Govern­
ment may have to develop, for the benefit of its people generally, any 
naturally occurring resources in an area adjacent to or in close proxim­
ity to the �order , agree to keep each other informed,  either by consul­
tation or through their respective representatives on the Joint Border 
Committee , as to particulars of such developments or proposed 
developments. 
2. The two Governments further recognise the need which may arise 
from time to time for them to co-operate in order to formalise mutually 
satisfactory arrangements which will assist in facilitating the establish­
ment and continued operation of such developments in either country, 
in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement . 
3 .  Having regard to the provisions of this Article , the two Govern­
ments recognise in particular the Ok Tedi Mining Project as being such 
a major development and agree to consult as appropriate , at the 
request of either Government, on any matter of concern relating to 
that development. 
4. If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or 
if any other mineral deposit on land or subsoil thereof, extends across 
the Border, and the parts of such accumulation or deposit that is siut­
ated on one side of the Border, is recoverable wholly or in part from 
the other side of the Border, the two Governments will seek to reach 
agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or deposit shall 
be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the 
benefits derived from such exploitation. 
ARTICLE 16 
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
When mining, industrial , forestry, agricultural or other projects are 
carried out in areas adjacent to, or in close proximity to the Border, 
The Government responsible for such development shall ensure that 
all necessary precautionary measures are taken to prevent or control 
pollution of the environment across the Border. 
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ARTICLE 17 
UTILISATION AND CONSERVATION OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
The two Governments shall, as appropriate and at the request of either 
Government, consult each other on matters regarding the utilisation 
and conservation of such natural resources as fresh water and forest 
resources (including wildlife) in areas adjacent to , or in close proximity 
to the Border, with a view to preventing the adverse effects which 
might arise from the exploitation of such resources. 
ARTICLE 18 
FAUNA AND FLORA 
Each Government shall use its best endeavour, and shall enhance 
mutual co-operation to protect species of indigenous fauna and flora 
that are or may become threatened with extinction, in and in the vicin­
ity of the Border Area. 
ARTICLE 19 
COMPENSATION 
1 .  Each Government shall pay due compensation for damages caused 
intentionally or otherwise to the other Government for acts and 
related activities within its responsibility in the Border Area. 
2 .  Damages in the Border Area caused by acts of each other's citizens, 
except by elements hostile to each other's country may be compen­
sated in accordance with traditional and customary practices, under 
the supervision of both Governments, without limiting the right of 
each Government to consult directly. 
ARTICLE 20 
PROMOTION OF THE AGREEMENT 
The two Governments shall promote amongst their people, particu­
larly those in the Border Area, an understanding of the Agreement in 
order to develop a stable and harmonious border regime , reflecting the 
good-neighbourly relations between the two countries. 
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ARTICLE 21 
1 .  The two Governments shall, if so required, consult each other on the 
implementation, operation and scope of this Agreement. 
2. This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of a five year 
period, or ear1ier with the approval of both Government beginning 
from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 
3. The members of the Joint Border Committee may make recommen­
dations to their respective Governments on any matters concerning 
border arrangements not specifically regulated by this Agreement. 
4 .  Upon receiving of information that an influx of border crossings or 
other border crossings have taken place other than border crossings 
under Articles 4,  5 and 7 ,  the two Governments shall consult 
immediately at liaison level . The two Governments shall agree to meet 
at higher levels if the need arises . 
ARTICLE 22 
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION 
1 .  This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the con­
stitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into force on 
the day on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged. 
2 .  On the day this Agreement enters into force , it replaces the Basic 
Agreement between the Government of Papua New Guinea and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Border Arrangements 
dated the 17th day of December one thousand nine hundred and 
seventy-nine . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by 
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. 
DONE IN DUPLICATE at Port Moresby this twenty-ninth day of 
October one thousand nine hundred and eighty-four, in English. 
FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT OF 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
[signed] 
Rabbie Namaliu 
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FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
[signed] 
Mochtar KS 
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